Strategy-based motor learning decreases the post-movement ß power.

Motor learning depends on the joint contribution of several processes including cognitive strategies aiming at goal achievement and prediction error-driven implicit adaptation. Understanding this functional interplay and its clinical implications requires insight into the individual learning processes, including at a neural level. Here, we set out to examine the impact of learning a cognitive strategy, over and above implicit adaptation, on the oscillatory post-movement ß rebound (PMBR), which typically decreases in power following (visuo)motor perturbations. Healthy participants performed reaching movements towards a target, with online visual feedback replacing the view of their moving hand. The feedback was sometimes rotated, either relative to their movements (visuomotor rotation) or invariant to their movements (and relative to the target; clamped feedback), always for two consecutive trials interspersed between non-rotated trials. In both conditions, the first trial with a rotation was unpredictable. On the second trial, the task was either to re-aim, and thereby compensate for the rotation experienced in the first trial (visuomotor rotation; Compensate condition), or to ignore the rotation and keep on aiming at the target (clamped feedback; Ignore condition). After-effects did not differ between conditions, indicating that the amount of implicit learning was similar, while large differences in movement direction in the second rotated trial between conditions indicated that participants successfully acquired re-aiming strategies. Importantly, PMBR power following the first rotated trial was modulated differently in the two conditions. Specifically, it decreased in both conditions, but this effect was larger when participants had to acquire a cognitive strategy and prepare to re-aim. Our results therefore suggest that the PMBR is modulated by cognitive demands of motor learning, possibly reflecting the evaluation of a behaviourally significant goal achievement error.

Action effect predictions in 'what', 'when', and 'whether' intentional actions.

It has been proposed that intentional action can be separated into three major types depending on the nature of the action choice - what (selecting what to do), when (selecting when to act) and whether (to perform the action or not). While many theories on action control assume that intentional action involves the prediction of action effects, there has not been any attempt to compare the three types of intentional actions (what, when, whether) with respect to action-effect prediction. Here, we employ an action-effect prediction paradigm where participants select the action on every trial based on either the what (choosing between alternative actions), when (choosing to respond at different time points) or whether (choosing to perform an action or not) action components, and each action choice is followed by either a predicted (standard) or a mispredicted (deviant) tone. We found a significant P2 difference between standard/deviant tones reflecting the formation of action-effect predictions regardless of whether the action choice was based on the 'what', 'when' or 'whether' decision. Furthermore, our analysis revealed that this P2 difference for the prediction effect was not observable in non-action trials within the 'whether' condition, which suggests an action-specific prediction process.

The auditory brain in action: Intention determines predictive processing in the auditory system-A review of current paradigms and findings.

According to the ideomotor theory, action may serve to produce desired sensory outcomes. Perception has been widely described in terms of sensory predictions arising due to top-down input from higher order cortical areas. Here, we demonstrate that the action intention results in reliable top-down predictions that modulate the auditory brain responses. We bring together several lines of research, including sensory attenuation, active oddball, and action-related omission studies: Together, the results suggest that the intention-based predictions modulate several steps in the sound processing hierarchy, from preattentive to evaluation-related processes, also when controlling for additional prediction sources (i.e., sound regularity). We propose an integrative theoretical framework-the extended auditory event representation system (AERS), a model compatible with the ideomotor theory, theory of event coding, and predictive coding. Initially introduced to describe regularity-based auditory predictions, we argue that the extended AERS explains the effects of action intention on auditory processing while additionally allowing studying the differences and commonalities between intention- and regularity-based predictions-we thus believe that this framework could guide future research on action and perception.

The encoding of stochastic regularities is facilitated by action-effect predictions.

Our brains continuously build and update predictive models of the world, sources of prediction being drawn for example from sensory regularities and/or our own actions. Yet, recent results in the auditory system indicate that stochastic regularities may not be easily encoded when a rare medium pitch deviant is presented between frequent high and low pitch standard sounds in random order, as reflected in the lack of sensory prediction error event-related potentials [i.e., mismatch negativity (MMN)]. We wanted to test the implication of the predictive coding theory that predictions based on higher-order generative models-here, based on action intention, are fed top-down in the hierarchy to sensory levels. Participants produced random sequences of high and low pitch sounds by button presses in two conditions: In a "specific" condition, one button produced high and the other low pitch sounds; in an "unspecific" condition, both buttons randomly produced high or low-pitch sounds. Rare medium pitch deviants elicited larger MMN and N2 responses in the "specific" compared to the "unspecific" condition, despite equal sound probabilities. These results thus demonstrate that action-effect predictions can boost stochastic regularity-based predictions and engage higher-order deviance detection processes, extending previous notions on the role of action predictions at sensory levels.

Evidence for Enhanced Long-term Memory in Professional Musicians and Its Contribution to Novel Word Learning.

Previous studies evidenced transfer effects from professional music training to novel word learning. However, it is unclear whether such an advantage is driven by cascading, bottom-up effects from better auditory perception to semantic processing or by top-down influences from cognitive functions on perception. Moreover, the long-term effects of novel word learning remain an open issue. To address these questions, we used a word learning design, with four different sets of novel words, and we neutralized the potential perceptive and associative learning advantages in musicians. Under such conditions, we did not observe any advantage in musicians on the day of learning (Day 1 [D1]), at neither a behavioral nor an electrophysiological level; this suggests that the previously reported advantages in musicians are likely to be related to bottom-up processes. Nevertheless, 1 month later (Day 30 [D30]) and for all types of novel words, the error increase from D1 to D30 was lower in musicians compared to nonmusicians. In addition, for the set of words that were perceptually difficult to discriminate, only musicians showed typical N400 effects over parietal sites on D30. These results demonstrate that music training improved long-term memory and that transfer effects from music training to word learning (i.e., semantic levels of speech processing) benefit from reinforced (long-term) memory functions. Finally, these findings highlight the positive impact of music training on the acquisition of foreign languages.

What exactly is missing here? The sensory processing of unpredictable omissions is modulated by the specificity of expected action-effects.

We select our actions according to the desired outcomes; for instance, piano players press certain keys to generate specific musical notes. It is well-described that the omission of a predicted action-effect may elicit prediction error signals in the brain, but what happens in the case of simultaneous effector-specific (by contrast to effector-unspecific) predictions? To answer this question, we asked participants to press left and right keys to generate tones A and B; based on the action-effect association, the tones' identity was either predictable or unpredictable, while rarely, the expected input was omitted. Crucially, the data show that omissions following hand-specific associations reliably elicited a late omission N1 (oN1) component, by contrast to the hand-unspecific associations, where the late oN1 was rather weak. An additional condition where both key-presses generated a unique tone was implemented. Here, rare omissions of the expected tone generated both early and late oN1 responses, by contrast to the condition in which two simultaneous action-effect representations had to be maintained, where only late oN1 responses were elicited. Finally, omission P3 (oP3) responses were strongly elicited for all omission types without differences, indicating that a general expectation based on a tone presentation (rather than which tone), is likely indexed at this stage. The present results emphasize the top-down effects of action intention on the sensory processing of omissions, where unspecific (vs. specific) and multiple (vs. single) action-effect representations are associated with processing costs at the early sensory levels.

Action Intention-based and Stimulus Regularity-based Predictions: Same or Different?

We act on the environment to produce desired effects, but we also adapt to the environmental demands by learning what to expect next, based on experience: How do action-based predictions and sensory predictions relate to each other? We explore this by implementing a self-generation oddball paradigm, where participants performed random sequences of left and right button presses to produce frequent standard and rare deviant tones. By manipulating the action-tone association as well as the likelihood of a button press over the other one, we compare ERP effects evoked by the intention to produce a specific tone, tone regularity, and both intention and regularity. We show that the N1b and Tb components of the N1 response are modulated by violations of tone regularity only. However, violations of action intention as well as of regularity elicit MMN responses, which occur similarly in all three conditions. Regardless of whether the predictions at sensory levels were based on either intention, regularity, or both, the tone deviance was further and equally well detected at hierarchically higher processing level, as reflected in similar P3a effects between conditions. We did not observe additive prediction errors when intention and regularity were violated concurrently, suggesting the two integrate despite presumably having independent generators. Even though they are often discussed as individual prediction sources in the literature, this study represents to our knowledge the first to directly compare them. Finally, these results show how, in the context of action, our brain can easily switch between top-down intention-based expectations and bottom-up regularity cues to efficiently predict future events.