Metabolic syndrome is associated with aggressive prostate cancer regardless of race.

PURPOSE: Recent meta-analyses suggest the Metabolic Syndrome (MS) increases high-grade prostate cancer (PC), although studies are inconsistent and few black men were included. We investigated MS and PC diagnosis in black and white men undergoing prostate biopsy in an equal access healthcare system. We hypothesized MS would be linked with aggressive PC, regardless of race. METHODS: Among men undergoing prostate biopsy at the Durham Veterans Affairs Hospital, medical record data abstraction of diagnosis or treatment for hypertension (≥ 130/85 mmHg), dyslipidemia (HDL < 40 mg/dL), hypertriglyceridemia (≥ 150 mg/dL), diabetes, hyperglycemia (fasting glucose ≥ 100 ml/dL), and central obesity (waist circumference ≥ 40 inches) were done. Biopsy grade group (GG) was categorized as low (GG1) or high (GG2-5). Multinomial logistic regression was used to examine MS (3-5 components) vs. no MS (0-2 components) and diagnosis of high grade and low grade vs. no PC, adjusting for potential confounders. Interactions between race and MS were also tested. RESULTS: Of 1,051 men (57% black), 532 (51%) had MS. Men with MS were older, more likely to be non-black, and had a larger prostate volume (all p ≤ 0.011). On multivariable analysis, MS was associated with high-grade PC (OR = 1.73, 95% CI 1.21-2.48, p = 0.003), but not overall PC (OR = 1.17, 95% CI 0.88-1.57, p = 0.29) or low grade (OR = 0.87, 95% CI 0.62-1.21, p = 0.39). Results were similar in black and non-black men (all p-interactions > 0.25). CONCLUSION: Our data suggest that metabolic dysregulation advances an aggressive PC diagnosis in both black and non-black men. If confirmed, prevention of MS could reduce the risk of developing aggressive PC, including black men at higher risk of PC mortality.

Correcting eyewitness suggestibility: does explanatory role predict resistance to correction?

Many studies have documented that exposure to post event misinformation can lead eyewitnesses to misremember witnessing events they did not see and do so with high confidence. The goal of the present study was to investigate whether reporting of suggested misinformation can be reversed following a correction, and if so, whether misinformation would be more resistant to correction when it serves an explanatory function than when it does not. In two experiments participants witnessed an event, were exposed to a blatantly false suggestion(s) and one week later received a correction followed by a test of their memory for the witnessed event. We found evidence for both the persistence of misinformation following a correction (E1) and the complete reversibility of misinformation effects following a highly salient correction (E2). Although false reporting of the misinformation doubled when it served an explanatory function relative to when it did not (E1 and E2), in both experiments we found no evidence that resistance to correction varied as a function of the misinformation's explanatory role. Our findings suggest that, with a salient correction provided by a credible source, people are capable of updating their knowledge with new information that reverses what they previously thought.

Does evaluating belief prior to its retraction influence the efficacy of later corrections?

News stories unfold over time, with initial reports sometimes containing mistaken accounts of the newsworthy outcome that are ultimately revised or corrected. Because facts associated with newsworthy events are accumulated in this piecemeal fashion, readers often have repeated opportunities to reflect upon, discuss, and evaluate their belief in these accounts before they learn that initial news reports have been revised or retracted. The primary goal of the present study was to assess whether rating the strength of one's belief in the initially reported, mistaken cause might influence the efficacy of a later correction. In the current study, participants evaluated their belief in the target cause by either rating how much they believed it caused the outcome (Experiment 1) or rating the probability that the target caused the outcome (Experiment 2). The results showed that evaluating belief in a target cause prior to its retraction (relative to not doing so) rendered the correction more effective. This enhanced correction effect was not observed when participants generated the target information prior to its retraction (Experiment 3). Collectively, the results suggest that it is not how much people believe something, but whether they have thought about why they do or do not believe it, that affects their later willingness to revise their mistaken beliefs.