Conceptual competence in psychiatric training: building a culture of conceptual inquiry.

Building a culture of conceptual inquiry in psychiatric training requires the development of conceptual competence: the ability to identify and examine assumptions that constitute the philosophical foundations of clinical care and scientific investigation in psychiatry. In this article, we argue for the importance of such competence and illustrate approaches to instilling it through examples drawn from our collective experiences as psychiatric educators.

Are Psychedelic Experiences Transformative? Can We Consent to Them?

Psychedelic substances have great promise for the treatment of many conditions, and they are the subject of intensive research. As with other medical treatments, both research and clinical use of psychedelics depend on our ability to ensure informed consent by patients and research participants. However, some have argued that informed consent for psychedelic use may be impossible, because psychedelic experiences can be transformative in the sense articulated by L. A. Paul (2014). For Paul, transformative experiences involve either the acquisition of knowledge that cannot be obtained in any other way or changes in the self. Either of these characteristics may appear to undermine informed consent. This article argues, however, that there is limited evidence that psychedelic experiences are transformative in Paul's sense, and that they may not differ in their transformative features from other common medical experiences for which informed consent is clearly possible. Further, even if psychedelic experiences can be transformative, informed consent is still possible. Because psychedelic experiences are importantly different in several respects from other medical experiences, this article closes with recommendations for how these differences should be reflected in informed consent processes.

What Do Psychiatrists Think About Caring for Patients Who Have Extremely Treatment-Refractory Illness?

Questions about when to limit unhelpful treatments are often raised in general medicine but are less commonly considered in psychiatry. Here we describe a survey of U.S. psychiatrists intended to characterize their attitudes about the management of suicidal ideation in patients with severely treatment-refractory illness. Respondents (n = 212) received one of two cases describing a patient with suicidal ideation due to either borderline personality disorder or major depressive disorder. Both patients were described as receiving all guideline-based and plausible emerging treatments. Respondents rated the expected helpfulness and likelihood of recommending each of four types of intervention: hospitalization, additional medication changes, additional neurostimulation, and additional psychotherapy. Across both cases, most respondents said they were likely to provide each intervention, except for additional neurostimulation in borderline personality disorder, while fewer thought each intervention would be helpful. Substantial minorities of respondents indicated that they would provide an intervention they did not think was likely to be helpful. Our results suggest that while most psychiatrists recognize the possibility that some patients are unlikely to be helped by available treatments, many would continue to offer such treatments.

A Focus Group Study of the Views of Persons with a History of Psychiatric Illness about Psychiatric Medical Aid in Dying.

BACKGROUND: Medical aid in dying (MAID) is legal in a number of countries, including some states in the U.S. While MAID is only permitted for terminal illnesses in the U.S., some other countries allow it for persons with psychiatric illness. Psychiatric MAID, however, raises unique ethical concerns, especially related to its effects on mental illness stigma and on how persons with psychiatric illnesses would come to feel about treatment and suicide. To explore those concerns, we conducted several focus groups with persons with lived experience of mental illness. METHODS: We conducted three video-conference-based focus groups involving adults residing in the U.S. who reported a prior diagnosis of any psychiatric illness. Only participants who reported thinking that MAID for terminal illness was morally acceptable were included. Focus group participants were asked to respond to a series of four questions. Groups were facilitated by a coordinator who was independent of the research team. RESULTS: A total of 22 persons participated in the focus groups. The majority of participants had depression and anxiety disorders; no participants had psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. Many participants strongly favored permitting psychiatric MAID, generally on the basis of respect for autonomy, its effects on stigma, and the severe suffering caused by mental illness. Others expressed concerns, typically related to difficulties in ensuring decision-making capacity and to the risk that MAID would be used in lieu of suicide. CONCLUSIONS: Persons with a history of psychiatric illness, as a group, have a diverse array of views about the permissibility of psychiatric MAID, reflecting nuanced consideration of how it relates to the public perception of mental illness, stigma, autonomy, and suicide risk.

Hard Choices: How Does Injustice Affect the Ethics of Medical Aid in Dying?

Critics of medical aid in dying (MAID) often argue that it is impermissible because background social conditions are insufficiently good for some persons who would utilize it. I provide a critical evaluation of this view. I suggest that receiving MAID is a sort of "hard choice," in that death is prima facie bad for the individual and only promotes that person's interests in special circumstances. Those raising this objection to MAID are, I argue, concerned primarily about the effects of injustice on hard choices. I show, however, that MAID and other hard choices are not always invalidated by injustice and that what matters is whether the injustice can be remediated given certain constraints. Injustice invalidates a hard choice when it can, reasonably, be remedied in a way that makes a person's life go better. I consider the implications of this view for law and policy regarding MAID.

AI as a Mental Health Therapist for Adolescents.

This Viewpoint discusses benefits and risks of using conversational artificial intelligence platforms to deliver psychotherapy to adolescents.

Does It Matter Whether a Psychiatric Intervention Is "Palliative"?

Palliative interventions are intended to alleviate suffering and improve quality, not quantity, of life and are not intended to cure illness. In psychiatry, uncertainty about which interventions count as palliative stems from the fact that psychiatry generally prioritizes symptom management irrespective of diagnosis or specific pathophysiology of illness. This commentary on a case considers how distinctions between palliative and other psychiatric interventions might not be all that helpful in resolving clinical and ethical questions about which interventions are-and when they are-appropriate.

Medical Assistance in Dying in Neurology.

An increasing number of jurisdictions have legalized medical assistance in dying (MAID) with significant variation in the procedures and eligibility criteria used. In the United States, MAID is available for persons with terminal illnesses but is frequently sought by persons with neurologic conditions. Persons with conditions that cause cognitive impairment, such as Alzheimer dementia, are often ineligible for MAID, as their illness is not considered terminal in its early stages, whereas in later stages, they may have impaired decision-making capacity.

Public mental health during and after the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic: Opportunities for intervention via emotional self-efficacy and resilience.

Importance: During the pandemic, the number of United States adults reporting clinically significant symptoms of anxiety and depression sky-rocketed, up from 11% in 2020 to more than 40% in 2021. Our current mental healthcare system cannot adequately accommodate the current crisis; it is therefore important to identify opportunities for public mental health interventions. Objective: Assess whether modifiable emotional factors may offer a point of intervention for the mental health crisis. Design setting and participants: From January 13 to 15, 2022, adults living in the United States were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk to complete an anonymous survey. Main outcomes and measures: Linear regressions tested whether the primary outcomes during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic (depressive and anxiety symptoms, burnout) were associated with hypothesized modifiable risk factors (loneliness and need for closure) and hypothesized modifiable protective factors (the ability to perceive emotions and connect with others emotionally; emotion-regulation efficacy; and resilience, or the ability to "bounce back" after negative events). Results: The sample included 1,323 adults (mean [SD] age 41.42 [12.52] years; 636 women [48%]), almost half of whom reported clinically significant depressive (29%) and/or anxiety (15%) symptoms. Approximately 90% of participants indicated feeling burned out at least once a year and nearly half of participants (45%) felt burned out once a week or more. In separate analyses, depressive symptoms (Model A), anxiety symptoms (Model B), and burnout (Model C) were statistically significantly associated with loneliness (ßModel A, 0.38; 95% CI, 0.33-0.43; ßModel B, 0.30; 95% CI, 0.26-0.36; ßModel C, 0.34; 95% CI, 0.28-0.41), need for closure (ßModel A, 0.09; 95% CI, 1.03-1.06; ßModel B, 0.13; 95% CI, 0.97-0.17; ßModel C, 0.11; 95% CI, 0.07-0.16), recent stressful life events (ßModel A, 0.14; 95% CI, 0.10-0.17; ßModel B, 0.14; 95% CI, 0.11-0.18; ßModel C, 0.10; 95% CI, 0.06-0.15), and resilience (ßModel A, -0.10; 95% CI, -0.15 to -0.05; ßModel B, -0.18; 95% CI, -0.23 to -0.13; ßModel C, -0.11; 95% CI, -0.17 to -0.05). In addition, depressive and anxiety symptoms were associated with emotional self-efficacy (ßModel A, -0.17; 95% CI, -0.22 to -0.12; ßModel B, -0.11; 95% CI, -0.17 to -0.06), and beliefs about the malleability of emotions (ßModel A, -0.08; 95% CI, -0.12 to -0.03; ßModel B, -0.09; 95% CI, -0.13 to -0.04). Associations between loneliness and symptoms were weaker among those with more emotional self-efficacy, more endorsement of emotion malleability beliefs, and greater resilience, in separate models. Analyses controlled for recent stressful life events, optimism, and social desirability. Conclusion and relevance: Public mental health interventions that teach resilience in response to negative events, emotional self-efficacy, and emotion-regulation efficacy may protect against the development of depressive symptoms, anxiety, and burnout, particularly in the context of a collective trauma. Emotional self-efficacy and regulation efficacy may mitigate the association between loneliness and mental health, but loneliness prevention research is also needed to address the current mental health crisis.

Epistemic injustice and the psychiatrist.

BACKGROUND: Psychiatrists depend on their patients for clinical information and are obligated to regard them as trustworthy, except in special circumstances. Nevertheless, some critics of psychiatry have argued that psychiatrists frequently perpetrate epistemic injustice against patients. Epistemic injustice is a moral wrong that involves unfairly discriminating against a person with respect to their ability to know things because of personal characteristics like gender or psychiatric diagnosis. METHODS: We review the concept of epistemic injustice and several claims that psychiatric practice is epistemically unjust. RESULTS: While acknowledging the risk of epistemic injustice in psychiatry and other medical fields, we argue that most concerns that psychiatric practice is epistemically unjust are unfounded. CONCLUSIONS: The concept of epistemic injustice does not add significantly to existing standards of good clinical practice, and that it could produce changes in practice that would be deleterious. Psychiatrists should resist calls for changes to clinical practice based on this type of criticism.

Moral Distress and Involuntary COVID-19 Vaccination of a Mature Minor Receiving Inpatient Psychiatric Treatment.

Mandatory vaccination against COVID-19 is a highly controversial issue, and many members of the public oppose it on the grounds that they should be free to determine what happens to their own body. Opinion has generally favored parental authority with respect to vaccination of children, but less attention has been paid to the ethical complexities of how to respond when mature minors refuse vaccination that is requested by their parents. We present a case in which an mature minor, who was psychiatrically hospitalized, refused vaccination that had been requested by her parents, which lead to significant moral distress for her caregivers.

Three kinds of suffering and their relative moral significance.

Suffering is widely assumed to have particular moral significance, and is of special relevance in medicine. There are, however, many theories about the nature of suffering that seem mutually incompatible. I suggest that there are three overall kinds of view about what suffering is: value-based theories, including the theory famously expounded by Eric Cassell, which as a group suggest that suffering is something like a state of distress related to threats to things that a person cares about; feeling-based theories, which equate suffering with aversive feelings or sensations like pain; and objective theories, which suggest that suffering is the absence of objective flourishing. Rather than argue that one or another of these kinds of theory most accurately captures the nature of suffering, I allow that the term is ambiguous and thus that it may have at least three different kinds. I further argue, however, that when we think about suffering as potentially justifying end-of-life interventions, especially for cognitively typical adults, we are interested mainly in value-based suffering. This is because the moral significance of value-based suffering for persons with decision-making capacity generally outweighs that of the other types; those other types of suffering achieve overriding moral significance only if they also constitute, or contribute to, value-based suffering.

Ending One's Life in Advance.

If you developed Alzheimer disease, would you want to go all the way to the end of what might be a decade-long course? Some would; some wouldn't. Options open to those who choose to die sooner are often inadequate. Do-not-resuscitate orders and advance directives depend on others' cooperation. Preemptive suicide may mean giving up years of life one would count as good. Do-it-yourself methods can fail. What we now ask of family and clinicians caring for persons with dementia, and of patients given no better option than to go on with lives they may not want, is unacceptable. To explore how one might better control one's own dying and avoid burdening others with overwhelming care and morally painful choices, we propose a thought experiment: an advance directive implant that would enable persons with early dementia, while competent, to arrange their own deaths without the subsequent intervention of anyone else.

Effects of temporary psychiatric holds on length of stay and readmission risk among persons admitted for psychotic disorders.

The practice of involuntary psychiatric commitment is central to the acute treatment of persons with severe mental illness and others in psychiatric crisis. Deciding whether a patient should be admitted involuntarily requires weighing respect for autonomy against beneficence, considering the clinical needs of the patient, and navigating ambiguous legal standards. The relative dearth of information about the impact of involuntary commitment on objective patient outcomes complicates matters ethically, legally, and clinically. To address this gap in the literature, we sought to determine the association between temporary psychiatric holds and length of stay and readmission rates among a retrospective sample of adult patients admitted to a large psychiatric hospital with diagnoses of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, mania, and other psychotic disorders. In total, we identified 460 patients and 559 unique encounters meeting our inclusion criteria; 90 of the encounters were voluntary (involving a temporary psychiatric hold) and 469 were involuntary. Univariable and multivariable analyses suggested that temporary psychiatric holds were not significantly associated with either length of stay or readmission rate. These findings are relevant to clinicians who must decide whether to admit a patient involuntarily, as they suggest that making a patient involuntary is not associated with differences in length of stay or readmission risk.

Ethical and public health implications of genetic testing for suicide risk: family and survivor perspectives.

PURPOSE: Death from suicide has an estimated heritability of ~50%. Research may soon allow calculation of polygenic risk scores (PRS) for suicide death, which could be marketed directly to consumers. This raises ethical concerns. Understanding how consumers will utilize this information is urgent. METHODS: We conducted three focus groups involving suicide attempt survivors ("survivors") and family members of suicide decedents ("family members") to gauge their reactions to this technology. Questions focused on positive and negative implications of PRS results. Qualitative research methods were used to summarize studio results. RESULTS: Eight survivors and 13 family members participated. Both groups postulated benefits of suicide PRS, including prevention and reduced stigma. Their concerns ranged from increased stigma to adverse psychological effects. They suggested that suicide PRS should be accompanied by extensive education and counseling. Participants experienced no adverse effects. CONCLUSION: Many ethical, legal, and social implications of genetic testing for suicide risk are highly salient to community stakeholders. Our participants hoped that suicide PRS could have significant individual and community-level benefits, but had concerns about effects in several domains, including stigma, access to insurance and employment, and increased anxiety and depression.

Risk of suicide after discharge from inpatient psychiatric care: a systematic review.

OBJECTIVE: The period following discharge from inpatient psychiatric care is recognised as an especially high-risk time for patient suicide. Astonishingly, there is a dearth of comprehensive studies examining risk and protective factors in this specific population. The aim of this study was to establish the protective and risk factors for suicide in the first year post-discharge (PD) from psychiatric facilities and their utility in categorising patients as high or low risk in a meaningful way to benefit clinical care and improve patient outcomes. METHODS: A methodical search of three databases (PubMed, EMBASE, and PsychINFO) was used to identify reports describing risk factors for suicide after psychiatric discharge. RESULTS: Predominantly, male sex, a history of self-harm, a history of suicide attempts, admission with suicidal ideation or suicidal behaviour, and hopelessness were identified as being associated with death by suicide after discharge. Lithium appeared to be protective against suicide in the studies reviewed. Other variables examined showed mixed results. CONCLUSIONS: The findings of this review suggest that significant suicide predictors both common and unique to those established for suicide in the general population exist and can be utilised in a clinically meaningful way, despite the difficulties inherent in studying this population.KEY POINTSThe risk of suicide after psychiatric hospitalisation is high.Factors that predict suicide after psychiatric hospitalisation overlap only partially with risk factors for suicide in general.Important risk factors for suicide in the post-discharge period include male sex, a history of self-harm, a history of suicide attempts, the presence of suicidal ideation during the admission, and hopelessness.The conclusions that can be drawn from the existing literature are limited by small study sizes, different study populations, and different follow-up periods; additional research in this domain is needed.

Evidence of new-onset depression among persons with migraine after discontinuing antidepressants.

Antidepressants have been hypothesized to cause tardive dysphoria-the delayed development of negative emotional symptoms. We assessed the risk of tardive dysphoria in a cohort of persons with migraine taking anti-migraine antidepressants with no known diagnosis of any mood or anxiety disorder. We included all outpatient encounters in a university hospital system for migraine from January 2008 through October 2018, excluding subjects with prior psychiatric diagnoses. Kaplan-Meier survival curves and multivariable Cox proportional hazards analyses were conducted. 13,048 subjects were included; 1191 took an antidepressant; 402 discontinued an antidepressant. In multivariable analyses examining the first year after exposure, antidepressant use was not significantly associated with risk of a depression, any mood disorder (including depression, mania, and other mood disorders), or anxiety. Antidepressant discontinuation was significantly associated with increased risk of depression, but not any mood disorder or anxiety. Among persons with migraine with no known psychiatric diagnosis, antidepressants did not appear to be associated with indicators of tardive dysphoria. Antidepressant discontinuation, however, was associated with increased risk of a depression diagnosis.