Associative Learning from Verbal Action-Effect Instructions: A Replication and Investigation of Underlying Mechanisms.

According to the ideomotor principle, repeated experience with an action and its perceivable consequences (effects) establish action-effect associations. Research on verbal instructions indicates that such associations are also acquired from verbal information. In the present experiment (N = 651), first, we aimed to replicate unintentional response-priming effects from verbal action-effect instructions (direct replication; Condition 1). Second, we investigated the involvement of perceptual processes in the verbally induced response-priming effect by perceptually presenting (Condition 1) versus not presenting (Condition 2) the color that was subsequently named as an effect in the instructions. Third, we tested a saliency-based explanation of the verbally induced response-priming effect by highlighting all components (action and effect) without an association between them (Condition 3). Overall, we found the predicted response-priming effect following verbal action-effect instructions (overall conditions and in the replication Condition 1). Condition 2, which did not include perceptual information in the instructions, still showed a significant response-priming effect but was descriptively weaker compared to the effect of the replication Condition 1. Condition 3, which merely highlighted the action and effect component without endorsing an association, did not show a significant effect. In sum, our study provides further solid evidence that verbal instructions lead to unintentional response-priming effects. Other conclusions must be considered preliminary: The between-condition comparisons were descriptively in the predicted direction-perceptual aspects are relevant, and a saliency-based account can be excluded-but the differences in accuracy between conditions were not statistically significant.

Unintentional response priming from verbal action-effect instructions.

Action-effect learning is based on a theoretical concept that actions are associated with their perceivable consequences through bidirectional associations. Past research has mostly investigated how these bidirectional associations are formed through actual behavior and perception of the consequences. The present research expands this idea by investigating how verbally formulated action-effect instructions contribute to action-effect learning. In two online experiments (Exp. 1, N = 41, student sample; Exp. 2, N = 349, non-student sample), participants memorized a specific action-effect instruction before completing a speeded categorization task. We assessed the consequences of the instructions by presenting the instructed effect as an irrelevant stimulus in the classification task and compared response errors and response times for instruction-compatible and instruction-incompatible responses. Overall, we found evidence that verbal action-effect instructions led to associations between an action and perception (effect) that are automatically activated upon encountering the previously verbally presented effect. In addition, we discuss preliminary evidence suggesting that the order of the action-effect components plays a role; only instructions in a perception-action order showed the expected effect. The present research contributes evidence to the idea that action-effect learning is not exclusively related to actual behavior but also achievable through verbally formulated instructions, thereby providing a flexible learning mechanism that does not rely on specific actual experiences.

From thought to action: On the relevance of including situational cues in thought about intended actions.

Successful everyday self-regulation often hinges on implementing intended responses at a later time-often in specific situations. We address this self-regulation challenge by examining the role of individuals' thought about intended actions-and specifically whether it does or does not include situational cues. We hypothesized that including situational cues when thinking about intended actions enables stimulus-response learning, thereby increasing the likelihood of implementing the intended actions. Consequently, we pre-registered and found (N = 392, age range 18-94) a positive relationship between the self-reported habitual inclusion of situational cues in thought about intended actions and everyday self-regulation success (assessed by self-reported self-efficacy and self-control beliefs). In addition, we provide exploratory evidence that the inclusion of situational cues in thought about intended actions mediates the relationship between conscientiousness and self-regulation success. We discuss the results and the theoretical perspective in relation to how self-control outcomes can be explained by associative learning.

Effects of self-instructed stimulus-affect plans on indirectly measured and self-reported evaluative responses.

Repeatedly experiencing a specific stimulus-affect contingency influences subsequent evaluative responses towards the respective stimulus (e.g., evaluative conditioning). In the present research, we provide further evidence that verbally processed stimulus-affect contingencies in the form of if-then plans have comparable evaluative consequences. We present three studies (N = 323) in which participants verbally linked cupcakes to either a positive ("delicious") or a negative ("disgusting") affective response while being instructed with the same health-related goal. We tested the evaluative consequences of processing these verbal stimulus-affect plans in a valence-based response-compatibility paradigm (Implicit Association Test, IAT) and self-reported liking ratings. We failed to observe the predicted effect in the first study and updated the methodology for the following two studies. With the updated procedure (two studies, N = 239), we found the hypothesized effect that processing a verbal stimulus-affect plan influences subsequent responses in the IAT and self-reported ratings in an evaluatively congruent direction. We discuss these results in relation to similar effects following directly experienced stimulus-affect contingencies and instructed evaluative conditioning. Furthermore, our present research highlights the potential to use verbal self-instruction in a stimulus-affect format to self-regulate one's evaluative responses towards specific stimuli (e.g., unhealthy snacks).

Exploring the determinants of reinvestment decisions: Sense of personal responsibility, preferences, and loss framing.

Two potentially costly errors are common in sequential investment decisions: sticking too long to a failing course of action (escalation of commitment), and abandoning a successful course of action prematurely. Past research has mostly focused on escalation of commitment, and identified three critical determinants: personal responsibility, preferences for prior decisions, and decision framing. We demonstrate in three studies using an incentivized poker inspired task that these determinants of escalation reliably lead decision makers to keep investing even when real money is on the line. We observed in Experiments 1, 2 and 3 that reinvestments were more likely when decision makers were personally responsible for prior decisions. This likelihood was also increased when the decision makers had indicated a preference for initial investments (Experiments 2 and 3), and when outcomes were framed in terms of losses as compared to gains (Experiment 3). Both types of decision errors - escalation of commitment and prematurely abandoning a course of action - could be traced to the same set of determinants. Being personally responsible for prior decisions, having a preference for the initial investment, and loss framing did increase escalation, whereas lacking personal responsibility, having no preference for the initial investment, and gain framing increased the likelihood of prematurely opting out. Finally, personal responsibility had a negative effect on decision quality, as decision-makers were still more likely to reinvest when they were personally responsible for prior decisions, than when prior decisions were assigned optimally by an algorithm (Experiments 2 and 3).

Changes in adiposity, physical activity, cardiometabolic risk factors, diet, physical capacity and well-being in inactive women and men aged 57-74 years with obesity and cardiovascular risk - A 6-month complex lifestyle intervention with 6-month follow-up.

A key challenge in lifestyle interventions is long-term maintenance of favorable lifestyle changes. Middle-aged and older adults are important target groups. The purpose of this analysis was to investigate changes in adiposity, physical activity, cardiometabolic risk factors, diet, physical capacity, and well-being, in inactive middle-aged and older women and men with obesity and elevated cardiovascular disease risk, participating in an interdisciplinary single-arm complex lifestyle intervention pilot study. Participants were recruited from the population-based Tromsø Study 2015-2016 with inclusion criteria age 55-74 years, body mass index (BMI) ≥30kg/m2, sedentary lifestyle, no prior myocardial infarction and elevated cardiovascular risk. Participants (11 men and 5 women aged 57-74 years) underwent a 6-month intervention of two 1-hour group-sessions per week with instructor-led gradually intensified exercise (endurance and strength), one individual and three 2-hour group counselling sessions with nutritionist (Nordic Nutrition Recommendations) and psychologist (Implementation intention strategies). We investigated changes in adiposity (weight, BMI, body composition, waist circumference), physical activity (self-reported and via physical activity trackers), cardiometabolic risk factors (blood pressure, HbA1c, blood lipids), diet (intake of energy, nutrients, foods), physical capacity (aerobic capacity, muscle strength), and psychological well-being, measured at baseline and end-of-intervention, using mean-comparison paired t-tests. Further, we investigated self-reported healthy lifestyle maintenance six months after end-of-intervention, and monthly changes in daily step count, moderate-to-vigorous physical activity (MVPA) and total energy expenditure. From baseline to end-of-intervention, there was a mean decrease in weight, BMI, fat mass, waist circumference, intake of total- and saturated fat, and increase in lean mass, lateral pulldown and leg press. We detected no changes in mean levels of physical activity, cardiometabolic risk factors or well-being. Six months after end-of-intervention, 25% responded healthy lifestyle achievement and maintenance, while objectively measured physical activity remained unchanged. The results are useful for development of a protocol for a full-scale trial. Trial registration: The study was registered at www.ClinicalTrials.gov registry (NCT03807323).

Deliberation decreases the likelihood of expressing dominant responses.

Deliberation is commonly assumed to be a central characteristic of humans' higher cognitive functions, and the responses following deliberation are attributed to mechanisms that are qualitatively different from lower-level associative or affectively driven responses. In contrast to this perspective, the current article's aim is to draw attention to potential issues with making inferences about mechanisms of deliberation based on characteristics of the observed decision outcomes. We propose that a consequence of deliberation is to simply reduce the likelihood of expressing immediately available (dominant) responses. We illustrate how this consequence of deliberation can provide a parsimonious explanation for a broad range of prior research on decision-making. Furthermore, we discuss how the present perspective on deliberation relates to the question of how the cognitive system implements nondominant responses based on associative learning and affective prioritization rather than voluntary decisions. Beyond the present article's theoretical focus, for illustrative purposes, we provide some empirical evidence (three studies, N = 175) that is in line with our proposal. In sum, our theoretical framework, prior empirical evidence, and the present studies suggest that deliberation reduces the likelihood of expressing dominant responses. Although we do not argue that this is the only consequence or mechanism regarding deliberation, we aim to highlight that it is worthwhile considering this minimal consequence of deliberation as compared with certain higher cognitive functions in the interpretation of deliberation outcomes.

From conscious thought to automatic action: A simulation account of action planning.

We provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence for how verbally planning an action creates direct perception-action links and behavioral automaticity. We argue that planning actions in an if (situation)-then (action) format induces sensorimotor simulations (i.e., activity patterns reenacting the event in the sensory and motor brain areas) of the anticipated situation and the intended action. Due to their temporal overlap, these activity patterns become linked. Whenever the previously simulated situation is encountered, the previously simulated action is partially reactivated through spreading activation and thus more likely to be executed. In 4 experiments (N = 363), we investigated the relation between specific if-then action plans worded to activate simulations of elbow flexion versus extension movements and actual elbow flexion versus extension movements in a subsequent, ostensibly unrelated categorization task. As expected, linking a critical stimulus to intended actions that implied elbow flexion movements (e.g., grabbing it for consumption) subsequently facilitated elbow flexion movements upon encountering the critical stimulus. However, linking a critical stimulus to actions that implied elbow extension movements (e.g., pointing at it) subsequently facilitated elbow extension movements upon encountering the critical stimulus. Thus, minor differences (i.e., exchanging the words "point at" with "grab") in verbally formulated action plans (i.e., conscious thought) had systematic consequences on subsequent actions. The question of how conscious thought can induce stimulus-triggered action is illuminated by the provided theoretical framework and the respective empirical evidence, facilitating the understanding of behavioral automaticity and human agency. (PsycINFO Database Record

Dealing with negative stereotypes in sports: the role of cognitive anxiety when multiple identities are activated in sensorimotor tasks.

Based on research on stereotype threat and multiple identities, this work explores the beneficial effects of activating a positive social identity when a negative identity is salient on women's performance in sports. Further, in line with research on the effects of anxiety in sports, we investigate whether the activation of a positive social identity buffers performance from cognitive anxiety associated with a negative stereotype. Two experiments tested these predictions in field settings. Experiment 1 (N = 83) shows that the simultaneous activation of a positive (i.e., member of a soccer team) and a negative social identity (i.e., woman) led to better performance than the activation of only a negative social identity for female soccer players. Experiment 2 (N = 46) demonstrates that identity condition moderated the effect of cognitive anxiety on performance for female basketball players. Results are discussed concerning multiple identities' potential for dealing with stressful situations.

Distractor devaluation in a flanker task: object-specific effects without distractor recognition memory.

Previous research has shown that ignored stimuli are affectively devalued (i.e., distractor devaluation effect). Whereas previous research used feature-based selection tasks to investigate distractor devaluation, we used an object-based paradigm, allowing us to investigate open questions regarding underlying mechanisms. First, by using an object-based paradigm, we expected to find distractor devaluation for specific distractors (in contrast to general effects for certain categories). Second, we expected distractor devaluation in the absence of explicit recall of the to-be-evaluated stimulus' prior status (e.g., distractor), which is an important and previously untested factor, in order to exclude alternative explanations for distractor devaluation. Third, derived from the devaluation-by-inhibition hypothesis, we predicted that conditions of stronger distractor interference would result in stronger distractor devaluation. These predictions were confirmed in two experiments. We thus provide evidence that distractor devaluation can be a consequence of selective attention processes and that the evaluative consequences of ignoring can be tied to the mental representation of specific distractors.