Heuristic decision-making across adulthood.

In general, research on aging and decision-making has grown in recent years. Yet, little work has investigated how reliance on classic heuristics may differ across adulthood. For example, younger adults rely on the availability of information from memory when judging the relative frequency of plane crashes versus car accidents, but it is unclear if older adults are similarly reliant on this heuristic. In the present study, participants aged 20-90 years old made judgments that could be answered by relying on five different heuristics: anchoring, availability, recognition, representativeness, and sunk-cost bias. We found no evidence of age-related differences in the use of the classic heuristics-younger and older adults employed anchoring, availability, recognition, and representativeness to equal degrees in order to make decisions. However, replicating past work, we found age-related differences in the sunk-cost bias-older adults were more likely to avoid this fallacy compared to younger adults. We explain these different patterns by drawing on the distinctive roles that stored knowledge and personal experience likely play across heuristics. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Prior exposure increases judged truth even during periods of mind wandering.

Much of our day is spent mind-wandering-periods of inattention characterized by a lack of awareness of external stimuli and information. Whether we are paying attention or not, information surrounds us constantly-some true and some false. The proliferation of false information in news and social media highlights the critical need to understand the psychological mechanisms underlying our beliefs about what is true. People often rely on heuristics to judge the truth of information. For example, repeated information is more likely to be judged as true than new information (i.e., the illusory truth effect). However, despite the prevalence of mind wandering in our daily lives, current research on the contributing factors to the illusory truth effect have largely ignored periods of inattention as experimentally informative. Here, we aim to address this gap in our knowledge, investigating whether mind wandering during initial exposure to information has an effect on later belief in the truth of that information. That is, does the illusory truth effect occur even when people report not paying attention to the information at hand. Across three studies we demonstrate that even during periods of mind wandering, the repetition of information increases truth judgments. Further, our results suggest that the severity of mind wandering moderated truth ratings, such that greater levels of mind wandering decreased truth judgements for previously presented information.

Individual Differences in Structure Building: Impacts on Comprehension and Learning, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Support for Less Able Structure Builders.

In this article, we highlight an underappreciated individual difference: structure building. Structure building is integral to many everyday activities and involves creating coherent mental representations of conversations, texts, pictorial stories, and other events. People vary in this ability in a way not generally captured by other better known concepts and individual difference measures. Individuals with lower structure-building ability consistently perform worse on a range of comprehension and learning measures than do individuals with higher structure-building ability, both in the laboratory and in the classroom. Problems include a range of comprehension processes, including encoding factual content, inhibiting irrelevant information, and constructing a cohesive situation model of a text or conversation. Despite these problems, recent research is encouraging in that techniques to improve the learning outcomes for low-ability structure builders have been identified. We argue that the accumulated research warrants the recognition of structure building as an important individual difference in cognitive functioning and that additional theoretical work is needed to understand the underpinnings of structure-building deficits.

A comparison of memories of fiction and autobiographical memories.

People consume, remember, and discuss not only memories of lived experiences, but also events from works of fiction, such as books, movies, and TV shows. We argue that these memories of fiction represent an important category of event memory, best understood within an autobiographical memory framework. How do fictional events yield psychological realities even when they are known to be invented? We explored this question in three studies by comparing the memory content, phenomenological qualities, and functional roles of naturally occurring personal memories to memories of fiction. In Studies 1 and 2, we characterized the subjective experience of memories of fiction by adapting established measures of autobiographical remembering, such as the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (Rubin et al., 2003), Centrality of Event Scale (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), and items from the Thinking About Life Experiences Scale (Bluck et al., 2005; Pillemer et al., 2015). In Study 3, we investigated similarities and differences in personal memories and memories of fiction for events from childhood or the recent past. In doing so, we observed the impact of a unique property of memories of fiction: their ability to be repeatedly reexperienced in their original form. Taken together, we argue that memories of fiction can be considered similar to other forms of autobiographical remembering and describe a theoretical framework for understanding memories of fiction in the context of other event memories. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Transfer of category learning to impoverished contexts.

Learning often happens in ideal conditions, but then must be applied in less-than-ideal conditions - such as when a learner studies clearly illustrated examples of rocks in a book but then must identify them in a muddy field. Here we examine whether the benefits of interleaving (vs. blocking) study schedules, as well as the use of feature descriptions, supports the transfer of category learning in new, impoverished contexts. Specifically, keeping the study conditions constant, we evaluated learners' ability to classify new exemplars in the same neutral context versus in impoverished contexts in which certain stimulus features are occluded. Over two experiments, we demonstrate that performance in new, impoverished contexts during test is greater for participants who received an interleaved (vs. blocked) study schedule, both for novel and for studied exemplars. Additionally, we show that this benefit extends to both a short (3-min) or long (48-h) test delay. The presence of feature descriptions during learning had no impact on transfer. Together, these results extend the growing literature investigating how changes in context during category learning or test impacts performance and provide support for the use of interleaving to promote the far transfer of category knowledge to impoverished contexts.

Predicting others' knowledge in younger and older adulthood.

Our beliefs about aging affect how we interact with others. For example, people know that episodic memory declines with age, and as a result, older adults' memories are less likely to be trusted. However, not all aspects of remembering decline with age; semantic memory (knowledge) increases across adulthood and is relatively unaffected in healthy aging. In the current work, we examined people's awareness of this pattern. Participants estimated the knowledge of hypothetical younger and older adults; in some studies, they also predicted and demonstrated their own knowledge on the same measures. Across studies, both younger and older adults estimated that older adults would perform better on a knowledge test, demonstrating awareness that knowledge is not impaired with aging. Furthermore, people's beliefs about their own knowledge influenced the predictions they made about others' knowledge. We discuss how this work informs theories of metacognition and contributes to positive self-perceptions in older adulthood.

Externalizing autobiographical memories in the digital age.

People externalize their autobiographical memories by creating representations that exist outside of their minds. Externalizations often serve personal and social functions, consistent with theorized functions of autobiographical memory. With new digital technologies, people are documenting more memories than ever and are sharing them with larger audiences. However, these technologies do not change the core cognitive processes involved in autobiographical memory, but instead present novel situations that affect how these processes are deployed. Smartphones allow events to be recorded as they unfold, thus directing attention and sometimes impairing memory. Social media increase the frequency of reviewing and sharing records which reactivate memories, potentially strengthening or updating them. Overall, externalization in the digital age changes what people attend to and remember about their own experiences.

Internal states and interoception along a spectrum of eating disorder symptomology.

OBJECTIVE: Recent studies on atypical interoceptive capabilities have focused on clinical populations, including anorexia nervosa[1,2]. The present exploratory study aims to characterize the influence of disordered eating symptomology on interoceptive capabilities in college students, a population for which dangerous dieting behaviors may emerge. METHOD: Ninety-nine participants were randomized to consume a blinded high calorie or low calorie midday shake. Participants reported frequency of eating disorder cognitions and behaviors; indicated changes in satiety, happiness, and energy pre- and post-consumption; and guessed the calories in their shake. Outcomes (perceived satiety, changes in mood, and caloric guess) were regressed on eating disorder symptoms scores, the high/low calorie shake condition, and the interaction between these predictors. RESULTS: Those randomized to receive the high calorie shake reported feeling fuller, but only when endorsing lower levels of eating concern. Those randomized to the high calorie shake reported greater post-meal happiness, but only at greater levels of eating concerns. Lastly, those with lower levels of eating restraint reported an expected positive association between level of fullness and calorie guess, but those with higher levels of eating restraint did not exhibit any relationship between perceived fullness and calorie guess. DISCUSSION: Results of this exploratory suggest that irregular eating habits (e.g., not eating a sufficient amount for lunch) may have direct consequences on interoceptive capabilities. Further, these capacities may be impacted by individual differences in eating concern and restraint. Preliminary findings suggest that impairment in deciphering visceral signals may be associated with the degree of eating disorder symptomology; such impairment may occur at lower levels of symptomatology than normative data would indicate.

Cheaters claim they knew the answers all along.

Cheating has become commonplace in academia and beyond. Yet, almost everyone views themselves favorably, believing that they are honest, trustworthy, and of high integrity. We investigate one possible explanation for this apparent discrepancy between people's actions and their favorable self-concepts: People who cheat on tests believe that they knew the answers all along. We found consistent correlational evidence across three studies that, for those particular cases in which participants likely cheated, they were more likely to report that they knew the answers all along. Experimentally, we then found that participants were more likely to later claim that they knew the answers all along after having the opportunity to cheat to find the correct answers - relative to exposure to the correct answers without the opportunity to cheat. These findings provide new insights into relationships between memory, metacognition, and the self-concept.

Meal skipping and cognition along a spectrum of restrictive eating.

OBJECTIVE: Inadequate nutrition adversely impacts brain development and cognitive functioning (Pollitt et al., 1983). Studies examining the acute impact of eating regular meals on cognition have reported inconsistent findings, necessitating the exploration of individual differences in samples contributing to equivocal results. The present study examines the impact of skipping lunch on cognitive ability in college-aged students by including eating restraint as a moderator. METHODS: Participants were 99 college-aged students (M = 19.7 years, SD = 1.5) randomized to a blinded 'lunch' or 'lunch-omission' condition, and assessed on memory, attention, processing speed, set shifting, and eating disorder symptomology. RESULTS: Regressing long and short-term memory on the lunch manipulation, eating restraint scores, and their interaction revealed significant interactions: those who had lunch had superior memory performance, but only for those reporting lower levels of eating restraint. Regressing set shifting speed on the manipulation, those who had lunch had slower set shifting speed than those who skipped, but only for those reporting lower levels of eating restraint. CONCLUSIONS: Results suggest that skipping lunch may have immediate consequences on cognition, however, cognitive enhancing effects may be diminished in the presence of even low levels of eating restraint. Findings highlight the significance of purported subclinical levels of eating restraint and may inform health education strategies.

Structure-seeking as a psychological antecedent of beliefs about morality.

People differ in their beliefs about the objectivity of moral claims. We investigated a possible psychological antecedent that might be associated with people's beliefs about the objectivity of moral claims. More specifically, we examined the relationship between the endorsement of moral objectivism and one's need to see the world as structured, ordered, and predictable. By believing that the world comprises objective facts about morality, a simple, rigid, and unambiguous structure is imposed on the moral landscape that is invariant to the whims and preferences of any particular person or group. Our results suggest that those more in need of personal structure and order in their lives are indeed more likely to endorse moral objectivism. We discuss the implications of these results for psychological theories of control and structure-seeking, and for cooperation, prosociality, social orderliness, and social goal pursuit. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

An initial accuracy focus prevents illusory truth.

News stories, advertising campaigns, and political propaganda often repeat misleading claims, increasing their persuasive power. Repeated statements feel easier to process, and thus truer, than new ones. Surprisingly, this illusory truth effect occurs even when claims contradict young adults' stored knowledge (e.g., repeating The fastest land animal is the leopard makes it more believable). In four experiments, we tackled this problem by prompting people to behave like "fact checkers." Focusing on accuracy at exposure (giving initial truth ratings) wiped out the illusion later, but only when participants held relevant knowledge. This selective benefit persisted over a delay. Our findings inform theories of how people evaluate truth and suggest practical strategies for coping in a "post-truth world."

Judging Truth.

Deceptive claims surround us, embedded in fake news, advertisements, political propaganda, and rumors. How do people know what to believe? Truth judgments reflect inferences drawn from three types of information: base rates, feelings, and consistency with information retrieved from memory. First, people exhibit a bias to accept incoming information, because most claims in our environments are true. Second, people interpret feelings, like ease of processing, as evidence of truth. And third, people can (but do not always) consider whether assertions match facts and source information stored in memory. This three-part framework predicts specific illusions (e.g., truthiness, illusory truth), offers ways to correct stubborn misconceptions, and suggests the importance of converging cues in a post-truth world, where falsehoods travel further and faster than the truth.

Neural basis of goal-driven changes in knowledge activation.

Depending on a person's goals, different aspects of stored knowledge are accessed. Decades of behavioral work document the flexible use of knowledge, but little neuroimaging work speaks to these questions. We used representational similarity analysis to investigate whether the relationship between brain activity and semantic structure of statements varied in two tasks hypothesized to differ in the degree to which knowledge is accessed: judging truth (semantic task) and judging oldness (episodic task). During truth judgments, but not old/new recognition judgments, a left-lateralized network previously associated with semantic memory exhibited correlations with semantic structure. At a neural level, people activate knowledge representations in different ways when focused on different goals. The present results demonstrate the potential of multivariate approaches in characterizing knowledge storage and retrieval, as well as the ways that it shapes our understanding and long-term memory.

Knowledge supports memory retrieval through familiarity, not recollection.

Semantic memory, or general knowledge of the world, guides learning and supports the formation and retrieval of new episodic memories. Behavioral evidence suggests that this knowledge effect is supported by recollection-a more controlled form of memory retrieval generally accompanied by contextual details-to a greater degree than familiarity-a more automatic form of memory retrieval generally absent of contextual details. In the current study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the role that regions associated with recollection and familiarity play in retrieving recent instances of known (e.g., The Summer Olympic Games are held four years apart) and unknown (e.g., A flaky deposit found in port bottles is beeswing) statements. Our results revealed a surprising pattern: Episodic retrieval of known statements recruited regions associated with familiarity, but not recollection. Instead, retrieval of unknown statements recruited regions associated with recollection. These data, in combination with quicker reaction times for the retrieval of known than unknown statements, suggest that known statements can be successfully retrieved on the basis of familiarity, whereas unknown statements were retrieved on the basis of recollection. Our results provide insight into how knowledge influences episodic retrieval and demonstrate the role of neuroimaging in providing insights into cognitive processes in the absence of explicit behavioral responses.

Retrieving and applying knowledge to different examples promotes transfer of learning.

Introducing variability during learning often facilitates transfer to new contexts (i.e., generalization). The goal of the present study was to explore the concept of variability in an area of research where its effects have received little attention: learning through retrieval practice. In four experiments, we investigated whether retrieval practice with different examples of a concept promotes greater transfer than repeated retrieval practice with the same example. Participants watched video clips from a lecture about geological science and answered application questions about concepts: either the same question three times or three different questions. Experiments 3 and 4 also included conditions that involved repeatedly studying the information in the application questions (either the same example or three different examples). Two days later, participants took a final test with new application questions. All four experiments showed that variability during retrieval practice produced superior transfer of knowledge to new examples. Experiments 3 and 4 also showed a testing effect and a benefit from studying different examples. Overall, these findings suggest that repeatedly retrieving and applying knowledge to different examples is a powerful method for acquiring knowledge that will transfer to a variety of new contexts. (PsycINFO Database Record

Family Matters: Measuring Impact Through One's Academic Descendants.

Scientific contributions take many forms, not all of which result in fame or are captured in traditional metrics of success (e.g., h factor). My focus is on one of the most lasting and important contributions a scientist can make: training scientists who go on to train scientists, who in turn train more scientists, etc. Academic genealogies provide many examples of scientists whose names might not be recognizable today but who trained psychologists that went on to publish very influential work. Of course success results from a combination of many factors (including but not limited to the student's abilities and motivation, luck, institutional resources, mentoring, etc.), but the field should find more ways to acknowledge the role that mentoring does play.

Understanding the cognitive processes involved in writing to learn.

Writing is often used as a tool for learning. However, empirical support for the benefits of writing-to-learn is mixed, likely because the literature conflates diverse activities (e.g., summaries, term papers) under the single umbrella of writing-to-learn. Following recent trends in the writing-to-learn literature, the authors focus on the underlying cognitive processes. They draw on the largely independent writing-to-learn and cognitive psychology learning literatures to identify important cognitive processes. The current experiment examines learning from 3 writing tasks (and 1 nonwriting control), with an emphasis on whether or not the tasks engaged retrieval. Tasks that engaged retrieval (essay writing and free recall) led to better final test performance than those that did not (note taking and highlighting). Individual differences in structure building (the ability to construct mental representations of narratives; Gernsbacher, Varner, & Faust, 1990) modified this effect; skilled structure builders benefited more from essay writing and free recall than did less skilled structure builders. Further, more essay-like responses led to better performance, implicating the importance of additional cognitive processes such as reorganization and elaboration. The results highlight how both task instructions and individual differences affect the cognitive processes involved when writing-to-learn, with consequences for the effectiveness of the learning strategy. (PsycINFO Database Record

Competing cues: Older adults rely on knowledge in the face of fluency.

Consumers regularly encounter repeated false claims in political and marketing campaigns, but very little empirical work addresses their impact among older adults. Repeated statements feel easier to process, and thus more truthful, than new ones (i.e., illusory truth). When judging truth, older adults' accumulated general knowledge may offset this perception of fluency. In two experiments, participants read statements that contradicted information stored in memory; a post-experimental knowledge check confirmed what individual participants knew. Unlike young adults, older adults exhibited illusory truth only when they lacked knowledge about claims. This interaction between knowledge and fluency extends dual-process theories of aging. (PsycINFO Database Record

Expertise effects in the Moses illusion: detecting contradictions with stored knowledge.

People frequently miss contradictions with stored knowledge; for example, readers often fail to notice any problem with a reference to the Atlantic as the largest ocean. Critically, such effects occur even though participants later demonstrate knowing the Pacific is the largest ocean (the Moses Illusion) [Erickson, T. D., & Mattson, M. E. (1981). From words to meaning: A semantic illusion. Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal Behavior, 20, 540-551]. We investigated whether such oversights disappear when erroneous references contradict information in one's expert domain, material which likely has been encountered many times and is particularly well-known. Biology and history graduate students monitored for errors while answering biology and history questions containing erroneous presuppositions ("In what US state were the forty-niners searching for oil?"). Expertise helped: participants were less susceptible to the illusion and less likely to later reproduce errors in their expert domain. However, expertise did not eliminate the illusion, even when errors were bolded and underlined, meaning that it was unlikely that people simply skipped over errors. The results support claims that people often use heuristics to judge truth, as opposed to directly retrieving information from memory, likely because such heuristics are adaptive and often lead to the correct answer. Even experts sometimes use such shortcuts, suggesting that overlearned and accessible knowledge does not guarantee retrieval of that information.