Montessori education's impact on academic and nonacademic outcomes: A systematic review.

Background: Montessori education is the oldest and most widely implemented alternative education in the world, yet its effectiveness has not been clearly established. Objectives: The primary objective of this review was to examine the effectiveness of Montessori education in improving academic and nonacademic outcomes compared to traditional education. The secondary objectives were to determine the degree to which grade level, Montessori setting (public Montessori vs. private Montessori), random assignment, treatment duration, and length of follow-up measurements moderate the magnitude of Montessori effects. Search Methods: We searched for relevant studies in 19 academic databases, in a variety of sources known to publish gray literature, in Montessori-related journals, and in the references of studies retrieved through these searches. Our search included studies published during or before February 2020. The initial search was performed in March 2014 with a follow-up search in February 2020. Selection Criteria: We included articles that compared Montessori education to traditional education, contributed at least one effect size to an academic or nonacademic outcome, provided sufficient data to compute an effect size and its variance, and showed sufficient evidence of baseline equivalency-through random assignment or statistical adjustment-of Montessori and traditional education groups. Data Collection and Analysis: To synthesize the data, we used a cluster-robust variance estimation procedure, which takes into account statistical dependencies in the data. Otherwise, we used standard methodological procedures as specified in the Campbell Collaboration reporting and conduct standards. Main Results: Initial searches yielded 2012 articles, of which 173 were considered in detail to determine whether they met inclusion/exclusion criteria. Of these, 141 were excluded and 32 were included. These 32 studies yielded 204 effect sizes (113 academic and 91 nonacademic) across 132,249 data points. In the 32 studies that met minimum standards for inclusion, including evidence of baseline equivalence, there was evidence that Montessori education outperformed traditional education on a wide variety of academic and nonacademic outcomes. For academic outcomes, Hedges' g effect sizes, where positive values favor Montessori, ranged from 0.26 for general academic ability (with high quality evidence) to 0.06 for social studies. The quality of evidence for language (g = 0.17) and mathematics (g = 0.22) was also high. The effect size for a composite of all academic outcomes was 0.24. Science was the only academic outcome that was deemed to have low quality of evidence according to the GRADE approach. Effect sizes for nonacademic outcomes ranged from 0.41 for students' inner experience of school to 0.23 for social skills. Both of these outcomes were deemed as having low quality of evidence. Executive function (g = 0.36) and creativity (g = 0.26) had moderate quality of evidence. The effect size for a composite of all nonacademic outcomes was 0.33. Moderator analyses of the composite academic and nonacademic outcomes showed that Montessori education resulted in larger effect sizes for randomized studies compared to nonrandomized studies, for preschool and elementary settings compared to middle school or high school settings, and for private Montessori compared to public Montessori. Moderator analyses for treatment duration and duration from intervention to follow-up data collection were inconclusive. There was some evidence for a lack of small sample-size studies in favor of traditional education, which could be an indicator of publication bias. However, a sensitivity analysis indicated that the findings in favor of Montessori education were nonetheless robust. Authors' Conclusions: Montessori education has a meaningful and positive impact on child outcomes, both academic and nonacademic, relative to outcomes seen when using traditional educational methods.

Neuroepigenetic impact on mentalizing in childhood.

Mentalizing, or the ability to understand the mental states and intentions of others, is an essential social cognitive function that children learn and continue to cultivate into adolescence. While most typically developing children acquire sufficient mentalizing skills, individual differences in mentalizing persist throughout childhood and are likely influenced by a combination of cognitive functioning, the social environment, and biological factors. DNA methylation of the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTRm) impacts gene expression and is associated with increased brain activity in mentalizing regions during displays of animacy in healthy young adults. The establishment, fine-tuning, and implications of such associations in the context of broader social functioning remain unclear. Using a developmental neuroimaging epigenetic approach, we investigated the contributions of OXTRm to individual variability in brain function during animate motion perception in middle childhood. We find that higher levels of OXTRm are associated with increased neural responses in the left temporo-parietal junction and inferior frontal gyrus. We also find a positive association between neural activity in LTPJ and social skills. These findings provide evidence of epigenetic influence on the developing child brain and demonstrate that variability in neural social perception in childhood is multifaceted with contributions from individual social experience and the endogenous oxytocin system.

An Association Between Montessori Education in Childhood and Adult Wellbeing.

Wellbeing, or how people think and feel about their lives, predicts important life outcomes from happiness to health to longevity. Montessori pedagogy has features that enhance wellbeing contemporaneously and predictively, including self-determination, meaningful activities, and social stability. Here, 1905 adults, ages 18-81 (M = 36), filled out a large set of wellbeing scales followed by demographic information including type of school attended each year from 2 to 17. About half the sample had only attended conventional schools and the rest had attended Montessori for between 2 and 16 years (M = 8 years). To reduce the variable set, we first developed a measurement model of wellbeing using the survey data with exploratory then confirmatory factor analyses, arriving at four factors: general wellbeing, engagement, social trust, and self-confidence. A structural equation model that accounted for age, gender, race, childhood SES, and years in private school revealed that attending Montessori for at least two childhood years was associated with significantly higher adult wellbeing on all four factors. A second analysis found that the difference in wellbeing between Montessori and conventional schools existed even among the subsample that had exclusively attended private schools. A third analysis found that the more years one attended Montessori, the higher one's wellbeing as an adult. Unmeasured selection effects could explain the results, in which case research should determine what third variable associated with Montessori schooling causes adult wellbeing. Several other limitations to the study are also discussed. Although some of these limitations need to be addressed, coupled with other research, including studies in which children were randomly assigned to Montessori schools, this study suggests that attending Montessori as a child might plausibly cause higher adult wellbeing.

The Magic School Bus dilemma: How fantasy affects children's learning from stories.

Although children's books often include fantasy, research suggests that children do not learn as well from fantastical stories as from realistic ones. The current studies investigated whether the type of fantasy matters, in effect testing two possible mechanisms for fantasy's interference. Across two studies, 110 5-year-olds were read different types of fantastical stories containing a problem and then were asked to solve an analogous problem in a real lab setting. Children who were read a minimally fantastical version of the story, in which the story occurred on another planet "that looked just like Earth," were no more likely to transfer the solution than children who heard a story that was slightly more fantastical in that the story occurred on another planet and that planet looked different from Earth (e.g., orange grass, a green sky). In contrast, significantly higher rates of learning were observed when the story contained those elements and two physically impossible events (e.g., walking through walls). Furthermore, this improvement was obtained only when the impossible events preceded, and not when they followed, the educational content. Although fantasy may sometimes detract from learning (as other research has shown), these new studies suggest that minimal fantasy does not and that particular types of fantasy may even increase learning. We propose that the mechanism for this may be that a small dose of impossible events induces deeper processing of the subsequent events in the story.

Pretending emotions in the early years: The role of language and symbolic play.

Although 3-year-old children sometimes simulate emotions to adapt to social norms, we do not know if even younger children can pretend emotions in playful contexts. The present study investigated (1) what emotions infants of 1-2 years old are capable of pretending and (2) the possible role of language and symbolic play in the ability to pretend emotions. The sample included 69 infants aged 18 to 31 months and their parents. Infants were administrated the Test of Pretend Play, and their parents responded to the MacArthur-Bates CDI-II inventory, part of the MacArthur-Bates CDI-I, and a questionnaire about the expression of pretend emotions. Results suggest that very young children simulate emotions. Furthermore, children's simulation of emotions was related to both symbolic play and language. Specifically, the ability to label emotions was linked to the ability to simulate them. The role of language and symbolic play in the development of the capacity to express and understand pretend emotions is discussed.

The real thing: preschoolers prefer actual activities to pretend ones.

Pretend play is a quintessential activity of early childhood, and adults supply children with many toys to encourage it. Do young children actually prefer to pretend, or do they do it because they are unable to engage in some activities for real? Here we examined, for nine different activities, American middle-class preschoolers' preferences for pretend and real activities. The 100 children we tested (M = 58.5 months, range 36 to 82 months) overwhelmingly preferred real activities to pretend ones, and this preference increased from age 3 to age 4, then remained steady through age 6. Children provided cogent justifications for their preferences. The results are discussed with reference to other domains in which children show reality preferences and with respect to the content of preschool curricula.

Montessori Preschool Elevates and Equalizes Child Outcomes: A Longitudinal Study.

Quality preschool programs that develop the whole child through age-appropriate socioemotional and cognitive skill-building hold promise for significantly improving child outcomes. However, preschool programs tend to either be teacher-led and didactic, or else to lack academic content. One preschool model that involves both child-directed, freely chosen activity and academic content is Montessori. Here we report a longitudinal study that took advantage of randomized lottery-based admission to two public Montessori magnet schools in a high-poverty American city. The final sample included 141 children, 70 in Montessori and 71 in other schools, most of whom were tested 4 times over 3 years, from the first semester to the end of preschool (ages 3-6), on a variety of cognitive and socio-emotional measures. Montessori preschool elevated children's outcomes in several ways. Although not different at the first test point, over time the Montessori children fared better on measures of academic achievement, social understanding, and mastery orientation, and they also reported relatively more liking of scholastic tasks. They also scored higher on executive function when they were 4. In addition to elevating overall performance on these measures, Montessori preschool also equalized outcomes among subgroups that typically have unequal outcomes. First, the difference in academic achievement between lower income Montessori and higher income conventionally schooled children was smaller at each time point, and was not (statistically speaking) significantly different at the end of the study. Second, defying the typical finding that executive function predicts academic achievement, in Montessori classrooms children with lower executive function scored as well on academic achievement as those with higher executive function. This suggests that Montessori preschool has potential to elevate and equalize important outcomes, and a larger study of public Montessori preschools is warranted.

Why Do the Children (Pretend) Play?

Pretend play appears to be an evolved behavior because it is universal and appears on a set schedule. However, no specific functions have been determined for pretend play and empirical tests for its functions in humans are elusive. Yet animal play fighting can serve as an analog, as both activities involve as-if, metacommunicative signaling and symbolism. In the rat and some other animals, adaptive functions of play fighting include assisting social behavior and emotion regulation. Research is presented suggesting that pretend play might serve similar functions for humans.

The evolutionary significance of pretend play: Two-year-olds' interpretation of behavioral cues.

Pretend play begins very early in human life. A key question is why, when figuring out reality is young children's major developmental task, they engage in its deliberate falsification. A second key question is how children know that pretend events are not real. Here we report three experiments addressing the latter question and providing indirect evidence for speculation on the first question. Children (N = 96) were shown actors eating or pretending to eat from covered bowls, and they had to indicate, on the basis of the actors' behavioral signs, which actor was pretending to eat or had the real food. Even 24-month-olds could do so when the contents of the bowls were shown before the actions, and even when substitute objects were shown. However, when one of the bowls contained imaginary objects (i.e., was empty), even 30-month-olds could not indicate which actor was pretending. These studies show how the ability to interpret pretending from behavioral cues develops gradually as children's representational abilities become more free of contextual support. We propose that, from an evolutionary and ontogenetic standpoint, pretend play might serve to heighten children's sensitivity to social signs. This sensitivity could assist the development of theory of mind, with which social pretend play is associated. In this way, pretend play in humans might serve a similar purpose to play fighting in other species: In both cases, play might sensitize the organism to social signs that will allow for sophisticated coordination of social behavior later in life.

Just Google It: Young Children's Preferences for Touchscreens versus Books in Hypothetical Learning Tasks.

Children today regularly interact with touchscreen devices (Rideout, 2013) and thousands of "educational" mobile applications are marketed to them (Shuler, 2012). Understanding children's own ideas about optimal learning has important implications for education, which is being transformed by electronic mobile devices, yet we know little about how children think about such devices, including what children think touchscreens are useful for. Based on a prior result that children prefer a book over a touchscreen for learning about dogs, the present study explored how children view touchscreens versus books for learning an array of different types of information. Seventy children ages 3-6 were presented with six different topics (cooking, today's weather, trees, vacuums, Virginia, and yesterday's football game) and chose whether a book or a touchscreen device would be best to use to learn about each topic. Some of this information was time-sensitive, like the current weather; we predicted that children would prefer a touchscreen for time-sensitive information. In addition, each child's parent was surveyed about the child's use of books and touchscreens for educational purposes, both at home and in school. Results indicated that younger children had no preference between books and touchscreen devices across learning tasks. However, 6-year-olds were significantly more likely to choose the touchscreen for several topics. Surprisingly, 6-year-olds chose a touchscreen device to learn about time-sensitive weather conditions, but not yesterday's football. Children's choices were not associated with their use of books and touchscreens at home and school.

Predictors and Moderators of Spontaneous Pretend Play in Children with and without Autism Spectrum Disorder.

Although pretend play has long been linked to children's normative cognitive development, inconsistent findings call for greater rigor in examining this relation (Lillard et al., 2013). Spontaneous pretend play is often impacted in atypical development, notably in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Since ASD traits exist along a continuum in the general population, investigating how pretend play varies across the range of ASD symptoms by indexing variations in ASD traits in both typically developing and ASD populations may provide insight into how ASD symptoms may influence the relation between pretend play and associated processes in cognitive development. This study used rigorous observational methods to assess spontaneous pretend play. Specifically, 5-min free-play sessions with two discrete toy sets were double-coded by blinded coders (coder assignment counterbalanced). Key facets of pretense development [attribution of pretend properties (APP), object substitution (OS), imaginary objects] were examined. These facets of pretend play production were then analyzed in relation to ASD symptoms, as well as plausible, long-theorized correlates [theory of mind (ToM), verbal ability, familiarity, and interest in specific toys]. Forty children (Mage = 6;5, SDage = 1.45; 29 males), six of whom met the threshold for ASD diagnosis via parent-reported ASD symptoms, participated in play sessions and completed measures of verbal IQ and ToM. Besides the measure of child ASD symptoms, parents completed a survey of their child's interest in and familiarity with the play session toys. Overall, greater ToM predicted more APP, and more interest in the toys presented predicted more OS. In terms of overall pretend play production, two results were counterintuitive. First, among children with more ASD symptoms, verbal ability marginally negatively predicted pretend play production. Second, among children with fewer ASD symptoms, ToM negatively predicted pretend play production. Further probing revealed that the negative effect of ASD symptoms on pretend play was simultaneously moderated by both variables: low ToM and high verbal ability both related to less pretend play production among children with more ASD symptoms. Implications for assessment and subsequent treatment for pretend ability among children with varying degrees of ASD symptoms, as well as for future research, are discussed.

Can that really happen? Children's knowledge about the reality status of fantastical events in television.

Although popular children's cartoons are replete with fantastical events, we know little about whether children understand that these events are fantastical rather than real. In Study 1, 54 children ages 4 to 6 years and 18 adults were shown 10 real and 10 fantastical events portrayed in 4s video clips from a popular cartoon. After viewing each clip, participants were asked to judge the reality status of the event and to explain their judgments. Results indicated that even 4-year-olds have a fairly good understanding of fantastical events in animated cartoons but that they underestimate the reality status of real events in such cartoons. In Study 2, 35 4- to 6-year-olds and 18 adults watched video clips of 10 real and 10 fantastical events performed by real people from a Chinese television show. Once again, 4-year-olds underestimated the reality status of real events shown on television. However, against the "real" backdrop in this study, 4-year-olds also judged nearly half of the fantastical events to be real. The implications for children's reality-fantasy discrimination and their media viewing are discussed.

The Effect of Realistic Contexts on Ontological Judgments of Novel Entities.

Although a great deal of research has focused on ontological judgments in preschoolers, very little has examined ontological judgments in older children. The present study asked 10-year-olds and adults (N = 94) to judge the reality status of known real, known imagined, and novel entities presented in simple and elaborate contexts and to explain their judgments. Although judgments were generally apt, participants were more likely to endorse imagined and novel entities when the entities were presented in elaborate contexts. When asked to explain their reasoning, participants at both ages cited firsthand experience for real entities and general knowledge for imagined entities. For novel entities, participants referred most to indirect experiences when entities were presented in simple contexts and to general knowledge when those entities were presented in elaborate contexts. These results suggest that rich contextual information continues to be an important influence on ontological judgments past the preschool years.

Further examination of the immediate impact of television on children's executive function.

Three studies examined the short-term impact of television (TV) on children's executive function (EF). Study 1 (N = 160) showed that 4- and 6-year-olds' EF is impaired after watching 2 different fast and fantastical shows, relative to that of children who watched a slow, realistic show or played. In Study 2 (N = 60), 4-year-olds' EF was as depleted after watching a fast and fantastical educational show as it was after a fast and fantastical entertainment 1, relative to that of children who read a book based on the educational show. Study 3 (N = 80) examined whether show pacing or fantasy was more influential, and found that only fantastical shows, regardless of their pacing, disrupted 4-year-olds' EF. Taken together, these studies show that 10-20 min watching televised fantastical events, relative to other experiences, results in lower EF in young children.

Television and children's executive function.

Children spend a lot of time watching television on its many platforms: directly, online, and via videos and DVDs. Many researchers are concerned that some types of television content appear to negatively influence children's executive function. Because (1) executive function predicts key developmental outcomes, (2) executive function appears to be influenced by some television content, and (3) American children watch large quantities of television (including the content of concern), the issues discussed here comprise a crucial public health issue. Further research is needed to reveal exactly what television content is implicated, what underlies television's effect on executive function, how long the effect lasts, and who is affected.

Do children learn from pretense?

Pretend play presents an interesting puzzle. Children generally must keep pretense separate from reality or else pretend would confuse their real-world representations. Children spend a great deal of time pretending, and so failing to take any information from pretend scenarios would present a lost opportunity; however, little research has investigated whether it is possible or efficient for children to learn new information they encounter during pretend play. In two tightly controlled studies using blind testers, we taught children information of two types (labels and object functions) in a pretend or real context. Children learned the novel functions in the pretend condition, and they inferred that the novel object would be similar in appearance to the substitute used to represent it during pretense. These findings coincide with other recent work suggesting that children can learn new information in pretense contexts that they can then apply to the real world, although this learning may differ in important ways from learning in real contexts.

From false belief to friendship: commentary on Fink, Begeer, Peterson, Slaughter, and de Rosnay.

Fink, Begeer, Peterson, Slaughter, and de Rosnay (Brit. J. Dev. Psychol, 2015; 33, 1-17) represent a welcome contribution in providing empirical evidence of the link from false belief understanding at Time 1 to mutual friendship 2 years later, controlling for several other possible contributors. This opens a new and important line of inquiry into the practical significance of a Theory of Mind. As is typical of pioneering research, further study is needed to address some issues; here, we point out some of these issues and then briefly discuss the broader implications of Fink et al.'s findings.

Cultural variations in global versus local processing: a developmental perspective.

We conducted 3 studies to explore cultural differences in global versus local processing and their developmental trajectories. In Study 1 (N = 363), we found that Japanese college students were less globally oriented in their processing than American or Argentine participants. We replicated this effect in Study 2 (N = 1,843) using a nationally representative sample of Japanese and American adults ages 20 to 69, and found further that adults in both cultures became more globally oriented with age. In Study 3 (N = 133), we investigated the developmental course of the cultural difference using Japanese and American children, and found it was evident by 4 years of age. Cultural variations in global versus local processing emerge by early childhood, and remain throughout adulthood. At the same time, both Japanese and Americans become increasingly global processors with age.

Do children prefer mentalistic descriptions?

Against a long tradition of childhood realism (Piaget, 1929), A. S. Lillard and J. H. Flavell (1990) found that 3-year-olds prefer to characterize people by their mental states (beliefs, desires, emotions) than by their visible behaviors. In this exploratory study, we extend this finding to a new cohort of 3-year-olds, examine how these preferences change from 3-4 years, and explore relationships with theory of mind and parental mind-mindedness. The results showed a developmental change and a possible cohort difference: at 3 years, children in the sample preferred behavioral descriptions, although by 4 years of age, they preferred mentalistic ones. Interestingly, mentalistic preferences were unrelated to theory of mind or parental mind-mindedness, concurrently or over time. Perspective-taking skills at 3 years, however, predicted an increase in mentalistic responses from 3 years to 4 years. Possible explanations for each finding are discussed.