Time Frame Affects Vantage Point in Episodic and Semantic Autobiographical Memory: Evidence from Response Latencies.

Previous research suggests that, with the passage of time, representations of self in episodic memory become less dependent on their initial (internal) vantage point and shift toward an external perspective that is normally characteristic of how other people are represented. The present experiment examined this phenomenon in both episodic and semantic autobiographical memory using latency of self-judgments as a measure of accessibility of the internal vs. the external perspective. Results confirmed that in the case of representations of the self retrieved from recent autobiographical memories, trait-judgments regarding unobservable self-aspects (internal perspective) were faster than trait judgments regarding observable self-aspects (external perspective). Yet, in the case of self-representations retrieved from memories of a more distant past, judgments regarding observable self-aspects were faster. Those results occurred for both self-representations retrieved from episodic memory and for representations retrieved from the semantic memory. In addition, regardless of the effect of time, greater accessibility of unobservable (vs. observable) self-aspects was associated with the episodic rather than semantic autobiographical memory. Those results were modified by neither declared trait's self-descriptiveness (yes vs. no responses) nor by its desirability (highly desirable vs. moderately desirable traits). Implications for compatibility between how self and others are represented and for the role of self in social perception are discussed.

Accessibility of observable and unobservable characteristics in autobiographical memories of recent and distant past.

Self-reports regarding how people visualise themselves during events that occurred in the past show that for events from the distant past individuals report assuming a more external perspective than for events from the recent past [Nigro, G., & Neisser, U. (1983). Point of view in personal memories. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 467-482; Pronin, E., & Ross, L. (2006). Temporal differences in trait self-ascription. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 90, 197-209]. Thus it appears that, with the passage of time, representations of self embodied in memories of past events lose their position of an insider and assume a more ordinary position of self as an object seen from the perspective of an outside observer. The purpose of the present experiment was to examine this shift using a performance-based measure of accessibility. Results showed that self-judgements regarding unobservable, covert characteristics were faster for recent-compared to more distant-autobiographical events. However, self-judgements regarding observable, overt characteristics were faster for more distant events. This suggests an accessibility-based mechanism underlying the shift from internal to the relatively more external perspective in forming self-images related to the distant past.

OBSERVABLE AND UNOBSERVABLE ASPECTS OF TRAITS IN SELF-OTHER COMPARISONS.

Previous research on absolute trait judgments regarding self and others showed that, compared to self-judgments, other-judgments involve greater focus on external, observable (as opposed to internal, unobservable) aspects of traits. The present research attempted to extend those findings to comparative judgments. In two experiments, Polish undergraduates (N = 144) were asked to perform a series of comparative self-other judgments followed by a series of absolute judgments regarding either the self or another person. The absolute judgments employed the same traits as the comparative judgments but with the trait preceded by a qualifier: either "feels," referring to covert, unobservable aspects of the trait, or "looks," referring to overt, observable aspects. As expected, comparative judgments correlated higher with absolute feels judgments regarding the self and with absolute looks judgments regarding the other than with absolute looks judgments regarding the self and absolute feels judgments regarding the other. This occurred for self-other judgments involving acquaintances but not for self-other judgments involving close friends.

Reversed better-than-average effect in direct comparisons of nonsocial stimuli depends on the set size.

Studies on direct comparative judgments typically show that, for items that are positively evaluated, a single item randomly drawn from a larger set of similar items tends to be judged as better than average (the BTA effect). However, Windschitl, Conybeare, and Krizan (2008) demonstrated that, under timing conditions that do not favor focusing attention on the single item, the reversal of the BTA effect occurs. We report two experiments showing that the magnitude of the reversed BTA effect increases as a function of the size of a multiitem referent with which a single item target is compared. Specifically, in direct comparative judgments of the attractiveness of positively evaluated objects (nice-looking cloth buttons, attractive buildings, or cupcakes), underestimation of the attractiveness of singletons, as compared with a multiitem set (reversed BTA effect), increased with the increased set size. Analysis of absolute judgments obtained for singletons and for small and large multiitem sets suggests that, for attractive stimuli, both the reversed BTA effect in comparative judgments and its sensitivity to set size occur as a result of a positive relationship between set size and perceived attractiveness in absolute judgments.

Salience and asymmetric judgments of physical distance.

Previous research has shown that distance estimates made from memory are often asymmetric. Specifically, when A is a prominent location (a landmark) and B is not, people tend to recall a longer distance from A to B than from B to A. Results of two experiments showed that asymmetric judgments of distance are not restricted to judgments made from memory but occur also for judgments made when all relevant visual cues are still present. Furthermore, results indicated that situational salience is sufficient to produce asymmetric judgments and that distinctiveness (such as in the case of architectural landmarks) is not necessary.

Accessibility of private and public aspects of traits descriptive of oneself and others.

Previous research has shown that compared to mental representations of others, mental representations of ourselves are characterized by relatively greater accessibility of private, unobservable content, as opposed to content that is public and observable. Are those differences preserved when individuals focus on their own public selves and/or on private selves of others? Participants were asked to make social judgments involving traits that, in their view, were highly descriptive of either public or private selves of themselves, their best friend, or an acquaintance. Results demonstrated that highly self-descriptive traits were more accessible in social judgments involving individuals' private rather than public selves. This was true not only for traits descriptive of one's private self but also for traits descriptive of one's public self. Furthermore, other-descriptive traits, including traits that were highly descriptive of representations of private selves of others, were more accessible in social judgments involving public rather than private selves.

Defining traits differently for self and others.

Identical trait labels may be understood differently in thinking about self and in thinking about others. Specifically, when making self-judgments, individuals define traits primarily in terms of unobservable manifestations, e.g., how one feels. However, in making other-judgments, particularly in making judgments about relatively unfamiliar others, individuals define traits primarily in terms of observable manifestations, e.g., how one looks. This prediction was tested in three experiments (Exp. 1: N = 96, Polish undergraduates including 19 men, 77 women; Exp. 2: N = 96, U.S. undergraduates including 18 men, 78 women; Exp. 3: N = 74, Polish undergraduates including 18 men, 56 women). Participants were asked to perform a generic trait judgment task followed by a specific trait judgment task in which the same traits were preceded by a qualifier "feels" or "looks". As expected, in the case of self-judgments, generic judgments predicted feels judgments better than looks judgments. This pattern did not occur for judgments of others and was reversed for judgments about others who were relatively unfamiliar.