Preschoolers retain more details from event sequences 1 week following an in-group demonstration.

Previous research highlights that the learning processes of preschool-aged children are influenced by the cultural group membership of the information sources. As of yet, however, no study has aimed to explore the influence of cultural group membership on the long-term retention of novel information. In the current study, 4-year-old children observed three event sequences that were demonstrated by either an adult speaking their native language or a foreign language speaker. In Experiment 1, children (N = 56) were allowed to imitate the events immediately. Results showed that the average number of accurately reproduced details (native = 3.26; foreign = 3.11) and the order of event elements (native = 1.69; foreign = 1.49) did not significantly differ in the two conditions. In Experiment 2, children (N = 56) were allowed to imitate only following a 1-week delay. In this case, children retained more details (native = 2.6; foreign = 2.2) and reproduced the order in the event sequences more accurately (native = 1.18; foreign = 0.87) following a native demonstration. The behavior of children in all conditions differed from a baseline group without any instruction (n = 15). These findings show that preschoolers retain more information in the long term when it was demonstrated to them by a member of their own culture. Importantly, they also learn from people belonging to different cultures-as evidenced by both the lack of difference in Experiment 1 and the difference between the out-group condition of Experiment 2 and the baseline.

Can 18-Month-Olds Revise Attributed Beliefs?

Successful social interactions rely on flexibly tracking and revising others' beliefs. These can be revised prospectively, new events leading to new beliefs, or retrospectively, when realizing that an attribution may have been incorrect. However, whether infants are capable of such belief revisions is an open question. We tested whether 18-month-olds can revise an attributed FB into a TB when they learn that a person may have witnessed an event that they initially thought she could not see. Infants first observed Experimenter 1 (E1) hiding two objects into two boxes. Then E1 left the room, and the locations of the objects were swapped. Infants then accompanied Experimenter 2 (E2) to the adjacent room. In the FB-revised-to-TB condition, infants observed E1 peeking into the experimental room through a one-way mirror, whereas in the FB-stays-FB condition, they observed E1 reading a book. After returning to the experimental room E1 requested an object by pointing to one of the boxes. In the FB-stays-FB condition, most infants chose the non-referred box, congruently with the agent's FB. However, in the FB-revised-to-TB condition, most infants chose the other, referred box. Thus, 18-month-olds revised an already attributed FB after receiving evidence that this attribution might have been wrong.

"The Red Spots Are Now Lava, We Shouldn't Step on Them"-The Joint Creation of Novel Arbitrary Social Contexts in Pretend Play.

Pretend play has been extensively studied in developmental science, nevertheless important questions remain about how children engage in and navigate between pretend episodes. In this proposal, we scrutinize childhood pretense from a social cognitive developmental point of view. First, we review previous theories of pretend play structured around important questions that pinpoint some attributes of pretend episodes, such as their transient and socially defined nature. In these sections, evidence is also reviewed about children's understanding of these attributes. Following this, we describe a novel proposal of pretend play which extends recent accounts of (pretend) play (Wyman & Rakoczy, 2011; Chu & Schulz, 2020a) by exploiting the importance of social interactions in pretense. We contend that engaging in shared pretending can be considered a manifestation of and support for children's ability to participate in and set up arbitrary contextual boundaries with others. These claims are discussed with regards to how pretend play may figure into social development, its potential implications for intra- as well as intercultural variation, as well as future research.

If you presume relevance, you don't need a bifocal lens.

We argue for a relevance-guided learning mechanism to account for both innovative reproduction and faithful imitation by focusing on the role of communication in knowledge transmission. Unlike bifocal stance theory, this mechanism does not require a strict divide between instrumental and ritual-like actions, and the goals they respectively fulfill (material vs. social/affiliative), to account for flexibility in action interpretation and reproduction.

3-4-year-old children's memory flexibility allows adaptation to an altered context.

Imitation provides a reliable method to investigate the developing memory functions in childhood. The present study explored whether 3-4-year-old children are able to revise their previous experiences after a 1 week delay in order to adapt to an altered context. We used a combined short-term (Session 1) and delayed (Session 2) imitation paradigm based on a previous study with 2-year-olds. The constraints (target object close/far) and relatedly the relevance of using a tool in a goal attainment task (irrelevant/relevant, respectively) changed between the sessions. We found that children in Session 1 used the tool only when it was needed (relevant/object far context). After the 1 week delay when the tool was previously irrelevant and then became relevant, children remembered the irrelevant act and applied it in the altered context. When the tool lost its relevance after 1 week, children used the tool less than before, but did not fully omit it, despite its reduced efficiency. The present data with 3-year-olds was compared to a pattern of results with 2-year-olds (from a similar previous study), that allowed to discuss possible developmental transitions in memory and imitation. We propose that the flexible restoration of a formerly irrelevant act and the maintenance of a formerly successful solution indicate flexibility of preschooler's memory when guiding imitation. This flexibility, however, interacts with children's tendency to remain faithful to strategies that were previously ostensively demonstrated to them.

Spontaneous attribution of underspecified belief of social partners facilitates processing shared information.

The main question of Theory of Mind research is not only how we represent others' mental states, but also how these representations influence our first-person interaction with our surrounding environment. A novel theory of belief files proposes that we should think about belief tracking as an online, spontaneous, and effortless mechanism giving rise to structured representations, thus easing the use of beliefs in behavior selection. Beliefs are formed by two different sub mechanisms: (1) opening an empty placeholder belief file, for a particular intentional agent, and (2) filling it up with mental content attributed to the agent. This theory opens the possibility of exploiting theory of mind abilities even in situations when we can attribute only underspecified mental contents to others. The goal of the present study was to provide a proof of concept test: whether spontaneous belief tracking starts effortlessly even when we do not know a partner's actual belief content. We created an object detection paradigm, where the visual access of a virtual agent to the object to be detected by the participant was manipulated. The agent getting access to the information for processing always preceded the participant getting access to it, resulting in the need of attributing belief without specified content in it. Our results have shown that participants detected the object with a reduced reaction time when the observed agent had visual access to the object's expected place compared to when the participant watched the same scenario, but the object's location remained occluded for the observed agent and thus was revealed only for the participant. This suggests that the information processing of humans speeds up when another agent has access to a piece of information as well. Thus, we do track agents' potential beliefs without knowing its actual content. This study contributes to our understanding of the effect of spontaneous computation of others' mental states on first-person information processing.

Can group representations based on relational cues warrant the rich inferences typically drawn from group membership?

Pietraszewski's model - though promising in many respects - needs to be extended so that it can explain the multitude of rich inferences that people draw from group membership. In this commentary, we highlight some facets of group thinking, especially from the field of developmental psychology, that cannot be unambiguously accounted for by a model that is built solely on relational cues.

Young children expect pretend object identities to be known only by their partners in joint pretence.

The present study examined whether three-year-old children (age = 42-48 months, n = 57; 31 boys) understand that object identities stipulated during pretend play could only be known by people witnessing the stipulation. Children participated in pretend scenarios that included some objects and two experimenters. Two pretend episodes corresponded to an object: one connected to its conventional function, the other to a pretend identity made-up on the spot. These episodes happened either in the presence or absence of the other person. In the test phase, this experimenter expressed an intention to do something with an object and asked for a 'missing' prop. The prediction was that in case she was present previously, children would be more likely to select the prop corresponding to a pretence stipulation, compared to when she was absent. The results confirmed this pattern: in the absent condition, 68.42% of the participants chose the prop connected to the conventional use of the object, while 31.58% chose the prop corresponding to its identity stipulated in pretend play. It seems that preschool aged children refrain from generalizing their knowledge about the pretend identity of an object, in case their interactive partner could not know of this identity.

Individuation of agents based on psychological properties in 10 month-old infants.

What makes agents fundamentally different from each other from the viewpoint of a 10-month-old infant? While infants at this age can already individuate human-like objects from non-humanlike ones and self-propelled agents from inert objects, little is known of when and how they start individuating within the domain of agents. What is clear from previous studies is that differences in surface and dynamic features are not sufficient. We hypothesized that mental properties-in this case the agents' preferences-can serve as an individuating property. In our study, we familiarized infants with two animated agents who had different preferences. The agents sequentially and repeatedly emerged from behind an occluder, and then each agent approached one of two target objects before returning behind the occluder. After familiarization, the occluder was lifted, revealing either one agent or two agents. While infants successfully individuated the agents in the preference-demonstration condition, they failed to do so in the exposure-only condition in which perceptually similar surface and dynamic features of the agents were presented but without indicating preferences. Our study thus provides evidence that mental properties can help individuate agents, grounding the claim that infants understand agents as mental entities at their core.

Semantic systems are mentalistically activated for and by social partners.

A recently discovered electrophysiological response, the social N400, suggests that we use our language system to track how social partners comprehend language. Listeners show an increased N400 response, when themselves not, only a communicative partner experiences a semantic incongruity. Does the N400 reflect purely semantic or mentalistic computations as well? Do we attribute language comprehension to communicative partners using our semantic systems? In five electrophysiological experiments we identified two subcomponents of the social N400. First, we manipulated the presence-absence of an Observer during object naming: the semantic memory system was activated by the presence of a social partner in addition to semantic predictions for the self. Next, we induced a false belief-and a consequent miscomprehension-in the Observer. Participants showed the social N400, over and above the social presence effect, to labels that were incongruent for the Observer, even though they were congruent for them. This effect appeared only if participants received explicit instructions to track the comprehension of the Observer. These findings suggest that the semantic systems of the brain are not merely sensitive to social information and contribute to the attribution of comprehension, but they appear to be mentalistic in nature.

Representing social categories based on shared cultural knowledge in adults.

The study investigated whether adults rely on the cues of shared cultural knowledge when forming social category representations. We used a modified version of the memory confusion paradigm, where participants are presented with the photographs of people differing along social category distinctions while listening to utterances associated with the pictures. In the test phase, the task is to match the utterances to the photographs. When category representations are formed, more within-category errors than between-category errors are expected. Experiment 1 contrasted two cues in social category representations: race and shared cultural knowledge. In Experiment 2, categorisation based on shared cultural knowledge was tested without any competing cue. Experiment 3 replicated previous results about automatic race encoding when no competing social distinction was available. Experiment 4 contrasted gender with cultural category membership. The results indicate that people encode information about race, gender, and cultural background; however, the latter two are more fundamental dimensions of social categorisation.

One Function One Tool? A Review on Mutual Exclusivity in Tool Use Learning in Human and Non-human Species.

The goal of this review is twofold: first to explore whether mutual exclusivity and functional fixedness overlap and what might be their respective specificities and second, to investigate whether mutual exclusivity as an inferential principle could be applied in other domains than language and whether it can be found in non-human species. In order to do that, we first give an overview of the representative studies of each phenomenon. We then analyze papers on tool use learning in children that studied or observed one of these phenomena. We argue that, despite their common principle -one tool one function- mutual exclusivity and functional fixedness are two distinct phenomena and need to be addressed separately in order to fully understand the mechanisms underlying social learning and cognition. In addition, mutual exclusivity appears to be applicable in other domains than language learning, namely tool use learning and is also found in non-human species when learning symbols and tools.

Two-Year-Old Children Expect Native, but Not Foreign Speakers to Use the Same Tool for the Same Purpose.

Previous research has already demonstrated that even very young children are sensitive to language cues and learn differently from native and foreign speaker models. A possible explanation for this phenomenon suggests that spoken language is a sign of someone's cultural background and in this sense demonstrates the person's culture specific knowledge. The aim of the present study was to investigate what children think about native and foreign speakers' behavior in a domain that is typically regulated by cultural norms (tool usage), specifically whether they expect group members to act alike or not. In a violation of expectation paradigm, two-year-old toddlers first watched a video on which a native and a foreign speaker person used different tools for achieving the same goal. In the test phase a new native speaker model appeared and selected one of the previously seen tools for the same goal as it was used before. Results indicated that toddlers were surprised if the native speaker model had chosen the tool that had previously been used by the foreign speaker. In Experiment 2, the familiarization phase was exactly the same as in Experiment 1, but during the test phase, the model spoke a foreign language. Results, in this case, showed no significant differences between looking times. These experiments suggest that two-year-olds expect native (but not foreign) speakers to use the same tool for the same goals. As tool usage is a fundamental element of cultural knowledge, we propose that this pattern of results suggest that children expect native speakers to possess shared cultural knowledge at least in the domain of artifacts.

Environmental drivers of forest biodiversity in temperate mixed forests - A multi-taxon approach.

Harmonization of timber production and forest conservation is a major challenge of modern silviculture. For the establishment of ecologically sustainable forest management, the management-related environmental drivers of multi-taxon biodiversity should be explored. Our study reveals those environmental variables related to tree species diversity and composition, stand structure, litter and soil conditions, microclimate, landscape, and land-use history that determine species richness and composition of 11 forest-dwelling organism groups. Herbs, woody regeneration, ground-floor and epiphytic bryophytes, epiphytic lichens, terricolous saprotrophic, ectomycorrhizal, and wood-inhabiting macrofungi, spiders, carabid beetles, and birds were sampled in West Hungarian mature mixed forests. The correlations among the diversities and compositions of different organism groups were also evaluated. Drivers of organism groups were principally related to stand structure, tree species diversity and composition, and microclimate, while litter, soil, landscape, and land-use historical variables were less influential. The complex roles of the shrub layer, deadwood, and the size of the trees in determining the diversity and composition of various taxa were revealed. Stands with more tree species sustained higher stand-level species richness of several taxa. Besides, stands with different dominant tree species harbored various species communities of organism groups. Therefore, landscape-scale diversity of dominant tree species may enhance the diversity of forest-dwelling communities at landscape level. The effects of the overstory layer on forest biodiversity manifested in many cases via microclimate conditions. Diversity of organism groups showed weaker relationship with the diversity of other taxa than with environmental variables. According to our results, the most influential drivers of forest biodiversity are under the direct control of the actual silvicultural management. Heterogeneous stand structure and tree species composition promote the different organism groups in various ways. Therefore, the long-term maintenance of the structural and compositional heterogeneity both at stand and landscape scale is an important aspect of ecologically sustainable forest management.

Attention in naïve psychology.

In everyday life, mentalizing is nested in a rich context of cognitive faculties and background information that potentially contribute to its success. Yet, we know little about these modulating effects. Here we propose that humans develop a naïve psychological model of attention (featured as a goal-dependent, intentional relation to the environment) and use this to fine-tune their mentalizing attempts, presuming that the way people represent their environment is influenced by the cognitive priorities (attention) their current intentions create. The attention model provides an opportunity to tailor mental state inferences to the temporary features of the agent whose mind is in the focus of mentalizing. The ability to trace attention is an exceptionally powerful aid for mindreading. Knowledge about the partner's attention provides background information, however being grounded in his current intentions, attention has direct relevance to the ongoing interaction. Furthermore, due to its causal connection to intentions, the output of the attention model remains valid for a prolonged but predictable amount of time: till the evoking intention is in place. The naïve attention model theory is offered as a novel theory on social attention that both incorporates existing evidence and identifies new directions in research.

The flexibility of early memories: Limited reevaluation of action steps in 2-year-old infants.

This study investigated the flexibility of 2-year-old infants' retrieval and reenactment processes. In a delayed imitation paradigm, children were exposed to a constraint change (implemented by the distance of a target object) affecting the relevance of using a tool to obtain a goal (reach the object). In Experiment 1, during demonstration in the first session the tool was either relevant or irrelevant for reaching the goal, and 1 week later it either lost or gained its relevance, respectively. We found that when the tool became unnecessary (relevant to irrelevant change), children used it somewhat less than before and used it less compared with when the tool's relevance remained the same (relevant to relevant, no change). When the tool became necessary after a constraint change (irrelevant to relevant change), children used the tool more than before, but not as much as in the Relevant-Relevant control condition. In Experiment 2, the timing of the constraint change (immediate or delayed) was varied in a modified version of the Irrelevant-Relevant condition, where practice before the constraint change was omitted. Children were not significantly more flexible in the immediate condition than in the delayed condition, and comparisons with Experiment 1 showed that performance did not change if we omitted the practice before the change. These results indicate that although 2-year-olds show considerable mnemonic performance, they face difficulties in adapting to constraint changes. We propose that this inflexibility may stem from infants' inability to revise their evaluations formed in previous events due to their immature episodic memory capacities.

The effect of language on prosocial behaviors in preschool children.

The present study investigated how linguistic group membership influences prosocial behaviors, namely helpfulness and cooperation, in preschool children. Whilst research indicates that children preferentially direct their prosocial behavior towards members of their own groups, the influence of perceived linguistic group membership on actual helpfulness and cooperation has not been investigated. We presented an experimenter to 4- and 5-year-olds either as a foreigner, who did not speak the local language or as a native person. Children were then given the opportunity to help or cooperate with this experimenter in a series of nonverbal playful tasks. Whilst 4-year-olds helped and cooperated equally with the foreign and the native experimenter, 5-year-olds required significantly more cues and prompts in order to help or cooperate in the foreign condition. We also found that children were overall more reluctant to respond prosocially in the cooperation tasks than in the helping tasks. We tested children in two European countries (France and Hungary) and found the same pattern of responses in the two locations, suggesting that our findings are not specific to the local culture. Our results extend the findings of earlier research that showed selectivity according to the language spoken by the partner for sharing and imitation. Studies that looked at helpfulness or cooperation used the minimal group paradigm to induce group membership (based on arbitrary cues) and used indirect measures of prosociality, such as different forms of reasoning about the partner. In our study, we used language, a natural cue for group membership (versus arbitrary cues or cues based on social conventions) and directly observed children's helpful and cooperative behaviors toward the experimenter. Our results also confirm previous results indicating that with age, children become selective in their prosocial behaviors as they acquire new means of social evaluation and categorization. We conclude that the language associated with a potential social partner is not only a cue for affiliation and shared knowledge but also a cue mediating children's prosocial acts.

Electrophysiological investigation of infants' understanding of understanding.

Social cognition might play a critical role in language acquisition and comprehension, as mindreading may be necessary to infer the intended meaning of linguistic expressions uttered by communicative partners. In three electrophysiological experiments, we explored the interplay between belief attribution and language comprehension of 14-month-old infants. First, we replicated our earlier finding: infants produced an N400 effect to correctly labelled objects when the labels did not match a communicative partner's beliefs about the referents. Second, we observed no N400 when we replaced the object with another category member. Third, when we named the objects incorrectly for infants, but congruently with the partner's false belief, we observed large N400 responses, suggesting that infants retained their own perspective in addition to that of the partner. We thus interpret the observed social N400 effect as a communicational expectancy indicator because it was contingent not on the attribution of false beliefs but on semantic expectations by both the self and the communicative partner. Additional exploratory analyses revealed an early, frontal, positive-going electrophysiological response in all three experiments, which was contingent on infants' computing the comprehension of the social partner based on attributed beliefs.

Action selection in imitation: Why do we still need the teleological stance? Commentary on 'The teleological stance: Past, present, and future' by Juvrud and Gredeback.

The teleological stance and natural pedagogy are integrated as a system for representing the teleological structure of novel events, including causally opaque ones. In this sense, the teleological stance allows children to build a goal hierarchy, based on which they become able to select the actions to perform.