An examination of the effects of eye-tracking on behavior in psychology experiments.

Eye-tracking is emerging as a tool for researchers to better understand cognition and behavior. However, it is possible that experiment participants adjust their behavior when they know their eyes are being tracked. This potential change would be considered a type of Hawthorne effect, in which participants alter their behavior in response to being watched and could potentially compromise the outcomes and conclusions of experimental studies that use eye tracking. We examined whether eye-tracking produced Hawthorne effects in six commonly used psychological scales and five behavioral tasks. The dependent measures were selected because they are widely used and cited and because they involved measures of sensitive topics, including gambling behavior, racial bias, undesirable personality characteristics, or because they require working memory or executive attention resources, which might be affected by Hawthorne effects. The only task where Hawthorne effects manifested was the mixed gambles task, in which participants accepted or rejected gambles involving a 50/50 chance of gaining or losing different monetary amounts. Participants in the eye-tracking condition accepted fewer gambles that were low in expected value, and they also took longer to respond for these low-value gambles. These results suggest that eye-tracking is not likely to produce Hawthorne effects in most common psychology laboratory tasks, except for those involving risky decisions where the probability of the outcomes from each choice are known.

Does eye-tracking have an effect on economic behavior?

Eye-tracking is becoming an increasingly popular tool for understanding the underlying behavior driving human decisions. However, an important unanswered methodological question is whether the use of an eye-tracking device itself induces changes in participants' behavior. We study this question using eight popular games in experimental economics chosen for their varying levels of theorized susceptibility to social desirability bias. We implement a simple between-subject design where participants are randomly assigned to either a control or an eye-tracking treatment. In seven of the eight games, eye-tracking did not produce different outcomes. In the Holt and Laury risk assessment (HL), subjects with multiple calibration attempts demonstrated more risk averse behavior in eye-tracking conditions. However, this effect only appeared during the first five (of ten) rounds. Because calibration difficulty is correlated with eye-tracking data quality, the standard practice of removing participants with low eye-tracking data quality resulted in no difference between the treatment and control groups in HL. Our results suggest that experiments may incorporate eye-tracking equipment without inducing changes in the economic behavior of participants, particularly after observations with low quality eye-tracking data are removed.

Spousal labor market effects from government health insurance: Evidence from a veterans affairs expansion.

Measuring the total impact of health insurance receipt on household labor supply is important in an era of increased access to publicly provided and subsidized insurance. Although government expansion of health insurance to older workers leads to direct labor supply reductions for recipients, there may be spillover effects on the labor supply of uncovered spouses. While the most basic model predicts a decrease in overall household work hours, financial incentives such as credit constraints, target income levels, and the need for own health insurance suggest that spousal labor supply might increase. In contrast, complementarities of spousal leisure would predict a decrease in labor supply for both spouses. Utilizing a mid-1990s expansion of health insurance for U.S. veterans, we provide evidence on the effects of public insurance availability on the labor supply of spouses. Using data from the Current Population Survey and Health and Retirement Study, we employ a difference-in-differences strategy to compare the labor market behavior of the wives of older male veterans and non-veterans before and after the VA health benefits expansion. Although husbands' labor supply decreases, wives' labor supply increases, suggesting that financial incentives dominate complementarities of spousal leisure. This effect is strongest for wives with lower education levels and lower levels of household wealth and those who were not previously employed full-time. These findings have implications for government programs such as Medicare and Social Security and the Affordable Care Act.

The effect of anti-abortion legislation on nineteenth century fertility.

Using nineteenth century legal information combined with census information, I examine the effect of state laws that restricted American women's access to abortion on the ratio of children to women. I estimate an increase in the birthrate of 4 % to 12 % when abortion is restricted. In the absence of anti-abortion laws, fertility would have been 5 % to 12 % lower in the early twentieth century.

The efficiency of a group-specific mandated benefit revisited: the effect of infertility mandates.

This paper examines the labor market effects of state health insurance mandates that increase the cost of employing a demographically identifiable group. State mandates requiring that health insurance plans cover infertility treatment raise the relative cost of insuring older women of child-bearing age. Empirically, wages in this group are unaffected, but their total labor input decreases. Workers do not value infertility mandates at cost, and so will not take wage cuts in exchange, leading employers to decrease their demand for this affected and identifiable group. Differences in the empirical effects of mandates found in the literature are explained by a model including variations in the elasticity of demand, moral hazard, ability to identify a group, and adverse selection.

Health Insurance and the Labor Supply Decisions of Older Workers: Evidence from a U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Expansion.

This paper exploits a major mid-1990s expansion in the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs health care system to provide evidence on the labor market effects of expanding health insurance availability. Using data from the Current Population Survey, we employ a difference-in-differences strategy to compare the labor market behavior of older veterans and non-veterans before and after the VA health benefits expansion to test the impact of public health insurance on labor supply. We find that older workers are significantly more likely to decrease work both on the extensive and intensive margins after receiving access to non-employer based insurance. Workers with some college education or a college degree are more likely to transition into self-employment, a result consistent with "job-lock" effects. However, less-educated workers are more likely to leave self-employment, a result suggesting that the positive income effect from receiving public insurance dominates the "job-lock" effect for these workers. Some relatively disadvantaged sub-populations may also increase their labor supply after gaining greater access to public insurance, consistent with complementary positive health effects of health care access or decreased work disincentives for these groups. We conclude that this reform has affected employment and retirement decisions, and suggest that future moves toward universal coverage or expansions of Medicare are likely to have significant labor market effects.

International Comparison of Age Discrimination Laws.

European age discrimination legislation is discussed in the context of the US Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and related state laws. US law was originally introduced to protect productive older workers from age stereotypes, but more recently preventing age discrimination has become important as a means of keeping costs down on entitlement programs as the population ages. Changes in enforcement, penalties, exemptions, length of time to file, and burden of proof have changed the effects of the laws over time. The ADEA has had both positive effects on currently employed older workers and negative effects on the hiring of older workers. Enforcement and publicity are offered as possible explanations for the strength of these positive and negative effects. Age discrimination legislation in Europe, indicated in the Framework Directive 2000/78, is driven by economic and political considerations. European legislation calls for less enforcement and more exemptions than the corresponding US cases which could lead to smaller effects on employment. However, pensions, disability, unemployment, and social security potentially have a stronger effect on social norms for retirement age than does anti-discrimination legislation.

Computerizing Audit Studies.

This paper briefly discusses the history, benefits, and shortcomings of traditional audit field experiments to study market discrimination. Specifically it identifies template bias and experimenter bias as major concerns in the traditional audit method, and demonstrates through an empirical example that computerization of a resume or correspondence audit can efficiently increase sample size and greatly mitigate these concerns. Finally, it presents a useful meta-tool that future researchers can use to create their own resume audits.