Great ape cognition is structured by stable cognitive abilities and predicted by developmental conditions.

Great ape cognition is used as a reference point to specify the evolutionary origins of complex cognitive abilities, including in humans. This research often assumes that great ape cognition consists of cognitive abilities (traits) that account for stable differences between individuals, which change and develop in response to experience. Here, we test the validity of these assumptions by assessing repeatability of cognitive performance among captive great apes (Gorilla gorilla, Pongo abelii, Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes) in five tasks covering a range of cognitive domains. We examine whether individual characteristics (age, group, test experience) or transient situational factors (life events, testing arrangements or sociality) influence cognitive performance. Our results show that task-level performance is generally stable over time; four of the five tasks were reliable measurement tools. Performance in the tasks was best explained by stable differences in cognitive abilities (traits) between individuals. Cognitive abilities were further correlated, suggesting shared cognitive processes. Finally, when predicting cognitive performance, we found stable individual characteristics to be more important than variables capturing transient experience. Taken together, this study shows that great ape cognition is structured by stable cognitive abilities that respond to different developmental conditions.

Are you as fooled as I am? Visual illusions in human (Homo) and nonhuman (Sapajus, Gorilla, Pan, Pongo) primate species.

It has been argued that humans' susceptibility to visual illusions does not simply reflect cognitive flaws but rather specific functional adaptations of our perceptual system. The data on cross-cultural differences in the perception of geometric illusions seemingly support this explanation. Little is known, however, about the developmental trajectories of such adaptations in humans, let alone a conclusive picture of the illusionary susceptibility in other primate species. So far, most developmental or comparative studies have tested single illusions with varying procedural implementations. The current study aims at overcoming these limitations by testing human subjects of four different age classes (3- to 5 year-old children and adults) and five nonhuman primate species (capuchin monkeys, bonobos, chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans) with an identical setup in five well-known geometric illusions (horizontal-vertical, Ebbinghaus, Mueller-Lyer, Ponzo, and Sander). Two food items of identical size were presented on separate trays with surrounding paintings eliciting the illusion of size differences and subjects were required to choose one of the items. Four of the five illusions elicited a strong effect in adult humans, and older children showed a greater susceptibility to illusions than younger ones. In contrast, only two illusions (Ebbingaus and horizontal-vertical) elicited a mild effect on nonhuman primates with high variation within species and little variation between species. Our results suggests that humans learn to see illusions as they develop during childhood. They also suggest that future work should address how nonhuman primates' experience of these illusion changes throughout their development. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Old and New Approaches to Animal Cognition: There Is Not "One Cognition".

Using the comparative approach, researchers draw inferences about the evolution of cognition. Psychologists have postulated several hypotheses to explain why certain species are cognitively more flexible than others, and these hypotheses assume that certain cognitive skills are linked together to create a generally "smart" species. However, empirical findings suggest that several animal species are highly specialized, showing exceptional skills in single cognitive domains while performing poorly in others. Although some cognitive skills may indeed overlap, we cannot a priori assume that they do across species. We argue that the term "cognition" has often been used by applying an anthropocentric viewpoint rather than a biocentric one. As a result, researchers tend to overrate cognitive skills that are human-like and assume that certain skills cluster together in other animals as they do in our own species. In this paper, we emphasize that specific physical and social environments create selection pressures that lead to the evolution of certain cognitive adaptations. Skills such as following the pointing gesture, tool-use, perspective-taking, or the ability to cooperate evolve independently from each other as a concrete result of specific selection pressures, and thus have appeared in distantly related species. Thus, there is not "one cognition". Our argument is founded upon traditional Darwinian thinking, which-although always at the forefront of biology-has sometimes been neglected in animal cognition research. In accordance with the biocentric approach, we advocate a broader empirical perspective as we are convinced that to better understand animal minds, comparative researchers should focus much more on questions and experiments that are ecologically valid. We should investigate nonhuman cognition for its own sake, not only in comparison to the human model.

Establishing an infrastructure for collaboration in primate cognition research.

Inferring the evolutionary history of cognitive abilities requires large and diverse samples. However, such samples are often beyond the reach of individual researchers or institutions, and studies are often limited to small numbers of species. Consequently, methodological and site-specific-differences across studies can limit comparisons between species. Here we introduce the ManyPrimates project, which addresses these challenges by providing a large-scale collaborative framework for comparative studies in primate cognition. To demonstrate the viability of the project we conducted a case study of short-term memory. In this initial study, we were able to include 176 individuals from 12 primate species housed at 11 sites across Africa, Asia, North America and Europe. All subjects were tested in a delayed-response task using consistent methodology across sites. Individuals could access food rewards by remembering the position of the hidden reward after a 0, 15, or 30-second delay. Overall, individuals performed better with shorter delays, as predicted by previous studies. Phylogenetic analysis revealed a strong phylogenetic signal for short-term memory. Although, with only 12 species, the validity of this analysis is limited, our initial results demonstrate the feasibility of a large, collaborative open-science project. We present the ManyPrimates project as an exciting opportunity to address open questions in primate cognition and behaviour with large, diverse datasets.

Chimpanzees use observed temporal directionality to learn novel causal relations.

We investigated whether chimpanzees use the temporal sequence of external events to determine causation. Seventeen chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) witnessed a human experimenter press a button in two different conditions. When she pressed the "causal button" the delivery of juice and a sound immediately followed (cause-then-effect). In contrast, she pressed the "non-causal button" only after the delivery of juice and sound (effect-then-cause). When given the opportunity to produce the desired juice delivery themselves, the chimpanzees preferentially pressed the causal button, i.e., the one that preceded the effect. Importantly, they did so in their first test trial and even though both buttons were equally associated with juice delivery. This outcome suggests that chimpanzees, like human children, do not rely solely on their own actions to make use of novel causal relations, but they can learn causal sequences based on observation alone. We discuss these findings in relation to the literature on causal inferences as well as associative learning.

How prior experience and task presentation modulate innovation in 6-year-old-children.

Low innovation rates have been found with children until 6-8 years of age in tasks that required them to make a tool. Little is known about how prior experience and task presentation influence innovation rates. In the current study, we investigated these aspects in the floating peanut task (FPT), which required children to pour water into a vertical tube to retrieve a peanut. In three experiments, we varied the amount of plants that 6-year-olds (N = 256) watered prior to the task (zero, one, or five plants), who watered the plants (child or experimenter), and the distance and salience of the water source. We expected that prior experience with the water would modulate task performance by either boosting innovation rates (facilitation effect) or reducing them given that children would possibly learn that the water was for watering plants (functional fixedness effect). Our results indicate robustly low innovation rates in 6-year-olds. However, children's performance improved to some extent with increased salience of the water source as well as with an experimenter-given hint. Due to the low innovation rates in this age group, we investigated whether watering plants prior to the FPT would influence innovation rates in 7- and 8-year-olds (N = 33), for which we did not find evidence. We conclude that 6-year-olds struggle with innovation but that they are more likely to innovate if crucial aspects of the task are made more salient. Thus, although 6-year-olds can innovate, they require more physical and social scaffolding than older children and adults.

Chimpanzees Consider Humans' Psychological States when Drawing Statistical Inferences.

Great apes have been shown to be intuitive statisticians: they can use proportional information within a population to make intuitive probability judgments about randomly drawn samples [1, J.E., J.C., J.H., E.H., and H.R., unpublished data]. Humans, from early infancy onward, functionally integrate intuitive statistics with other cognitive domains to judge the randomness of an event [2-6]. To date, nothing is known about such cross-domain integration in any nonhuman animal, leaving uncertainty about the origins of human statistical abilities. We investigated whether chimpanzees take into account information about psychological states of experimenters (their biases and visual access) when drawing statistical inferences. We tested 21 sanctuary-living chimpanzees in a previously established paradigm that required subjects to infer which of two mixed populations of preferred and non-preferred food items was more likely to lead to a desired outcome for the subject. In a series of three experiments, we found that chimpanzees chose based on proportional information alone when they had no information about experimenters' preferences and (to a lesser extent) when experimenters had biases for certain food types but drew blindly. By contrast, when biased experimenters had visual access, subjects ignored statistical information and instead chose based on experimenters' biases. Lastly, chimpanzees intuitively used a violation of statistical likelihoods as indication for biased sampling. Our results suggest that chimpanzees have a random sampling assumption that can be overridden under the appropriate circumstances and that they are able to use mental state information to judge whether this is necessary. This provides further evidence for a shared statistical inference mechanism in apes and humans.

Causal reasoning versus associative learning: A useful dichotomy or a strawman battle in comparative psychology?

The debate about whether or not one could/should ascribe reasoning abilities to animals has deep historical roots and seems very up-to-date in the light of the immense body of new empirical data originating from various species and research paradigms. Associative learning (AL) seems to be a ubiquitous low-level contender for any cognitive interpretation of animal behavior, mostly because of the assumed mechanistic simplicity and phylogenetic prevalence. However, the implicit assumption that AL is simple and therefore the most parsimonious mechanism to describe seemingly complex behavior can and must be questioned on various grounds. Using recent empirical findings with chimpanzees as an example, I argue that at times inferential reasoning might be the most likely candidate to account for performance differences between experimental and control conditions. Finally, a general conclusion drawn from the current debate(s) in the field of comparative psychology could be that a dichotomist battle of 2 conceptual camps-each of which is lacking a clear and homogeneous theoretical framework-is a scientific deadlock. (PsycINFO Database Record

Making sense of (exceptional) causal relations. A cross-cultural and cross-linguistic study.

In order to make sense of the world, humans tend to see causation almost everywhere. Although most causal relations may seem straightforward, they are not always construed in the same way cross-culturally. In this study, we investigate concepts of "chance," "coincidence," or "randomness" that refer to assumed relations between intention, action, and outcome in situations, and we ask how people from different cultures make sense of such non-law-like connections. Based on a framework proposed by Alicke (2000), we administered a task that aims to be a neutral tool for investigating causal construals cross-culturally and cross-linguistically. Members of four different cultural groups, rural Mayan Yucatec and Tseltal speakers from Mexico and urban students from Mexico and Germany, were presented with a set of scenarios involving various types of causal and non-causal relations and were asked to explain the described events. Three links varied as to whether they were present or not in the scenarios: Intention-to-Action, Action-to-Outcome, and Intention-to-Outcome. Our results show that causality is recognized in all four cultural groups. However, how causality and especially non-law-like relations are interpreted depends on the type of links, the cultural background and the language used. In all three groups, Action-to-Outcome is the decisive link for recognizing causality. Despite the fact that the two Mayan groups share similar cultural backgrounds, they display different ideologies regarding concepts of non-law-like relations. The data suggests that the concept of "chance" is not universal, but seems to be an explanation that only some cultural groups draw on to make sense of specific situations. Of particular importance is the existence of linguistic concepts in each language that trigger ideas of causality in the responses from each cultural group.

Does presentation format influence visual size discrimination in tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.)?

Most experimental paradigms to study visual cognition in humans and non-human species are based on discrimination tasks involving the choice between two or more visual stimuli. To this end, different types of stimuli and procedures for stimuli presentation are used, which highlights the necessity to compare data obtained with different methods. The present study assessed whether, and to what extent, capuchin monkeys' ability to solve a size discrimination problem is influenced by the type of procedure used to present the problem. Capuchins' ability to generalise knowledge across different tasks was also evaluated. We trained eight adult tufted capuchin monkeys to select the larger of two stimuli of the same shape and different sizes by using pairs of food items (Experiment 1), computer images (Experiment 1) and objects (Experiment 2). Our results indicated that monkeys achieved the learning criterion faster with food stimuli compared to both images and objects. They also required consistently fewer trials with objects than with images. Moreover, female capuchins had higher levels of acquisition accuracy with food stimuli than with images. Finally, capuchins did not immediately transfer the solution of the problem acquired in one task condition to the other conditions. Overall, these findings suggest that--even in relatively simple visual discrimination problems where a single perceptual dimension (i.e., size) has to be judged--learning speed strongly depends on the mode of presentation.

When maths trumps logic: probabilistic judgements in chimpanzees.

When searching for hidden food, do chimpanzees take into account both the number of hidden items and the number of potential hiding locations? We presented chimpanzees with two trays, each of them containing a different food/cup ratio and therefore a different likelihood of finding a baited cup among empty alternatives. Subjects' performance was directly influenced by the relative difference (probability ratio (PR)) between the two given probabilities. Interestingly, however, they did not appreciate the special value of a truly safe option (with P = 1.0). Instead, they seemed to 'blindly' rely on the PR between the two options, systematically preferring the more likely one once a certain threshold had been reached. A control condition ruled out the possibility of low-level learning explanations for the observed performance.

Comparing the performances of apes (Gorilla gorilla, Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus) and human children (Homo sapiens) in the floating peanut task.

Recently, Mendes et al. [1] described the use of a liquid tool (water) in captive orangutans. Here, we tested chimpanzees and gorillas for the first time with the same "floating peanut task." None of the subjects solved the task. In order to better understand the cognitive demands of the task, we further tested other populations of chimpanzees and orangutans with the variation of the peanut initially floating or not. Twenty percent of the chimpanzees but none of the orangutans were successful. Additional controls revealed that successful subjects added water only if it was necessary to obtain the nut. Another experiment was conducted to investigate the reason for the differences in performance between the unsuccessful (Experiment 1) and the successful (Experiment 2) chimpanzee populations. We found suggestive evidence for the view that functional fixedness might have impaired the chimpanzees' strategies in the first experiment. Finally, we tested how human children of different age classes perform in an analogous experimental setting. Within the oldest group (8 years), 58 percent of the children solved the problem, whereas in the youngest group (4 years), only 8 percent were able to find the solution.

Chimpanzee problem-solving: contrasting the use of causal and arbitrary cues.

Humans are able to benefit from a causally structured problem-solving context rather than arbitrarily structured situations. In order to better understand nonhuman causal cognition, it is therefore important to isolate crucial factors that might differentiate between events that follow a purely spatial and temporal contingency and those that hold a "true" causal relationship. In the first of two experiments, chimpanzee subjects were required to detect a bottle containing juice from five opaque bottles of equal shape and size. In the causal condition, the juice bottle looked identical to the other four bottles, only it was much heavier than the others. In the arbitrary condition, the weight of all five bottles was identical, but the juice bottle was color-marked differently. Since bottle opening was made difficult (and therefore costly), the question was whether subject's manipulative behavior would be random or somehow influenced by the nature of the provided information. Our results show that subjects detected and opened the juice bottle significantly faster when weight was the discriminating feature (causal condition) compared to situations in which the discrimination was necessarily based on a color-cue (arbitrary condition). Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility of a general learning bias toward tactile rather than visual information in chimpanzees. When tested in a simple exchange paradigm that prevented any use of causal information, no predominance of a tactile cue (weight) over a visual cue (color) could be found. Furthermore--and in contrast to the causal condition in Experiment 1--no learning occurred during the course of Experiment 2, neither in the weight nor in the color condition. We therefore conclude that chimpanzees can more easily determine the content of an object based on its causal properties compared to situations in which the only available information is a pure arbitrary regularity. This supports the view that chimpanzees' causal cognition does not rely on mere perceptual information but also on structural abstraction about their physical environment.

Discrete quantity judgments in the great apes (Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, Gorilla gorilla, Pongo pygmaeus): the effect of presenting whole sets versus item-by-item.

The authors examined quantity-based judgments for up to 10 items for simultaneous and sequential whole sets as well as for sequentially dropped items in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), bonobos (Pan paniscus), and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). In Experiment 1, subjects had to choose the larger of 2 quantities presented in 2 separate dishes either simultaneously or 1 dish after the other. Representatives of all species were capable of selecting the larger of 2 quantities in both conditions, even when the quantities were large and the numerical distance between them was small. In Experiment 2, subjects had to select between the same food quantities sequentially dropped into 2 opaque cups so that none of the quantities were ever viewed as a whole. The authors found some evidence (albeit weaker) that subjects were able to select the larger quantity of items. Furthermore, the authors found no performance breakdown with the inclusion of certain quantities. Instead, the ratio between quantities was the best performance predictor. The authors conclude that quantity-based judgments rely on an analogical system, not a discrete object file model or perceptual estimation mechanism, such as subitizing.

Raising the level: orangutans use water as a tool.

We investigated the use of water as a tool by presenting five orangutans (Pongo abelii) with an out-of-reach peanut floating inside a vertical transparent tube. All orangutans collected water from a drinker and spat it inside the tube to get access to the peanut. Subjects required an average of three mouthfuls of water to get the peanut. This solution occurred in the first trial and all subjects continued using this successful strategy in subsequent trials. The latency to retrieve the reward drastically decreased after the first trial. Moreover, the latency between mouthfuls also decreased dramatically from the first mouthful in the first trial to any subsequent ones in the same trial or subsequent trials. Additional control conditions suggested that this response was not due to the mere presence of the tube, to the existence of water inside, or frustration at not getting the reward. The sudden acquisition of the behaviour, the timing of the actions and the differences with the control conditions make this behaviour a likely candidate for insightful problem solving.

Spontaneous altruism by chimpanzees and young children.

People often act on behalf of others. They do so without immediate personal gain, at cost to themselves, and even toward unfamiliar individuals. Many researchers have claimed that such altruism emanates from a species-unique psychology not found in humans' closest living evolutionary relatives, such as the chimpanzee. In favor of this view, the few experimental studies on altruism in chimpanzees have produced mostly negative results. In contrast, we report experimental evidence that chimpanzees perform basic forms of helping in the absence of rewards spontaneously and repeatedly toward humans and conspecifics. In two comparative studies, semi-free ranging chimpanzees helped an unfamiliar human to the same degree as did human infants, irrespective of being rewarded (experiment 1) or whether the helping was costly (experiment 2). In a third study, chimpanzees helped an unrelated conspecific gain access to food in a novel situation that required subjects to use a newly acquired skill on behalf of another individual. These results indicate that chimpanzees share crucial aspects of altruism with humans, suggesting that the roots of human altruism may go deeper than previous experimental evidence suggested.