Sense of own body shapes neural processes of memory encoding and reinstatement.

How is the fundamental sense of one's body, a basic aspect of selfhood, incorporated into memories for events? Disrupting bodily self-awareness during encoding impairs functioning of the left posterior hippocampus during retrieval, which implies weakened encoding. However, how changes in bodily self-awareness influence neural encoding is unknown. We investigated how the sense of body ownership, a core aspect of the bodily self, impacts encoding in the left posterior hippocampus and additional core memory regions including the angular gyrus. Furthermore, we assessed the degree to which memories are reinstated according to body ownership during encoding and vividness during retrieval as a measure of memory strength. We immersed participants in naturalistic scenes where events unfolded while we manipulated feelings of body ownership with a full-body-illusion during functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning. One week later, participants retrieved memories for the videos during functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning. A whole brain analysis revealed that patterns of activity in regions including the right hippocampus and angular gyrus distinguished between events encoded with strong versus weak body ownership. A planned region-of-interest analysis showed that patterns of activity in the left posterior hippocampus specifically could predict body ownership during memory encoding. Using the wider network of regions sensitive to body ownership during encoding and the left posterior hippocampus as separate regions-of-interest, we observed that patterns of activity present at encoding were reinstated more during the retrieval of events encoded with strong body ownership and high memory vividness. Our results demonstrate how the sense of physical self is bound within an event during encoding, which facilitates reactivation of a memory trace during retrieval.

Causal Inference of Body Ownership in the Posterior Parietal Cortex.

How do we come to sense that a hand in view belongs to our own body or not? Previous studies have suggested that the integration of vision and somatosensation in the frontoparietal areas plays a critical role in the sense of body ownership (i.e., the multisensory perception of limbs and body parts as our own). However, little is known about how these areas implement the multisensory integration process at the computational level and whether activity predicts illusion elicitation in individual participants on a trial-by-trial basis. To address these questions, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and a rubber hand illusion-detection task and fitted the registered neural responses to a Bayesian causal inference model of body ownership. Thirty healthy human participants (male and female) performed 12 s trials with varying degrees of asynchronously delivered visual and tactile stimuli of a rubber hand (in view) and a (hidden) real hand. After the 12 s period, participants had to judge whether the rubber hand felt like their own. As hypothesized, activity in the premotor and posterior parietal cortices was related to illusion elicitation at the level of individual participants and trials. Importantly, activity in the posterior parietal cortex fit the predicted probability of illusion emergence of the Bayesian causal inference model based on each participant's behavioral response profile. Our findings suggest an important role for the posterior parietal cortex in implementing Bayesian causal inference of body ownership and reveal how trial-by-trial variations in neural signatures of multisensory integration relate to the elicitation of the rubber hand illusion.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How does the brain create a coherent perceptual experience of one's own body based on information from the different senses? We examined how the likelihood of eliciting a classical bodily illusion that depends on vision and touch-the rubber hand illusion-is related to neural activity measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging. We found that trial-by-trial variations in the neural signal in the posterior parietal cortex, a well known center for sensory integration, fitted a statistical function that describes how likely it is that the brain infers that a rubber hand is one's own given the available visual and tactile evidence. Thus, probabilistic analysis of sensory information in the parietal lobe underlies our unitary sense of bodily self.

Perceptual illusion of body-ownership within an immersive realistic environment enhances memory accuracy and re-experiencing.

Our bodies provide a necessary scaffold for memories of past events. Yet, we are just beginning to understand how feelings of one's own body during the encoding of realistic events shape memory. Participants formed memories for immersive, lifelike events by watching pre-recorded 3D videos that involved a first-person view of a mannequin's body through head mounted displays. We manipulated feelings of body ownership over the mannequin using a perceptual full-body illusion. Participants completed cued recall questions and subjective ratings (i.e., degree of reliving, emotional intensity, vividness, and belief in memory accuracy) for each video immediately following encoding and one week later. Sensing the mannequin's body as one's own during encoding enhanced the following factors: memory accuracy across testing points, immediate reliving, delayed emotional intensity, vividness, and belief in memory accuracy. These findings demonstrate that a basic sense of bodily selfhood provides a crucial foundation for the accurate reliving of the past.

Memories for third-person experiences in immersive virtual reality.

We typically experience the world from a first-person perspective (1PP) but can sometimes experience events from a third-person perspective (3PP) much as an observer might see us. Little is known about how visual perspective influences the formation of memories for events. We developed an immersive virtual reality paradigm to examine how visual perspective during encoding influences memories. Across two studies, participants explored immersive virtual environments from first-person and third-person avatar perspectives while wearing an Oculus Rift headset. Memory was tested immediately (Study One and Study Two) and following a one-week delay (Study Two). We assessed the accuracy of visual memory using cued recall questions and spatial memory by asking participants to draw maps of the layout of each environment (Study One and Study Two). Additional phenomenological ratings were included to assess visual perspective during remembering (Study Two). There were no differences in the accuracy of visual information across the two studies, but 3PP experiences were found to increase spatial memory accuracy due to their wider camera field of view when compared to 1PP experiences. Our results also demonstrate that 3PP experiences create 3PP memories, as reflected by an increase in subjective ratings of observer-like perspectives during remembering. In sum, visual perspective during memory formation influences the accuracy of spatial but not visual information, and the vantage point of memories during remembering.

How visual perspective influences the spatiotemporal dynamics of autobiographical memory retrieval.

Visual perspective, recalling events from one's own eyes or one of several possible observer viewpoints, is a fundamental aspect of AM. Yet, exactly how visual perspective influences the functional mechanisms supporting retrieval is unclear. Here we used a multivariate analysis to characterize the spatiotemporal dynamics of networks supporting AM retrieval from multiple typical and atypical visual perspectives. Both own eyes and observer perspectives engaged an AM retrieval network (i.e., hippocampus, anterior and posterior midline, and lateral frontal and posterior cortices) that peaked during later retrieval periods, but was recruited less strongly for observer perspectives. Functional connectivity analyses with an anterior hippocampal seed revealed that visual perspective also affected the strength and timing of neural recruitment. There was stronger hippocampal connectivity with a posterior medial network during the initial retrieval of AMs from atypical observer perspectives and stronger within-MTL and ventromedial prefrontal cortex connectivity during later retrieval periods from own eyes perspectives, suggesting that visual perspective is an important factor in understanding how neocortical systems guide memory retrieval. Our findings demonstrate that adopting own eyes and observer perspectives during AM retrieval is correlated with distinct patterns of hippocampal-neocortical interactions associated with differential recruitment of the AM retrieval network during later retrieval periods, thereby supporting the central role of visual perspective in reconstructing the personal past.

Fractionation of parietal function in bistable perception probed with concurrent TMS-EEG.

When visual input has conflicting interpretations, conscious perception can alternate spontaneously between these possible interpretations. This is called bistable perception. Previous neuroimaging studies have indicated the involvement of two right parietal areas in resolving perceptual ambiguity (ant-SPLr and post-SPLr). Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies that selectively interfered with the normal function of these regions suggest that they play opposing roles in this type of perceptual switch. In the present study, we investigated this fractionation of parietal function by use of combined TMS with electroencephalography (EEG). Specifically, while participants viewed either a bistable stimulus, a replay stimulus, or resting-state fixation, we applied single pulse TMS to either location independently while simultaneously recording EEG. Combined with participant's individual structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans, this dataset allows for complex analyses of the effect of TMS on neural time series data, which may further elucidate the causal role of the parietal cortex in ambiguous perception.