Expertise and category-based induction.

The authors examined inductive reasoning among experts in a domain. Three types of tree experts (landscapers, taxonomists, and parks maintenance personnel) completed 3 reasoning tasks. In Experiment 1, participants inferred which of 2 novel diseases would affect "more other kinds of trees" and provided justifications for their choices. In Experiment 2, the authors used modified instructions and asked which disease would be more likely to affect "all trees." In Experiment 3, the conclusion category was eliminated altogether, and participants were asked to generate a list of other affected trees. Among these populations, typicality and diversity effects were weak to nonexistent. Instead, experts' reasoning was influenced by "local" coverage (extension of the property to members of the same folk family) and causal-ecological factors. The authors concluded that domain knowledge leads to the use of a variety of reasoning strategies not captured by current models of category-based induction.

Tall is typical: central tendency, ideal dimensions, and graded category structure among tree experts and novices.

Many accounts of categorization equate goodness-of-example with central tendency for common taxonomic categories; the best examples of a category are average members--those that are most similar to most other category members. In the present study, we asked 24 tree experts and 20 novices to rate goodness-of-example for a sample of 48 trees and found (1) that the internal structure of the category tree differed between novices and experts and (2) that central tendency did not determine goodness-of-example ratings for either group. For novices, familiarity determined goodness-of-example ratings. For experts, the "ideal" dimensions of height and weediness, rather than average similarity to other trees, were the primary predictors of goodness-of-example ratings for experts. The best examples of tree were not species of average height, but of extreme height. The worst examples were the weediest trees. We also found systematic differences in predictors of goodness-of-example as a function of type of expertise. We argue that the internal structure of taxonomic categories can be shaped by goal-related experience and is not necessarily a reflection of the attributional structure of the environment. Implications for models of category structure and category learning are discussed.

Are there kinds of concepts?

Past research on concepts has focused almost exclusively on noun-object concepts. This paper discusses recent research demonstrating that useful distinctions may be made among kinds of concepts, including both object and nonobject concepts. We discuss three types of criteria, based on structure, process, and content, that may be used to distinguish among kinds of concepts. The paper then reviews a number of possible candidates for kinds based on the discussed criteria.

Evolution and devolution of folkbiological knowledge.

In this paper we present evidence in support of the hypothesis that the average person's knowledge about trees, and about the natural world in general, has declined during the 20th century. Our investigations are based on examination of a large sample of written material from the 16th through 20th centuries contained in the Oxford English Dictionary. In Analysis 1, we show a precipitous decline in the use of tree terms after, but not before, the 19th century. In Analysis 2, we analyze tree terms at different levels of organization and show that the decline observed in Analysis 1 occurs for all levels of organization. This second analysis also reveals that during the 16th to 19th centuries tree terms became progressively more specific, suggesting that during these periods knowledge about trees increased. In Analysis 3, we show similar rates of decline in other folkbiological categories, indicating that the change in tree terms reflects a general decline in knowledge about living kinds. Also in Analysis 3, we show that several non-biological categories have experienced evolution during the 20th century, indicating that the declines in the 20th century for folkbiological categories are not an inevitable outcome of the corpus. Finally, Analysis 4 also shows declines in the frequency of quotations for which the tree term was not the topic of the sentence, and thus incidental to the purposes of the writer. The results from Analysis 4 reassure us that the results from Analyses 1-3 were not solely due to change in the aims and purposes of writers over the centuries. In sum, the analyses indicate that in the domain of trees, there has been a long and sustained period of conceptual evolution followed by a recent pronounced period of devolution.

Similarity of the perimeters in the Ebbinghaus illusion.

Coren and Miller (1974) and Coren and Enns (1993) argued that the magnitude of the Ebbinghaus illusion is a function of the rated or conceptual similarity of the inducing objects to the test object. In three experiments, we examined the convergence between conceptual similarity and illusion magnitude. The first failed to find support for this parallel. Two further experiments yielded support for an alternative hypothesis that the magnitude of the Ebbinghaus illusion is a function of the similarity of the perimeters of the inducing object to the test object. The similarity of the centers had no effect. These results suggest that the information used to estimate size is computed earlier in the visual system than suggested by Coren and colleagues and apparently does not involve the use of conceptual information.

Asymmetries of comparison.

Tversky's (1977) seminal work on directionality injudgments of similarity demonstrated that people may not judge the similarity of A to B to be equal to the similarity of B to A. In a series of studies, we investigated comparison asymmetries. In Experiment 1, our aim was to extend Tversky's findings to a heterogeneous stimulus set, but no reliable asymmetries were observed. Experiment 2 employed a variety of comparison judgments, and, although some of these measures showed asymmetries, we still failed to observe asymmetries in rated similarity. A final attempt to obtain asymmetries used direction as a within-subjects factor, and for the first time, rating asymmetries were observed. Our data reinforce the idea of comparison asymmetries but suggest that similarity rating asymmetries are only observed under quite circumscribed conditions.

Broadening behavioral decision research: multiple levels of cognitive processing.

The area of behavioral decision research--specifically, the work on heuristics and biases--has had a tremendous influence on basic research, applied research, and application over the last 25 years. Its unique juxtaposition against economics has provided important benefits, but at the cost of leaving it disconnected from too much of psychology. This paper explores an expanded definition of behavioral decision research through the consideration of multiple levels of cognitive processing. Rather than being limited to how decision makers depart from optimality, we offer a broader analysis of how decision makers define the decision problem and link decisions to goals, as well as a more detailed focus on processes associated with implementing decisions.

The semantic side of decision making.

The research reported in this paper follows the perspective that decision making is a meaningful act that conveys information. Furthermore, the potential meanings associated with decision options may affect the decisions themselves. This idea is examined in the contexts of compensation, donation, and exchange. In general, judgments were relation dependent and meaning dependent. Furthermore, the results show nonmonotonicities and limited substitutability in a pattern that challenges straightforward ways of mapping decisions onto a common currency of utility.

Validation of continuous thermodilution cardiac output in critically ill patients with analysis of systematic errors.

PURPOSE: Bolus thermodilution cardiac output (BCO) measurements are affected by variations in injectate volume, rate, and temperature. These variations are eliminated when CO is measured by a continuous automated thermal technique (CCO). Further, CCO eliminates the need for fluid boluses, reduces contamination risk, requires no operator, and provides a continuous CO trend. We prospectively evaluated CCO versus BCO in a population of critically ill adults with low, normal, and high CO states. We sought to discern any systematic effects of temperature fluctuations or signal-to-noise-ratios (SNR) on disparities between BCO and CCO measurements and also sought to assess the relative cost effectiveness of the CCO system. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Pulmonary artery catheterizations were performed in a convenience sample of 20 patients over 6 months. BCO data were obtained using a standardized protocol. Three bolus injections of 5% dextrose were given when each CO was within 10% of the median before averaging; otherwise five boluses were given, with the high and low values eliminated before averaging. Injectates were administered randomly through the respiratory cycle and at 1-minute intervals. CCO measurements were recorded from a Vigilance monitor pre and post BCO measurements, yielding an average CCO value. Also recorded were pre- and post-core temperatures and SNR during the first CCO measurement. Cost data included estimates of operator time for BCO determinations as well as costs of Intellicath (Baxter-Edwards, Irvine, CA) pulmonary artery catheters, Vigilance (Baxter-Edwards, Irvine, CA) monitors, conventional catheters, and injectates. RESULTS: Of the 20 patients, 15 were mechanically ventilated. A total of 306 paired CO values were obtained for analysis. CCO ranged from 2.5 to 14.4 L/min and BCO from 2.4 to 13.3 L/min. Absolute differences between CCO and BCO measurements increased with increasing CO, but percentage differences did not. Of the paired values, 77% were within 1 L/min of one another. Temperature instability and SNR independently had weak correlations with CCO/BCO disparities. The Vigilance system had a slightly higher net cost than conventional BCO, although no economical value was assigned to the clinical usefulness of continuous, as opposed to intermittent, CO monitoring. CONCLUSIONS: Continuous CO is a reliable and cost-effective alternative to bolus thermodilution CO for critically ill patients in low, normal, and high CO states.

The coincidence effect in similarity and choice.

Medin, Goldstone, and Markman (1995) recently described a series of parallel effects in similarity and choice. They suggested that similarity and choice are related in a nontrivial way such that choice may entail a similarity judgment to an explicit or constructed ideal. In this paper, the correspondences between similarity and choice were investigated with respect to a phenomenon in similarity known as the coincidence effect. In coincidence (pronounced "coincide-ence"), two items that match on one dimension but have a large difference on another dimension receive a higher similarity rating than do two items that have only modest differences on both dimensions. We conducted five experiments in order to examine commonalities between similarity and choice processes with respect to coincidence. Four types of tasks were given: similarity ratings, desirability ratings, forced choice similarities (which of two items is most similar to a target), and forced choice preferences (which of two items one would prefer, given a target). We found a main effect for ratings as opposed to forced choices, with ratings showing greater coincidence effects than did choices. Similarity measures tended to produce more coincidence than did preference measures. The overall pattern of results suggests the presence of dimensional weighting processes sensitive to task characteristics and operating somewhat differently for similarity and decision making.

Similarity in context.

Similarity comparisons are highly sensitive to judgment context. Three experiments explore context effects that occur within a single comparison rather than across several trials. Experiment 1 shows reliable intransitivities in which a target is judged to be more similar to stimulus A than to stimulus B, more similar to B than to stimulus C, and more similar to C than to A. Experiment 2 explores the locus of Tversky's (1977) diagnosticity effect in which the relative similarity of two alternatives to a target is influenced by a third alternative. Experiment 3 demonstrates a new violation of choice independence which is explained by object dimensions' becoming foregrounded or backgrounded, depending upon the set of displayed objects. The observed violations of common assumptions to many models of similarity and choice can be accommodated in terms of a dynamic property-weighting process based on the variability and diagnosticity of dimensions.

Categorization and reasoning among tree experts: do all roads lead to Rome?

To what degree do conceptual systems reflect universal patterns of featural covariation in the world (similarity) or universal organizing principles of mind, and to what degree do they reflect specific goals, theories, and beliefs of the categorizer? This question was addressed in experiments concerned with categorization and reasoning among different types of tree experts (e.g., taxonomists, landscape workers, parks maintenance personnel). The results show an intriguing pattern of similarities and differences. Differences in sorting between taxonomists and maintenance workers reflect differences in weighting of morphological features. Landscape workers, in contrast, sort trees into goal-derived categories based on utilitarian concerns. These sorting patterns carry over into category-based reasoning for the taxonomists and maintenance personnel but not the landscape workers. These generalizations interact with taxonomic rank and suggest that the genus (or folk generic) level is relatively and in some cases absolutely privileged. Implications of these findings for theories of categorization are discussed.

The role of covariation versus mechanism information in causal attribution.

Traditional approaches to causal attribution propose that information about covariation of factors is used to identify causes of events. In contrast, we present a series of studies showing that people seek out and prefer information about causal mechanisms rather than information about covariation. Experiments 1, 2 and 3 asked subjects to indicate the kind of information they would need for causal attribution. The subjects tended to seek out information that would provide evidence for or against hypotheses about underlying mechanisms. When asked to provide causes, the subjects' descriptions were also based on causal mechanisms. In Experiment 4, subjects received pieces of conflicting evidence matching in covariation values but differing in whether the evidence included some statement of a mechanism. The influence of evidence was significantly stronger when it included mechanism information. We conclude that people do not treat the task of causal attribution as one of identifying a novel causal relationship between arbitrary factors by relying solely on covariation information. Rather, people attempt to seek out causal mechanisms in developing a causal explanation for a specific event.

Comparison and choice: Relations between similarity processes and decision processes.

Research and theory in decision making and in similarity judgment have developed along parallel paths. We review and analyze phenomena in both domains that suggest that similarity processing and decision making share important correspondences. The parallels are explored at the level of empirical generalizations and underlying processing principles. Important component processes that are shared by similarity judgments and decision making include generation of alternatives, recruitment of reference points, dynamic weighting of aspects, creation of new descriptors, development of correspondences between items, and justification of judgment. Preparation of this article was supported by National Science Foundation Grants 92-11277 and 91-10245.

Presentation order and recognition of categorically related examples.

Two experiments are described in which different groups of participants saw the same examples in different orders and then were given an old-new recognition test. The learning and test examples were created from different combinations from four binary-valued dimensions. One order (small change) was constructed to maximize the similarity between successive examples, and the other order (large change) minimized the similarity across successive examples. The small change condition was consistently associated with better old-new recognition than the large change condition was. These results are discussed in terms of exemplar-guided encoding and models of category generalization.

Relational similarity and the nonindependence of features in similarity judgments.

Four experiments examined the hypothesis that simple attributional features and relational features operate differently in the determination of similarity judgments. Forced choice similarity judgments ("Is X or Y more similar to Z?") and similarity rating tasks demonstrate that making the same featural change in two geometric stimuli unequally affects their judged similarity to a third stimulus (the comparison stimulus). More specifically, a featural change that causes stimuli to be more superficially similar and less relationally similar increases judged similarity if it occurs in stimuli that already share many superficial attributes, and decreases similarity if it occurs in stimuli that do not share as many superficial attributes. These results argue against an assumption of feature independence which asserts that the degree to which a feature shared by two objects affects similarity is independent of the other features shared by the objects. The MAX hypothesis is introduced, in which attributional and relational similarities are separately pooled, and shared features affect similarity more if the pool they are in is already relatively large. The results support claims that relations and attributes are psychologically distinct and that formal measures of similarity should not treat all types of matching features equally.

Concepts and conceptual structure.

Research and theory on categorization and conceptual structure have recently undergone two major shifts. The first shift is from the assumption that concepts have defining properties (the classical view) to the idea that concept representations may be based on properties that are only characteristic or typical of category examples (the probabilistic view). Both the probabilistic view and the classical view assume that categorization is driven by similarity relations. A major problem with describing category structure in terms of similarity is that the notion of similarity is too unconstrained to give an account of conceptual coherence. The second major shift is from the idea that concepts are organized by similarity to the idea that concepts are organized around theories. In this article, the evidence and rationale associated with these shifts are described, and one means of integrating similarity-based and theory-driven categorization is outlined.