Moral foundations and HPV vaccine acceptance in the United States: State, parental, and individual factors.

RATIONALE: Appeals to intuitive morality may present a novel approach to addressing vaccine hesitancy. OBJECTIVE: To better understand the relationship between morality and vaccination by employing Moral Foundations Theory to studies surrounding the HPV vaccination at multiple different levels of decision making. METHOD: We employed three different study modalities which examined moralities link to vaccination by employing Moral Foundations Theory. A state-wide ecological study aimed to understand population level trends. Two randomized control interventional studies were then created to understand the effects of Moral Foundations Theory based interventions on both parents of children and individual decision makers. RESULTS: We demonstrated a negative association at the state level between the purity moral foundations and HPV vaccination rates (ß = -.75, SE 0.23; p < .01) and a positive association between loyalty and HPV vaccination rates (ß = 0.62 SE 0.24; p < .05). The parental study built upon this by demonstrating negative association between higher moral purity scores and attitudes towards the HPV vaccine and intention to vaccinate their children (ß = -0.27 SE 0.07; p < .001). Our final study demonstrated a Moral Foundations Theory based intervention was associated with an increase in the odds of indicating an intention to receive the HPV vaccination (adjusted Odds Ratio (aOR) 2.59, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) 1.62-4.14). This equates to a 20% increase in the predicted probability of the intention to receive an HPV vaccine (39% CI (36%-42%) vs 60% CI (57%-63%). CONCLUSIONS: Together, these studies demonstrate that moral foundations, specifically the purity foundation, appear to have a strong and consistent relationship with HPV vaccination. They also demonstrate the how moral values-based interventions may serve as a novel approach to increase HPV vaccine uptake with potential to be employed to target vaccine hesitancy more broadly.

Only as a last resort: Sociocultural differences between women and men explain women's heightened reaction to threat, not evolutionary principles.

The target article proposed that women display greater self-protectiveness than men to major physical and social threats because such self-protective responses have higher fitness value for women than men. Rather than having evolutionary roots, we suggest the various physiological, behavioral, and emotional responses to social and physical threats exhibited more by women than men are instead rooted in sociocultural forces.

The affective origins of the Industrial Revolution.

We suggest in this commentary an emotional origin of the Industrial Revolution. Specifically, increased living standards directly preceding the Industrial Revolution produced increased happiness and subjective well-being that, in turn, fueled the explosion of innovation and economic growth experienced in industrial England.

Association of moral values with vaccine hesitancy.

Clusters of unvaccinated children are particularly susceptible to outbreaks of vaccine-preventable disease 1,2 . Existing messaging interventions demonstrate short-term success, but some may backfire and worsen vaccine hesitancy 3 . Values-based messages appeal to core morality, which influences the attitudes individuals then have on topics like vaccination 4-7 . We must understand how underlying morals, not just attitudes, differ by hesitancy type to develop interventions that work with individual values. Here, we show in two correlational studies that harm and fairness foundations are not significantly associated with vaccine hesitancy, but purity and liberty foundations are. We found that medium-hesitancy parents were twice as likely as low-hesitancy parents to highly emphasize purity (adjusted odds ratio: 2.08; 95% confidence interval: 1.27-3.40). High-hesitancy respondents were twice as likely to strongly emphasize purity (adjusted odds ratio: 2.15; 95% confidence interval: 1.39-3.31) and liberty (adjusted odds ratio: 2.19; 95% confidence interval: 1.50-3.21). Our results demonstrate that endorsement of harm and fairness-ideas often emphasized in traditional vaccine-focused messages-are not predictive of vaccine hesitancy. This, combined with significant associations of purity and liberty with hesitancy, indicates a need for inclusion of broader themes in vaccine discussions. These findings have the potential for application to other health decisions and communications as well.

A flexible influence of affective feelings on creative and analytic performance.

Considerable research shows that positive affect improves performance on creative tasks and negative affect improves performance on analytic tasks. The present research entertained the idea that affective feelings have flexible, rather than fixed, effects on cognitive performance. Consistent with the idea that positive and negative affect signal the value of accessible processing inclinations, the influence of affective feelings on performance on analytic or creative tasks was found to be flexibly responsive to the relative accessibility of different styles of processing (i.e., heuristic vs. systematic, global vs. local). When a global processing orientation was accessible happy participants generated more creative uses for a brick (Experiment 1), successfully solved more remote associates and insight problems (Experiment 2) and displayed broader categorization (Experiment 3) than those in sad moods. When a local processing orientation was accessible this pattern reversed. When a heuristic processing style was accessible happy participants were more likely to commit the conjunction fallacy (Experiment 3) and showed less pronounced anchoring effects (Experiment 4) than sad participants. When a systematic processing style was accessible this pattern reversed. Implications of these results for relevant affect-cognition models are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

Once more with feeling: On the explanatory limits of the GANE model and the missing role of subjective experience.

We applaud Mather and colleagues' model, which emphasizes the neurobiological pathways by which affective arousal tunes attention and memory. This commentary offers a friendly discussion of several potential limitations of the theory. We suggest the model is strong when predicting task-driven demands but is limited when predicting the impact of individual biases, interpretations, and experiential feelings.

The affective control of thought: malleable, not fixed.

Despite decades of research demonstrating a dedicated link between positive and negative affect and specific cognitive processes, not all research is consistent with this view. We present a new overarching theoretical account as an alternative-one that can simultaneously account for prior findings, generate new predictions, and encompass a wide range of phenomena. According to our proposed affect-as-cognitive-feedback account, affective reactions confer value on accessible information processing strategies (e.g., global vs. local processing) and other responses, goals, concepts, and thoughts that happen to be accessible at the time. This view underscores that the relationship between affect and cognition is not fixed but, instead, is highly malleable. That is, the relationship between affect and cognitive processing can be altered, and often reversed, by varying the mental context in which it is experienced. We present evidence that supports this account, along with implications for specific affective states and other subjective experiences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).

A flexible impact of affective feelings on priming effects: assimilation and contrast.

Four experiments found that positive and negative affect dictated whether primed social categories and trait concepts led to assimilation or contrast. This influence was further found to be flexibly responsive to the momentary activation of a global or local focus. When a global focus was dominant, positive affect resulted in assimilation to primed traits and social categories, and negative affect resulted in contrast. But, when a local focus was dominant, the opposite pattern of assimilation and contrast as a consequence of positive and negative affect was observed. These results are consistent with the more general view that positive and negative affect signal the value of currently accessible response tendencies and are, therefore, flexibly responsive in their influence cognition to changing situations and mental contexts.

Incidental experiences of affective coherence and incoherence influence persuasion.

When affective experiences are inconsistent with activated evaluative concepts, people experience what is called affective incoherence; when affective experiences are consistent with activated evaluative concepts, people experience affective coherence. The present research asked whether incidental feelings of affective coherence and incoherence would regulate persuasion. Experiences of affective coherence and incoherence were predicted and found to influence the processing of persuasive messages when evoked prior to receipt of such messages (Experiments 1 and 3), and to influence the confidence with which thoughts generated by persuasive messages were held when evoked after presentation of such messages (Experiments 2 and 3). These results extend research on affective coherence and incoherence by showing that they exert a broader impact on cognitive activity than originally assumed.

Anger enhances correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes.

The goal of the current research was to subject to empirical examination the idea that the experience of anger would narrow the separation between implicit and explicit attitudes. Specifically, the tendency of anger to promote a sense of certainty in one's point of view was predicted to enhance the subjective validity of implicit attitudes, and that this validation of implicit attitudes by anger should increase implicit-explicit attitude correspondence. Consistent with these predictions, across three experiments, anger, as compared with neutral emotion (Experiments 1-3) and sad emotion (Experiments 1-2), was found to increase implicit-explicit attitude correspondence. Appraisals of certainty, but not individual control, mediated the effect of anger on implicit-explicit correspondence (Experiment 3). More generally, these results imply that anger may play an essential, but until now overlooked, role in directing the interplay between spontaneous and deliberative aspects of the self.

Does positive affect broaden and negative affect narrow attentional scope? A new answer to an old question.

The current research challenges the common view that positive affect and negative affect generate a broadened or narrowed attentional focus, respectively. Contrary to this view, two studies found that the link between affect and attentional focus as measured by a traditional flanker task (Study 1) and a modified flanker task (Study 2) reflects whatever focus is momentarily dominant. Further, in these studies when neither focus was dominant, the link between affect and attentional focus vanished. These results demonstrate that, like reward, positive affect and negative affect are not dedicated to a particular broadened or narrowed attentional scope but rather provide embodied information about the value of currently accessible attentional orientations.

Mood and trust in intuition interactively orchestrate correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes.

The goal of the current research was to subject the prediction that affect and trust in intuition would interactively shape implicit and explicit attitude correspondence to empirical assessment. In four experiments, either trust versus distrust in intuition was measured or manipulated and positive or negative moods were induced. The outcome of interest was correspondence between implicit and explicit academic attitudes (Experiments 1-2) and self-attitudes (Experiments 3-4). As predicted, affect served as information about chronically or temporarily accessible tendencies to trust or distrust their intuitions, with positive affect validating and negative affect invalidating such tendencies, which in turn shaped correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes. By drawing together these two seemingly unrelated lines of research, these experiments provide important insights into the sometimes mysterious circumstances in which implicit attitudes are translated into explicit attitude reports.

Mood and global-local focus: priming a local focus reverses the link between mood and global-local processing.

Positive moods promote a focus on the forest (global focus) and negative moods, a focus on the trees (local focus). Is this well-established link fixed or variable? Does it reflect a direct influence of affect, as usually assumed, or is it frequently observed simply because a global perspective is often dominant? If affect serves as information about the value of currently accessible inclinations, and a global focus is generally the default perspective, then the global focus of positive affect and local focus of negative affect might be variable rather than fixed. Two experiments tested this hypothesis using different mood inductions, different tests of global-local focus, and different methods of inducing global and local perspectives. In each, we discovered that positive affect empowered whatever focus was momentarily dominant. Thus, whether individuals in happy moods saw the forest or the trees depended only on which of the two had been primed.

Affective regulation of stereotype activation: it's the (accessible) thought that counts.

Prior research has found that positive affect, compared to negative affect, increases stereotype activation. In four experiments the authors explore whether the link between affect and stereotype activation depends on the relative accessibility of stereotype-relevant thoughts and response tendencies. As well as manipulating mood, the authors measured or manipulated the accessibility of egalitarian response tendencies (Experiments 1 and 2) and counterstereotypic thoughts (Experiments 2 through 4). In the absence of such response tendencies and thoughts, people in positive moods displayed greater stereotype activation-consistent with past research. By contrast, in the presence of accessible egalitarian response tendencies or counterstereotypic thoughts, people in positive moods exhibited less stereotype activation than those in negative moods. Implications of these results for existing affect-cognition models are discussed.

Contagion without contact: anticipatory mood matching in response to affiliative motivation.

We investigated whether the desire to have a smooth and pleasant interaction with an anticipated interaction partner caused participants' moods to become similar to their imminent partners' moods. We found evidence of anticipatory mood matching when participants were motivated to affiliate with a partner through goal priming (Experiments 1 and 2) and outcome dependency (Experiment 3). Prior research has demonstrated mood contagion arising from actual social interaction but these experiments establish contagion without contact, an outcome evident regardless of whether mood was assessed via self-report (Experiments 1 through 3) or information-processing style (Experiment 3).

First thought, best thought: positive mood maintains and negative mood degrades implicit-explicit attitude correspondence.

Two studies investigate the effect of mood on the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes toward African Americans (Experiment 1) and implicit and explicit academic attitudes (Experiment 2). Because explicit and implicit attitudes are more related when people validate their automatic attitudes as true (the associative-propositional evaluation model) and because people tend to validate their immediate reactions when they are in positive rather than negative moods (the affect-as-information model), the authors predicted a stronger implicit-explicit attitude correspondence among positive versus negative mood participants. As predicted, in both studies, participants exhibited a significant correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes when in positive moods but not when in negative moods.

How the Object of Affect Guides its Impact.

In this article, we examine how affect influences judgment and thought, but also how thought transforms affect. The general thesis is that the nature and impact of affective reactions depends largely on their objects. We view affect as a representation of value, and its consequences as dependent on its object or what it is about. Within a review of relevant literature and a discussion of the nature of emotion, we focus on the role of the object of affect in governing both the nature of emotional reactions and the impact of affect and emotion on cognition and action. Although emotion is always about the here and now, the capacity for abstract thought means that the human here and now includes imagination as well as perception. Indeed, the hopes and fears that dominate human lives often involve things only imagined.

A Reply to Commentaries on "How the Object of Affect Guides Its Impact"

Commentaries focused on the emotional appraisal part of our article. Cunningham and Van Bavel argued for distinguishing core disgust from moral disgust, and we describe how the theory might accommodate their proposal. They also suggested that temporal and other comparisons could account for emotional variety. We concur, but see such comparisons as inherent in the different emotional objects. Winkielman emphasized unconscious affect, but we suggest its power flows from the absence of situational constraints on its meaning. He characterized our appraisal model as coldly cognitive rather than embodied, but the complaint is misdirected, as the model addresses emotional structure, not emotional process. Indeed, embodied accounts will still require structural accounts to determine why one emotion rather than another is elicited.

How emotions inform judgment and regulate thought.

Being happy or sad influences the content and style of thought. One explanation is that affect serves as information about the value of whatever comes to mind. Thus, when a person makes evaluative judgments or engages in a task, positive affect can enhance evaluations and empower potential responses. Rather than affect itself, the information conveyed by affect is crucial. Tests of the hypothesis find that affective influences can be made to disappear by changing the source to which the affect is attributed. In tasks, positive affect validates and negative affect invalidates accessible cognitions, leading to relational processing and item-specific processing, respectively. Positive affect is found to promote, and negative affect to inhibit, many textbook phenomena from cognitive psychology.

Social tuning of the self: consequences for the self-evaluations of stereotype targets.

These experiments examined how social interactions with individuals who ostensibly have stereotype-relevant views affect the self-evaluations of stereotype targets. Participants believed they were going to interact, or actually interacted, with a person who ostensibly had stereotype-consistent or stereotype-inconsistent views about their social group. Consistent with shared reality theory, participants' self-evaluations (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and behavior (Experiment 2) corresponded with the ostensible views of the other person when affiliative motivation was high. This occurred even when it was likely to be detrimental to participants' nonaffiliative outcomes (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 showed that self-evaluative shift away from the ostensible views of another person was a function of social distance motives, also consistent with shared reality theory.