RESUMO
Do international reputational concerns constrain governments' economic policy choices? We assess this question by analyzing emerging market decisions to tighten restrictions on capital outflows. While policymakers should be more likely to tighten restrictions to protect their economies as capital flow volatility (CFV) increases, investors view outflow controls as heterodox policies that violate investment contracts. We argue that the effect of CFV on outflow controls depends on the use of controls in peer markets. When peers are open, governments anticipate that controls will come at a high cost to their market reputations as heterodox measures send a negative signal to investors among a crowd of liberal peers. Conversely, when peers are closed, using controls should do less damage to an economy's reputation. For 25 emerging markets from 1995-2015, we show that CFV is associated with outflow controls, but only when market peers are already closed, suggesting reputational concerns can limit policy autonomy. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11558-021-09433-1.
RESUMO
Malaria-schistosomiasis coinfections are common in sub-Saharan Africa but studies present equivocal results regarding the interspecific relationships between these parasites. Through mixed-model analyses of a dataset of Ugandan preschool children, we explore how current coinfection and prior infection with either Schistosoma mansoni or Plasmodium species alter subsequent Plasmodium intensity, Plasmodium risk, and S mansoni risk. Coinfection and prior infections with S mansoni were associated with reduced Plasmodium intensity, moderated by prior Plasmodium infections, wealth, and host age. Future work should assess whether these interactions impact host health and parasite control efficacy in this vulnerable age group.