When are people more open to cheating? Economic inequality makes people expect more everyday unethical behavior.

Economic inequality has been found to be associated with increased unethical behavior and an increased acceptance of unethical behavior. In this paper we explored whether higher amounts of perceived inequality lead to an increase in the expectation of unethical behavior. We tested whether people would say that they themselves would engage in more unethical behavior in a context of high compared to low inequality. We find evidence for this hypothesis in 3 of 4 studies (n = 3,038). An internal meta-analysis shows a small but significant effect. Such increased expectations that oneself will behave unethically likely has consequences for societal trust and functioning.

Shame and anger differentially predict disidentification between collectivistic and individualistic societies.

In the present research we tested the differential effects of anger versus shame as emotional predictors of ingroup disidentification in one rather collectivistic (Japan) and two rather individualistic societies (Germany, Canada). We tested the idea that individuals cope with socially undesired emotions by disidentifying from their group. Specifically, we predicted that after a group conflict, anger, an undesired emotion in Japan, would elicit disidentification in Japan, whereas shame, an undesired emotion in Canada and Germany, would elicit disidentification in Germany and Canada. Study 1 (N = 378) found that anger, but not shame, was related to disidentification in Japan, whereas shame, but not anger, was related to disidentification in Canada and Germany. Study 2 (N = 171) shows that, after group conflict, Japanese disidentified more when imagining to feel angry, whereas Germans disidentified more when imagining to feel ashamed. Implications for these findings are discussed.

Leadership in the eye of the beholder: Follower self-esteem is associated with divergent perceptions of leadership ability for dominant and prestigious leaders.

OBJECTIVE: Drawing from dual-strategies theory, leader-member exchange theory, and several theories of self-esteem, we develop and test hypotheses about how followers' self-esteem predicts their perceptions of dominant and prestigious leaders' leadership ability. METHOD: Across four studies (N = 1568), we tested the association between self-esteem and perceptions of leadership ability for dominant and prestigious leaders. RESULTS: Individuals with high self-esteem perceived greater leadership ability in prestigious leaders than did those with low self-esteem and individuals with low self-esteem perceived greater leadership ability in dominant leaders than did those with high self-esteem. These results emerged across ratings of leaders from hypothetical vignettes (Studies 1 and 4), abstract beliefs about what constitutes good leadership (Study 1), past personal experiences with leaders (Study 2) and clips of leaders from reality television (Study 3). In Study 4, we also tested potential mechanisms. Compared with followers with low self-esteem, followers with high self-esteem found prestigious leaders more trustworthy, and they anticipated feeling inauthentic around a dominant leader. CONCLUSIONS: Self-esteem is reliably and robustly related to perceived leadership ability of dominant and prestigious leaders, and these differences might stem from differences in trust in prestigious leaders and anticipated authenticity around dominant leaders.

From Freud to Android: Constructing a Scale of Uncanny Feelings.

The uncanny valley is a topic for engineers, animators, and psychologists, yet uncanny emotions are without a clear definition. Across three studies, we developed an 8-item measure of unnerved feelings, finding that it was discriminable from other affective experiences. In Study 1, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis that yielded two factors; an unnerved factor, which connects to emotional reactions to the uncanny, and a disoriented factor, which connects to mental state changes more distally following uncanny experiences. Focusing on the unnerved measure, Study 2 tests the scale's convergent and discriminant validity, concluding that participants who watched an uncanny video were more unnerved than those who watched a disgusting, fearful, or a neutral video. In Study 3, we determined that our scale detects unnerved feelings created during early 2020 by the coronavirus pandemic; a distinct source of uncanniness. These studies contribute to the psychological and interdisciplinary understanding of this strange, eerie phenomenon of being confronted with what looms just beyond our understanding.

The (im-)moral scientist? Measurement and framing effects shape the association between scientists and immorality.

Recent years have not only seen growing public distrust in science, but also in the people conducting science. Yet, attitudes toward scientists remain largely unexplored, and the limited body of literature that exists points to an interesting ambivalence. While survey data suggest scientists to be positively evaluated (e.g., respected and trusted), research has found scientists to be perceived as capable of immoral behavior. We report two experiments aimed at identifying what contributes to this ambivalence through systematic investigations of stereotypical perceptions of scientists. In these studies, we particularly focus on two potential sources of inconsistencies in previous work: divergent operationalizations of morality (measurement effects), and different specifications of the broad group of scientists (framing effects). Results show that scientists are generally perceived as more likely to violate binding as opposed to individualizing moral foundations, and that they deviate from control groups more strongly on the latter. The extent to which different morality measures reflect the differentiation between binding and individualizing moral foundations at least partially accounts for previous contradictory findings. Moreover, the results indicate large variation in perceptions of different types of scientists: people hold more positive attitudes toward university-affiliated scientists as compared to industry-affiliated scientists, with perceptions of the 'typical scientist' more closely resembling the latter. Taken together, the findings have important academic ramifications for science skepticism, morality, and stereotyping research as well as valuable practical implications for successful science communication.

The dubious precision and utility of heritability estimates.

Uchiyama et al. question heritability estimates in a convincing manner. We offer additional arguments to further bolster their claims, highlighting methodological issues in heritability coefficients' derivation, their misuse in various contexts, and their potential contributions to exacerbating common erroneous intuitions that have been shown to lead to deleterious social phenomena. We conclude that science should move away from using them.

Subjective Economic Inequality Decreases Emotional Intelligence, Especially for People of High Social Class.

Across five studies (three preregistered; N = 2,481), we investigated two effects as follows: (1) Is higher subjective economic inequality associated with a decreased ability to accurately identify emotions (emotional intelligence)? When inequality is high, people are less focused on others and may thus be less motivated to correctly identify their emotions. (2) Is this main effect of subjective inequality qualified by an interaction with socioeconomic status (SES)? Past research suggests that high SES leads to lower emotional intelligence because people of higher SES are less dependent on others and thus less motivated to identify their emotions. When perceiving higher inequality, high SES individuals should feel even more self-reliant, thereby exacerbating the difference in emotional intelligence between people of low and high SES. We provide empirical support in three out of five studies for the first and in four out of five studies for the second hypothesis. An internal meta-analysis supported both hypotheses.

The Construct of Subjective Economic Inequality.

Economic inequality has been associated with a host of social ills, but most research has focused on objective measures of inequality. We argue that economic inequality also has a subjective component, and understanding the effects of economic inequality will be deepened by considering the ways that people perceive inequality. In an American sample (N = 1,014), we find that some of the key variables that past research has found to correlate with objective inequality also correlate with a subjective measure of inequality. Across six countries (N = 683), we find that the relationship between subjective inequality and different psychological variables varies by country. Subjective inequality shows only modest correlations with objective inequality and varies by sociodemographic background.

The role of genetic essentialism and genetics knowledge in support for eugenics and genetically modified foods.

People are regularly exposed to discussions about the role of genes in their lives, despite often having limited understanding about how they operate. The tendency to oversimplify genetic causes, and ascribe them with undue influence is termed genetic essentialism. Two studies revealed that genetic essentialism is associated with support for eugenic policies and social attitudes based in social inequality, and less acceptance of genetically modified foods. These views about eugenics and genetically-modified foods were especially evident among people who had less knowledge about genes, potentially highlighting the value of education in genetics.

Considering cross-cultural differences in sleep duration between Japanese and Canadian university students.

Sleep is a fundamental biological process that all humans exhibit, and there is much evidence that people suffer adverse health outcomes from insufficient sleep. Despite this evidence, much research demonstrates significant heterogeneity in the amounts that people sleep across cultures. This suggests that despite serving fundamental biological functions, sleep is also subject to cultural influence. Using self-report and actigraphy data we examined sleep among European Canadian, Asian Canadian, and Japanese university students. Significant cultural differences emerged in terms of various parameters of sleep (e.g. sleep time), and beliefs about sleep (e.g. perceived relation between sleep and health). Despite sleeping significantly less than European Canadians, Japanese participants slept less efficiently, yet reported being less tired and having better health. Moreover, relative to European Canadians, Japanese participants perceived a weaker relation between sleep and physical health, and had a significantly shorter ideal amount of sleep. Asian Canadians' sleep behaviors and attitudes were largely similar to European Canadians suggesting that people acculturate to local cultural sleep norms.

Exploring people's thoughts about the causes of ethnic stereotypes.

Much research has shown that people tend to view genes in rather deterministic ways-often termed genetic essentialism. We explored how people would view the causes of ethnic stereotypes in contexts where human genetic variability was either emphasized or downplayed. In two studies with over 1600 participants we found that people viewed ethnic stereotypes to be more of a function of underlying genetics after they read an article describing how ancestry can be estimated by geographic distributions of gene frequencies than after reading an article describing how relatively homogeneous the human genome was or after reading a control essay. Moreover, people were more likely to attribute ethnic stereotypes to genes when they scored higher on a measure of genetic essentialism or when they had less knowledge about genes. Our understanding of stereotypes is a function of our understanding of genetics.

Making Sense of Genetics: The Problem of Essentialism.

"Psychological essentialism" refers to our tendency to view the natural world as emerging from the result of deep, hidden, and internal forces called "essences." People tend to believe that genes underlie a person's identity. People encounter information about genetics on a regular basis, as through media such as a New York Times piece "Infidelity Lurks in Your Genes" or a 23andMe commercial showing people acquiring new ethnic identities as the result of their genotyping. How do people make sense of new scientific findings that are inherently complex if they don't have years of specialized training and education at their disposal? Given the substantial overlap between a lay understanding of genetics and lay intuitions about essences, we argue that, when most people are thinking about genes, they are not really thinking about genes in the complex ways that good scientists are. Combating people's essentialist biases can be a formidable challenge. Although we have identified some promising results of trying to reduce people's genetic essentialist tendencies, there is still much to learn about how these essentialist biases can be countered. It is important to help people understand genetic information so they are able make well-informed decisions about their lives.

The Influence of Acetaminophen on Task Related Attention.

Our study was designed to examine whether the pain reliever acetaminophen impacts the normal ebb-and-flow of off-task attentional states, such as captured by the phenomenon of mind wandering. In a placebo-controlled between-groups design, participants performed a sustained attention to response task while event-related potentials (ERPs) to target events were recorded. Participants were queried at random intervals for their attentional reports - either "on-task" or "off-task." The frequency of these reports and the ERPs generated by the preceding target events were assessed. Behaviorally, the frequency of off-task attentional reports was comparable between groups. Electrophysiologically, two findings emerged: first, the amplitude of the P300 ERP component elicited by target events was significantly attenuated during off-task vs. on-task attentional states in both the acetaminophen and placebo groups. Second, the amplitude of the LPP ERP component elicited by target events showed a significant decrease during off-task attentional states that was specific to the acetaminophen group. Taken together, our findings support the conclusion that acetaminophen doesn't impact our relative propensity to drift into off-task attentional states, but it does affect the depth of neurocognitive disengagement during off-task attentional states, and in particular, at the level of post-categorization stimulus evaluations indexed by the LPP.

Searching for answers in an uncertain world: Meaning threats lead to increased working memory capacity.

The Meaning Maintenance Model posits that individuals seek to resolve uncertainty by searching for patterns in the environment, yet little is known about how this is accomplished. Four studies investigated whether uncertainty has an effect on people's cognitive functioning. In particular, we investigated whether meaning threats lead to increased working memory capacity. In each study, we exposed participants to either an uncertain stimulus used to threaten meaning in past studies, or a control stimulus. Participants then completed a working memory measure, where they either had to recall lists of words (Studies 1, 2), or strings of digits (Studies 3, 4). We used both a frequentist approach and Bayesian analysis to evaluate our findings. Across the four studies, we find a small but consistent effect, where participants in the meaning threat condition show improved performance on the working memory tasks. Overall, our findings were consistent with the hypothesis that working memory capacity increases when people experience a meaning threat, which may help to explain improved pattern recognition. Additionally, our results highlight the value of using a Bayesian analytic approach, particularly when studying phenomena with high variance.

Overconfidence is universal? Elicitation of Genuine Overconfidence (EGO) procedure reveals systematic differences across domain, task knowledge, and incentives in four populations.

Overconfidence is sometimes assumed to be a human universal, but there remains a dearth of data systematically measuring overconfidence across populations and contexts. Moreover, cross-cultural experiments often fail to distinguish between placement and precision and worse still, often compare population-mean placement estimates rather than individual performance subtracted from placement. Here we introduce a procedure for concurrently capturing both placement and precision at an individual level based on individual performance: The Elicitation of Genuine Overconfidence (EGO) procedure. We conducted experiments using the EGO procedure, manipulating domain, task knowledge, and incentives across four populations-Japanese, Hong Kong Chinese, Euro Canadians, and East Asian Canadians. We find that previous measures of population-level overconfidence may have been misleading; rather than universal, overconfidence is highly context dependent. Our results reveal cross-cultural differences in sensitivity to incentives and differences in overconfidence strategies, with underconfidence, accuracy, and overconfidence. Comparing sexes, we find inconsistent results for overplacement, but that males are consistently more confident in their placement. These findings have implications for our understanding of the adaptive value of overconfidence and its role in explaining population-level and individual-level differences in economic and psychological behavior.

A Sense of Obligation: Cultural Differences in the Experience of Obligation.

In this investigation of cultural differences in the experience of obligation, we distinguish between Confucian Role Ethics versus Relative Autonomy lay theories of motivation and illustrate them with data showing relevant cultural differences in both social judgments and intrapersonal experience. First, when judging others, Western European heritage culture (WEHC) participants (relative to Confucian heritage culture [CHC] participants) judged obligation-motivated actors more negatively than those motivated by agency (Study 1, N = 529). Second, in daily diary and situation sampling studies, CHC participants (relative to WEHC participants) perceived more congruency between their own agentic and obligated motivations, and more positive emotional associations with obligated motivations (Study 2, N = 200 and Study 3, N = 244). Agentic motivation, however, was universally associated with positive emotions. More research on a Role Ethics rather than Relative Autonomy conception of agency may improve our understanding of human motivation, especially across cultures.

The Immoral Landscape? Scientists Are Associated with Violations of Morality.

Do people think that scientists are bad people? Although surveys find that science is a highly respected profession, a growing discourse has emerged regarding how science is often judged negatively. We report ten studies (N = 2328) that investigated morality judgments of scientists and compared those with judgments of various control groups, including atheists. A persistent intuitive association between scientists and disturbing immoral conduct emerged for violations of the binding moral foundations, particularly when this pertained to violations of purity. However, there was no association in the context of the individualizing moral foundations related to fairness and care. Other evidence found that scientists were perceived as similar to others in their concerns with the individualizing moral foundations of fairness and care, yet as departing for all of the binding foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity. Furthermore, participants stereotyped scientists particularly as robot-like and lacking emotions, as well as valuing knowledge over morality and being potentially dangerous. The observed intuitive immorality associations are partially due to these explicit stereotypes but do not correlate with any perceived atheism. We conclude that scientists are perceived not as inherently immoral, but as capable of immoral conduct.

Acetaminophen attenuates error evaluation in cortex.

Acetaminophen has recently been recognized as having impacts that extend into the affective domain. In particular, double blind placebo controlled trials have revealed that acetaminophen reduces the magnitude of reactivity to social rejection, frustration, dissonance and to both negatively and positively valenced attitude objects. Given this diversity of consequences, it has been proposed that the psychological effects of acetaminophen may reflect a widespread blunting of evaluative processing. We tested this hypothesis using event-related potentials (ERPs). Sixty-two participants received acetaminophen or a placebo in a double-blind protocol and completed the Go/NoGo task. Participants' ERPs were observed following errors on the Go/NoGo task, in particular the error-related negativity (ERN; measured at FCz) and error-related positivity (Pe; measured at Pz and CPz). Results show that acetaminophen inhibits the Pe, but not the ERN, and the magnitude of an individual's Pe correlates positively with omission errors, partially mediating the effects of acetaminophen on the error rate. These results suggest that recently documented affective blunting caused by acetaminophen may best be described as an inhibition of evaluative processing. They also contribute to the growing work suggesting that the Pe is more strongly associated with conscious awareness of errors relative to the ERN.

The double-edged sword of genetic accounts of criminality: causal attributions from genetic ascriptions affect legal decision making.

Much debate exists surrounding the applicability of genetic information in the courtroom, making the psychological processes underlying how people consider this information important to explore. This article addresses how people think about different kinds of causal explanations in legal decision-making contexts. Three studies involving a total of 600 Mechanical Turk and university participants found that genetic, versus environmental, explanations of criminal behavior lead people to view the applicability of various defense claims differently, perceive the perpetrator's mental state differently, and draw different causal attributions. Moreover, mediation and path analyses highlight the double-edged nature of genetic attributions-they simultaneously reduce people's perception of the perpetrator's sense of control while increasing people's tendencies to attribute the cause to internal factors and to expect the perpetrator to reoffend. These countervailing relations, in turn, predict sentencing in opposite directions, although no overall differences in sentencing or ultimate verdicts were found.

Is dissonance reduction a special case of fluid compensation? Evidence that dissonant cognitions cause compensatory affirmation and abstraction.

Cognitive dissonance theory shares much in common with other perspectives that address anomalies, uncertainty, and general expectancy violations. This has led some theorists to argue that these theories represent overlapping psychological processes. If responding to dissonance and uncertainty occurs through a common psychological process, one should expect that the behavioral outcomes of feeling uncertain would also apply to feelings of dissonance, and vice versa. One specific prediction from the meaning maintenance model would be that cognitive dissonance, like other expectancy violations, should lead to the affirmation of unrelated beliefs, or the abstraction of unrelated schemas when the dissonant event cannot be easily accommodated. This article presents 4 studies (N = 1124) demonstrating that the classic induced-compliance dissonance paradigm can lead not only to a change of attitudes (dissonance reduction), but also to (a) an increased reported belief in God (Study 2), (b) a desire to punish norm-violators (Study 1 and 3), (c) a motivation to detect patterns amid noise (Study 3), and (d) polarizing support of public policies among those already biased toward a particular side (Study 4). These results are congruent with theories that propose content-general fluid compensation following the experience of anomaly, a finding not predicted by dissonance theory. The results suggest that dissonance reduction behaviors may share psychological processes described by other theories addressing violations of expectations.