Virological and epidemiological patterns of swine influenza A virus infections in France: Cumulative data from the RESAVIP surveillance network, 2011-2018.

Swine influenza A viruses (swIAVs) cause acute respiratory syndromes in pigs and may also infect humans. Following the 2009 pandemic, a network was established in France to reinforce swIAV monitoring. This study reports virological and epidemiological data accumulated through passive surveillance conducted during 1,825 herd visits from 2011 to 2018. Among them, 887 (48.6 %) tested swIAV-positive. The proportion of positive cases remained stable year-on-year and year-round. The European avian-like swine H1N1 (H1avN1) virus was the most frequently identified (69.6 %), and was widespread across the country. The European human-like reassortant swine H1N2 (H1huN2) virus accounted for 22.1 % and was only identified in the north-western quarter and recently in the far north. The 2009 pandemic H1N1 (H1N1pdm) virus (3.6 %) was detected throughout the country, without settling in areas of higher pig densities. Its proportion increased in winter, during the seasonal epidemics in humans. The European human-like reassortant swine H3N2 as well as H1avN2 viruses were identified sporadically. In up to 30 % of swIAV-positive cases, pigs exhibited clinical signs of high intensity, regardless of the viral subtype and vaccination program. The recurrent pattern of the disease, i.e., an endemic infection at the herd level, was reported in 41% of cases and mainly affected post-weaning piglets (OR = 5.11 [3.36-7.76]). Interestingly, the study also revealed a significant association between the recurrent pattern and sow vaccination (OR = 1.96 [1.37-2.80]). Although restricted to the studied pig population, these results bring new knowledge about swIAV dynamics and infection patterns in pig herds in France.

Virus persistence in pig herds led to successive reassortment events between swine and human influenza A viruses, resulting in the emergence of a novel triple-reassortant swine influenza virus.

This report describes the detection of a triple reassortant swine influenza A virus of H1avN2 subtype. It evolved from an avian-like swine H1avN1 that first acquired the N2 segment from a seasonal H3N2, then the M segment from a 2009 pandemic H1N1, in two reassortments estimated to have occurred 10 years apart. This study illustrates how recurrent influenza infections increase the co-infection risk and facilitate evolutionary jumps by successive gene exchanges. It recalls the importance of appropriate biosecurity measures inside holdings to limit virus persistence and interspecies transmissions, which both contribute to the emergence of new potentially zoonotic viruses.

Bidirectional Human-Swine Transmission of Seasonal Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 Virus in Pig Herd, France, 2018.

In 2018, a veterinarian became sick shortly after swabbing sows exhibiting respiratory syndrome on a farm in France. Epidemiologic data and genetic analyses revealed consecutive human-to-swine and swine-to-human influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus transmission, which occurred despite some biosecurity measures. Providing pig industry workers the annual influenza vaccine might reduce transmission risk.

Designing a Syndromic Bovine Mortality Surveillance System: Lessons Learned From the 1-Year Test of the French OMAR Alert Tool.

Between May 2018 and 2019, a syndromic bovine mortality surveillance system (OMAR) was tested in 10 volunteer French départements (French intermediate-level administrative unit) to assess its performance in real conditions, as well as the human and financial resources needed to ensure normal functioning. The system is based on the automated weekly analysis of the number of cattle deaths reported by renderers in the Fallen Stock Data Interchange Database established in January 2011. In our system, every Thursday, the number of deaths is grouped by ISO week and small surveillance areas and then analyzed using traditional time-series analysis steps (cleaning, prediction, signal detection). For each of the five detection algorithms implemented (i.e., the exponentially weighted moving average chart, cumulative sum chart, Shewhart chart, Holt-Winters, and historical limits algorithms), seven detection limits are applied, giving a signal score from 1 (low excess mortality) to 7 (high excess mortality). The severity of excess mortality (alarm) is then classified into four categories, from very low to very high, by combining the signal scores, the relative excess mortality, and the persistence of the signal(s) over the previous 4 weeks. Detailed and interactive weekly reports and a short online questionnaire help pilot départements and the OMAR central coordination cell assess the performance of the system. During the 1-year test, the system showed highly variable sensitivity among départements. This variability was partly due not only to the demographic distribution of cattle (very few signals in low-density areas) but also to the renderer's delay in reporting to the Fallen Stock Data Interchange Database (on average, only 40% of the number of real deaths had been transmitted within week, with huge variations among départements). As a result, in the pilot départements, very few alarms required on-farm investigation and excess mortality often involved a small number of farms already known to have health or welfare problems. Despite its perfectibility, the system nevertheless proved useful in the daily work of animal health professionals for collective and individual surveillance. The test is still ongoing for a second year in nine départements to evaluate the effectiveness of the improvements agreed upon at the final meeting.