Decentralization can help reduce deforestation when user groups engage with local government.

Policy makers around the world tout decentralization as an effective tool in the governance of natural resources. Despite the popularity of these reforms, there is limited scientific evidence on the environmental effects of decentralization, especially in tropical biomes. This study presents evidence on the institutional conditions under which decentralization is likely to be successful in sustaining forests. We draw on common-pool resource theory to argue that the environmental impact of decentralization hinges on the ability of reforms to engage local forest users in the governance of forests. Using matching techniques, we analyze longitudinal field observations on both social and biophysical characteristics in a large number of local government territories in Bolivia (a country with a decentralized forestry policy) and Peru (a country with a much more centralized forestry policy). We find that territories with a decentralized forest governance structure have more stable forest cover, but only when local forest user groups actively engage with the local government officials. We provide evidence in support of a possible causal process behind these results: When user groups engage with the decentralized units, it creates a more enabling environment for effective local governance of forests, including more local government-led forest governance activities, fora for the resolution of forest-related conflicts, intermunicipal cooperation in the forestry sector, and stronger technical capabilities of the local government staff.

Effect of holding office on the behavior of politicians.

Reciprocity is central to our understanding of politics. Most political exchanges-whether they involve legislative vote trading, interbranch bargaining, constituent service, or even the corrupt exchange of public resources for private wealth-require reciprocity. But how does reciprocity arise? Do government officials learn reciprocity while holding office, or do recruitment and selection practices favor those who already adhere to a norm of reciprocity? We recruit Zambian politicians who narrowly won or lost a previous election to play behavioral games that provide a measure of reciprocity. This combination of regression discontinuity and experimental designs allows us to estimate the effect of holding office on behavior. We find that holding office increases adherence to the norm of reciprocity. This study identifies causal effects of holding office on politicians' behavior.

The complex links between governance and biodiversity.

We argue that two problems weaken the claims of those who link corruption and the exploitation of natural resources. The first is conceptual and the second is methodological. Studies that use national-level indicators of corruption fail to note that corruption comes in many forms, at multiple levels, that may affect resource use quite differently: negatively, positively, or not at all. Without a clear causal model of the mechanism by which corruption affects resources, one should treat with caution any estimated relationship between corruption and the state of natural resources. Simple, atheoretical models linking corruption measures and natural resource use typically do not account for other important control variables pivotal to the relationship between humans and natural resources. By way of illustration of these two general concerns, we used statistical methods to demonstrate that the findings of a recent, well-known study that posits a link between corruption and decreases in forests and elephants are not robust to simple conceptual and methodological refinements. In particular, once we controlled for a few plausible anthropogenic and biophysical conditioning factors, estimated the effects in changes rather than levels so as not to confound cross-sectional and longitudinal variation, and incorporated additional observations from the same data sources, corruption levels no longer had any explanatory power.