Social norms in patients with relapsing-remitting multiple sclerosis: Impairment of the moral/conventional distinction?

In multiple sclerosis, conflicting results have been reported between social impairment and relatively preserved moral judgments, mainly tested with moral dilemmas. Some results even yet suggest signs of "ultra-morality" in these patients. The objective of the present study was to test this hypothesis with the moral/conventional distinction task, investigating the knowledge of social norms and the judgment of moral versus conventional transgressions. In the first condition, the permissibility of social situations was estimated. If the participant judged the situation as wrong, he had to estimate the seriousness of the transgression, to give verbal justifications and to re-estimate the permissibility when the law authorizes the act (generalization condition) and when a social authority recommends the act (dependency condition). Forty-six multiple sclerosis patients matched to healthy controls completed this task. Contrary to our hypotheses, patients showed less permissibility for moral transgressions or a higher seriousness but, unexpectedly, for conventional transgressions. Most importantly, abnormal justifications were observed (strictly moral arguments for conventional transgressions and vice versa). This suggests a lack of distinction between conventional and moral judgment in multiple sclerosis. This confusion may explain the "ultra-morality" sometimes reported, if patients base their judgment mainly on social knowledge and not on emotional processing.

Theory of mind and irony comprehension in children with cerebral palsy.

The main goal of the present study was to characterise the pragmatic abilities of French children with cerebral palsy through their understanding of irony and other people's mental states. We predicted that children with cerebral palsy would have difficulty understanding false-belief and ironic remarks, due to the executive dysfunction that accompanies the motor disorders of cerebral palsy. We conducted an experiment in which children with cerebral palsy and typically developing matched controls performed theory-of-mind and executive function tasks. They then listened to ironic stories and answered questions about the speakers' beliefs and attitudes. The groups differed significantly on second-order theory of mind, irony comprehension and working memory, indicating pragmatic difficulties in children with cerebral palsy.