Awareness of goal-oriented behavior during infancy and early childhood, in human- and non-human primates.

We review the literature surrounding the phylogenetic and developmental emergence of goal-oriented behavior, among human and non-human primates. We define goal-oriented awareness as the ability to perceive goals and perceptions in others. We examine empirical literature involving gaze-following, shared attention, distinguishing between actions and intentions, and the ability to generate and understand communicative cues. We conclude that at least a rudimentary awareness of goal-oriented behavior is present from birth in humans, and in adult great apes. The evidence in other primate species shows phylogenetic differences as well as gaps in the empirical literature.

Six- and 9-Month-Old Infants Discriminate Between Goals Despite Similar Action Patterns.

Behne, Carpenter, Call, and Tomasello (2005) showed that 9- to 18-month-olds, but not 6-month-olds, differentiated between people who were unwilling and unable to share toys. As the outcome of the two tasks is the same (i.e., the toy is not shared), the infants must respond to the different goals of the actor. However, visual habituation paradigms have shown an earlier onset of goal awareness. The present study reconciles this disparity by replicating the findings of Behne et al. with both 6- and 9-month-olds, using similar tasks and additional response measures.

Variations in 10-month-old infant imitation of people and things.

To explore 10-month-old infants' abilities to engage in intentional imitation, they were shown a human agent, a non-human agent (stuffed animal), and a surrogate object (mechanical pincers) model actions on objects. The tendency of infants to perform the target act was compared in several situations: (a) after test items were manipulated but the target action was not shown, (b) after the target act was demonstrated successfully, and (c) after the target act was demonstrated unsuccessfully. Although infants imitated the successful actions of human and non-human agents, they completed the unsuccessful actions of humans only. Toward the surrogate object infants did not respond differentially. These findings suggest that although infant may mimic the actions of human and non-human agents, they only engage in intentional imitation with people.

The role of maternal affect attunement in dyadic and triadic communication.

The influence of maternal affect attunement on the relationship between gaze monitoring during dyadic communication at 3 months and coordinated attention during triadic communication at 5, 7 and 10 months was examined in a longitudinal study. Although most infants engaged in gaze monitoring at 3 months and in coordinated attention at 5, 7 and 10 months, a regression analysis revealed that gaze monitoring at 3 months significantly predicted coordinated attention at 10 months only when maternal affect attunement was high. These findings are discussed in terms of theories that emphasize the role of social interaction in the development of meaningful communication and continuity in mental state awareness during the first year of life.

Intentions make a difference: infant responses to still-face and modified still-face conditions.

In two studies, 3-, 6- and 9-month-old infants interacted with their mothers during natural, still-face, and modified still-face (i.e., mothers wearing a mask, or drinking from bottle) conditions. Infants were also presented with matching doll conditions to control for the possibility that their responses might be due to changes in superficial perceptual features. Regardless of age, infants displayed negative affect to the still-face, but, in contrast to recent reports, not to the modified still-face conditions. However, whereas infants' positive affect also depended on their mothers' communicative intentions, these responses changed with cognitive maturation. As expected, infant responses to their mothers were significantly different from those to the doll. The implications of these findings for theories of communication are discussed.

Contingency, imitation, and affect sharing: Foundations of infants' social awareness.

Predictions about the role of contingency, imitation, and affect sharing in the development of social awareness were tested in infants during natural, imitative, and yoked conditions with their mothers at 5 and 13 weeks of age. Results showed that at both ages, infants of highly attuned mothers gazed, smiled, and vocalized positively more during the natural than during the imitative and yoked conditions, whereas they increased negative vocalizations during the yoked conditions. In contrast, infants of less attuned mothers did not differentiate between the conditions, except at 13 weeks when these infants increased their gazes during the imitative condition. Whereas contingency and imitation draw infant attention to conspecifics, affective communication appears to lay the foundation for infants' social awareness.

The role of modelling and request type on symbolic comprehension of objects and gestures in young children.

In a first study, we considered whether modelling and the type of an adult's request influenced children's ability at 1;8 and 2;2 to comprehend gestures and replica objects as symbols for familiar objects. In a second study, we evaluated whether modelling and type of request influenced children's ability at 1;8 (N = 24) to understand unfamiliar (i.e. unconventional) objects as symbols. Results of Study 1 indicated that children at 2;2 comprehended a gesture as a symbol in the absence of any previous model demonstration. All children comprehended a replica as standing for another object, although modelling marginally improved children's performance at 2;2 and decreased performance at 1;8. In general, the type of request did not influence children's comprehension of gestures or replicas as symbols. Results of Study 2 showed that modelling and request type did not influence children's understanding of objects that are unconventional and novel, as symbols. The studies converge to suggest that symbolic comprehension is a highly context-dependent ability that continues to develop over the second year.

Effects of maintaining and redirecting infant attention on the production of referential communication in infants with and without Down syndrome.

The effects of maternal interactive styles on the production of referential communication were assessed in four groups of infants whose chronological ages ranged between 0;6 and 1;8. Two groups of infants with Down syndrome (DS), one (n = 11) with a mean mental age (MA) of 0;8.6, and the other (n = 11) of 1;4.5, were matched on MA with two groups (n = 10 each) of typically developing infants. Infants were seen bi-monthly, for 8 months, with mothers, same-aged peers, and mothers of the peers. Results showed that High MA non-Down syndrome (ND) infants produced more words, and High MA DS infants produced more gestures when playing with mothers than peers. Mothers exhibited more attentional maintaining behaviours than peers, in particular to High MA infants, but they redirected the attentional focus of Low MA infants more. Sequential loglinear analyses revealed interesting contingencies between the interactive strategies of mothers and the referential communicative behaviours of their infants. Whereas maintaining attention increased, redirecting attention decreased the likelihood of the production of gestures and words in children. However, redirecting attention was followed by maintaining attention. Thus, mothers redirect the attentional focus in order to promote joint attention and referential communication. Furthermore, words and gestures of the children also promote joint attention in mothers. This highlights the reciprocal nature of these dynamic communicative interactions.

Precursors to the development of intention at 6 months: understanding people and their actions.

Under investigation was whether 6-month-old infants expect people to behave differently toward persons and inanimate objects. Infants were randomly assigned to experimental and control conditions. In the experimental conditions, infants were habituated to an actor who either talked to or reached for and swiped with something hidden behind an occluder. In the test events the actor was occluded, but the infants were shown either a person or an object. In the control condition, infants only saw the person or object stimulus. Results showed that infants who had been habituated to an actor who was talking looked longer at the object, and infants who had been habituated to an actor who was reaching and swiping looked longer at the person. No difference in looking at the stimuli was observed in the control condition. This suggests that infants expect people's actions to be related to objects in ways that are continuous with more mature, intentional understandings.