Pointing to potential reference areas to assess soil mutagenicity.

Several have been performed to evaluate the mutagenicity of soil samples in urban and industrial areas. The use of uncontaminated reference areas has been an obstacle to the study of environmental mutagenesis. The study aimed to indicate a methodology to define reference areas in studies of environmental contamination based on "Ambient Background Concentration" of metallic elements associated with the Salmonella/microsome assay. We looked at three potential reference areas, two of them close by the industrial sources of contamination (São Jerônimo reference, near the coal-fired power plant, and Triunfo reference, near the wood preservative plant), but not directly influenced by them and an area located inside a protected area (Itapuã reference). We also carried out chemical analyses of some metals to plot the metal profile of these potential reference areas and define basal levels of these metals in the soils. After examining the mutagenicity of the inorganic extracts using strains TA98, TA97a, and TA100, in the presence and absence of S9 mix, we indicated the São Jerônimo reference and the Itapuã reference as two sites that could be used in future studies of mutagenicity of soils in southern Brazil. The association between a mutagenicity bioassay and the "Ambient Background Concentration" seems to be a useful method to indicate the reference areas in studies of contamination by environmental mutagens, where these results were corroborated by canonical correspondence analysis.

Lochner redeemed: family privacy after Troxel and Carhart.

At least since its 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme Court has differentiated its review of abortion laws from its scrutiny of other intrusions on family privacy. Whereas abortion restrictions are reviewed under the middling "undue burden" standard, incursions on other family-related liberties, including marriage, kinship, and child rearing are said to be subject to the strict scrutiny ordinarily employed in the defense of fundamental rights. This Article contends that the Court's most recent decisions in this context give reason to reconsider both sides of that equation. Stenberg v. Carhart, striking down Nebraska's ban on "partial-birth" abortions, suggests that the Court's scrutiny in the abortion context will be more aggressive and rigid than most had supposed. At the same time, its decision in Troxel v. Granville, limiting states' authority to order grandparent visitation over the objects of a parent, suggest that there is more fluidity in the Court's review of other family liberties than is conventionally assumed. Together the cases signal a convergence in both sorts of family-privacy controversies toward a common standard of "reasonableness." That standard bears, for many, an uncomfortable association with the much-maligned "natural law-due process formula" of the Lochner era, but Professor Meyer argues that it is precisely the right approach in the context of family privacy. Although more rigid doctrinal formulae are sometimes preferred on the ground that they constrain judicial judgment, here they are undesirable precisely because they obscure the value judgments that are inevitably at the core of every family-privacy decision.