Assuring data quality in investigator-initiated trials in dutch hospitals: Balancing between mentoring and monitoring.

The complexity of regulations governing investigator-initiated trials (IITs) places a great burden on hospitals. Consequently, many hospitals seek to alleviate regulatory pressures by seeking an alternative quality management system (QMS). This paper takes the Netherlands as a case. To investigate how QMSs for IITs are organized in Dutch hospitals, we adopted the theoretical concepts of mentoring and monitoring in a mixed methods study in the period 2014-2018. In clinical practice and international guidelines, monitoring is seen as the standard quality assurance for ongoing trials. However, hospitals have implemented monitoring programs that resemble mentoring. The contrast between these ideal types is less pronounced in practice as both combine elements of compliance and feedback for learning in practice. In a monitoring setting, learning is one-way, from monitor to researcher; whereas mentoring focuses on mutual support and learning. To tackle problems in each system, the authority of the Board of Directors (BoD) and the BoD's relationship with staff members are crucial. We discuss the challenges that BoD and staff face in keeping an integrated view of the various components of QMSs.

Institutional work to maintain, repair, and improve the regulatory regime: How actors respond to external challenges in the public supervision of ongoing clinical trials in the Netherlands.

BACKGROUND: National regulatory regimes for supervising ongoing clinical trials are affected by external challenges, both international, such as harmonization of EU legislation, and national, such as critical reviews of incidents. This study examines how supervisory bodies dealing with ongoing trials respond to external challenges of the past two decades and engage in institutional work to maintain, repair, or improve the Dutch regulatory regime. METHODS: International and national regulatory documents were analyzed and interviews (n = 27) were conducted with various actors, including public supervisory bodies, hospital staff, and boards of directors. FINDINGS: In the Netherlands, EU harmonization directed at centralizing and coordinating the regulatory regime for good clinical trial practice in Member States has paradoxically led to further fragmentation. The resulting ambiguity and inefficiency remained largely unresolved until a serious incident in a university hospital became a catalyst to clarify both the interconnected responsibilities and working relationships of various supervisory bodies. New legislation and regulatory methods were implemented, and actors outside the legislative framework became active in the field in order to strengthen supervision of ongoing trials, further multiplying yet also aligning with existing regulatory regimes. CONCLUSIONS: Public supervision of ongoing trials is fragmented in the Netherlands because the responsibilities and resources are unevenly distributed. In countries like the Netherlands, public supervisory bodies must do a great deal of institutional work to align with new EU regulations and still safeguard their traditional regulatory mechanisms that protect human safety. However, national regulatory traditions also offer new opportunities to strengthen the quality assurance of clinical trials.

Effects of EU harmonization policies on national public supervision of clinical trials: A dynamic cycle of institutional change and institutional work.

BACKGROUND: The EU Clinical Trials Directive (EUCTD) and the EU Clinical Trials Regulation aim to harmonize good clinical practice (GCP) of clinical trials across Member States. Using the Netherlands as a case study, this paper analyzes how endeavours to implement the EUCTD set in motion a dynamic process of institutional change and institutional work. This process lead to substantial differences between policy and actual practice; therefore, it is important to learn more about the implementation of harmonization policies. METHODS: Relevant documents, such as legal texts and previous research, were analyzed. Interviews were conducted with stakeholders in clinical trials and inspectors from (inter)national supervisory bodies (n=33), and Dutch Health Care Inspectorate inspections were observed (n=4). RESULTS: Dutch legislators' efforts to implement the EUCTD created a new level of governance in an already multilevel legislative framework. Institutional layering caused a complex and fragmented organizational structure in public supervision, leading to difficulties in achieving GCP. This instigated institutional work by actors, which set in motion further incremental institutional change, principally drift and conversion. CONCLUSIONS: Harmonization processes can create dynamic cycles between institutional change and institutional work, leading to significant divergence from the intended effects of legislation. If legislation intended to strengthen harmonization is not carefully implemented, it can become counterproductive to its aims.

Patient participation in collective healthcare decision making: the Dutch model.

OBJECTIVE: To study whether the Dutch participation model is a good model of participation. BACKGROUND: Patient participation is on the agenda, both on the individual and the collective level. In this study, we focus on the latter by looking at the Dutch model in which patient organizations are involved in many formal decision-making processes. This model can be described as neo-corporatist. DESIGN: We did 52 interviews with actors in the healthcare field, 35 of which were interviews with representatives of patient organizations and 17 with actors that involved patient organizations in their decision making. RESULTS: Dutch patient organizations have many opportunities to participate in formal healthcare decision making and, as a result, have become institutionalized. Although there were several examples identified in which patient organizations were able to influence decision making, patient organizations remain in a dependent position, which they try to overcome through professionalization. DISCUSSION: Although this model of participation gives patient organizations many opportunities to participate, it also causes important tensions. Many organizations cannot cope with all the participation possibilities attributed to them. This participation abundance can therefore cause redistribution effects. Furthermore, their dependent position leads to the danger of being put to instrumental use. Moreover, professionalization causes tensions concerning empowerment possibilities and representativeness. Conclusion Although the Dutch model tries to make patient organizations an equal party in healthcare decision making, this goal is not reached in practice. It is therefore important to study more closely which subjects patients can and should contribute to, and in what way.