What determines the vote-seeking behavior of legislators in South Korea?

Pre-existing studies suggest that legislators in small districts tend to be more responsive to the electorate than those in large districts, as accountability is typically clearer in a smaller setting. However, it is not clear whether the relationship between district size and legislators' constituency-oriented spending holds in other electoral settings (e.g., South Korea), where pork barrel benefits tend to be determined at the administrative unit, not the electoral district. The present study hypothesizes that as the number of legislators in an administrative unit increases, they are less likely to try to appeal to the voters. Additionally, this study examines the moderating effects of partisan homogeneity and legislators' seniority. The results from the statistical analysis of data from Korean National Assembly members confirm our hypothesis: the number of legislators in an administrative unit turns out to be negatively associated with their vote-seeking behavior. Such a relationship tends to be strong in administrative units co-represented by multiple parties and weak among newly elected legislators.

Do political parties always prefer loyalists? Evidence from South Korea.

This paper examines the relationship between ideological polarization and party disloyalty, focusing on the moderating role of the status of a political party in the legislature, i.e., the ruling party or the opposition party. It hypothesizes that the ruling party is willing to endorse disloyal candidates whose issue positions are not close to their own party's platform, whereas the opposition party is likely to punish disloyal candidates to demonstrate party unity in the nomination process. The present study tests this hypothesis, using data from South Korea, where the nomination process for the parliamentary election is dominated by party leaders. The results are by and large consistent with the hypotheses. In line with previous studies, our results suggest that party loyalty is one of the driving forces of polarization in politics. In order to fully understand party polarization at the level of political elites, it is necessary to consider heterogeneous effects of party members' behavior on candidate selection, varying across the party's status, either the ruling party or the opposition party.

Yes, but what's the mechanism? (don't expect an easy answer).

Psychologists increasingly recommend experimental analysis of mediation. This is a step in the right direction because mediation analyses based on nonexperimental data are likely to be biased and because experiments, in principle, provide a sound basis for causal inference. But even experiments cannot overcome certain threats to inference that arise chiefly or exclusively in the context of mediation analysis-threats that have received little attention in psychology. The authors describe 3 of these threats and suggest ways to improve the exposition and design of mediation tests. Their conclusion is that inference about mediators is far more difficult than previous research suggests and is best tackled by an experimental research program that is specifically designed to address the challenges of mediation analysis.