A "Goldilocks zone" for mind-wandering reports? A secondary data analysis of how few thought probes are enough for reliable and valid measurement.

Mind-wandering assessment relies heavily on the thought probe technique as a reliable and valid method to assess momentary task-unrelated thought (TUT), but there is little guidance available to help researchers decide how many probes to include within a task. Too few probes may lead to unreliable measurement, but too many probes might artificially disrupt normal thought flow and produce reactive effects. Is there a "Goldilocks zone" for how few thought probes can be used to reliably and validly assess individual differences in mind-wandering propensity? We address this question by reanalyzing two published datasets (Study 1, n = 541; Study 2, ns ≈ 260 per condition) in which thought probes were presented in multiple tasks. Our primary analyses randomly sampled probes in increments of two for each subject in each task. A series of confirmatory factor analyses for each probe "bin" size tested whether the latent correlations between TUT rate and theoretically relevant constructs like working memory capacity, attention-control ability, disorganized schizotypy, and retrospective self-reported mind wandering changed as more probes assessed the TUT rate. TUT rates were remarkably similar across increasing probe-bin sizes and zero-order correlations within and between tasks stabilized at 8-10 probes; moreover, TUT-rate correlations with other latent variables stabilized at about 8 thought probes. Our provisional recommendation (with caveats) is that researchers may use as few as 8 thought probes in prototypical cognitive tasks to gain reliable and valid information about individual differences in TUT rate.

Fixation, flexibility, and creativity: The dynamics of mind wandering.

The mind-wandering literature is long on results and short on theory. One notable exception is the Dynamic Framework, a theoretical framework that characterizes mind wandering as thoughts that are relatively unconstrained from deliberate and automatic sources, or "freely moving." Critically, this framework makes numerous testable predictions, including (a) a positive association between freely moving thought and ADHD, (b) negative associations between freely moving thought and depression, anxiety, and OCD, and (c) a positive association between freely moving thought and divergent thinking ability. In Study 1, to test these predictions, we measured participants' reports of freely moving thoughts during a cognitive task and assessed divergent thinking and various psychopathological symptoms. Results failed to support any of the Dynamic Framework's predictions. In Study 2, we assessed the predicted relations between freely moving thought and divergent-thinking performance by manipulating thought constraint during a creative-incubation interval that preceded a divergent-thinking task. Here, we found some evidence (albeit very weak) to support the Dynamic Framework's prediction. Finally, in Study 3, we examined the possibility that indexing freely moving thought during a divergent-thinking task would yield the predicted associations but failed to find support for these associations. These results, most of which are at odds with the predictions of the Dynamic Framework, suggest either the need to revise the framework and/or that current methods are inadequate to properly test these predictions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Testing the construct validity of competing measurement approaches to probed mind-wandering reports.

Psychology faces a measurement crisis, and mind-wandering research is not immune. The present study explored the construct validity of probed mind-wandering reports (i.e., reports of task-unrelated thought [TUT]) with a combined experimental and individual-differences approach. We examined laboratory data from over 1000 undergraduates at two U.S. institutions, who responded to one of four different thought-probe types across two cognitive tasks. We asked a fundamental measurement question: Do different probe types yield different results, either in terms of average reports (average TUT rates, TUT-report confidence ratings), or in terms of TUT-report associations, such as TUT rate or confidence stability across tasks, or between TUT reports and other consciousness-related constructs (retrospective mind-wandering ratings, executive-control performance, and broad questionnaire trait assessments of distractibility-restlessness and positive-constructive daydreaming)? Our primary analyses compared probes that asked subjects to report on different dimensions of experience: TUT-content probes asked about what they'd been mind-wandering about, TUT-intentionality probes asked about why they were mind-wandering, and TUT-depth probes asked about the extent (on a rating scale) of their mind-wandering. Our secondary analyses compared thought-content probes that did versus didn't offer an option to report performance-evaluative thoughts. Our findings provide some "good news"-that some mind-wandering findings are robust across probing methods-and some "bad news"-that some findings are not robust across methods and that some commonly used probing methods may not tell us what we think they do. Our results lead us to provisionally recommend content-report probes rather than intentionality- or depth-report probes for most mind-wandering research.

Testing the attention-distractibility trait.

Forster and Lavie (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40[1], 251-260, 2014; Psychological Science, 27[2], 203-212, 2016) found that task-irrelevant distraction correlated positively with a measure of mind-wandering and a report of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptomology. Based primarily on these results, Forster and Lavie claimed to establish an attention-distractibility trait. Here, I tested whether these associations could be distinguished from associations with working memory capacity and task-relevant distraction (measured with an antisaccade task). With data collected from 226 subjects (ns differ among analyses), the results from the current study suggest that the measures of task-irrelevant distraction and working memory capacity were not (or only very weakly) associated with measures of mind wandering (measured both with a stand-alone questionnaire and in-task thought probes) and ADHD symptomology. Task-relevant interference (i.e., antisaccade accuracy) was associated with mind-wandering reports from in-task thought probes (presented in a separate task), but not the stand-alone mind wandering questionnaire or ADHD symptomology. Additionally, the measure of irrelevant-distraction exhibited low internal consistency suggesting that (as measured) it may not be a suitable individual difference measure. [Preregistration, data, analysis scripts and output are available via the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/bhs24/ ].

The Worst Performance Rule, or the Not-Best Performance Rule? Latent-Variable Analyses of Working Memory Capacity, Mind-Wandering Propensity, and Reaction Time.

The worst performance rule (WPR) is a robust empirical finding reflecting that people's worst task performance shows numerically stronger correlations with cognitive ability than their average or best performance. However, recent meta-analytic work has proposed this be renamed the "not-best performance" rule because mean and worst performance seem to predict cognitive ability to similar degrees, with both predicting ability better than best performance. We re-analyzed data from a previously published latent-variable study to test for worst vs. not-best performance across a variety of reaction time tasks in relation to two cognitive ability constructs: working memory capacity (WMC) and propensity for task-unrelated thought (TUT). Using two methods of assessing worst performance-ranked-binning and ex-Gaussian-modeling approaches-we found evidence for both the worst and not-best performance rules. WMC followed the not-best performance rule (correlating equivalently with mean and longest response times (RTs)) but TUT propensity followed the worst performance rule (correlating more strongly with longest RTs). Additionally, we created a mini-multiverse following different outlier exclusion rules to test the robustness of our findings; our findings remained stable across the different multiverse iterations. We provisionally conclude that the worst performance rule may only arise in relation to cognitive abilities closely linked to (failures of) sustained attention.

An individual differences investigation of the relations among life event stress, working memory capacity, and mind wandering: A preregistered replication-extension study.

Klein and Boals (2001a, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 15[5], 565-579, Experiments 1 and 2) found that working memory capacity correlated negatively with perceived negative life event stress and speculated the relation may be driven by thoughts produced from these experiences. Here, we sought to replicate the association between working memory capacity and perceived negative life experience and to assess potential mediators of this association such as mind wandering propensity, rumination propensity, and the sum of negatively valenced mind wandering reports. In this preregistered replication and extension study, with data collected from 356 subjects (ns differ among analyses), we found no evidence suggesting that perceived negative life stress is associated with working memory capacity. Additionally, we found evidence consistent with the claim that negatively valenced mind wandering is uniquely detrimental to cognitive task performance, but we highlight a potential confound that may account for this association that should be addressed in future work.

Is There a Positive Association Between Working Memory Capacity and Mind Wandering in a Low-Demand Breathing Task? A Preregistered Replication of a Study by Levinson, Smallwood, and Davidson (2012).

Levinson, Smallwood, and Davidson (2012, Experiment 2) found that working memory capacity (WMC) correlated positively with mind-wandering rates measured by thought probes in a breath-awareness task but was unassociated with the tendency to self-catch mind wandering. Here, I sought to replicate the associations between mind wandering and WMC in Levinson et al.'s breath-awareness task. The data from the current study, collected from 315 subjects ( ns differed among analyses) and two measures of WMC, suggest that if WMC correlates with probe-caught mind wandering, the association is most likely negative. In addition, the evidence regarding self-caught mind wandering is consistent with that found by Levinson et al. for the sum of self-caught responses, but when self-caught responses were considered in proportion to probe-caught mind wandering, modest evidence was found for a positive association with WMC.

Can research participants comment authoritatively on the validity of their self-reports of mind wandering and task engagement? A replication and extension of Seli, Jonker, Cheyne, Cortes, and Smilek (2015).

Seli, Jonker, Cheyne, Cortes, and Smilek (2015) found that, through retrospective confidence reports, participants can distinguish the validity of their mind wandering reports during a sustained attention ("metronome response") task. In addition, some participants were better able to make this distinction than others. Here, I sought to replicate both the within- and between-subjects' effects of confidence judgments on thought probe validity. To this end, I executed a preregistered close replication of Seli et al. (2015) and extended this work by administering the metronome response task twice and by measuring potential individual difference markers for which participants may be better than others at monitoring their thoughts: working memory capacity, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and dispositional mindfulness. With data from 291 participants, I found only weak evidence for a within-subject effect of confidence on thought-report validity in the first administration of the metronome response task and weak to nonexistent evidence for individual differences in thought monitoring. No evidence was found for individual differences in the ability to provide valid thought reports. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Working memory capacity and the antisaccade task: A microanalytic-macroanalytic investigation of individual differences in goal activation and maintenance.

The association between working memory capacity (WMC) and the antisaccade task, which requires subjects to move their eyes and attention away from a strong visual cue, supports the claim that WMC is partially an attentional construct (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004). Specifically, the WMC-antisaccade relation suggests that WMC helps maintain and execute task goals despite interference from habitual actions. Related work has recently shown that mind wandering (McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a, 2012b) and reaction time (RT) variability (Unsworth, 2015) are also related to WMC and they partially explain WMC's prediction of cognitive abilities. Here, we tested whether mind-wandering propensity and intraindividual RT variation account for WMC's associations with 2 antisaccade-cued choice RT tasks. In addition, we asked whether any influences of WMC, mind wandering, or intraindividual RT variation on antisaccade are moderated by (a) the temporal gap between fixation and the flashing location cue, and (b) whether targets switch sides on consecutive trials. Our quasi-experimental study reexamined a published dataset (Kane et al., 2016) comprising 472 subjects who completed 6 WMC tasks, 5 attentional tasks with mind-wandering probes, 5 tasks from which we measured intraindividual RT variation, and 2 antisaccade tasks with varying fixation-cue gap durations. The WMC-antisaccade association was not accounted for by mind wandering or intraindividual RT variation. WMC's effects on antisaccade performance were greater with longer fixation-to-cue intervals, suggesting that goal activation processes-beyond the ability to control mind wandering and RT variability-are partially responsible for the WMC-antisaccade relation. (PsycINFO Database Record

For Whom the Mind Wanders, and When, Varies Across Laboratory and Daily-Life Settings.

Undergraduates ( N = 274) participated in a weeklong daily-life experience-sampling study of mind wandering after being assessed in the lab for executive-control abilities (working memory capacity; attention-restraint ability; attention-constraint ability; and propensity for task-unrelated thoughts, or TUTs) and personality traits. Eight times a day, electronic devices prompted subjects to report on their current thoughts and context. Working memory capacity and attention abilities predicted subjects' TUT rates in the lab, but predicted the frequency of daily-life mind wandering only as a function of subjects' momentary attempts to concentrate. This pattern replicates prior daily-life findings but conflicts with laboratory findings. Results for personality factors also revealed different associations in the lab and daily life: Only neuroticism predicted TUT rate in the lab, but only openness predicted mind-wandering rate in daily life (both predicted the content of daily-life mind wandering). Cognitive and personality factors also predicted dimensions of everyday thought other than mind wandering, such as subjective judgments of controllability of thought. Mind wandering in people's daily environments and TUTs during controlled and artificial laboratory tasks have different correlates (and perhaps causes). Thus, mind-wandering theories based solely on lab phenomena may be incomplete.

Correction to Kane et al. (2016).

Reports an error in "Individual differences in the executive control of attention, memory, and thought, and their associations with schizotypy" by Michael J. Kane, Matt E. Meier, Bridget A. Smeekens, Georgina M. Gross, Charlotte A. Chun, Paul J. Silvia and Thomas R. Kwapil (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2016[Aug], Vol 145[8], 1017-1048). There were errors in Table 3 and Table 7 (these transcription errors were limited to descriptive statistics in the Tables and did not affect any inferential statistics). In Table 3, the ARRO-TUT and LETT-TUT variables had incorrect values for Mean [95% CI], SD, Skew, Kurtosis, and N. In Table 7, the same values (plus Min and Max) were incorrect for the SEM-SART variable. The correct values for these measures are presented in the correction (the values for Min and Max were correct as set in Table 3, but are repeated below for clarity). (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2016-29680-001.) A large correlational study took a latent-variable approach to the generality of executive control by testing the individual-differences structure of executive-attention capabilities and assessing their prediction of schizotypy, a multidimensional construct (with negative, positive, disorganized, and paranoid factors) conveying risk for schizophrenia. Although schizophrenia is convincingly linked to executive deficits, the schizotypy literature is equivocal. Subjects completed tasks of working memory capacity (WMC), attention restraint (inhibiting prepotent responses), and attention constraint (focusing visual attention amid distractors), the latter 2 in an effort to fractionate the "inhibition" construct. We also assessed mind-wandering propensity (via in-task thought probes) and coefficient of variation in response times (RT CoV) from several tasks as more novel indices of executive attention. WMC, attention restraint, attention constraint, mind wandering, and RT CoV were correlated but separable constructs, indicating some distinctions among "attention control" abilities; WMC correlated more strongly with attentional restraint than constraint, and mind wandering correlated more strongly with attentional restraint, attentional constraint, and RT CoV than with WMC. Across structural models, no executive construct predicted negative schizotypy and only mind wandering and RT CoV consistently (but modestly) predicted positive, disorganized, and paranoid schizotypy; stalwart executive constructs in the schizophrenia literature-WMC and attention restraint-showed little to no predictive power, beyond restraint's prediction of paranoia. Either executive deficits are consequences rather than risk factors for schizophrenia, or executive failures barely precede or precipitate diagnosable schizophrenia symptoms. (PsycINFO Database Record

Individual differences in the executive control of attention, memory, and thought, and their associations with schizotypy.

A large correlational study took a latent-variable approach to the generality of executive control by testing the individual-differences structure of executive-attention capabilities and assessing their prediction of schizotypy, a multidimensional construct (with negative, positive, disorganized, and paranoid factors) conveying risk for schizophrenia. Although schizophrenia is convincingly linked to executive deficits, the schizotypy literature is equivocal. Subjects completed tasks of working memory capacity (WMC), attention restraint (inhibiting prepotent responses), and attention constraint (focusing visual attention amid distractors), the latter 2 in an effort to fractionate the "inhibition" construct. We also assessed mind-wandering propensity (via in-task thought probes) and coefficient of variation in response times (RT CoV) from several tasks as more novel indices of executive attention. WMC, attention restraint, attention constraint, mind wandering, and RT CoV were correlated but separable constructs, indicating some distinctions among "attention control" abilities; WMC correlated more strongly with attentional restraint than constraint, and mind wandering correlated more strongly with attentional restraint, attentional constraint, and RT CoV than with WMC. Across structural models, no executive construct predicted negative schizotypy and only mind wandering and RT CoV consistently (but modestly) predicted positive, disorganized, and paranoid schizotypy; stalwart executive constructs in the schizophrenia literature-WMC and attention restraint-showed little to no predictive power, beyond restraint's prediction of paranoia. Either executive deficits are consequences rather than risk factors for schizophrenia, or executive failures barely precede or precipitate diagnosable schizophrenia symptoms. (PsycINFO Database Record

Carving executive control at its joints: Working memory capacity predicts stimulus-stimulus, but not stimulus-response, conflict.

Three experiments examined the relation between working memory capacity (WMC) and 2 different forms of cognitive conflict: stimulus-stimulus (S-S) and stimulus-response (S-R) interference. Our goal was to test whether WMC's relation to conflict-task performance is mediated by stimulus-identification processes (captured by S-S conflict), response-selection processes (captured by S-R conflict), or both. In Experiment 1, subjects completed a single task presenting both S-S and S-R conflict trials, plus trials that combined the 2 conflict types. We limited ostensible goal-maintenance contributions to performance by requiring the same goal for all trial types and by presenting frequent conflict trials that reinforced the goal. WMC predicted resolution of S-S conflict as expected: Higher WMC subjects showed reduced response time interference. Although WMC also predicted S-R interference, here, higher WMC subjects showed increased error interference. Experiment 2A replicated these results in a version of the conflict task without combined S-S/S-R trials. Experiment 2B increased the proportion of congruent (nonconflict) trials to promote reliance on goal-maintenance processes. Here, higher WMC subjects resolved both S-S and S-R conflict more successfully than did lower WMC subjects. The results were consistent with Kane and Engle's (2003) 2-factor theory of cognitive control, according to which WMC predicts executive-task performance through goal-maintenance and conflict-resolution processes. However, the present results add specificity to the account by suggesting that higher WMC subjects better resolve cognitive conflict because they more efficiently select relevant stimulus features against irrelevant, distracting ones.

Working memory capacity and Stroop interference: global versus local indices of executive control.

Two experiments examined the relations among working memory capacity (WMC), congruency-sequence effects, proportion-congruency effects, and the color-word Stroop effect to test whether congruency-sequence effects might inform theoretical claims regarding WMC's prediction of Stroop interference. In Experiment 1, subjects completed either a high-congruency or low-congruency Stroop task that restricted trial-to-trial repetitions of stimulus dimensions to examine WMC's relation to congruency-sequence effects while minimizing bottom-up, stimulus-driven contributions. Congruency-sequence effects and congruency-proportion effects were significant but did not interact. WMC predicted global Stroop interference under low-congruency conditions but neither local congruency-sequence effects nor global Stroop interference under high-congruency conditions, contrary to previous studies (e.g., Kane & Engle, 2003). A high-congruency Stroop task in Experiment 2 removed the Experiment 1 task constraints, and, here, we obtained the typical, global association between WMC and Stroop interference but still no relation between WMC and congruency-sequence effects. We thus examined the methodological differences between Experiments 1 and 2 to determine whether any of these were locally responsible for the global WMC-related differences. They were not, suggesting that the changes between Experiments 1 and 2 created a general task context that engaged (or disengaged) the executive processes associated with WMC.