Real-time Feedback in Pay-for-Performance: Does More Information Lead to Improvement?

BACKGROUND: Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been used expansively to improve quality of care delivered by physicians. However, to what extent P4P works through the provision of information versus financial incentives is poorly understood. OBJECTIVE: To determine whether an increase in information feedback without changes to financial incentives resulted in improved physician performance within an existing P4P program. INTERVENTION/EXPOSURE: Implementation of a new registry enabling real-time feedback to physicians on quality measure performance. DESIGN: Observational, predictive piecewise model at the physician-measure level to examine whether registry introduction associated with performance changes. We used detailed physician quality measure data 3 years prior to registry implementation (2010-2012) and 2 years after implementation (2014-2015). We also linked physician-level data including age, gender, and board certification; group-level data including registry click rates; and patient panel data including chronic conditions. PARTICIPANTS: Four hundred thirty-four physicians continuously affiliated with Advocate from 2010 to 2015. MAIN MEASURES: Physician performance on ten quality metrics. KEY RESULTS: We found no consistent pattern of improvement associated with the availability of real-time information across ten measures. Relative to predicted performance without the registry, average performance increased for two measures (childhood immunization status-rotavirus (p < 0.001) and diabetes care-medical attention for nephropathy (p = 0.024)) and decreased for three measures (childhood immunization status-influenza (p < 0.001) and diabetes care-HbA1c testing (p < 0.001) and poor HbA1c control (p < 0.001)). Results were consistent for subgroup analysis on those most able to improve, i.e., physicians in the bottom tertile of performance prior to registry introduction. Physicians who improved most were in groups that accessed the registry more than those who improved least (8.0 vs 10.0 times per week, p = 0.010). CONCLUSIONS: More frequent provision of information, provided in real-time, was insufficient to improve physician performance in an existing P4P program with high baseline performance. Results suggest that electronic registries may not themselves drive performance improvement. Future work should consider testing information feedback enhancements with financial incentives.

Moderating Effects of Patient Characteristics on the Impact of Financial Incentives.

While financial incentives to providers or patients are increasingly common as a quality improvement strategy, their impact on patient subgroups and health care disparities is unclear. To examine these patterns, we analyzed data from a randomized clinical trial of financial incentives to lower low-density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol levels in patients at risk for cardiovascular disease. Patients with higher baseline LDL experienced greater cholesterol reductions in the shared incentive arm (0.23 mg/dL per unit change in baseline LDL, 95% CI [-0.46, -0.00]) but were also less likely to have medication potency increases in the physician incentive arm ( OR = 0.98, 95% CI [0.97, 0.996]). Uninsured patients and those of race other than Black or White were less likely to have potency increases in the shared incentive arm ( OR = 0.15, 95% CI [0.03, 0.70] and OR = 0.09, 95% CI [0.01, 0.93], respectively). These findings suggest some differential response to incentives, particularly in the form of targeted medication changes.

Redesigning provider payment: Opportunities and challenges from the Hawaii experience.

OBJECTIVES: To describe the process of developing a new physician payment system based on value and transitioning away from a fee-for-service payment system STUDY DESIGN: Descriptive. This paper describes a recent initiative involving redesign of primary care provider payment in the State of Hawaii. While there has been extensive discussion about switching payment from volume to value in recent years, much of this change has happened at the organizational level and this initiative focused on changing the incentives for individual providers. METHODS: Descriptive paper. In this paper we discuss the approach taken to shift incentives from fee-for-service towards value using behavioral economics as a conceptual framework for program design. We summarize the new payment system, challenges in its design, and our approach to piloting of different behavioral economic strategies to improve performance. RESULTS: None. CONCLUSIONS: This paper will provide useful guidance to health plans or health delivery systems considering shifting primary care payment away from fee-for-service towards value highlighting some of the design challenges and necessary compromises in implementing such a system at scale.

A Randomized Controlled Trial of Opt-In Versus Opt-Out Enrollment Into a Diabetes Behavioral Intervention.

PURPOSE: To examine the effect of an opt-out default recruitment strategy compared to a conventional opt-in strategy on enrollment and adherence to a behavioral intervention for poorly controlled diabetic patients. DESIGN: Randomized controlled trial. SETTING: University of Pennsylvania primary care practices. PARTICIPANTS: Participants of this trial included those with (1) age 18 to 80 years; (2) diabetes diagnosis; and (3) a measured hemoglobin A1c (HbA1c) greater than 8% in the past 12 months. INTERVENTION: We randomized eligible patients into opt-in and opt-out arms prior to enrollment. Those in the opt-out arm received a letter stating that they were enrolled into a diabetes research study with the option to opt out, and those in the opt-in arm received a standard recruitment letter. MEASURES: Main end points include enrollment rate, defined as the proportion of participants who attended the baseline visit, and adherence to daily glycemic monitoring. ANALYSIS: We powered our study to detect a 20% difference in adherence to device usage between arms and account for a 10% attrition rate. RESULTS: Of the 569 eligible participants who received a recruitment letter, 496 were randomized to the opt-in arm and 73 to the opt-out arm. Enrollment rates were 38% in the opt-out arm and 13% in the opt-in arm ( P < .001). CONCLUSIONS: Opt-out defaults, where clinically appropriate, could be a useful approach for increasing the generalizability of low-risk trials testing behavioral interventions in clinical settings.

Effect of Financial Incentives to Physicians, Patients, or Both on Lipid Levels: A Randomized Clinical Trial.

IMPORTANCE: Financial incentives to physicians or patients are increasingly used, but their effectiveness is not well established. OBJECTIVE: To determine whether physician financial incentives, patient incentives, or shared physician and patient incentives are more effective than control in reducing levels of low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) among patients with high cardiovascular risk. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: Four-group, multicenter, cluster randomized clinical trial with a 12-month intervention conducted from 2011 to 2014 in 3 primary care practices in the northeastern United States. Three hundred forty eligible primary care physicians (PCPs) were enrolled from a pool of 421. Of 25,627 potentially eligible patients of those PCPs, 1503 enrolled. Patients aged 18 to 80 years were eligible if they had a 10-year Framingham Risk Score (FRS) of 20% or greater, had coronary artery disease equivalents with LDL-C levels of 120 mg/dL or greater, or had an FRS of 10% to 20% with LDL-C levels of 140 mg/dL or greater. Investigators were blinded to study group, but participants were not. INTERVENTIONS: Primary care physicians were randomly assigned to control, physician incentives, patient incentives, or shared physician-patient incentives. Physicians in the physician incentives group were eligible to receive up to $1024 per enrolled patient meeting LDL-C goals. Patients in the patient incentives group were eligible for the same amount, distributed through daily lotteries tied to medication adherence. Physicians and patients in the shared incentives group shared these incentives. Physicians and patients in the control group received no incentives tied to outcomes, but all patient participants received up to $355 each for trial participation. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Change in LDL-C level at 12 months. RESULTS: Patients in the shared physician-patient incentives group achieved a mean reduction in LDL-C of 33.6 mg/dL (95% CI, 30.1-37.1; baseline, 160.1 mg/dL; 12 months, 126.4 mg/dL); those in physician incentives achieved a mean reduction of 27.9 mg/dL (95% CI, 24.9-31.0; baseline, 159.9 mg/dL; 12 months, 132.0 mg/dL); those in patient incentives achieved a mean reduction of 25.1 mg/dL (95% CI, 21.6-28.5; baseline, 160.6 mg/dL; 12 months, 135.5 mg/dL); and those in the control group achieved a mean reduction of 25.1 mg/dL (95% CI, 21.7-28.5; baseline, 161.5 mg/dL; 12 months, 136.4 mg/dL; P < .001 for comparison of all 4 groups). Only patients in the shared physician-patient incentives group achieved reductions in LDL-C levels statistically different from those in the control group (8.5 mg/dL; 95% CI, 3.8-13.3; P = .002). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: In primary care practices, shared financial incentives for physicians and patients, but not incentives to physicians or patients alone, resulted in a statistically significant difference in reduction of LDL-C levels at 12 months. This reduction was modest, however, and further information is needed to understand whether this approach represents good value. TRIAL REGISTRATION: clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT01346189.