Liraglutide restores impaired associative learning in individuals with obesity.

Survival under selective pressure is driven by the ability of our brain to use sensory information to our advantage to control physiological needs. To that end, neural circuits receive and integrate external environmental cues and internal metabolic signals to form learned sensory associations, consequently motivating and adapting our behaviour. The dopaminergic midbrain plays a crucial role in learning adaptive behaviour and is particularly sensitive to peripheral metabolic signals, including intestinal peptides, such as glucagon-like peptide 1 (GLP-1). In a single-blinded, randomized, controlled, crossover basic human functional magnetic resonance imaging study relying on a computational model of the adaptive learning process underlying behavioural responses, we show that adaptive learning is reduced when metabolic sensing is impaired in obesity, as indexed by reduced insulin sensitivity (participants: N = 30 with normal insulin sensitivity; N = 24 with impaired insulin sensitivity). Treatment with the GLP-1 receptor agonist liraglutide normalizes impaired learning of sensory associations in men and women with obesity. Collectively, our findings reveal that GLP-1 receptor activation modulates associative learning in people with obesity via its central effects within the mesoaccumbens pathway. These findings provide evidence for how metabolic signals can act as neuromodulators to adapt our behaviour to our body's internal state and how GLP-1 receptor agonists work in clinics.

Habitual daily intake of a sweet and fatty snack modulates reward processing in humans.

Western diets rich in fat and sugar promote excess calorie intake and weight gain; however, the underlying mechanisms are unclear. Despite a well-documented association between obesity and altered brain dopamine function, it remains elusive whether these alterations are (1) pre-existing, increasing the individual susceptibility to weight gain, (2) secondary to obesity, or (3) directly attributable to repeated exposure to western diet. To close this gap, we performed a randomized, controlled study (NCT05574660) with normal-weight participants exposed to a high-fat/high-sugar snack or a low-fat/low-sugar snack for 8 weeks in addition to their regular diet. The high-fat/high-sugar intervention decreased the preference for low-fat food while increasing brain response to food and associative learning independent of food cues or reward. These alterations were independent of changes in body weight and metabolic parameters, indicating a direct effect of high-fat, high-sugar foods on neurobehavioral adaptations that may increase the risk for overeating and weight gain.

Neural encoding of food and monetary reward delivery.

Different types of rewards such as food and money can similarly drive our behavior owing to shared brain processes encoding their subjective value. However, while the value of money is abstract and needs to be learned, the value of food is rooted in the innate processing of sensory properties and nutritional utilization. Yet, the actual consumption of food and the receipt of money have never been directly contrasted in the same experiment, questioning what unique neural processes differentiate those reward types. To fill this gap, we examined the distinct and common neural responses to the delivery of food and monetary rewards during fMRI. In a novel experimental approach, we parametrically manipulated the subjective value of food and monetary rewards by modulating the quantities of administered palatable milkshake and monetary gains. The receipt of increasing amounts of milkshake and money recruited the ventral striatum and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, previously associated with value encoding. Notably, the consumption and the subsequent evaluation of increasing quantities of milkshake relative to money revealed an extended recruitment of brain regions related to taste, somatosensory processing, and salience. Moreover, we detected a decline of reward encoding in the ventral tegmental area, nucleus accumbens, and vmPFC, indicating that these regions may be susceptible to time-dependent effects upon accumulation of food and money rewards. Relative to monetary gains, the consumption and evaluation of palatable milkshakes engaged complex neural processing over and above value tracking, emphasizing the critical contribution of taste and other sensory properties to the processing of food rewards. Furthermore, our results highlight the need to closely monitor metabolic states and neural responses to the accumulation of rewards to pinpoint the mechanisms underlying time-dependent dynamics of reward-related processing.

Technical Note: Modulation of fMRI brainstem responses by transcutaneous vagus nerve stimulation.

Our increasing knowledge about gut-brain interaction is revolutionising the understanding of the links between digestion, mood, health, and even decision making in our everyday lives. In support of this interaction, the vagus nerve is a crucial pathway transmitting diverse gut-derived signals to the brain to monitor of metabolic status, digestive processes, or immune control to adapt behavioural and autonomic responses. Hence, neuromodulation methods targeting the vagus nerve are currently explored as a treatment option in a number of clinical disorders, including diabetes, chronic pain, and depression. The non-invasive variant of vagus nerve stimulation (VNS), transcutaneous auricular VNS (taVNS), has been implicated in both acute and long-lasting effects by modulating afferent vagus nerve target areas in the brain. The physiology of neither of those effects is, however, well understood, and evidence for neuronal response upon taVNS in vagal afferent projection regions in the brainstem and its downstream targets remain to be established. Therefore, to examine time-dependent effects of taVNS on brainstem neuronal responses in healthy human subjects, we applied taVNS during task-free fMRI in a single-blinded crossover design. During fMRI data acquisition, we either stimulated the left earlobe (sham), or the target zone of the auricular branch of the vagus nerve in the outer ear (cymba conchae, verum) for several minutes, both followed by a short 'stimulation OFF' period. Time-dependent effects were assessed by averaging the BOLD response for consecutive 1-minute periods in an ROI-based analysis of the brainstem. We found a significant response to acute taVNS stimulation, relative to the control condition, in downstream targets of vagal afferents, including the nucleus of the solitary tract, the substantia nigra, and the subthalamic nucleus. Most of these brainstem regions remarkably showed increased activity in response to taVNS, and these effect sustained during the post-stimulation period. These data demonstrate that taVNS activates key brainstem regions, and highlight the potential of this approach to modulate vagal afferent signalling. Furthermore, we show that carry-over effects need to be considered when interpreting fMRI data in the context of general vagal neurophysiology and its modulation by taVNS.

Modulation of midbrain neurocircuitry by intranasal insulin.

Insulin modulates dopamine neuron activity in midbrain and affects processes underlying food intake behaviour, including impulsivity and reward processing. Here, we used intranasal administration and task-free functional MRI in humans to assess time- and dose-dependent effects of insulin on functional connectivity of the dopaminergic midbrain - and how these effects varied depending on systemic insulin sensitivity as measured by HOMA-IR. Specifically, we used a repeated-measures design with factors dose (placebo, 40 IU, 100 IU, 160 IU), time (7 time points during a 90 min post-intervention interval), and group (low vs. high HOMA-IR). A factorial analysis identified a three-way interaction (with whole-brain significance) with regard to functional connectivity between midbrain and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. This interaction demonstrates that systemic insulin sensitivity modulates the temporal course and dose-dependent effects of intranasal insulin on midbrain functional connectivity. It suggests that altered insulin sensitivity may impact on dopaminergic projections of the midbrain and might underlie the dysregulation of reward-related and motivational behaviour in obesity and diabetes. Perhaps most importantly, the time courses of midbrain functional connectivity we present may provide useful guidance for the design of future human studies that utilize intranasal insulin administration.

Brief Report: Reduced Optimism Bias in Self-Referential Belief Updating in High-Functioning Autism.

Previous research has demonstrated irrational asymmetry in belief updating: people tend to take into account good news and neglect bad news. Contradicting formal learning principles, belief updates were on average larger after better-than-expected information than after worse-than-expected information. In the present study, typically developing subjects demonstrated this optimism bias in self-referential judgments. In contrast, adults with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (ASD) were significantly less biased when updating self-referential beliefs (each group n = 21, matched for age, gender and IQ). These findings indicate a weaker influence of self-enhancing motives on prospective judgments in ASD. Reduced susceptibility to emotional and motivational biases in reasoning in ASD could elucidate impairments of social cognition, but may also confer important cognitive benefits.

Influence of vmPFC on dmPFC Predicts Valence-Guided Belief Formation.

When updating beliefs about their future prospects, people tend to disregard bad news. By combining fMRI with computational and dynamic causal modeling, we identified neurocircuitry mechanisms underlying this optimism bias to test for valence-guided belief formation. In each trial of the fMRI task, participants (n = 24, 10 male) estimated the base rate (eBR) and their risks of experiencing negative future events, were confronted with the actual BR, and finally had the opportunity to update their initial self-related risk estimate. We demonstrated an optimism bias by revealing greater belief updates in response to good over bad news (i.e., learning that the actual BR is lower or higher than expected) while controlling for confounds (estimation error and personal relevance of the new information). Updating was favorable when the final belief about risks improved (or at least did not worsen) relative to the initial risk estimate. This valence of updating was encoded by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) associated with the valuation of rewards. Within the updating circuit, the vmPFC filtered the incoming signal in a valence-dependent manner and influenced the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). Both the valence-encoding activity in the vmPFC and its influence on the dmPFC predicted individual magnitudes of the optimism bias. Our results indicate that updating was biased by the motivation to maximize desirable beliefs, mediated by the influence of the valuation system on further cognitive processing. Therefore, although it provides the very basis for human reasoning, belief formation is essentially distorted to promote desired conclusions.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The question of whether human reasoning is biased by desires and goals is crucial for everyday social, professional, and economic decisions. How much our belief formation is influenced by what we want to believe is, however, still debated. Our study confirms that belief updates are indeed optimistically biased. Critically, the bias depends on the recruitment of the brain valuation system and the influence of this system on neural regions involved in reasoning. These neurocircuit interactions support the notion that the motivation to maximize pleasant beliefs reinforces those cognitive processes that are most likely to yield the desired conclusion.

Valence-Dependent Belief Updating: Computational Validation.

People tend to update beliefs about their future outcomes in a valence-dependent way: they are likely to incorporate good news and to neglect bad news. However, belief formation is a complex process which depends not only on motivational factors such as the desire for favorable conclusions, but also on multiple cognitive variables such as prior beliefs, knowledge about personal vulnerabilities and resources, and the size of the probabilities and estimation errors. Thus, we applied computational modeling in order to test for valence-induced biases in updating while formally controlling for relevant cognitive factors. We compared biased and unbiased Bayesian models of belief updating, and specified alternative models based on reinforcement learning. The experiment consisted of 80 trials with 80 different adverse future life events. In each trial, participants estimated the base rate of one of these events and estimated their own risk of experiencing the event before and after being confronted with the actual base rate. Belief updates corresponded to the difference between the two self-risk estimates. Valence-dependent updating was assessed by comparing trials with good news (better-than-expected base rates) with trials with bad news (worse-than-expected base rates). After receiving bad relative to good news, participants' updates were smaller and deviated more strongly from rational Bayesian predictions, indicating a valence-induced bias. Model comparison revealed that the biased (i.e., optimistic) Bayesian model of belief updating better accounted for data than the unbiased (i.e., rational) Bayesian model, confirming that the valence of the new information influenced the amount of updating. Moreover, alternative computational modeling based on reinforcement learning demonstrated higher learning rates for good than for bad news, as well as a moderating role of personal knowledge. Finally, in this specific experimental context, the approach based on reinforcement learning was superior to the Bayesian approach. The computational validation of valence-dependent belief updating represents a novel support for a genuine optimism bias in human belief formation. Moreover, the precise control of relevant cognitive variables justifies the conclusion that the motivation to adopt the most favorable self-referential conclusions biases human judgments.

What is unrealistic optimism?

Here we consider the nature of unrealistic optimism and other related positive illusions. We are interested in whether cognitive states that are unrealistically optimistic are belief states, whether they are false, and whether they are epistemically irrational. We also ask to what extent unrealistically optimistic cognitive states are fixed. Based on the classic and recent empirical literature on unrealistic optimism, we offer some preliminary answers to these questions, thereby laying the foundations for answering further questions about unrealistic optimism, such as whether it has biological, psychological, or epistemic benefits.

The role of the neural reward circuitry in self-referential optimistic belief updates.

People are motivated to adopt the most favorable beliefs about their future because positive beliefs are experienced as rewarding. However, it is so far inconclusive whether brain regions known to represent reward values are involved in the generation of optimistically biased belief updates. To address this question, we investigated neural correlates of belief updates that result in relatively better future outlooks, and therefore imply a positive subjective value of the judgment outcome. Participants estimated the probability of experiencing different adverse future events. After being provided with population base rates of these events, they had the opportunity to update their initial estimates. Participants made judgments concerning themselves or a similar other, and were confronted with desirable or undesirable base rates (i.e., lower or higher than their initial estimates). Belief updates were smaller following undesirable than desirable information, and this optimism bias was stronger for judgments regarding oneself than others. During updating, the positive value of self-related updates was reflected by neural activity in the subgenual ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) that increased both with increasing sizes of favorable updates, and with decreasing sizes of unfavorable updates. During the processing of self-related undesirable base rates, increasing activity in a network including the dorsomedial PFC, hippocampus, thalamus and ventral striatum predicted decreasing update sizes. Thus, key regions of the neural reward circuitry contributed to the generation of optimistically biased self-referential belief updates. While the vmPFC tracked subjective values of belief updates, a network including the ventral striatum was involved in neglecting information calling for unfavorable updates.

The use of virtual characters to assess and train non-verbal communication in high-functioning autism.

High-functioning autism (HFA) is a neurodevelopmental disorder, which is characterized by life-long socio-communicative impairments on the one hand and preserved verbal and general learning and memory abilities on the other. One of the areas where particular difficulties are observable is the understanding of non-verbal communication cues. Thus, investigating the underlying psychological processes and neural mechanisms of non-verbal communication in HFA allows a better understanding of this disorder, and potentially enables the development of more efficient forms of psychotherapy and trainings. However, the research on non-verbal information processing in HFA faces several methodological challenges. The use of virtual characters (VCs) helps to overcome such challenges by enabling an ecologically valid experience of social presence, and by providing an experimental platform that can be systematically and fully controlled. To make this field of research accessible to a broader audience, we elaborate in the first part of the review the validity of using VCs in non-verbal behavior research on HFA, and we review current relevant paradigms and findings from social-cognitive neuroscience. In the second part, we argue for the use of VCs as either agents or avatars in the context of "transformed social interactions." This allows for the implementation of real-time social interaction in virtual experimental settings, which represents a more sensitive measure of socio-communicative impairments in HFA. Finally, we argue that VCs and environments are a valuable assistive, educational and therapeutic tool for HFA.

Why we interact: on the functional role of the striatum in the subjective experience of social interaction.

There is ample evidence that human primates strive for social contact and experience interactions with conspecifics as intrinsically rewarding. Focusing on gaze behavior as a crucial means of human interaction, this study employed a unique combination of neuroimaging, eye-tracking, and computer-animated virtual agents to assess the neural mechanisms underlying this component of behavior. In the interaction task, participants believed that during each interaction the agent's gaze behavior could either be controlled by another participant or by a computer program. Their task was to indicate whether they experienced a given interaction as an interaction with another human participant or the computer program based on the agent's reaction. Unbeknownst to them, the agent was always controlled by a computer to enable a systematic manipulation of gaze reactions by varying the degree to which the agent engaged in joint attention. This allowed creating a tool to distinguish neural activity underlying the subjective experience of being engaged in social and non-social interaction. In contrast to previous research, this allows measuring neural activity while participants experience active engagement in real-time social interactions. Results demonstrate that gaze-based interactions with a perceived human partner are associated with activity in the ventral striatum, a core component of reward-related neurocircuitry. In contrast, interactions with a computer-driven agent activate attention networks. Comparisons of neural activity during interaction with behaviorally naïve and explicitly cooperative partners demonstrate different temporal dynamics of the reward system and indicate that the mere experience of engagement in social interaction is sufficient to recruit this system.

Dissociating animacy processing in high-functioning autism: neural correlates of stimulus properties and subjective ratings.

When movements indicate meaningful actions, even nonbiological objects induce the impression of "having a mind" or animacy. This basic social ability was investigated in adults with high-functioning autism (HFA, n = 13, and matched controls, n = 13) by systematically varying motion properties of simple geometric shapes. Critically, trial-by-trial variations of (1) motion complexity of stimuli, and of (2) participants' individual animacy ratings were separately correlated with neural activity to dissociate cognitive strategies relying more closely on stimulus analysis vs. subjective experience. Increasing motion complexity did not yield any significant group differences, and in both groups, it correlated with neural activity in regions involved in perceptual and evaluative processing, including the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), superior temporal gyrus (STG) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). In contrast, although there were no significant behavioral differences between the groups, increasing animacy ratings correlated with neural activity in the insula, STG, amygdala, dorsal mPFC and PCC more strongly in controls than in HFA. These results indicate that in HFA the evaluation of stimulus properties cuing for animacy is intact, while increasing subjective ratings do not seem to be robustly related to social processing, including spontaneous mental state inferences and experience of salience.

Perceiving nonverbal behavior: neural correlates of processing movement fluency and contingency in dyadic interactions.

Despite the fact that nonverbal dyadic social interactions are abundant in the environment, the neural mechanisms underlying their processing are not yet fully understood. Research in the field of social neuroscience has suggested that two neural networks appear to be involved in social understanding: (1) the action observation network (AON) and (2) the social neural network (SNN). The aim of this study was to determine the differential contributions of the AON and the SNN to the processing of nonverbal behavior as observed in dyadic social interactions. To this end, we used short computer animation sequences displaying dyadic social interactions between two virtual characters and systematically manipulated two key features of movement activity, which are known to influence the perception of meaning in nonverbal stimuli: (1) movement fluency and (2) contingency of movement patterns. A group of 21 male participants rated the "naturalness" of the observed scenes on a four-point scale while undergoing fMRI. Behavioral results showed that both fluency and contingency significantly influenced the "naturalness" experience of the presented animations. Neurally, the AON was preferentially engaged when processing contingent movement patterns, but did not discriminate between different degrees of movement fluency. In contrast, regions of the SNN were engaged more strongly when observing dyads with disturbed movement fluency. In conclusion, while the AON is involved in the general processing of contingent social actions, irrespective of their kinematic properties, the SNN is preferentially recruited when atypical kinematic properties prompt inferences about the agents' intentions.

Affective and motivational influences in person perception.

Interpersonal impression formation is highly consequential for social interactions in private and public domains. These perceptions of others rely on different sources of information and processing mechanisms, all of which have been investigated in independent research fields. In social psychology, inferences about states and traits of others as well as activations of semantic categories and corresponding stereotypes have attracted great interest. On the other hand, research on emotion and reward demonstrated affective and motivational influences of social cues on the observer, which in turn modulate attention, categorization, evaluation, and decision processes. While inferential and categorical social processes have been shown to recruit a network of cortical brain regions associated with mentalizing and evaluation, the affective influence of social cues has been linked to subcortical areas that play a central role in detection of salient sensory input and reward processing. In order to extend existing integrative approaches to person perception, both the inferential-categorical processing of information about others, and affective and motivational influences of this information on the beholder should be taken into account.

Imaging first impressions: distinct neural processing of verbal and nonverbal social information.

First impressions profoundly influence our attitudes and behavior toward others. However, little is known about whether and to what degree the cognitive processes that underlie impression formation depend on the domain of the available information about the target person. To investigate the neural bases of the influence of verbal as compared to nonverbal information on interpersonal judgments, we identified brain regions where the BOLD signal parametrically increased with increasing strength of evaluation based on either short text vignettes or mimic and gestural behavior. While for verbal stimuli the increasing strength of subjective evaluation was correlated with increased neural activation of precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex (PC/PCC), a similar effect was observed for nonverbal stimuli in the amygdala. These findings support the assumption that qualitatively different cognitive operations underlie person evaluation depending upon the stimulus domain: while the processing of nonverbal person information may be more strongly associated with affective processing as indexed by recruitment of the amygdala, verbal person information engaged the PC/PCC that has been related to social inferential processing.

Shall we do this together? Social gaze influences action control in a comparison group, but not in individuals with high-functioning autism.

Perceiving someone else's gaze shift toward an object can influence how this object will be manipulated by the observer, suggesting a modulatory effect of a gaze-based social context on action control. High-functioning autism (HFA) is characterized by impairments of social interaction, which may be associated with an inability to automatically integrate socially relevant nonverbal cues when generating actions. To explore these hypotheses, we made use of a stimulus-response compatibility paradigm in which a comparison group and patients with HFA were asked to generate spatially congruent or incongruent motor responses to changes in a face, a face-like and an object stimulus. Results demonstrate that while in the comparison group being looked at by a virtual other leads to a reduction of reaction time costs associated with generating a spatially incongruent response, this effect is not present in the HFA group. We suggest that this modulatory effect of social gaze on action control might play an important role in direct social interactions by helping to coordinate one's actions with those of someone else. Future research should focus on these implicit mechanisms of interpersonal alignment ('online' social cognition), which might be at the very heart of the difficulties individuals with autism experience in everyday social encounters.

Differential activation of memory-relevant brain regions during a dialysis cycle.

Cognitive impairment is a common and largely undiagnosed finding in a significant number of dialysis patients. These alterations may result from concomitant cerebrovascular disease, hemodynamic instability, the uremic milieu, or changes induced by the dialysis process. In order to gain further insight into this, we recruited 12 stable chronic hemodialysis patients (without clinical neurological disease) and an age- and gender-matched cohort of 12 control individuals (without renal or neurological problems) in a prospective, single-center study. In order to disentangle the influence of dialysis itself on memory function, each dialysis patient was tested twice: once immediately before dialysis following a long weekend (t1) and again the day after this dialysis (t2). The control individuals were tested in the same time frame. Neuropsychological testing found that the control individuals performed significantly better in verbal learning, motor speed, task switching, verbal comprehension, word fluency, spatial visualization, spatial perception, and reasoning; all independent of the time point. Functional magnetic resonance imaging of the whole brain in seven hemodialysis patients found significantly more bilateral activation of the hippocampus during the verbal working memory task at t2 relative to t1 compared with their seven matched control counterparts. Thus, our study found differential and task-specific activation of memory-relevant brain areas during a dialysis cycle.

Duration matters: dissociating neural correlates of detection and evaluation of social gaze.

The interpretation of interpersonal gaze behavior requires the use of complex cognitive processes and guides social interactions. Among a variety of different gaze characteristics, gaze direction and gaze duration modulate crucially the meaning of the "social gaze". Nevertheless, prior neuroimaging studies disregarded the relevance of gaze duration by focusing on gaze direction only. The present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study focused on the differentiation of these two gaze parameters. Therefore direct gaze displayed by virtual characters was contrasted with averted gaze and, additionally, systematically varied with respect to gaze duration (i.e., 1, 2.5 or 4 s). Consistent with prior findings, behavioral data showed that likeability was higher for direct than for averted gaze and increased linearly with increasing direct gaze duration. On the neural level, distinct brain regions were associated with the processing of gaze direction and gaze duration: (i) the comparison between direct and averted gaze revealed activations in bilateral occipito-temporal regions including the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS); (ii) whereas increasing duration of direct gaze evoked differential neural responses in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) including orbitofrontal and paracingulate regions. The results suggest two complementary cognitive processes related to different gaze parameters. On the one hand, the recruitment of multimodal sensory regions in the pSTS indicates detection of gaze direction via complex visual analysis. On the other hand, the involvement of the MPFC associated with outcome monitoring and mentalizing indicates higher-order social cognitive processes related to evaluation of the ongoing communicational input conveyed by direct gaze duration.