Candidate genes associated with susceptibility for SARS-coronavirus.

Assuming that no human had any previously acquired immunoprotection against severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) during the 2003 SARS outbreak, the biological bases for possible difference in individual susceptibility are intriguing. However, this issue has never been fully elucidated. Based on the premise that SARS patients belonging to a given genotype group having a significantly higher SARS infection rate than others would imply that genotype group being more susceptible, we make use of a compartmental model describing disease transmission dynamics and clinical and gene data of 100 laboratory confirmed SARS patients from Chinese Han population in Taiwan to estimate the infection rates of distinct candidate genotype groups among these SARS-infected individuals. The results show that CXCL10(-938AA) is always protective whenever it appears, but appears rarely and only jointly with either Fgl2(+158T/*) or HO-1(-497A/*), while (Fgl2)(+158T/*) is associated with higher susceptibility unless combined with CXCL10/IP-10(-938AA), when jointly is associated with lower susceptibility. The novel modeling approach proposed, which does not require sizable case and control gene datasets, could have important future public health implications in swiftly identifying potential high-risk groups associated with being highly susceptible to a particular infectious disease.

Impact of quarantine on the 2003 SARS outbreak: a retrospective modeling study.

During the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak, traditional intervention measures such as quarantine and border control were found to be useful in containing the outbreak. We used laboratory verified SARS case data and the detailed quarantine data in Taiwan, where over 150,000 people were quarantined during the 2003 outbreak, to formulate a mathematical model which incorporates Level A quarantine (of potentially exposed contacts of suspected SARS patients) and Level B quarantine (of travelers arriving at borders from SARS affected areas) implemented in Taiwan during the outbreak. We obtain the average case fatality ratio and the daily quarantine rate for the Taiwan outbreak. Model simulations is utilized to show that Level A quarantine prevented approximately 461 additional SARS cases and 62 additional deaths, while the effect of Level B quarantine was comparatively minor, yielding only around 5% reduction of cases and deaths. The combined impact of the two levels of quarantine had reduced the case number and deaths by almost a half. The results demonstrate how modeling can be useful in qualitative evaluation of the impact of traditional intervention measures for newly emerging infectious diseases outbreak when there is inadequate information on the characteristics and clinical features of the new disease-measures which could become particularly important with the looming threat of global flu pandemic possibly caused by a novel mutating flu strain, including that of avian variety.

Quarantine for SARS, Taiwan.

During the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Taiwan, >150,000 persons were quarantined, 24 of whom were later found to have laboratory-confirmed SARS-coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infection. Since no evidence exists that SARS-CoV is infective before the onset of symptoms and the quarantined persons were exposed but not symptomatic, we thought the quarantine's effectiveness should be investigated. Using the Taiwan quarantine data, we found that the onset-to-diagnosis time of previously quarantined confirmed case-patients was significantly shortened compared to that for those who had not been quarantined. Thus, quarantine for SARS in Taiwan screened potentially infective persons for swift diagnosis and hospitalization after onset, thereby indirectly reducing infections. Full-scale quarantine measures implemented on April 28 led to a significant improvement in onset-to-diagnosis time of all SARS patients, regardless of previous quarantine status. We discuss the temporal effects of quarantine measures and other interventions on detection and isolation as well as the potential usefulness of quarantine in faster identification of persons with SARS and in improving isolation measures.