The interplay of multiple unconditioned stimuli in evaluative conditioning: A weighted averaging framework for attitude formation via stimulus co-occurrences.

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is a key effect in attitude formation, leading to changes in the liking of neutral attitude objects due to their pairing with positive or negative stimuli. Despite EC's significance, current theories and most empirical findings are limited to stimulus pairings with a single affective stimulus at a time. In contrast, social environments often involve more complex combinations of affective stimuli. In this article, we introduce a novel framework grounded in information integration research to understand how conditioned attitudes develop in the presence of multiple affective stimuli. Through 10 experiments with different designs, measures, materials, and pairing procedures, we find that individuals' conditioned attitudes follow the average valence of all affective stimuli present with a stronger weighting of negative stimuli. This weighted averaging rule bears two implications for EC in more complex stimulus combinations. First, EC effects are nonmonotonous, such that additional stimuli of the same valence do not produce incremental EC effects. Second, EC effects are interdependent, such that the impact of one stimulus is weakest when accompanied by another negative stimulus and strongest when no other affective stimulus is present. We examine different cognitive processes underlying this weighted averaging rule, including potential differences in pairing memory or changes in the affective stimuli's valence when other stimuli are present. Our findings present a novel theoretical perspective on EC and offer valuable insights into attitude change from stimulus co-occurrences in stimulus-rich environments. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Contingency inferences from base rates: A parsimonious strategy?

The pseudocontingency framework provides a parsimonious strategy for inferring the contingency between two variables by assessing the base rates. Frequently occurring levels are associated, as are rarely occurring levels. However, this strategy can lead to different contingency inferences in different contexts, depending on how the base rates vary across contexts. Here, we examine how base-rate consistency influences base-rate learning and reliance by contrasting consistent with inconsistent base rates. We hypothesized that base-rate learning is facilitated, and that people rely more on base rates if base rates are consistent. In Experiment 1, the base rates across four contexts implied the same (consistent) or different (inconsistent) contingencies. Base rates were learned equally accurately, and participants inferred contingencies that followed the base rates but deviated from the genuine contingencies within contexts, regardless of consistency. In Experiment 2, we additionally manipulated whether the context was a plausible moderator of the contingency. While we replicated the first experiment's results when the context was a plausible moderator, base-rate inferences were stronger for consistent base rates when the context was an implausible moderator. Possibly, when a moderation-by-context was implausible, participants also relied on the base-rate correlation across contexts, which implied the same contingency when base rates were consistent but was zero when the base rates were inconsistent. Thus, our findings suggest that contingency inferences from base rates involve top-down processes in which people decide how to use base-rate information.

Can sequencing of articulation ease explain the in-out effect? A preregistered test.

Words whose consonantal articulation places move from the front of the mouth to the back (e.g. BADAKA; inward) receive more positive evaluations than words whose consonantal articulation places move from the back of the mouth to the front (e.g. KADABA; outward). This in-out effect has a variety of affective, cognitive, and even behavioural consequences, but its underlying mechanisms remain elusive. Most recently, a linguistic explanation has been proposed applying the linguistic easy-first account and the so-called labial-coronal effect from developmental speech research and phonology to the in-out effect: Labials (front) are easier to process than coronals (middle); and people prefer easy followed by harder motor components. Disentangling consonantal articulation direction and articulation place, the present three preregistered experiments (total N = 1012) found in-out effects for coronal-dorsal (back), and labial-dorsal articulation places. Critically, no in-out effect emerged for labial-coronal articulation places. Thus, the in-out effect is unlikely an instantiation of easy first.

The role of category valence in prototype preference.

People prefer prototypical stimuli over atypical stimuli. The dominant explanation for this prototype preference effect is that prototypical stimuli are processed more fluently. However, a more recent account proposes that prototypes are more strongly associated with their category's valence, leading to a reversed prototype preference effect for negative categories. One critical but untested assumption of this category-valence account is that no prototype preference should emerge for entirely neutral categories. We tested this prediction by conditioning categories of dot patterns positively, negatively, or neutrally. In line with previous findings on the category-valence account, prototype preference reversed for negatively conditioned categories. However, prototype preference was similarly strong for positive and neutral categories. These findings imply that prototype preferences do not only reflect a transfer of category valence to exemplars. Instead, the results suggest that prototype preference is a multi-process phenomenon arising from the activated category valence and a fluency-based process. We discuss further implications for theories on fluency and prototype preference.

Who shows the Unlikelihood Effect - and why?

Recent work shows that people judge an outcome as less likely when they learn the probabilities of all single pathways that lead to that outcome, a phenomenon termed the Unlikelihood Effect. The initial explanation for this effect is that the low pathway probabilities trigger thoughts that deem the outcome unlikely. We tested the alternative explanation that the effect results from people's erroneous interpretation and processing of the probability information provided in the paradigm. By reanalyzing the original experiments, we discovered that the Unlikelihood Effect had been substantially driven by a small subset of people who give extremely low likelihood judgments. We conducted six preregistered experiments, showing that these people are unaware of the total outcome probability and do formally incorrect calculations with the given probabilities. Controlling for these factors statistically and experimentally reduced the proportion of people giving extremely low likelihood judgments, reducing and sometimes eliminating the Unlikelihood Effect. Our results confirm that the Unlikelihood Effect is overall a robust empirical phenomenon, but suggest that the effect results at least to some degree from a few people's difficulties with encoding, understanding, and integrating probabilities. Our findings align with current research on other psychological effects, showing that empirical effects can be caused by participants engaging in qualitatively different mental processes.

Articulation dynamics and evaluative conditioning: investigating the boundary conditions, mental representation, and origin of the in-out effect.

People prefer linguistic stimuli with an inward (e.g. BODIKA) over those with an outward articulation dynamic (e.g. KODIBA), a phenomenon known as the articulatory in-out effect. Despite its robustness across languages and contexts, the phenomenon is still poorly understood. To learn more about the effect's boundary conditions, mental representation, and origin, we crossed the in-out effect with evaluative conditioning research. In five experiments (N = 713, three experiments pre-registered), we systematically paired words containing inward versus outward dynamics with pictures of negative versus positive valence. Although this evaluative conditioning procedure reversed the preference for inward over outward words, this was the case only for words with the same consonant sequences as the conditioned words. For words with inward/outward dynamics but different consonant sequences than the conditioned ones, a regular in-out effect emerged. Also, no preference reversal at all emerged for the conditioned consonant sequences when the contingency between single consonants at specific positions and positive/negative valence was zero. Implications of these findings for the in-out effect and evaluative conditioning are discussed.

On the emergence of the in-out effect across trials: two items do the trick.

Individuals prefer letter strings whose consonantal articulation spots move from the front of the mouth to the back (e.g., BAKA, inward) over those with a reversed consonant order (e.g., KABA, outward), the so-called in-out effect. The present research explores whether individuals hold an internal standard or scheme of consonant order that triggers this effect. If this were the case, the in-out effect should already occur in one-trial between-subjects designs. If not, the in-out effect should emerge over the course of trials in within-subjects designs. In Experiments 1a-e (1b-e preregistered; total N = 2973; German, English, and Portuguese samples) employing a one-trial between-subjects design, no in-out effect was found. In Experiment 2 (N = 253), employing within-subjects designs with either 1, 5, 10, 30, or 50 trials per consonant order category (inward vs. outward), the in-out effect was absent in the first trial, but already surfaced for the first 2 trials, reached significance within the first 10 trials and a solid plateau within the first 20 trials. Of the four theoretical explanations, the present evidence favors the fluency/frequency and letter-position accounts and is at odds with the eating-related embodiment and easy-first accounts.

Transparent by choice: Proactive disclosures increase compliance with digital defaults.

Default nudges successfully guide choices across multiple domains. Online use cases for defaults range from promoting sustainable purchases to inducing acceptance of behavior tracking scripts, or "cookies." However, many scholars view defaults as unethical due to the covert ways in which they influence behavior. Hence, opt-outs and other digital decision aids are progressively being regulated in an attempt to make them more transparent. The current practice of transparency boils down to saturating the decision environment with convoluted legal information. This approach might be informed by researchers, who hypothesized that nudges could become less effective once they are clearly laid out: People can retaliate against influence attempts if they are aware of them. A recent line of research has shown that such concerns are unfounded when the default-setters proactively discloses the purpose of the intervention. Yet, it remained unclear whether the effect persists when defaults reflect the current practice of such mandated transparency boils down to the inclusion of information disclosures, containing convoluted legal information. In two empirical studies (N = 364), respondents clearly differentiated proactive from mandated transparency. Moreover, they choose the default option significantly more often when the transparency disclosure was voluntary, rather than mandated. Policy implications and future research directions are discussed.

The articulatory in-out effect: Driven by consonant preferences?

The articulatory in-out effect describes the preference for stimuli with an inward-wandering consonant order (e.g., BODIKA) as opposed to an outward-wandering consonant order (e.g., KODIBA). Originally, the in-out effect has been explained in terms of articulation trajectories, with inward trajectories being preferred over outward trajectories. However, recent research by Maschmann et al. (2020) raised doubts on this explanation of articulation trajectory preferences and offered a parsimonious alternative explanation for the in-out effect based on consonant preferences instead. As we show in the present article, stimulus materials in Maschmann et al. (2020) diverged from materials used in previous research and might have prevented the experience of articulation trajectories. Here, we present a conceptual replication of Maschmann et al. (2020), using stimulus materials more likely to elicit articulation trajectory preferences. In a preregistered, high-powered experiment (N = 349), we find strong support for the original idea of trajectory preferences but no evidence for the consonant preference account. Our research shows that preferences for articulation trajectories are robust and cannot be explained by mere consonant preferences. We discuss further implications of these findings for future research on the processes involved in the empirical in-out effect. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The articulatory in-out effect: replicable, but inexplicable.

People prefer inward over outward articulation dynamics, a phenomenon referred to as the articulatory in-out effect. It is empirically robust and generalizes across languages, settings, and stimuli. However, the theoretical explanation of the effect is still a matter of lively debate and in need of novel research directions.

From Which Direction Does the Empire Strike (Back)?

In cultures with left-right-script, agentic behavior is mentally represented as following a left-to-right trajectory, an effect referred to as the Spatial Agency Bias (SAB, Suitner and Maass, 2016). In this research, we investigated whether spatial representations of activities are universal across activities by analyzing the opposite concepts of "attack" and "defense". Both behaviors involve similar actions (e.g., fighting) but may differ in perceived agency. Moreover "defense" is necessarily always a response to an attack and may therefore be represented by a trajectory in the opposite direction. Two studies found the classic SAB for activities representing attacking but a reduction (Study 1) and reversal (Study 2) for activities involving defense. Although the spatial representation of defense on the right was much weaker and less unequivocal than that of attack on the left, the results suggest that the spatial representations of defense and attack are located in different positions. Apparently not all actors and all activities are spatially represented on the left with a left-to-right trajectory but position and direction depend on the perceived agency. Directions for future research and applications of our findings are discussed.

The architecture of prototype preferences: Typicality, fluency, and valence.

A classic phenomenon known as prototype preference effect (PPE) or beauty-in-averageness effect is that prototypical exemplars of a neutral category are preferred over atypical exemplars. This PPE has been explained in terms of deviance avoidance, hedonic fluency, or preference for certainty and familiarity. However, typicality also facilitates greater activation of category-related information. Thus, prototypes rather than atypical exemplars should be more associated with the valence of the category, either positive or negative. Hence, we hypothesize that the evaluation of a prototype depends on the valence of its category. Results from three experiments crossing a standard PPE paradigm with an evaluative conditioning procedure support our hypothesis. We show that for positive categories, greater typicality increases liking. Critically, for negative categories, greater typicality decreases liking. This pattern of results challenges dominant explanations of prototype evaluation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).