Do cognitive abilities reduce eyewitness susceptibility to the misinformation effect? A systematic review.

The fact that memories can be distorted by post-event misinformation has cast considerable doubt over the dependability of eyewitness evidence in legal contexts. However, despite its adverse practical implications, the misinformation effect is likely an unavoidable distortion stemming from the reconstructive nature of episodic memory. Certain cognitive abilities have been reported to offer protection against misinformation, suggesting that mechanisms aside from episodic memory may also be underpinning this type of memory distortion. The purpose of this review was to collate findings of associations between eyewitness misinformation susceptibility and individual differences in cognitive ability in adults aged 18 and over. Nine studies met the eligibility criteria for this review, including 23 distinct associations. Using a narrative synthesis, three categories of cognitive ability were identified as influencing susceptibility to misinformation: general intelligence and reasoning, perceptual abilities, and memory abilities. Across almost all categories, higher levels of ability were associated with reduced susceptibility to misinformation. While there is no indication that any one trait provides total immunity to the misinformation effect, there is a reasonable amount of evidence to suggest that several cognitive abilities create variance in individual levels of susceptibility. Future research should investigate not only if but how these cognitive abilities protect against misinformation distortions, for example, by contributing to more detailed encoding of the memory, enhancing discrepancy detection in the face of post-event misinformation, or improving source-monitoring during an eyewitness memory test.

Can we enhance working memory? Bias and effectiveness in cognitive training studies.

Meta-analyses have found that working memory (WM) can be improved with cognitive training; however, some authors have suggested that these improvements are mostly driven by biases in the measurement of WM, especially the use of similar tasks for assessment and training. In the present meta-analysis, we investigated whether WM, fluid intelligence, executive functions, and short-term memory can be improved by cognitive training and evaluated the impact of possible sources of bias. We performed a risk of bias assessment of the included studies and took special care in controlling for practice effects. Data from 52 independent comparisons were analyzed, including cognitive training aimed at different cognitive functions. Our results show small improvements in WM after training (SMD = 0.18). Much larger effects were observed when the analysis was restricted to assessment tasks similar to those used for training (SMD = 1.15). Fluid intelligence was not found to improve as a result of training, and improvements in WM were not related to changes in fluid intelligence. Our analyses did however indicate that cognitive training can improve specific executive functions. Contrary to expectations, a set of meta-regressions indicated that characteristics of the training programme, such as dosage and type of training, do not have an impact on the effectiveness of training. The risk of bias assessment revealed some concerns in the randomization process and possible selective reporting among studies. Overall, our results identified various potential sources of bias, with the most significant being the choice of assessment tasks.

Unringing the bell: Successful debriefing following a rich false memory study.

In rich false memory studies, familial informants often provide information to support researchers in planting vivid memories of events that never occurred. The goal of the current study was to assess how effectively we can retract these false memories via debriefing - i.e., to what extent can we put participants back the way we found them? We aimed to establish (1) what proportion of participants would retain a false memory or false belief following debriefing, and (2) whether richer, more detailed memories would be more difficult to retract. Participants (N = 123) completed a false memory implantation protocol as part of a replication of the "Lost in the Mall" study (Loftus & Pickrell, Psychiatric Annals, 25, 720-725, 1995). By the end of the protocol, 14% of participants self-reported a memory for the fabricated event, and a further 52% believed it had happened. Participants were then fully debriefed, and memory and belief for the false event were assessed again. In a follow-up assessment 3 days post-debriefing, the false memory rate had dropped to 6% and false belief rates also fell precipitously to 7%. Moreover, virtually all persistent false memories were found to be nonbelieved memories, where participants no longer accepted that the fabricated event had occurred. Richer, more detailed memories were more resistant to correction, but were still mostly retracted. This study provides evidence that participants can be "dehoaxed", and even very convincing false memories can be retracted.

Us versus them: The role of national identity in the formation of false memories for fake news.

People are prone to forming false memories for fictitious events described in fake news stories. In this preregistered study, we hypothesized that the formation of false memories may be promoted when the fake news includes stereotypes that reflect positively on one's own nationality or negatively on another nationality. We exposed German and Irish participants (N = 1,184) to fabricated news stories that were consistent with positive or negative stereotypes about Germany and Ireland. The predicted three-way interaction was not observed. Exploratory follow-up analyses revealed the expected pattern of results for German participants but not for Irish participants, who were more likely to remember positive stories and stories about Ireland. Individual differences in patriotism did not significantly affect false memory rates; however, higher levels of cognitive ability and analytical reasoning decreased false memories and increased participants' ability to distinguish between true and false news stories. These results demonstrate that stereotypical information pertaining to national identity can influence the formation of false memories for fake news, but variations in cultural context may affect how misinformation is received and processed. We conclude by urging researchers to consider the sociopolitical and media landscape when predicting the consequences of fake news exposure. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Conducting ethical misinformation research: Deception, dialogue, and debriefing.

Misinformation research can present many ethical challenges to researchers. These challenges are not insurmountable, but recent research suggests that as a field, we should be adopting and reporting stronger ethical practices. In this review, we consider the three D's of ethical misinformation research; the need to balance deception with informed consent, the value of maintaining an open dialogue with research participants to gather their insights and perspectives, and perhaps most importantly, the essential requirement for effective post-experimental debriefing. We make some specific and straightforward recommendations for misinformation researchers to increase the visibility of their ethical practices and outline the benefits for individual researchers and for the field.

Bias and constructive processes in a self-memory system.

Martin Conway's influential theorising about the self-memory system (Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107(2), 261-288) illuminated how the "working self" influences the construction of autobiographical memories. Moreover, his constructive view of self and memory is compatible with the occurrence of various kinds of errors and distortions in remembering. Here we consider one of the "seven sins" of memory Schacter, D. L. (2021). The seven sins of memory updated edition: How the mind forgets and remembers. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt) that we believe is most closely related to the operation of Conway's self-memory system: bias, which refers to the role of current knowledge, beliefs, and feelings in shaping and sometimes distorting memories for past experiences and attitudes. More specifically, we discuss recent research on three forms of bias - consistency, self-enhancing, and positivity biases - that illuminate their role in influencing how people remember the past and also imagine the future. We consider both theoretical and applied aspects of these biases and, consistent with Conway's perspective, argue that despite sometimes contributing to inaccuracies, bias also serves adaptive functions.

Lost in the mall again: a preregistered replication and extension of Loftus & Pickrell (1995).

ABSTRACTThe seminal Lost in the Mall study [Loftus, E. F., & Pickrell, J. E. (1995). The formation of false memories. Psychiatric Annals, 25(12), 720-725. https://doi.org/10.3928/0048-5713-19951201-07] has been enormously influential in psychology and is still cited in legal cases. The current study directly replicated this paper, addressing methodological weaknesses including increasing the sample size fivefold and preregistering detailed analysis plans. Participants (N = 123) completed a survey and two interviews where they discussed real and fabricated childhood events, based on information provided by an older relative. We replicated the findings of the original study, coding 35% of participants as reporting a false memory for getting lost in a mall in childhood (compared to 25% in the original study). In an extension, we found that participants self-reported high rates of memories and beliefs for the fabricated event. Mock jurors were also highly likely to believe the fabricated event had occurred and that the participant was truly remembering the event, supporting the conclusions of the original study.

Lost in the mall again: a preregistered replication and extension of Loftus & Pickrell (1995).

The seminal Lost in the Mall study has been enormously influential in psychology and is still cited in legal cases. The current study directly replicated this paper, addressing methodological weaknesses including increasing the sample size fivefold and preregistering detailed analysis plans. Participants (N = 123) completed a survey and two interviews where they discussed real and fabricated childhood events, based on information provided by an older relative. We replicated the findings of the original study, coding 35% of participants as reporting a false memory for getting lost in a mall in childhood (compared to 25% in the original study). In an extension, we found that participants self-reported high rates of memories and beliefs for the fabricated event. Mock jurors were also highly likely to believe the fabricated event had occurred and that the participant was truly remembering the event, supporting the conclusions of the original study.

Debriefing works: Successful retraction of misinformation following a fake news study.

In recent years there has been an explosion of research on misinformation, often involving experiments where participants are presented with fake news stories and subsequently debriefed. In order to avoid potential harm to participants or society, it is imperative that we establish whether debriefing procedures remove any lasting influence of misinformation. In the current study, we followed up with 1547 participants one week after they had been exposed to fake news stories about COVID-19 and then provided with a detailed debriefing. False memories and beliefs for previously-seen fake stories declined from the original study, suggesting that the debrief was effective. Moreover, the debriefing resulted in reduced false memories and beliefs for novel fake stories, suggesting a broader impact on participants' willingness to accept misinformation. Small effects of misinformation on planned health behaviours observed in the original study were also eliminated at follow-up. Our findings suggest that when a careful and thorough debriefing procedure is followed, researchers can safely and ethically conduct misinformation research on sensitive topics.

How do participants feel about the ethics of rich false memory studies?

ABSTRACTDeception is often a necessity in rich false memory studies, but is this deception acceptable to participants? In the current study, we followed up with 175 participants who had taken part in a replication of the Lost in the Mall childhood false memory study (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), as either a research subject or a familial informant. We found that both participants and informants were generally very positive about their experience, did not regret taking part and found the deceptive methods acceptable. Importantly, the vast majority reported that they would still have taken part had they known the true objectives from the beginning. Participants also reported learning something interesting about memory and enjoying the nostalgia and family discussions that were prompted by the study. We would encourage other researchers to assess the ethical implications of false memory research paradigms and to incorporate the valuable feedback from participants and informants.

False memories for true and false vaccination information form in line with pre-existing vaccine opinions.

Misinformation continually threatens efforts to control the COVID-19 pandemic, with vaccine misinformation now a key concern. False memories for misinformation can influence behavioural intentions, yet little is known about the factors affecting (false) memories for vaccine-related news items. Across two experiments (total n = 1481), this paper explores the effects of pre-existing vaccine opinions on reported memories for true and false news items. In Study 1, participants (n = 817) were exposed to fabricated pro- or anti-vaccine news items, and then asked if they have a memory of this news event having occurred. In Study 2, participants (n = 646) viewed true pro- or anti-vaccine news items. News items were more likely to be remembered when they aligned with participants' pre-existing vaccine beliefs, with stronger effects for pro-vaccine information. We conclude by encouraging researchers to consider the role of attitudinal bias when developing interventions to reduce susceptibility to misinformation.

Measuring the effects of misinformation exposure and beliefs on behavioural intentions: a COVID-19 vaccination study.

Misinformation has been a pressing issue since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, threatening our ability to effectively act on the crisis. Nevertheless, little is known about the actual effects of fake news on behavioural intentions. Does exposure to or belief in misinformation about COVID-19 vaccines affect people's intentions to receive such a vaccine? This paper attempts to address this question via three preregistered experiments (N = 3463). In Study 1, participants (n = 1269) were exposed to fabricated pro- or anti-vaccine information or to neutral true information, and then asked about their intentions to get vaccinated. In Study 2, participants (n = 646) were exposed to true pro- and anti-vaccine information, while Study 3 (n = 1548) experimentally manipulated beliefs in novel misinformation about COVID-19 vaccines by increasing exposure to the information. The results of these three studies showed that exposure to false information about the vaccines had little effect on participants' intentions to get vaccinated, even when multiple exposures led them to believe the headlines to be more accurate. An exploratory meta-analysis of studies 1 and 3, with a combined sample size of 2683, showed that exposure to false information both supporting and opposing COVID-19 vaccines actually increased vaccination intentions, though the effect size was very small. We conclude by cautioning researchers against equating exposure to misinformation or perceived accuracy of false news with actual behaviours.

Investigating false memories among "winners" and "losers" in the prisoner's dilemma.

Many legal cases hinge on evaluating the veracity of two versions of events ("he said, she said"). Expert witnesses are often called upon to testify on the malleability of memory, most often testifying for the defence. This may lead to the theoretically unfounded assumption that it is only victims who are vulnerable to distorted memories of a crime. Inspired by this question, we conducted a series of five experiments in which 2010 participants played a novel version of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Participants could either betray their partner in the game ("winners") or be betrayed by their partner ("losers"). We exposed participants to misinformation concerning the other player's statements to assess whether winners and losers may be differentially susceptible to false memories of the event in question. Across our experiments, including where real financial rewards were at stake, we found that winners were just as susceptible as losers to memory distortion. We highlight the need to consider the possibility of faulty memory affecting all parties to in legal cases, though further research is needed beyond this highly artificial paradigm.

Working memory training does not improve executive functioning or fluid intelligence.

Several studies have reported that cognitive training can lead to improvements of complex mental skills such as intelligence. However, attempts to replicate these findings have not been very successful with many studies reporting lack of transferable effects on cognitive processes unrelated to the training task. On the contrary, transfer effects on cognitive processes closely related to the training task have been more commonly reported. In this study, we investigated the effects of a frequently used working-memory training programme on fluid intelligence and specific executive functions (updating, inhibition, switching, the focus of attention, and sustained attention). We remedied common issues with previous training studies by using an active control group, using more than one instrument to assess each function, and including a larger sample size. The experimental group showed significant improvement in the training task, indicating strong practice effects. However, no evidence of training-specific transfer was found in any of the variables investigated, and we could not find any of the previous improvements reported. Participants in both the training and control groups showed post-training improvements in most of the outcome variables, suggesting that practice effects can be found even when a task is only performed twice. We conclude by discussing possible explanations for the differences between our results and those reported in prior studies and recommend that any claims of improvement should be supported by studies capable of replicating them.

The medium and the message: Comparing the effectiveness of six methods of misinformation delivery in an eyewitness memory paradigm.

Studies of eyewitness memory commonly employ variations on a standard misinformation paradigm. Participants are (a) exposed to an event (e.g., a simulated crime), (b) misled about certain details of the event and (c) questioned about their memory of the original event. Misinformation may be provided in the second step via a range of methods. Here, we directly compared the effectiveness of six misinformation delivery methods-leading questions, elaborate leading questions, doctored photographs, simple narratives, scrambled narratives, and missing word narratives. We presented 1182 participants with a video of a simulated robbery and randomly assigned them to receive misinformation about two out of four critical details via one of these methods. In line with the levels of processing account of memory, we report that methods that encourage deeper processing of misinformation result in more memory distortions. Contrary to previous reports, doctored photographs were not a successful method of implanting misinformation. The six delivery methods resulted in minimal differences in confidence and metamemory estimates, but participants were more likely to notice the presence of misinformation in the simple narrative condition. We conclude with suggestions for the selection of an appropriate method of misinformation delivery in future studies. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Cognitive emotion regulation strategies and psychological distress during lockdown due to COVID-19.

Several governments have implemented strict measures to reduce the spread of COVID-19, such as lockdown measures. However, these measures have brought negative consequences at an individual level by exacerbating the psychological distress caused by the pandemic. We evaluated the role of cognitive emotion regulation strategies (CERS) on the levels of anxiety and depression during the lockdown in a sample of 663 Spanish-speaking adults, while controlling for variables related to social support, hobbies, seeking information related to COVID-19, perceived risk of infection, time of assessment, number of deaths and contagions during the assessment and age. Using multiple regression analyses with a stepwise model selection procedure, 29% of the variance in anxiety and 38% of the variance of depression were found to be predicted by specific CERS. The impact of CERS on anxiety and depression was moderated by the sex of participants and the time of assessment, indicating that CERS did not have the same protective or harmful effects in all participants and situations. Based on our results, recommendations are provided for improving coping with stressful events where lockdown measures are taken.

Quantifying the effects of fake news on behavior: Evidence from a study of COVID-19 misinformation.

Previous research has argued that fake news may have grave consequences for health behavior, but surprisingly, no empirical data have been provided to support this assumption. This issue takes on new urgency in the context of the coronavirus pandemic, and the accompanying wave of online misinformation. In this large preregistered study (N = 3,746), we investigated the effect of a single exposure to fabricated news stories about COVID-19 on related behavioral intentions. We observed small but measurable effects on some behavioral intentions but not others-for example, participants who read a story about problems with a forthcoming contact-tracing app reported a 5% reduction in willingness to download the app. These data suggest that one-off fake news exposure may have behavioral consequences, though the effects are not large. We also found no effects of providing a general warning about the dangers of online misinformation on response to the fake stories, regardless of the framing of the warning in positive or negative terms. This suggests that generic warnings about online misinformation, such as those used by governments and social media companies, are unlikely to be effective. We conclude with a call for more empirical research on the real-world consequences of fake news. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Misremembering Brexit: partisan bias and individual predictors of false memories for fake news stories among Brexit voters.

Exposure to fake news stories can result in false memories for the events portrayed, and this effect can be enhanced if the stories conform to the reader's ideological position. We exposed 1299 UK residents to fabricated news stories about Brexit. 44% of participants reported a false memory for at least one fabricated story, with a higher rate of false memories for stories that reflected poorly on the opposing side. This effect of ideological congruency was somewhat greater among participants who were exposed to a threat to their social identity as a Leave or Remain supporter; however, this moderating effect was only statistically significant in exploratory analyses using a more conservative definition of false memory. Participants with higher cognitive ability and analytical reasoning scores were less susceptible to false memories. Individuals with better knowledge about Brexit showed better discrimination between true and false stories, while self-reported engagement with the Brexit debate was associated with an increased tendency to "remember" any story, regardless of its truth. These results implicate a combination of social and individual factors in the development of false memories from fake news, and suggest that exposure to social identity threats may enhance the polarising effects of fake news.

Visual Search in 3D: Effects of Monoscopic and Stereoscopic Cues to Depth on the Validity of Feature Integration Theory and Perceptual Load Theory.

Previous research has successfully used feature integration theory to operationalise the predictions of Perceptual Load Theory, while simultaneously testing the predictions of both models. Building on this work, we test the extent to which these models hold up in a 3D world. In two experiments, participants responded to a target stimulus within an array of shapes whose apparent depth was manipulated using a combination of monoscopic and stereoscopic cues. The search task was designed to test the predictions of (a) feature integration theory, as the target was identified by a single feature or a conjunction of features and embedded in search arrays of varying size, and (b) perceptual load theory, as the task included congruent and incongruent distractors presented alongside search tasks imposing high or low perceptual load. Findings from both experiments upheld the predictions of feature integration theory, regardless of 2D/3D condition. Longer search times in conditions with a combination of monoscopic and stereoscopic depth cues suggests that binding features into three-dimensional objects requires greater attentional effort. This additional effort should have implications for perceptual load theory, yet our findings did not uphold its predictions; the effect of incongruent distractors did not differ between conjunction search trials (conceptualised as high perceptual load) and feature search trials (low perceptual load). Individual differences in susceptibility to the effects of perceptual load were evident and likely explain the absence of load effects. Overall, our findings suggest that feature integration theory may be useful for predicting attentional performance in a 3D world.

Remembering facts versus feelings in the wake of political events.

Amid rising political polarisation, inaccurate memory for facts and exaggerated memories of grievances can drive individuals and groups further apart. We assessed whether people with more accurate memories of the facts concerning political events were less susceptible to bias when remembering how events made them feel. Study 1 assessed participants' memories concerning the 2016 U.S. presidential election (N = 571), and included 33 individuals with Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM). Study 2 assessed participants' memories concerning the 2018 referendum on abortion in Ireland (N = 733). Participants rated how happy, angry, and scared they felt days after these events. Six months later, they recalled their feelings and factual information. In both studies, participants overestimated how angry they had felt but underestimated happiness and fear. Adjusting for importance, no association was found between the accuracy of memory for facts and feelings. Accuracy in remembering facts was predicted by media exposure. Accuracy in remembering feelings was predicted by consistency over time in feelings and appraisals about past events. HSAM participants in Study 1 remembered election-related facts better than others, but not their feelings. Thus, having a good grasp of the facts did not protect against bias in remembering feelings about political events.