The contribution of semantic distance knowledge to size constancy in perception and grasping when visual cues are limited.

To achieve a stable perception of object size in spite of variations in viewing distance, our visual system needs to combine retinal image information and distance cues. Previous research has shown that, not only retinal cues, but also extraretinal sensory signals can provide reliable information about depth and that different neural networks (perception versus action) can exhibit preferences in the use of these different sources of information during size-distance computations. Semantic knowledge of distance, a purely cognitive signal, can also provide distance information. Do the perception and action systems show differences in their ability to use this information in calculating object size and distance? To address this question, we presented 'glow-in-the-dark' objects of different physical sizes at different real distances in a completely dark room. Participants viewed the objects monocularly through a 1-mm pinhole. They either estimated the size and distance of the objects or attempted to grasp them. Semantic knowledge was manipulated by providing an auditory cue about the actual distance of the object: "20 cm", "30 cm", and "40 cm". We found that semantic knowledge of distance contributed to some extent to size constancy operations during perceptual estimation and grasping, but size constancy was never fully restored. Importantly, the contribution of knowledge about distance to size constancy was equivalent between perception and action. Overall, our study reveals similarities and differences between the perception and action systems in the use of semantic distance knowledge and suggests that this cognitive signal is useful but not a reliable depth cue for size constancy under restricted viewing conditions.

Revisiting the effect of visual illusions on grasping in left and right handers.

Visual illusions have provided compelling evidence for a dissociation between perception and action. For example, when two different-sized objects are placed on opposite ends of the Ponzo illusion, people erroneously perceive the physically smaller object to be bigger than the physically larger one, but when they pick up the objects, their grip aperture reflects the real difference in size between the objects. This and similar findings have been demonstrated almost entirely for the right hand in right handers. The scarce research that has examined right and left-handed subjects in this context, has typically used only small samples. Here, we extended this research with a larger sample size (more than 50 in each group) in a version of the Ponzo illusion that allowed us to disentangle the effects of real and illusory size on action and perception in much more powerful way. We also collected a wide range of kinematic measures to assess possible differences in visuomotor control in left and right handers. The results showed that the dissociation between perception and action persisted for both hands in right handers, but only for the right hand in left handers. The left hand of left handers was sensitive to the illusion. Left handers also showed more variable and slower movements, as well as larger safety margins in both hands. These findings suggest that grasping in left handers may require more cognitive supervision, which could lead to greater sensitivity to visual context , particularly with their dominant left hand.

Neural correlates of visual acuity for fine text.

Human sensitivity to visual input often scales with the magnitude of evoked responses in the brain. Here, we demonstrate an exception. We record electroencephalography (EEG) while people attempt to resolve fine print - similar to people attempting to read eye charts (the world's most popular means of testing vision). We find that the ability to resolve fine print is associated with smaller evoked responses recorded by large clusters of occipital-parietal sensors ∼150 ms after people see words. Moreover, we find that a better ability to resolve fine print is associated with enhanced alpha-band oscillatory brain activity immediately prior to word presentations. These investigations were inspired by psychophysical data, which suggested the ability to resolve fine print can be enhanced by pre-adaptation to flicker, which should encourage a reduced neural response to inputs. We included this manipulation in this study, and our results are broadly consistent with this conjecture. As alpha-band activity has been linked to inhibitory interactions in visual cortex, we regard our data as evidence that smaller neural responses to fine print can be promoted by inhibitory processes that target unhelpful blur-related signals, which thereby sharpen subsequent visual experiences.

Looking at the Ebbinghaus illusion: differences in neurocomputational requirements, not gaze-mediated attention, explain a classic perception-action dissociation.

Perceiving and grasping an object present an animal with different sets of computational problems. The solution in primates entails the specialization of separate neural networks for visual processing with different object representations. This explains why the Ebbinghaus illusion minimally affects the grasping hand's in-flight aperture, which normally scales with target size, even though the size of the target disc remains misperceived. An attractive alternative account, however, posits that grasps are refractory to the illusion because participants fixate on the target and fail to attend to the surrounding context. To test this account, we tracked both limb and gaze while participants made forced-choice judgments of relative disc size in the Ebbinghaus illusion or did so in combination with grasping or manually estimating the size of one of the discs. We replicated the classic dissociation: grasp aperture was refractory to the measured illusory effect on perceived size, while judgments and manual estimates of disc size were not. Importantly, the number of display-wide saccades per second and the percentage of total fixation time or fixations directed at the selected disc failed to explain the dissociation. Our findings support the contention that object perception and goal-directed action rely on distinct visual representations. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'New approaches to 3D vision'.

Biases in human perception of facial age are present and more exaggerated in current AI technology.

Our estimates of a person's age from their facial appearance suffer from several well-known biases and inaccuracies. Typically, for example, we tend to overestimate the age of smiling faces compared to those with a neutral expression, and the accuracy of our estimates decreases for older faces. The growing interest in age estimation using artificial intelligence (AI) technology raises the question of how AI compares to human performance and whether it suffers from the same biases. Here, we compared human performance with the performance of a large sample of the most prominent AI technology available today. The results showed that AI is even less accurate and more biased than human observers when judging a person's age-even though the overall pattern of errors and biases is similar. Thus, AI overestimated the age of smiling faces even more than human observers did. In addition, AI showed a sharper decrease in accuracy for faces of older adults compared to faces of younger age groups, for smiling compared to neutral faces, and for female compared to male faces. These results suggest that our estimates of age from faces are largely driven by particular visual cues, rather than high-level preconceptions. Moreover, the pattern of errors and biases we observed could provide some insights for the design of more effective AI technology for age estimation from faces.

Smiling makes you look older, even when you wear a mask: the effect of face masks on age perception.

The widespread use of face masks in the era of the Covid-19 pandemic has promoted research on their effect on the perception and recognition of faces. There is growing evidence that masks hinder the recognition of identity and expression, as well as the interpretation of speech from facial cues. It is less clear whether and in what manner masks affect the perception of age from facial cues. Recent research has emphasized the role of the upper region of the face, a part not covered by a mask, in the evaluation of age. For example, smile-related wrinkles in the region of the eyes make smiling faces appear older than neutral faces of the same individuals (the aging effect of smiling, AES). In two experiments, we tested the effect of face masks on age evaluations of neutral and smiling faces in a range of different age groups from 20 to 80 years. The results showed that smiling faces were perceived as older than neutral faces even when individuals were wearing a face mask-and there was no effect of masks on bias in age evaluations. Additional analyses showed reduced accuracy in age evaluations for smiling compared to neutral faces and for masked compared to unmasked faces. The results converge on previous studies emphasizing the importance of the upper region of the face in evaluations of age.

The role of animal faces in the animate-inanimate distinction in the ventral temporal cortex.

Animate and inanimate objects elicit distinct response patterns in the human ventral temporal cortex (VTC), but the exact features driving this distinction are still poorly understood. One prominent feature that distinguishes typical animals from inanimate objects and that could potentially explain the animate-inanimate distinction in the VTC is the presence of a face. In the current fMRI study, we investigated this possibility by creating a stimulus set that included animals with faces, faceless animals, and inanimate objects, carefully matched in order to minimize other visual differences. We used both searchlight-based and ROI-based representational similarity analysis (RSA) to test whether the presence of a face explains the animate-inanimate distinction in the VTC. The searchlight analysis revealed that when animals with faces were removed from the analysis, the animate-inanimate distinction almost disappeared. The ROI-based RSA revealed a similar pattern of results, but also showed that, even in the absence of faces, information about agency (a combination of animal's ability to move and think) is present in parts of the VTC that are sensitive to animacy. Together, these analyses showed that animals with faces do elicit a stronger animate/inanimate response in the VTC, but that faces are not necessary in order to observe high-level animacy information (e.g., agency) in parts of the VTC. A possible explanation could be that this animacy-related activity is driven not by faces per se, or the visual features of faces, but by other factors that correlate with face presence, such as the capacity for self-movement and thought. In short, the VTC might treat the face as a proxy for agency, a ubiquitous feature of familiar animals.

Faster social attention disengagement in individuals with higher autism traits.

INTRODUCTION: Atypical visual and social attention has often been associated with clinically diagnosed autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and with the broader autism phenotype. Atypical social attention is of particular research interest given the importance of facial expressions for social communication, with faces tending to attract and hold attention in neurotypical individuals. In autism, this is not necessarily so, where there is debate about the temporal differences in the ability to disengage attention from a face. METHOD: Thus, we have used eye-tracking to record saccadic latencies as a measure of time to disengage attention from a central task-irrelevant face before orienting to a newly presented peripheral nonsocial target during a gap-overlap task. Neurotypical participants with higher or lower autism-like traits (AT) completed the task that included central stimuli with varied expressions of facial emotion as well as an inverted face. RESULTS: High AT participants demonstrated faster saccadic responses to detect the nonsocial target than low AT participants when disengaging attention from a face. Furthermore, faster saccadic responses were recorded when comparing disengagement from upright to inverted faces in low AT but not in high AT participants. CONCLUSIONS: Together, these results extend findings of atypical social attention disengagement in autism and highlight how differences in attention to faces in the broader autism phenotype can lead to apparently superior task performance under certain conditions. Specifically, autism traits were linked to faster attention orienting to a nonsocial target due to the reduced attentional hold of the task irrelevant face stimuli. The absence of an inversion effect in high AT participants also reinforces the suggestion that they process upright or inverted faces similarly, unlike low AT participants for whom inverted faces are thought to be less socially engaging, thus allowing faster disengagement.

The effect of smiling on the perceived age of male and female faces across the lifespan.

Previous research has shown an unintuitive effect of facial expression on perceived age: smiling faces are perceived as older compared to neutral faces of the same people. The aging effect of smiling (AES), which is thought to result from the presence of smile-related wrinkles around the eyes, contradicts the common belief that smiling faces should be perceived as younger, not older. Previous research, however, has focused on faces of young adults, where the absence of inherent, age-related wrinkles and other age signs is offset by the weight of the smile-related wrinkles. In a series of experiments, we tested whether the AES extends to male and female faces in older age groups. We replicated the AES in young adults (20-39) and showed that it disappeared in older adults (60-79) of both genders. For photos of middle-aged adults (40-59), however, AES was found only for male, but not for female faces, who showed fewer and less prominent smile-related wrinkles. The results suggest that a person's apparent age is perceived in a holistic manner in which age-related cues in the region of the eyes are weighted against age cues in other regions of the face.

A priming study on naming real versus pictures of tools.

There is a growing body of literature demonstrating the relationship between the activation of sensorimotor processes in object recognition. It is unclear, however, if these processes are influenced by the differences in how real (3D) tools and two-dimensional (2D) images of tools are processed by the brain. Here, we examined if these differences could influence the naming of tools. Participants were presented with a prime stimulus that was either a picture of a tool, or a real tool, followed by a target stimulus that was always a real tool. They were then required to name each tool as they appeared. The functional use action required by the target tool was either the same (i.e., squeegee-paint roller) or different (i.e. knife-whisk) to the prime. We found that the format in which the prime tool was presented (i.e., a picture or real tool) had no influence on the participants' response times to naming the target tool. Furthermore, participants were faster at naming target tools relative to prime tools when the exact same tool was presented as both the prime and target. There was no difference in response times to naming the target tool relative to the prime when they were different tools, regardless of whether the tools' functional actions were the same or different. We also found more errors in naming target tools relative to the primes when different tools had a different functional action compared to when the same tool was presented as both the prime and the target. Taken together, our results highlight that the functional actions associated with tools do not facilitate or interfere with the recognition of tools for the purposes of naming. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.

Pupil size is modulated by the size of equal-luminance gratings.

Pupil size changes with light. For this reason, researchers studying the effect of attention, contextual processing, and arousal on the pupillary response have matched the mean luminance of their stimuli across conditions to eliminate the contribution of differences in light levels. Here, we argue that the match of mean luminance is not enough. In Experiment 1, we presented a circular sinewave grating on a gray background for 2 seconds. The area of the grating could be 3°, 6°, or 9°. The mean luminance of each grating was equal to the luminance of the gray background, such that regardless of the size of the grating there was no change in mean luminance between conditions. Participants were asked to fixate the center of the grating and passively view it. We found that in all size conditions, there was a pupil constriction starting at about 300 ms after stimulus onset, and the pupil constriction increased with the size of the grating. In Experiment 2, when a small grating was presented immediately after the presentation of a large grating (or vice versa), the pupil constriction changed accordingly. In Experiment 3, we replicated Experiment 1 but had the subjects perform an attention-demanding fixation task in one session, and passively view the stimuli in the other. We found that the main effect of task was not significant. In sum, our results show that stimulus size can modulate pupil size robustly and steadily even when the luminance is matched across the different stimuli.

Grip Constancy but Not Perceptual Size Constancy Survives Lesions of Early Visual Cortex.

Object constancies are central constructs in theories of visual phenomenology. A powerful example is "size constancy," in which the perceived size of an object remains stable despite changes in viewing distance [1-4]. Evidence from neuropsychology [5], neuroimaging [6-11], transcranial magnetic stimulation [12, 13], single-unit and lesion studies in monkey [14-20], and computational modeling [21] suggests that re-entrant processes involving reciprocal interactions between primary visual cortex (V1) and extrastriate visual areas [22-26] play an essential role in mediating size constancy. It is seldom appreciated, however, that object constancies must also operate for the visual guidance of goal-directed action. For example, when reaching out to pick up an object, the hand's in-flight aperture scales with size of the goal object [27-30] and is refractory to the decrease in retinal-image size with increased viewing distance [31-41] (Figure 1), a phenomenon we call "grip constancy." Does grip constancy, like perceptual constancy, depend on V1 or can it be mediated by pathways that bypass it altogether? We tested these possibilities in an individual, M.C., who has bilateral lesions encompassing V1 and much of the ventral visual stream. We show that her perceptual estimates of object size co-vary with retinal-image size rather than real-world size as viewing distance varies. In contrast, M.C. shows near-normal scaling of in-flight grasp aperture to object size despite changes in viewing distance. Thus, although early visual cortex is necessary for perceptual object constancy, it is unnecessary for grip constancy, which is mediated instead by separate visual inputs to dorsal-stream visuomotor areas [42-48].

Corrigendum: Saccade Latency Provides Evidence for Reduced Face Inversion Effects With Higher Autism Traits.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2019.00470.].

The Age-Dependent Neural Substrates of Blindsight.

Some patients who are considered cortically blind due to the loss of their primary visual cortex (V1) show a remarkable ability to act upon or discriminate between visual stimuli presented to their blind field, without any awareness of those stimuli. This phenomenon is often referred to as blindsight. Despite the range of spared visual abilities, the identification of the pathways mediating blindsight remains an active and contentious topic in the field. In this review, we discuss recent findings of the candidate pathways and their relative contributions to different forms of blindsight across the lifespan to illustrate the varied nature of unconscious visual processing.

The Role of Haptic Expectations in Reaching to Grasp: From Pantomime to Natural Grasps and Back Again.

When we reach to pick up an object, our actions are effortlessly informed by the object's spatial information, the position of our limbs, stored knowledge of the object's material properties, and what we want to do with the object. A substantial body of evidence suggests that grasps are under the control of "automatic, unconscious" sensorimotor modules housed in the "dorsal stream" of the posterior parietal cortex. Visual online feedback has a strong effect on the hand's in-flight grasp aperture. Previous work of ours exploited this effect to show that grasps are refractory to cued expectations for visual feedback. Nonetheless, when we reach out to pretend to grasp an object (pantomime grasp), our actions are performed with greater cognitive effort and they engage structures outside of the dorsal stream, including the ventral stream. Here we ask whether our previous finding would extend to cued expectations for haptic feedback. Our method involved a mirror apparatus that allowed participants to see a "virtual" target cylinder as a reflection in the mirror at the start of all trials. On "haptic feedback" trials, participants reached behind the mirror to grasp a size-matched cylinder, spatially coincident with the virtual one. On "no-haptic feedback" trials, participants reached behind the mirror and grasped into "thin air" because no cylinder was present. To manipulate haptic expectation, we organized the haptic conditions into blocked, alternating, and randomized schedules with and without verbal cues about the availability of haptic feedback. Replicating earlier work, we found the strongest haptic effects with the blocked schedules and the weakest effects in the randomized uncued schedule. Crucially, the haptic effects in the cued randomized schedule was intermediate. An analysis of the influence of the upcoming and immediately preceding haptic feedback condition in the cued and uncued random schedules showed that cuing the upcoming haptic condition shifted the haptic influence on grip aperture from the immediately preceding trial to the upcoming trial. These findings indicate that, unlike cues to the availability of visual feedback, participants take advantage of cues to the availability of haptic feedback, flexibly engaging pantomime, and natural modes of grasping to optimize the movement.