The neural correlates of topographical disorientation-a lesion analysis study.

Topographical disorientation refers to the selective inability to orient oneself in familiar surroundings. However, to date its neural correlates remain poorly understood. Here we use quantitative lesion analysis and a lesion network mapping approach in order to investigate seven patients with topographical disorientation. Our findings link not only the posterior parahippocampal gyrus (PHG) and retrosplenial cortex but also the lingual gyrus, the precuneus and the fusiform gyrus to topographical disorientation. We propose that topographical disorientation is due to the inability to integrate familiar landmarks within a framework of allocentric and egocentric orientation, supported by a neural network including the posterior PHG, the retrosplenial and the lingual cortex.

REM sleep and muscle atonia in brainstem stroke: A quantitative polysomnographic and lesion analysis study.

Important brainstem regions are involved in the regulation of rapid eye movement sleep. We hypothesized that brainstem stroke is associated with dysregulated rapid eye movement sleep and related muscle activity. We compared quantitative/qualitative polysomnography features of rapid eye movement sleep and muscle activity (any, phasic, tonic) between 15 patients with brainstem stroke (N = 46 rapid eye movement periods), 16 patients with lacunar/non-brainstem stroke (N = 40 rapid eye movement periods), 15 healthy controls (N = 62 rapid eye movement periods), and patients with Parkinson's disease and polysomnography-confirmed rapid eye movement sleep behaviour disorder. Further, in the brainstem group, we performed a magnetic resonance imaging-based lesion overlap analysis. The mean ratio of muscle activity to rapid eye movement sleep epoch in the brainstem group ("any" muscle activity 0.09 ± 0.15; phasic muscle activity 0.08 ± 0.14) was significantly lower than in the lacunar group ("any" muscle activity 0.17 ± 0.2, p < 0.05; phasic muscle activity 0.16 ± 0.19, p < 0.05), and also lower than in the control group ("any" muscle activity 0.15 ± 0.17, p < 0.05). Magnetic resonance imaging-based lesion analysis indicated an area of maximum overlap in the medioventral pontine region for patients with reduced phasic muscle activity index. For all groups, mean values of muscle activity were significantly lower than in the patients with Parkinson's disease and polysomnography-confirmed REM sleep behaviour disorder group ("any" activity 0.51 ± 0.26, p < 0.0001 for all groups; phasic muscle activity 0.42 ± 0.21, p < 0.0001 for all groups). For the tonic muscle activity in the mentalis muscle, no significant differences were found between the groups. In the brainstem group, contrary to the lacunar and the control groups, "any" muscle activity index during rapid eye movement sleep was significantly reduced after the third rapid eye movement sleep phase. This study reports on the impact of brainstem stroke on rapid eye movement atonia features in a human cohort. Our findings highlight the important role of the human brainstem, in particular the medioventral pontine regions, in the regulation of phasic muscle activity during rapid eye movement sleep and the ultradian distribution of rapid eye movement-related muscle activity.

Common and distinct brain networks of autoscopic phenomena.

OBJECTIVE: Autoscopic phenomena (AP) are illusory own body reduplications characterized by the visual perception of a second own body in extrapersonal space, and include three main forms: autoscopic hallucination (AH), heautoscopy (HAS) and out-of-body-experience (OBE). Past research showed that lesions were heterogeneously distributed and affected many different brain regions within and across patients, while small case series suggested that AP lesions converge in temporo-parietal and parieto-occipital cortex. As only few studies investigated each form of AP separately, it remains unknown whether the three AP are characterized by common and distinct brain mechanisms. METHODS: Here, we applied lesion network analysis in 26 neurological AP patients and determined their common and distinct functional connectivity patterns. RESULTS: We report that all localize to a single common brain network at the bilateral temporo-parietal junction, further associated with specific patterns of functional connectivity, defining each type of AP. OBE resulted from a brain network connected to bilateral angular gyrus, right precuneus, and right inferior frontal gyrus, differing from AH with a brain network connected to bilateral precuneus, inferior temporal gyrus, and cerebellum. HAS resulted from a brain network connected to left inferior frontal gyrus, left insula and left parahippocampus. CONCLUSION: The present data identify the temporo-parietal junction as the common core region for AP and show that each form of AP recruits additional specific networks, associated with different sensorimotor and self-related sub-networks.

Interoception and Empathy Impact Perspective Taking.

Adopting the perspective of another person is an important aspect of social cognition and has been shown to depend on multisensory signals from one's own body. Recent work suggests that interoceptive signals not only contribute to own-body perception and self-consciousness, but also to empathy. Here we investigated if social cognition - in particular adopting the perspective of another person - can be altered by a systematic manipulation of interoceptive cues and further, if this effect depends on empathic ability. The own-body transformation task (OBT) - wherein participants are instructed to imagine taking the perspective and position of a virtual body presented on a computer screen - offers an effective way to measure reaction time differences linked to the mental effort of taking an other's perspective. Here, we adapted the OBT with the flashing of a silhouette surrounding the virtual body, either synchronously or asynchronously with the timing of participants' heartbeats. We evaluated the impact of this cardio-visual synchrony on reaction times and accuracy rates in the OBT. Empathy was assessed with the empathy quotient (EQ) questionnaire. Based on previous work using the cardio-visual paradigm, we predicted that synchronous (vs. asynchronous) cardio-visual stimulation would increase self-identification with the virtual body and facilitate participants' ability to adopt the virtual body's perspective, thereby enhancing performance on the task, particularly in participants with higher empathy scores. We report that participants with high empathy showed significantly better performance during the OBT task during synchronous versus asynchronous cardio-visual stimulation. Moreover, we found a significant positive correlation between empathic ability and the synchrony effect (the difference in reaction times between the asynchronous and synchronous conditions). We conclude that synchronous cardio-visual stimulation between the participant's body and a virtual body during an OBT task makes it easier to adopt the virtual body's perspective, presumably based on multisensory integration processes. However, this effect depended on empathic ability, suggesting that empathy, interoception and social perspective taking are inherently linked.

Depersonalization- and derealization-like phenomena of epileptic origin.

OBJECTIVE: Depersonalization refers to the sensation of being detached from one's body, often associated with feelings of loss of control over one's own body, actions, or thoughts. Derealization refers to the altered perception of one's surroundings that is experienced as unreal. Although usually reported by psychiatric patients suffering from depression or anxiety, single case reports and small case series have described depersonalization- and derealization-like symptoms in the context of epilepsy. METHODS: We investigated the brain mechanisms of ictal depersonalization- and derealization like symptoms by analyzing clinical and neuropsychological data as well as the epileptogenic zone based on a multimodal approach in a group of patients reporting depersonalization- (n = 9) and derealization-like symptoms (n = 7), from a single presurgical epilepsy center with focal epilepsy. We compared them with a group of control patients with experiential phenomena due to temporal lobe epilepsy (n = 28). RESULTS: We show that all patients with ictal depersonalization-like symptoms report altered self-identification with their body and mostly suffer from frontal lobe epilepsy with the epileptogenic zone in the dorsal premotor cortex, while patients with derealization-like symptoms suffer from temporal lobe epilepsy. This finding is supported by post-ictal neuropsychological deficits, showing that depersonalization-like symptoms were significantly more often associated with frontal lobe dysfunction as compared to the control patients and patients with derealization-like symptoms. CONCLUSION: We argue that depersonalization of epileptic origin constitutes a distinct disorder due to frontal lobe epilepsy. We discuss these findings with respect to earlier accounts of depersonalization and the recent concept of bodily self-consciousness.

Cardio-visual full body illusion alters bodily self-consciousness and tactile processing in somatosensory cortex.

Prominent theories highlight the importance of bodily perception for self-consciousness, but it is currently not known whether this is based on interoceptive or exteroceptive signals or on integrated signals from these anatomically distinct systems, nor where in the brain such integration might occur. To investigate this, we measured brain activity during the recently described 'cardio-visual full body illusion' which combines interoceptive and exteroceptive signals, by providing participants with visual exteroceptive information about their heartbeat in the form of a periodically illuminated silhouette outlining a video image of the participant's body and flashing in synchrony with their heartbeat. We found, as also reported previously, that synchronous cardio-visual signals increased self-identification with the virtual body. Here we further investigated whether experimental changes in self-consciousness during this illusion are accompanied by activity changes in somatosensory cortex by recording somatosensory evoked potentials (SEPs). We show that a late somatosensory evoked potential component (P45) reflects the illusory self-identification with a virtual body. These data demonstrate that interoceptive and exteroceptive signals can be combined to modulate activity in parietal somatosensory cortex.

Illusory hand ownership in a patient with personal neglect for the upper limb, but no somatoparaphenia.

The symptoms of patients with left personal neglect are characterized by inattention towards contralesional (left) body parts while at the same time explicitly ascertaining ownership for the neglected hemibody. It is currently unknown if personal neglect is associated with more subtle or implicit disturbances of own body perception and body ownership as measured with the rubber hand illusion. In this study, we report data from a patient with a right hemispheric lesion and personal neglect, without associated somatosensory deficits. We administered to the patient (and to 12 age-matched controls) the rubber hand illusion paradigm to the right and left hands, to elicit illusory ownership for a fake hand, before and after recovery from personal neglect for the left arm. In a first session, run when the patient showed personal neglect affecting the left arm, he experienced a significantly enhanced subjective illusion of embodiment for the left fake hand as compared to the right hand (as assessed through a standard questionnaire). After recovery from personal neglect for the left arm (second session), the results of the left and right rubber hand illusion experiments were comparable, with no modulation of hand ownership. We argue that personal neglect may consist not only in an inattentional disorder, but also in a deficit of multisensory body representation characterized by a high sensitivity to experimental manipulations of subjective aspects of body ownership.

Lateralising value of experiential hallucinations in temporal lobe epilepsy.

OBJECTIVES: Ever since John Hughlings Jackson first described the so-called 'dreamy state' during temporal lobe epilepsy, that is, the sense of an abnormal familiarity (déjà vu) or vivid memory-like hallucinations from the past (experiential hallucinations), these phenomena have been studied and repeatedly linked to mesial temporal lobe structures. However, little is known about the lateralising value of either déjà vu or experiential hallucinations. METHODS: We analysed a sample of 28 patients with intractable focal epilepsy suffering from either déjà vu or experiential hallucinations. All the patients underwent thorough presurgical examination, including MRI, positron emission tomography, single-photon emission CT, EEG and neuropsychological examination. RESULTS: While déjà vu was due to right or left mesial temporal lobe epilepsy, experiential hallucinations were strongly lateralised to the left mesial temporal lobe. Moreover, there was a significant effect for interictal language deficits being more frequent in patients suffering from experiential hallucinations. CONCLUSIONS: These results suggest a lateralising value for experiential hallucinations to the left temporal lobe.

"Crossed" somatoparaphrenia: an unusual new case and a review of the literature.

Somatoparaphrenia is a delusional misidentification and confabulation of body parts, usually arm or hand, opposite to a cerebral lesion, generally of the "minor" right hemisphere. There is some controversy concerning lesion site (fronto-parietal; parieto-temporal; posterior insula, additional subcortical nuclei) or necessary associated symptoms (hemiparesis/plegia, anosognosia, neglect, position sense deficit). We here present a patient who is unusual in many respects, that is: (1) he is a right-hander with somatoparaphrenia after a "dominant" left-hemisphere lesion associated with aphasia and ideo-motor apraxia, but also with right hemineglect. He thus has "crossed" somatoparaphrenia; (2) his delusional misidentification concerned the right leg and not the arm or hand; (3) he has no anosognosia; (4) his proprioception is disturbed for the leg only; and (5) the lesion site is very posterior, a left occipito-parietal haemorrhage without involvement of the frontal lobe or the posterior insula. We present this case together with the seven other cases of "crossed somatoparaphrenia" with and without aphasia we found since 1935 in the literature and discuss their relevance in relation to the above controversies.

Neurological and robot-controlled induction of an apparition.

Tales of ghosts, wraiths, and other apparitions have been reported in virtually all cultures. The strange sensation that somebody is nearby when no one is actually present and cannot be seen (feeling of a presence, FoP) is a fascinating feat of the human mind, and this apparition is often covered in the literature of divinity, occultism, and fiction. Although it is described by neurological and psychiatric patients and healthy individuals in different situations, it is not yet understood how the phenomenon is triggered by the brain. Here, we performed lesion analysis in neurological FoP patients, supported by an analysis of associated neurological deficits. Our data show that the FoP is an illusory own-body perception with well-defined characteristics that is associated with sensorimotor loss and caused by lesions in three distinct brain regions: temporoparietal, insular, and especially frontoparietal cortex. Based on these data and recent experimental advances of multisensory own-body illusions, we designed a master-slave robotic system that generated specific sensorimotor conflicts and enabled us to induce the FoP and related illusory own-body perceptions experimentally in normal participants. These data show that the illusion of feeling another person nearby is caused by misperceiving the source and identity of sensorimotor (tactile, proprioceptive, and motor) signals of one's own body. Our findings reveal the neural mechanisms of the FoP, highlight the subtle balance of brain mechanisms that generate the experience of "self" and "other," and advance the understanding of the brain mechanisms responsible for hallucinations in schizophrenia.

Suppression of the auditory N1-component for heartbeat-related sounds reflects interoceptive predictive coding.

Although many studies have elucidated the neurocognitive mechanisms supporting the processing of externally generated sensory signals, less is known about the processing of interoceptive signals related to the viscera. Drawing a parallel with research on agency and the perception of self-generated action effects, in the present EEG study we report a reduced auditory N1 component when participants listened to heartbeat-related sounds compared to externally generated sounds. The auditory suppression for heartbeat sounds was robust and persisted after controlling for ECG-related artifacts, the number of trials involved and the phase of the cardiac cycle. In addition, the auditory N1 suppression for heartbeat-related sounds had a comparable scalp distribution as the N1 suppression observed for actively generated sounds. This finding indicates that the brain automatically differentiates between heartbeat-related and externally generated sounds through a process of sensory suppression, suggesting that a comparable predictive mechanism may underlie the processing of heartbeat and action-related information. Extending recent behavioral data about cardio-visual integration, the present cardio-auditory EEG data reveal that the processing of sounds in auditory cortex is systematically modulated by an interoceptive cardiac signal. The findings are discussed with respect to theories of interoceptive awareness, emotion, predictive coding, and their relevance to bodily self-consciousness.

Auditory verbal hallucinations of epileptic origin.

Complex auditory hallucinations are often characterized by hearing voices and are then called auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs). While AVHs have been extensively investigated in psychiatric patients suffering from schizophrenia, reports from neurological patients are rare and, in most cases, incomplete. Here, we characterize AVHs in 9 patients suffering from pharmacoresistant epilepsy by analyzing the phenomenology of AVHs and patients' neuropsychological and lesion profiles. From a cohort of 352 consecutively examined patients with epilepsy, 9 patients suffering AVHs were identified and studied by means of a semistructured interview, neuropsychological tests, and multimodal imaging, relying on a combination of functional and structural neuroimaging data and surface and intracranial EEG. We found that AVHs in patients with epilepsy were associated with prevalent language deficits and damage to posterior language areas and basal language areas in the left temporal cortex. Auditory verbal hallucinations, most of the times, consisted in hearing a single voice of the same gender and language as the patient and had specific spatial features, being, most of the times, perceived in the external space, contralateral to the lesion. We argue that the consistent location of AVHs in the contralesional external space, the prominence of associated language deficits, and the prevalence of lesions to the posterior temporal language areas characterize AVHs of neurological origin, distinguishing them from those of psychiatric origin.

Turning body and self inside out: visualized heartbeats alter bodily self-consciousness and tactile perception.

Prominent theories highlight the importance of bodily perception for self-consciousness, but it is currently not known whether bodily perception is based on interoceptive or exteroceptive signals or on integrated signals from these anatomically distinct systems. In the research reported here, we combined both types of signals by surreptitiously providing participants with visual exteroceptive information about their heartbeat: A real-time video image of a periodically illuminated silhouette outlined participants' (projected, "virtual") bodies and flashed in synchrony with their heartbeats. We investigated whether these "cardio-visual" signals could modulate bodily self-consciousness and tactile perception. We report two main findings. First, synchronous cardio-visual signals increased self-identification with and self-location toward the virtual body, and second, they altered the perception of tactile stimuli applied to participants' backs so that touch was mislocalized toward the virtual body. We argue that the integration of signals from the inside and the outside of the human body is a fundamental neurobiological process underlying self-consciousness.

Distinct illusory own-body perceptions caused by damage to posterior insula and extrastriate cortex.

Recent research in cognitive neuroscience using virtual reality, robotic technology and brain imaging has linked self-consciousness to the processing and integration of multisensory bodily signals. This work on bodily self-consciousness has implicated the temporo-parietal, premotor and extrastriate cortex and partly originated in work on neurological patients with different disorders of bodily self-consciousness. One class of such disorders is autoscopic phenomena, which are defined as illusory own-body perceptions, during which patients experience the visual illusory reduplication of their own body in extrapersonal space. Three main forms of autoscopic phenomena have been defined. During autoscopic hallucinations, a second own body is seen without any changes in bodily self-consciousness. During out-of-body experiences, the second own body is seen from an elevated perspective and location associated with disembodiment. During heautoscopy, subjects report strong self-identification with the second own body, often associated with the experience of existing at and perceiving the world from two places at the same time. Although it has been proposed that each autoscopic phenomenon is associated with different impairments of bodily self-consciousness, past research on neurological patients and the development of experimental paradigms for the study of bodily self-consciousness has focused on out-of-body experiences and the association with temporo-parietal cortex. Here, we performed quantitative lesion analysis in the-to date-largest group of patients with autoscopic hallucination and heautoscopy and compared the location of brain damage with those of control patients suffering from complex visual hallucinations. We found that heautoscopy was associated with lesions to the left posterior insula, and that autoscopic hallucinations were associated with damage to the right occipital cortex. Autoscopic hallucination and heautoscopy were further associated with distinct symptoms and deficits. The present data suggest that the autoscopic hallucination is a visuo-somatosensory deficit implicating extrastriate cortex and is, despite the visual hallucination of the own body, not associated with major deficits in bodily self-consciousness. Based on the symptoms and deficits in patients with heautoscopy and the implication of the left posterior insula, we suggest that abnormal bodily self-consciousness during heautoscopy is caused by a breakdown of self-other discrimination regarding affective somatosensory experience due to a disintegration of visuo-somatosensory signals with emotional (and/or interoceptive) bodily signals. These brain mechanisms are distinct from those described for out-of-body experiences. The present data extend previous models of autoscopic phenomena and provide clinical evidence for the importance of emotional and interoceptive signal processing in the posterior insula in relation to bodily self-consciousness.

Visual capture and the experience of having two bodies - Evidence from two different virtual reality techniques.

In neurology and psychiatry the detailed study of illusory own body perceptions has suggested close links between bodily processing and self-consciousness. One such illusory own body perception is heautoscopy where patients have the sensation of being reduplicated and to exist at two or even more locations. In previous experiments, using a video head-mounted display, self-location and self-identification were manipulated by applying conflicting visuo-tactile information. Yet the experienced singularity of the self was not affected, i.e., participants did not experience having multiple bodies or selves. In two experiments presented in this paper, we investigated self-location and self-identification while participants saw two virtual bodies (video-generated in study 1 and 3D computer generated in study 2) that were stroked either synchronously or asynchronously with their own body. In both experiments, we report that self-identification with two virtual bodies was stronger during synchronous stroking. Furthermore, in the video generated setup with synchronous stroking participants reported a greater feeling of having multiple bodies than in the control conditions. In study 1, but not in study 2, we report that self-location - measured by anterior posterior drift - was significantly shifted towards the two bodies in the synchronous condition only. Self-identification with two bodies, the sensation of having multiple bodies, and the changes in self-location show that the experienced singularity of the self can be studied experimentally. We discuss our data with respect to ownership for supernumerary hands and heautoscopy. We finally compare the effects of the video and 3D computer generated head-mounted display technology and discuss the possible benefits of using either technology to induce changes in illusory self-identification with a virtual body.

Multisensory mechanisms in temporo-parietal cortex support self-location and first-person perspective.

Self-consciousness has mostly been approached by philosophical enquiry and not by empirical neuroscientific study, leading to an overabundance of diverging theories and an absence of data-driven theories. Using robotic technology, we achieved specific bodily conflicts and induced predictable changes in a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness by altering where healthy subjects experienced themselves to be (self-location). Functional magnetic resonance imaging revealed that temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) activity reflected experimental changes in self-location that also depended on the first-person perspective due to visuo-tactile and visuo-vestibular conflicts. Moreover, in a large lesion analysis study of neurological patients with a well-defined state of abnormal self-location, brain damage was also localized at TPJ, providing causal evidence that TPJ encodes self-location. Our findings reveal that multisensory integration at the TPJ reflects one of the most fundamental subjective feelings of humans: the feeling of being an entity localized at a position in space and perceiving the world from this position and perspective.

Partial and full own-body illusions of epileptic origin in a child with right temporoparietal epilepsy.

Partial and full own-body illusions of neurological origin have been claimed crucial to understand the contribution of bodily experience and perception to self-consciousness. Whereas partial body illusions are relatively common and well defined, much less is known about full own-body illusions, and even less is known about these illusions in children. Here we describe a 10-year-old patient with the association of partial and full own-body illusions (somatoparaphrenia and out-of-body experience) that occurred sequentially during an epileptic seizure caused by right temporoparietal epilepsy. This report shows that partial and full own-body illusions share functional and neuroanatomical properties and highlights the importance of the right temporoparietal junction for bodily self-consciousness. This is the first report of out-of-body experiences in a child with focal epilepsy.

Illusory own body perceptions: case reports and relevance for bodily self-consciousness.

Neurological disorders of body representation have for a long time suggested the importance of multisensory processing of bodily signals for self-consciousness. One such group of disorders--illusory own body perceptions affecting the entire body--has been proposed to be especially relevant in this respect, based on neurological data as well as philosophical considerations. This has recently been tested experimentally in healthy subjects showing that integration of multisensory bodily signals from the entire body with respect to the three aspects: self-location, first-person perspective, and self-identification [corrected], is crucial for bodily self-consciousness. Here we present clinical and neuroanatomical data of two neurological patients with paroxysmal disorders of full body representation in whom only one of these aspects, self-identification, was abnormal. We distinguish such disorders of global body representation from related but distinct disorders and discuss their relevance for the neurobiology of bodily self-consciousness.

Swiss Cancer League communication skills training programme for oncology nurses: an evaluation.

AIM: This paper is a report of an evaluation of the effectiveness of a communication skills training programme for oncology nurses. BACKGROUND: Clinical care for patients with cancer is increasingly being divided between nurses and physicians, with nurses being responsible for the continuity of patient care, and oncologists choosing and explaining the basics of anti-cancer therapy. Therefore, oncology nurses will profit from evidence-based communication skills training to allow them to perform in a professional way. METHODS: Between 2003 and 2006 pre- and post-intervention videos of interviews with simulated patients were compared using the Roter Interaction Analysis System. Patient centeredness was assessed by counting segments of appropriate mutual responding to cues and by calculating length of uninterrupted patient speech. FINDINGS: Appropriate empathic (1.6% vs. 3.2%), reassuring statements (2.3% vs. 3.4%), questions concerning psychosocial information (2.8% vs. 4.0%) increased statistically significantly; utterances containing medical information decreased on the part of nurses (17.8% vs. 13.3%) and patients (8.1% vs. 6.7%); and patients provided more psychosocial information (3.3% vs. 5.7%). The level of congruence and empathic responses to patients' emotional cues increased statistically significantly, as did the length of uninterrupted speech (3.7-4.3 utterances; all P < 0.05). CONCLUSION: The communication skills training of the Swiss Cancer League could be used as a model to achieve substantial improvements in patient-centred communication. Sequence analysis of utterances from patient-provider interaction should be used to assess the amount of patient-centred talk.