Neural specialization for 'visual' concepts emerges in the absence of vision.

Vision provides a key source of information about many concepts, including 'living things' (e.g., tiger) and visual events (e.g., sparkle). According to a prominent theoretical framework, neural specialization for different conceptual categories is shaped by sensory features, e.g., living things are neurally dissociable from navigable places because living things concepts depend more on visual features. We tested this framework by comparing the neural basis of 'visual' concepts across sighted (n=22) and congenitally blind (n=21) adults. Participants judged the similarity of words varying in their reliance on vision while undergoing fMRI. We compared neural responses to living things nouns (birds, mammals) and place nouns (natural, manmade). In addition, we compared visual event verbs (e.g., 'sparkle') to non-visual events (sound emission, hand motion, mouth motion). People born blind exhibited distinctive univariate and multivariate responses to living things in a temporo-parietal semantic network activated by nouns, including the precuneus (PC). To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration that neural selectivity for living things does not require vision. We additionally observed preserved neural signatures of 'visual' light events in the left middle temporal gyrus (LMTG+). Across a wide range of semantic types, neural representations of sensory concepts develop independent of sensory experience.

MEG correlates of speech planning in simple vs. interactive picture naming in children and adults.

The picture naming task is common both as a clinical task and as a method to study the neural bases of speech production in the healthy brain. However, this task is not reflective of most naturally occurring productions, which tend to happen within a context, typically in dialogue in response to someone else's production. How the brain basis of the classic "confrontation picture naming" task compares to the planning of utterances in dialogue is not known. Here we used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to measure neural activity associated with language production using the classic picture naming task as well as a minimal variant of the task, intended as more interactive or dialogue-like. We assessed how neural activity is affected by the interactive context in children, teenagers, and adults. The general pattern was that in adults, the interactive task elicited a robust sustained increase of activity in frontal and temporal cortices bilaterally, as compared to simple picture naming. This increase was present only in the left hemisphere in teenagers and was absent in children, who, in fact, showed the reverse effect. Thus our findings suggest a robustly bilateral neural basis for the coordination of interaction and a very slow developmental timeline for this network.

Non-literal language processing is jointly supported by the language and theory of mind networks: Evidence from a novel meta-analytic fMRI approach.

Going beyond the literal meaning of language is key to communicative success. However, the mechanisms that support non-literal inferences remain debated. Using a novel meta-analytic approach, we evaluate the contribution of linguistic, social-cognitive, and executive mechanisms to non-literal interpretation. We identified 74 fMRI experiments (n = 1,430 participants) from 2001 to 2021 that contrasted non-literal language comprehension with a literal control condition, spanning ten phenomena (e.g., metaphor, irony, indirect speech). Applying the activation likelihood estimation approach to the 825 activation peaks yielded six left-lateralized clusters. We then evaluated the locations of both the individual-study peaks and the clusters against probabilistic functional atlases (cf. anatomical locations, as is typically done) for three candidate brain networks-the language-selective network (Fedorenko, Behr, & Kanwisher, 2011), which supports language processing, the Theory of Mind (ToM) network (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), which supports social inferences, and the domain-general Multiple-Demand (MD) network (Duncan, 2010), which supports executive control. These atlases were created by overlaying individual activation maps of participants who performed robust and extensively validated 'localizer' tasks that selectively target each network in question (n = 806 for language; n = 198 for ToM; n = 691 for MD). We found that both the individual-study peaks and the ALE clusters fell primarily within the language network and the ToM network. These results suggest that non-literal processing is supported by both i) mechanisms that process literal linguistic meaning, and ii) mechanisms that support general social inference. They thus undermine a strong divide between literal and non-literal aspects of language and challenge the claim that non-literal processing requires additional executive resources.

Inflection across Categories: Tracking Abstract Morphological Processing in Language Production with MEG.

Coherent language production requires that speakers adapt words to their grammatical contexts. A fundamental challenge in establishing a functional delineation of this process in the brain is that each linguistic process tends to correlate with numerous others. Our work investigated the neural basis of morphological inflection by measuring magnetoencephalography during the planning of inflected and uninflected utterances that varied across several linguistic dimensions. Results reveal increased activity in the left lateral frontotemporal cortex when inflection is planned, irrespective of phonological specification, syntactic context, or semantic type. Additional findings from univariate and connectivity analyses suggest that the brain distinguishes between different types of inflection. Specifically, planning noun and verb utterances requiring the addition of the suffix -s elicited increased activity in the ventral prefrontal cortex. A broadly distributed effect of syntactic context (verb vs. noun) was also identified. Results from representational similarity analysis indicate that this effect cannot be explained in terms of word meaning. Together, these results 1) offer evidence for a neural representation of abstract inflection that separates from other stimulus properties and 2) challenge theories that emphasize semantic content as a source of verb/noun processing differences.