A genetic profile of oxytocin receptor improves moral acceptability of outcome-maximizing harm in male insurance brokers.

In recent years, conflicting findings have been reported in the scientific literature about the influence of dopaminergic, serotonergic and oxytocinergic gene variants on moral behavior. Here, we utilized a moral judgment paradigm to test the potential effects on moral choices of three polymorphisms of the Oxytocin receptor (OXTR): rs53576, rs2268498 and rs1042770. We analyzed the influence of each single polymorphism and of genetic profiles obtained by different combinations of their genotypes in a sample of male insurance brokers (n = 129), as compared to control males (n = 109). Insurance brokers resulted significantly more oriented to maximize outcomes than control males, thus they expressed more than controls the utilitarian attitude phenotype. When analyzed individually, none of the selected variants influenced the responses to moral dilemmas. In contrast, a composite genetic profile that potentially increases OXTR activity was associated with higher moral acceptability in brokers. We hypothesize that this genetic profile promotes outcome-maximizing behavior in brokers by focusing their attention on what represents a greater good, that is, saving the highest number of people, even though at the cost of sacrificing one individual. Our data suggest that investigations in a sample that most expresses the phenotype of interest, combined with the analysis of composite genetic profiles rather than individual variants, represent a promising strategy to find out weak genetic influences on complex phenotypes, such as moral behavior.

Selective changes in moral judgment by noninvasive brain stimulation of the medial prefrontal cortex.

Multiple cortical networks intervene in moral judgment, among which the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the medial prefrontal structures (medial PFC) emerged as two major territories, which have been traditionally attributed, respectively, to cognitive control and affective reactions. However, some recent theoretical and empirical accounts disputed this dualistic approach to moral evaluation. In the present study, to further assess the functional contribution of the medial PFC in moral judgment, we modulated its cortical excitability by means of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) and tracked the change in response to different types of moral dilemmas, including switch-like and footbridge-like moral dilemmas, with and without personal involvement. One hundred participants (50 males) completed a questionnaire to assess the baseline levels of deontology. Next, participants were randomly assigned to receive anodal, sham, or cathodal tDCS over the medial prefrontal structures and then were asked to address a series of dilemmas. The results showed that participants who received anodal stimulation over the medial PFC provided more utilitarian responses to switch-like (but not footbridge-like) dilemmas than those who received cathodal tDCS. We also found that neurostimulation modulated the influence that deontology has on moral choices. Specifically, in the anodal tDCS group, participants' decisions were less likely to be influenced by their baseline levels of deontology compared with the sham or cathodal groups. Overall, our results seem to refute a functional role of the medial prefrontal structures purely restricted to affective reactions for moral dilemmas, providing new insights on the functional contribution of the medial PFC in moral judgment.

A Systematic Review of the Psychological Implications of Genetic Testing: A Comparative Analysis Among Cardiovascular, Neurodegenerative and Cancer Diseases.

Background: Genetic testing is performed for different purposes, such as identifying carriers, predicting a disease onset in presymptomatic individuals or confirming a diagnosis. However, these tests may have notable psychological effects, such as generating anxiety and depression. These effects may depend on people's perception of risk, severity, and controllability of the disease; and the availability of treatments. To date, there are no reports that analyze these factors specifically, and their role in influencing genetic test users' experience. Methods: We performed a systematic review of the psychological implication of undergoing genetic testing for cardiovascular, neurodegenerative and cancer diseases. Articles were searched on PubMed, Google Scholar, and PsychInfo. Results: 47 studies were included, 9 concerning cardiovascular disease, 18 neurodegenerative disorders, and 20 for cancer disease. According to the reviewed studies, people experience no significant increase in distress and anxiety, or adverse impacts on quality of life, except the Huntington disease, which is characterized by depressive symptoms, suicidal ideations, and hopelessness in gene carriers. People tend to consider genetic tests as valid information to take important preventive decisions. Genetic risk for cardiovascular disease is perceived to be manageable; genetic analysis for some neurodegenerative diseases (e.g., Alzheimer) or cancer (breast cancer in particular) is considered useful because the problem could be addressed in advance with preventive behaviors. Conclusions: Genetic tests should be proposed along with proper psychological support and counseling focused on users' genetic health literacy; perception of risk, beliefs about disease controllability, in order to foster fruitful medical decisions.

Are Moral and Socio-conventional Knowledge Impaired in Severe Traumatic Brain Injury?

OBJECTIVE: The aim of this study was to investigate explicit moral and socio-conventional knowledge in Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) patients. METHOD: A group of 28 TBI patients was tested on a new set of moral and socio-conventional items. Responses of TBI patients were compared with those of 28 matched controls. Participants had to report how hard would be to perform specific moral or socio-conventional transgressions, using a 10-point Likert scale. We analyzed our data through mixed-effects models, to jointly assess by-participants and by-items variance. The factors considered were Type of Item (Moral vs. Socio-conventional) and Group (TBI vs. Controls). RESULTS: Results revealed a significant interaction between Type of Item and Group (χ2[1] = 25.5, p < .001). Simple-effects analyses showed that TBI, as Controls, were able to differentiate moral and socio-conventional transgressions (χ2[1] = 72.3, p < .001), as they deemed the former as more difficult to enact. TBI patients, however, evaluated moral transgressions as easier to fulfill (χ2[1] = 12.2, p = .001). CONCLUSIONS: TBI patients can clearly differentiate moral and socio-conventional transgressions, suggesting that the explicit knowledge of these two dimensions is spared. TBI patients, however, considered moral transgressions as easier to fulfill with respect to Controls. This finding may suggest a tendency in TBI patients to underestimate the weight of moral transgressions.

Genetically-Driven Enhancement of Dopaminergic Transmission Affects Moral Acceptability in Females but Not in Males: A Pilot Study.

Moral behavior has been a key topic of debate for philosophy and psychology for a long time. In recent years, thanks to the development of novel methodologies in cognitive sciences, the question of how we make moral choices has expanded to the study of neurobiological correlates that subtend the mental processes involved in moral behavior. For instance, in vivo brain imaging studies have shown that distinct patterns of brain neural activity, associated with emotional response and cognitive processes, are involved in moral judgment. Moreover, while it is well-known that responses to the same moral dilemmas differ across individuals, to what extent this variability may be rooted in genetics still remains to be understood. As dopamine is a key modulator of neural processes underlying executive functions, we questioned whether genetic polymorphisms associated with decision-making and dopaminergic neurotransmission modulation would contribute to the observed variability in moral judgment. To this aim, we genotyped five genetic variants of the dopaminergic pathway [rs1800955 in the dopamine receptor D4 (DRD4) gene, DRD4 48 bp variable number of tandem repeat (VNTR), solute carrier family 6 member 3 (SLC6A3) 40 bp VNTR, rs4680 in the catechol-O-methyl transferase (COMT) gene, and rs1800497 in the ankyrin repeat and kinase domain containing 1 (ANKK1) gene] in 200 subjects, who were requested to answer 56 moral dilemmas. As these variants are all located in genes belonging to the dopaminergic pathway, they were combined in multilocus genetic profiles for the association analysis. While no individual variant showed any significant effects on moral dilemma responses, the multilocus genetic profile analysis revealed a significant gender-specific influence on human moral acceptability. Specifically, those genotype combinations that improve dopaminergic signaling selectively increased moral acceptability in females, by making their responses to moral dilemmas more similar to those provided by males. As females usually give more emotionally-based answers and engage the "emotional brain" more than males, our results, though preliminary and therefore in need of replication in independent samples, suggest that this increase in dopamine availability enhances the cognitive and reduces the emotional components of moral decision-making in females, thus favoring a more rationally-driven decision process.

United we stand, divided we fall: Cognition, emotion, and the moral link between them.

Contrary to Greene's dual-process theory of moral judgment (Greene 2013), this commentary suggests that the network view of the brain proposed by Pessoa, in which emotion and cognition may be used as labels in the context of certain behaviors, but will not map clearly into compartmentalized pieces of the brain, could represent a better explanation of the rationale behind people's moral behavior.

Moral dilemmas and moral principles: when emotion and cognition unite.

Traditional studies on moral judgement used resolutions of moral dilemmas that were framed in terms of acceptability of the consequentialist action promoting a greater good, thus overlooking the deontological implications (choices cannot be justified by their consequences). Recently, some authors have suggested a parallelism between automatic, unreflective emotional responses and deontological moral judgements. In this study, we developed a novel experimental paradigm in which participants were required to choose between two resolutions of a moral dilemma (consequentialist and deontological). To assess whether emotions are engaged in each of the two resolutions, we asked participants to evaluate their emotional experience through the ratings of valence and arousal. Results showed that emotion is involved not only in deontological but also in consequentialist resolutions. Moreover, response times pointed out a different interplay between emotion and cognition in determining a conflict in the dilemma's resolution. In particular, when people were faced with trolley-like dilemmas we found that decisions leading to deontological resolutions were slower than decisions leading to consequentialist resolutions. We propose that this finding reflects the special (but not accepted) permission provided by the doctrine of the double effect for incidentally causing death for the sake of a good end.

Attitudes towards end-of-life decisions and the subjective concepts of consciousness: an empirical analysis.

BACKGROUND: People have fought for their civil rights, primarily the right to live in dignity. At present, the development of technology in medicine and healthcare led to an apparent paradox: many people are fighting for the right to die. This study was aimed at testing whether different moral principles are associated with different attitudes towards end-of-life decisions for patients with a severe brain damage. METHODOLOGY: We focused on the ethical decisions about withdrawing life-sustaining treatments in patients with severe brain damage. 202 undergraduate students at the University of Padova were given one description drawn from four profiles describing different pathological states: the permanent vegetative state, the minimally conscious state, the locked-in syndrome, and the terminal illness. Participants were asked to evaluate how dead or how alive the patient was, and how appropriate it was to satisfy the patient's desire. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We found that the moral principles in which people believe affect not only people's judgments concerning the appropriateness of the withdrawal of life support, but also the perception of the death status of patients with severe brain injury. In particular, we found that the supporters of the Free Choice (FC) principle perceived the death status of the patients with different pathologies differently: the more people believe in the FC, the more they perceived patients as dead in pathologies where conscious awareness is severely impaired. By contrast, participants who agree with the Sanctity of Life (SL) principle did not show differences across pathologies. CONCLUSIONS: These results may shed light on the complex aspects of moral consensus for supporting or rejecting end-of-life decisions.

Temporal dynamics of cognitive-emotional interplay in moral decision-making.

This study investigated the temporal dynamics of emotional and cognitive processing underlying decision-making in moral judgment. Thirty-seven participants were presented with a set of 60 dilemmas varying in whether killing one individual was an intended means to save others (instrumental dilemmas) or a foreseen but unintended consequence (incidental dilemmas). Participants were required to decide between Options A (letting a specific number of people die) and B (killing one person to save a specific number of people). ERPs were recorded to a slide displaying the letters A and B while subjects were deciding between the options, and movement-related potentials were recorded time-locked to the behavioral response, thus allowing the investigation of both stimulus- and response-related processes during decision-making. Ratings of emotional valence and arousal experienced during decision-making were collected after each decision. Compared with incidental dilemmas, instrumental dilemmas prompted a lower number of B choices and significantly more unpleasant decisions. A larger P260 component was found in the frontopolar and frontal areas when subjects were deciding on instrumental than incidental dilemmas, possibly reflecting an immediate affective reaction during the early stage of assessment and formation of preferences between available options. On the other hand, decisions on incidental dilemmas required greater attentional resources during the fairly controlled later processing, as reflected in the larger slow wave amplitudes. In addition, facilitation of action selection and implementation was found for incidental dilemmas during the second stage of decision-making, as supported by the larger amplitudes of both components of the Bereitschaftspotential.