Tracing the origin of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron-like Spike sequences detected in wastewater

ImportanceThe origin of highly divergent "cryptic" SARS-CoV-2 Spike sequences, which appear in wastewater but not clinical samples, is unknown. These wastewater sequences have harbored many of the same mutations that later emerged in Omicron variants. If these enigmatic sequences are human-derived and transmissible, they could both be a source of future variants and a valuable tool for forecasting sequences that should be incorporated into vaccines and therapeutics. ObjectiveTo determine whether enigmatic SARS-CoV-2 lineages detected in wastewater have a human or non-human (i.e., animal) source. DesignOn January 11, 2022, an unusual Spike sequence was detected in municipal wastewater from a metropolitan area. Over the next four months, more focused wastewater sampling resolved the source of this variant. SettingThis study was performed in Wisconsin, United States, which has a comprehensive program for detecting SARS-CoV-2 in wastewater. ParticipantsComposite wastewater samples were used for this study; therefore, no individuals participated. Main Outcome(s) and Measure(s)The primary outcome was to determine the host(s) responsible for shedding this variant in wastewater. Both human and non-human hosts were plausible candidates at the studys outset. ResultsThe presence of the cryptic virus was narrowed from a municipal wastewater sample (catchment area >100,000 people) to an indoor wastewater sample from a single facility (catchment area [~]30 people), indicating the human origin of this virus. Extraordinarily high concentrations of viral RNA ([~]520,000,000 genome copies / L and [~]1,600,000,000 genome copies / L in June and August 2022, respectively) were detected in the indoor wastewater sample. The virus sequence harbored a combination of fixed nucleotide substitutions previously observed only in Pango lineage B.1.234, a variant that circulated at low levels in Wisconsin from October 2020 to February 2021. Conclusions and RelevanceHigh levels of persistent SARS-CoV-2 shedding from the gastrointestinal tract of an infected individual likely explain the presence of evolutionarily advanced "cryptic variants" observed in some wastewater samples. Key points QuestionWhat is the source of unusual SARS-CoV-2 Omicron-like Spike variants detected in wastewater but not in clinical samples? FindingsWe identified a cryptic SARS-CoV-2 lineage in wastewater collected at a central wastewater treatment facility and traced its source to a single wastewater outlet serving six restrooms. The virus in this sample resembled a 2020-2021 lineage except for the Spike protein, in which Omicron-like variants were observed. MeaningProlonged shedding from the human gastrointestinal tract is the most likely source for evolutionarily advanced SARS-CoV-2 variant sequences found in wastewater.

Description of a University COVID-19 Outbreak and Interventions to Disrupt Transmission, Wisconsin, August - October 2020.

University settings have demonstrated potential for COVID-19 outbreaks, as they can combine congregate living, substantial social activity, and a young population predisposed to mild illness. Using genomic and epidemiologic data, we describe a COVID-19 outbreak at the University of Wisconsin (UW)-Madison. During August - October 2020, 3,485 students tested positive, including 856/6,162 students living in residence halls. Case counts began rising during move-in week for on-campus students (August 25-31, 2020), then rose rapidly during September 1-11, 2020. UW-Madison initiated multiple prevention efforts, including quarantining two residence halls; a subsequent decline in cases was observed. Genomic surveillance of cases from Dane County, where UW-Madison is located, did not find evidence of transmission from a large cluster of cases in the two residence halls quarantined during the outbreak. Coordinated implementation of prevention measures can effectively reduce SARS-CoV-2 spread in university settings and may limit spillover to the community surrounding the university.

SARS-CoV-2 transmission in intercollegiate athletics not fully mitigated with daily antigen testing

BackgroundHigh frequency, rapid turnaround SARS-CoV-2 testing continues to be proposed as a way of efficiently identifying and mitigating transmission in congregate settings. However, two SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks occurred among intercollegiate university athletic programs during the fall 2020 semester despite mandatory directly observed daily antigen testing. MethodsDuring the fall 2020 semester, athletes and staff in both programs were tested daily using Quidels Sofia SARS Antigen Fluorescent Immunoassay (FIA), with positive antigen results requiring confirmatory testing with real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). We used genomic sequencing to investigate transmission dynamics in these two outbreaks. ResultsIn Outbreak 1, 32 confirmed cases occurred within a university athletics program after the index patient attended a meeting while infectious despite a negative antigen test on the day of the meeting. Among isolates sequenced from Outbreak 1, 24 (92%) of 26 were closely related, suggesting sustained transmission following an initial introduction event. In Outbreak 2, 12 confirmed cases occurred among athletes from two university programs that faced each other in an athletic competition despite receiving negative antigen test results on the day of the competition. Sequences from both teams were closely related and unique from strains circulating in the community, suggesting transmission during intercollegiate competition. ConclusionsThese findings suggest that antigen testing alone, even when mandated and directly observed, may not be sufficient as an intervention to prevent SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in congregate settings, and highlights the importance of supplementing serial antigen testing with appropriate mitigation strategies to prevent SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in congregate settings. SummaryHigh frequency, rapid turnaround SARS-CoV-2 testing continues to be proposed as a way of efficiently identifying and mitigating transmission in congregate settings. However, here we describe two SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks occurred among intercollegiate university athletic programs during the fall 2020 semester.

Loss of Taste and Smell as Distinguishing Symptoms of COVID-19

Olfactory and taste dysfunctions have emerged as symptoms of COVID-19. Among individuals with COVID-19 enrolled in a household study, loss of taste and/or smell was the fourth most commonly reported symptom (26/42; 62%), and among household contacts, it had the highest positive predictive value (83%; 95% CI: 55-95%) for COVID-19. These findings support consideration of loss of taste and/or smell in possible case identification and testing prioritization for COVID-19.

Enhanced Contact Investigations for Nine Early Travel-Related Cases of SARS-CoV-2 in the United States

BackgroundCoronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), the respiratory disease caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was first identified in Wuhan, China and has since become pandemic. As part of initial response activities in the United States, enhanced contact investigations were conducted to enable early identification and isolation of additional cases and to learn more about risk factors for transmission. MethodsClose contacts of nine early travel-related cases in the United States were identified. Close contacts meeting criteria for active monitoring were followed, and selected individuals were targeted for collection of additional exposure details and respiratory samples. Respiratory samples were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. ResultsThere were 404 close contacts who underwent active monitoring in the response jurisdictions; 338 had at least basic exposure data, of whom 159 had [≥]1 set of respiratory samples collected and tested. Across all known close contacts under monitoring, two additional cases were identified; both secondary cases were in spouses of travel-associated case patients. The secondary attack rate among household members, all of whom had [≥]1 respiratory sample tested, was 13% (95% CI: 4 - 38%). ConclusionsThe enhanced contact tracing investigations undertaken around nine early travel-related cases of COVID-19 in the United States identified two cases of secondary transmission, both spouses. Rapid detection and isolation of the travel-associated case patients, enabled by public awareness of COVID-19 among travelers from China, may have mitigated transmission risk among close contacts of these cases.