End-of-life decisions in medical practice: a survey of doctors in Victoria (Australia).

OBJECTIVES: To discover the current state of opinion and practice among doctors in Victoria, Australia, regarding end-of-life decisions and the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia. Longitudinal comparison with similar 1987 and 1993 studies. DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS: Cross-sectional postal survey of doctors in Victoria. RESULTS: 53% of doctors in Victoria support the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia. Of doctors who have experienced requests from patients to hasten death, 35% have administered drugs with the intention of hastening death. There is substantial disagreement among doctors concerning the definition of euthanasia. CONCLUSIONS: Disagreement among doctors concerning the meaning of the term euthanasia may contribute to misunderstanding in the debate over voluntary euthanasia. Among doctors in Victoria, support for the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia appears to have weakened slightly over the past 17 years. Opinion on this issue is sharply polarised.

Partial and impartial ethical reasoning in health care professionals.

OBJECTIVES: To determine the relationship between ethical reasoning and gender and occupation among a group of male and female nurses and doctors. DESIGN: Partialist and impartialist forms of ethical reasoning were defined and singled out as being central to the difference between what is known as the "care" moral orientation (Gilligan) and the "justice" orientation (Kohlberg). A structured questionnaire based on four hypothetical moral dilemmas involving combinations of (health care) professional, non-professional, life-threatening and non-life-threatening situations, was piloted and then mailed to a randomly selected sample of doctors and nurses. SETTING: 400 doctors from Victoria, and 200 doctors and 400 nurses from New South Wales. RESULTS: 178 doctors and 122 nurses returned completed questionnaires. 115 doctors were male, 61 female; 50 nurses were male and 72 were female. It was hypothesised that there would be an association between feminine subjects and partialist reasoning and masculine subjects and impartialist reasoning. It was also hypothesised that nurses would adopt a partialist approach to reasoning and doctors an impartialist approach. No relationship between any of these variables was observed.

End-of-life decisions in Australian medical practice.

OBJECTIVE: To estimate the proportion of medical end-of-life decisions in Australia, describe the characteristics of such decisions and compare these data with medical end-of-life decisions in the Netherlands, where euthanasia is openly practised. DESIGN: Postal survey, conducted between May and July 1996, using a self-administered questionnaire based on the questionnaire used to determine medical end-of-life decisions in the Netherlands in 1995. PARTICIPANTS: A random sample of active medical practitioners from all Australian States and Territories selected from medical disciplines in which there were opportunities to be the attending doctor at non-acute patient deaths, and hence to make medical end-of-life decisions. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: Proportion of Australian deaths that involved a medical end-of-life decision, using ratio-to-size estimation based on the sampled doctors' responses to the questionnaire. The response rate was 64%. RESULTS: The proportion of all Australian deaths that involved a medical end-of-life decision were: euthanasia, 1.8% (including physician-assisted suicide, 0.1%); ending of patient's life without patient's concurrent explicit request, 3.5%; withholding or withdrawing of potentially life-prolonging treatment, 28.6%; alleviation of pain with opioids in doses large enough that there was a probable life-shortening effect, 30.9%. In 30% of all Australian deaths, a medical end-of-life decision was made with the explicit intention of ending the patient's life, of which 4% were in response to a direct request from the patient. Overall, Australia had a higher rate of intentional ending of life without the patient's request than the Netherlands. CONCLUSIONS: Australian law has not prevented doctors from practising euthanasia or making medical end-of-life decisions explicitly intended to hasten the patient's death without the patient's request.

"No" to the intention/foresight distinction in medical end-of-life decisions.

The idea that the permissibility of an action (or an omission) depends on the agent's intention has played an important role in traditional moral thinking and the law and determines, at least in part, the permissibility of medical end-of-life decisions. I argue that there are good reasons why the law ought not, in end-of-life decisions, focus on the doctor's intention. The patient's interests or rights are a more appropriate focus.

Confidentiality and the AMA's new code of ethics: an imprudent formulation?

The Australian Medical Association's modification of the absolute rule requiring confidentiality in the doctor-patient relationship may be seen as a coming-of-age of the organisation. However, the change remains controversial: there are no guidelines as to when breaches of confidentiality are justified; and it is uncertain whether the new formulation will actually protect the public interest.

Caring and justice: a study of two approaches to health care ethics.

This article presents an empirical study of approaches to ethical decision-making among nurses and doctors. It takes as its starting point the distinction between the perspectives of care and of justice in ethical thinking, and the view that nurses' thinking will be aligned with the former and doctors' with the latter. It goes on to argue that the differences in these approaches are best understood in terms of the distinction between partialist and impartialist modes of moral thinking. The study seeks to determine the distribution of these modes of thinking between nurses and doctors, and finds that these are no significant differences between them. A 'two-level' philosophical view of the nature of moral thinking is appealed to in order to explain the study findings.

Double jeopardy, the equal value of lives and the veil of ignorance: a rejoinder to Harris.

Harris levels two main criticisms against our original defence of QALYs (Quality Adjusted Life Years). First, he rejects the assumption implicit in the QALY approach that not all lives are of equal value. Second, he rejects our appeal to Rawls's veil of ignorance test in support of the QALY method. In the present article we defend QALYs against Harris's criticisms. We argue that some of the conclusions Harris draws from our view that resources should be allocated on the basis of potential improvements in quality of life and quantity of life are erroneous, and that others lack the moral implications Harris claims for them. On the other hand, we defend our claim that a rational egoist, behind a veil of ignorance, could consistently choose to allocate life-saving resources in accordance with the QALY method, despite Harris's claim that a rational egoist would allocate randomly if there is no better than a 50% chance of being the recipient.

Another peep behind the veil.

Harris argues that if QALYs are used only 50% of the population will be eligible for survival, whereas if random methods of allocation are used 100% will be eligible. We argue that this involves an equivocation in the use of "eligible", and provides no support for the random method. There is no advantage in having a 100% chance of being "eligible" for survival behind a veil of ignorance if you still only have a 50% chance of survival once the veil is lifted. A 100% chance of a 50% chance is still only a 50% chance. We also argue that Harris provides no plausible way of dealing with the criticism that his random method of allocation may result in the squandering of resources.

The significance of age and duration of effect in social evaluation of health care.

To give priority to the young over the elderly has been labelled 'ageism'. People who express 'ageist' preferences may feel that, all else equal, an individual has greater right to enjoy additional life years the fewer life years he or she has already had. We shall refer to this as egalitarian ageism. They may also emphasise the greater expected duration of health benefits in young people that derives from their greater life expectancy. We may call this utilitarian ageism. Both these forms of ageism were observed in an empirical study of social preferences in Australia. The study lends some support to the assumptions in the QALY approach that duration of benefits and hence old age, should count in prioritising at the budget level in health care.

Maximizing health benefits vs egalitarianism: an Australian survey of health issues.

Economists have often treated the objective of health services as being the maximization of the QALYs gained, irrespective of how the gains are distributed. In a cross section of Australians such a policy of distributive neutrality received: (a) very little support when health benefits to young people compete with health benefits to the elderly; (b) only moderate support when those who can become a little better compete with those who can become much better; (c) only moderate support when smokers compete with non smokers; (d) some support when young children compete with newborns; and (e) wide spread support when parents of dependent children compete with people without children. Overall, the views of the study population were strongly egalitarian. A policy of health benefit maximization received very limited support when the consequence is a loss of equity and access to services for the elderly and for people with a limited potential for improving their health.

Who cares about cost? Does economic analysis impose or reflect social values?

In a two-stage survey, a cross-section of Australians were questioned about the importance of costs in setting priorities in health care. Generally, respondents felt that it is unfair to discriminate against patients who happen to have a high cost illness and that costs should therefore not be a major factor in prioritising. The majority maintained this view even when confronted with its implications in terms of the total number of people who could be treated and their own chance of receiving treatment if they fall ill. Their position cannot be discarded as irrational, as it is consistent with a defensible view of utility. However, the results suggest that the concern with allocative efficiency, as usually envisaged by the economists, is not shared by the general public and that the cost-effectiveness approach to assigning priorities in health care may be imposing an excessively simple value system upon resource allocation decision-making.

Double jeopardy and the use of QALYs in health care allocation.

The use of the Quality Adjusted Life-Year (QALY) as a measure of the benefit obtained from health care expenditure has been attacked on the ground that it gives a lower value to preserving the lives of people with a permanent disability or illness than to preserving the lives of those who are healthy and not disabled. The reason for this is that the quality of life of those with illness or disability is ranked, on the QALY scale, below that of someone without a disability or illness. Hence we can, other things being equal, gain more QALYs by saving the lives of those without a permanent disability or illness than by saving the lives of those who are disadvantaged in these ways. But to do so puts these disadvantaged people under a kind of double jeopardy. Not only do they suffer from the disability or illness, but because of it, a low priority is given to forms of health care that can preserve their lives. This, so the objection runs, is unjust or unfair. This article assesses this objection to the use of QALYs as a basis for allocating health care resources. It seeks to determine what is sound in the double jeopardy objection, and then to show that the defender of QALYs has an adequate response to it.

Bioethics and the limits of tolerance.

Since 1989 there has been an ongoing controversy about the limits of public discussion of bioethical issues in the German-speaking world. While a number of scholars have been involved, Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse have been the principal targets of those seeking to limit bioethical debates. Those who have supported silencing discussion of certain issues have argued that such public discussion leads to a loss of freedom. In the article we argue that toleration is not based on subjectivism but rather on reason. Furthermore, the efforts to suppress debate are often based on a failure to understand our position. Such efforts at suppression also rest on an elitist view of society that must assume that the general public cannot debate such topics.

Voluntary euthanasia and the nurse: an Australian survey.

This article presents the results of a survey of the attitudes and practices of nurses in Victoria with regard to requests for active or passive help in dying from patients who were suffering from a terminal or incurable disease. Questionnaires were sent to 1942 nurses who had been selected at random, 943 nurses (49%) of whom returned completed questionnaires. The survey indicates that a clear majority of those who responded to the questionnaire support active voluntary euthanasia. Many nurses have collaborated with doctors in the provision of active voluntary euthanasia and a few have acted without consulting a doctor. Seventy-eight per cent of nurses thought the law should be changed to allow doctors to take active steps to bring about a patient's death under some circumstances; and 65% of nurses indicated that they would be willing to collaborate with doctors in the provision of active voluntary euthanasia if it were legal.

Michael Tooley on possible people and promising.

PIP: This critique takes issue with the arguments that Michael Tooley forwarded in "Abortion and Infanticide" to further the notion that the destruction of potential persons is not immoral. In particular, the author focuses on Tooley's presupposition that it is not wrong to prevent the existence of additional persons who are likely to lead happy lives. The writings of Derek Parfit are called upon to provide examples upon which the criticism of Tooley is based. Particular attention is paid to two scenarios proposed by Parfit: one in which a pregnant woman would be wrong to refuse a simple treatment to prevent a handicap in her baby and the other in which a woman planning to become pregnant is advised to wait three months before becoming pregnant to allow herself time to recover from a condition which would result in her having a handicapped child. Parfit suggests that it would be wrong of the woman not to wait. Of course, the problem inherent in the second scenario is that the woman would harm her potential handicapped child by not allowing its conception. Tooley's reconciliation of the problems posed by Parfit are based on the morality involved in making and keeping promises. The author reviews Tooley's attempt to justify his views in this way and concludes that Tooley's reasoning fails, in part because promising is only a social institution, and morality also encompasses basic values. If one accepts Tooley's argument that there is an obligation to refrain from bringing wretched people into the world, then one must also accept the reverse: an obligation exists to bring additional happy people into the world. In this case, both abortion and infanticide are wrong.^ieng