Metamotivational beliefs about intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.

Although intrinsic motivation is often viewed as preferable to more extrinsic forms of motivation, there is evidence that the adaptiveness of these motivational states depends on the nature of the task being completed (e.g., Cerasoli et al., 2014). Specifically, research suggests task-motivation fit such that intrinsic motivation tends to benefit performance on open-ended tasks (tasks that involve qualitative performance assessment; e.g., creative writing) and extrinsic motivation benefits performance on closed-ended tasks (tasks that involve quantitative performance assessment; e.g., multiple choice). We examined people's metamotivational beliefs about intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in the context of this task-motivation fit. Across 11 studies (seven primary, four supplemental; N = 3,544), participants provided beliefs about the utility of different types of motivation-regulation strategies: strategies that enhance one's interest and enjoyment in a task versus strategies that focus on the value associated with task outcomes (self-relevance strategies and reward strategies). Across all studies, participants recognized that the adaptiveness of these strategies depends on the nature of the task being completed. Consistent with an understanding of normative task-motivation fit, participants generally reported that interest-enhancing strategies were more useful for open-ended tasks and that reward strategies were more useful for closed-ended tasks; however, in some studies, participants reported that reward strategies were equally useful across task types (Studies 2, 3, and 5). More normatively accurate beliefs were associated with more normatively accurate consequential behavioral choices (Study 6) and better task performance (Study 7). We discuss the implications of these results for theories of motivation and self-regulation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Corrigendum: The relationship between metamotivational knowledge and performance.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1124171.].

The relationship between metamotivational knowledge and performance.

Self-regulation research highlights the performance trade-offs of different motivational states. For instance, within the context of regulatory focus theory, promotion motivation enhances performance on eager tasks and prevention motivation enhances performance on vigilant tasks (i.e., regulatory focus task-motivation fit). Work on metamotivation-people's understanding and regulation of their motivational states-reveals that, on average, people demonstrate knowledge of how to create such task-motivation fit; at the same time, there is substantial variability in this normative accuracy. The present research examines whether having accurate normative metamotivational knowledge predicts performance. Results revealed that more accurate metamotivational knowledge predicts better performance on brief, single-shot tasks (Study 1) and in a consequential setting (course grades; Study 2). The effect was more robust in Study 2; potential implications of this variability are discussed for understanding when and why knowledge may be associated with performance.

A Cross-Cultural Investigation of Metamotivational Beliefs About Regulatory Focus Task-Motivation Fit.

Recent metamotivation research revealed that Westerners recognize that promotion versus prevention motivations benefit performance on eager versus vigilant tasks, respectively; that is, they know how to create task-motivation fit with respect to regulatory focus. Westerners also believe that, across tasks, promotion is more beneficial than prevention (i.e., a promotion bias). Adopting a cross-cultural approach, we examined whether beliefs about task-motivation fit generalize across cultures, whether Easterners exhibit a contrasting prevention bias, and the role of independence/interdependence in these beliefs. Results revealed cross-cultural similarities in metamotivational beliefs. Moreover, Easterners and Westerners alike often exhibited a promotion bias, suggesting that this effect may not be shaped by culture. One potential cultural difference did emerge: Easterners appeared to recognize how to create task-motivation fit for both independent and interdependent outcomes, whereas Westerners only recognized how to do so for independent outcomes. We discuss the role of culture in shaping metamotivation.

Metamotivational knowledge of the role of high-level and low-level construal in goal-relevant task performance.

Metamotivation research suggests that people may be able to modulate their motivational states strategically to secure desired outcomes (Scholer & Miele, 2016). To regulate one's motivational states effectively, one must at minimum understand (a) which states are more or less beneficial for a given task and (b) how to instantiate these states. In the current article, we examine to what extent people understand the self-regulatory benefits of high-level versus low-level construal (i.e., motivational orientations toward abstract and essential vs. concrete and idiosyncratic features). Seven experiments revealed that participants can distinguish tasks that entail high-level versus low-level construal. Further, participants recognized the usefulness of preparatory exercises with which to instantiate high-level versus low-level construal for task performance, and this knowledge predicted behavioral choices. This research highlights novel insights that the metamotivational approach offers to research on construal level theory and, more broadly, to the study of self-regulation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

College Students' Evaluations and Reasoning About Exclusion of Students with Autism and Learning Disability: Context and Goals may Matter More than Contact.

This study used mixed-effects logistic regression to examine undergraduates' (N = 142) evaluations and reasoning about scenarios involving disability-based exclusion. Scenarios varied by disability [autism spectrum disorder (ASD) versus learning disability (LD)], the context of exclusion (classroom versus social), and whether or not a grade was at stake. Participants were more likely to determine exclusion was acceptable if the excluded student had an ASD diagnosis, there was a grade at stake, and it occurred in a classroom. Exclusion was less likely to be considered acceptable in the "no grade" compared to the "grade" conditions for LD students, but remained high in both conditions for autistic students. This study also describes contextual variations in participants' justifications for their evaluations.

Hitting a high note on math tests: Remembered success influences test preferences.

Remembered utility is the retrospective evaluation about the pleasure and pain associated with a past experience. It can influence choices about repeating or avoiding similar situations in the future (Kahneman, 2000). A set of 5 experiments explored the remembered utility of effortful test episodes and how it impacted future test choices. Experiments 1-3 mimicked Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, and Redelmeier's (1993) cold pressor study, but used a challenging test experience in place of submerging one's hand in painfully cold ice water. Participants took a short and an extended test of difficult math problems. The short test was made of 30 difficult math problems. The extended test used 30 difficult problems plus 10 moderately difficult problems. Participants made retrospective evaluations about the tests and chose which kind of test (short or extended) they wanted for their next test and for a hypothetical test 1 day later. Results showed that a challenging test episode extended by a more moderate interval was preferred to an unextended interval. Future test choices reflected this preference. This pattern was evidenced even when points were awarded only to correctly answered difficult items but not to moderately answered difficult items. Experiment 4 directly compared preferences for a moderate end versus a moderate start test, and Experiment 5 contrasted those test conditions with a moderate middle test condition. The findings demonstrated test-takers' bias in favor of test experiences that start or end on a high note. (PsycINFO Database Record

The cognitive antecedents and motivational consequences of the feeling of being in the zone.

The feeling of being in the zone (related to "flow") is marked by an elevated yet effortless sense of concentration. Prior research suggests that feelings of being in the zone are strongest when the demand posed by a task matches one's level of ability (i.e., the balance hypothesis). In the present article, we tested this hypothesis using a novel experimental paradigm. By collecting numerous zone judgments for each participant, we were able to examine intra-individual sources of variance that explain why people often feel more or less in-the-zone on the same task from one moment to the next. The results of two experiments provide support for what we have termed the balance-plus hypothesis, which posits that zone experiences are strongest (Experiments 1-2) and have the greatest motivational force (Experiment 2) when the balance between task demand and ability is accompanied by positive assessments of one's own performance.

Children's naive theories of intelligence influence their metacognitive judgments.

Recent studies have shown that the metacognitive judgments adults infer from their experiences of encoding effort vary in accordance with their naive theories of intelligence. To determine whether this finding extends to elementary schoolchildren, a study was conducted in which 27 third graders (M(age) = 8.27) and 24 fifth graders (M(age) = 10.39) read texts presented in easy- or difficult-to-encode fonts. The more children in both grades viewed intelligence as fixed, the less likely they were to interpret effortful or difficult encoding as a sign of increasing mastery and the more likely they were to report lower levels of comprehension as their perceived effort increased. This suggests that children may use naive theories of intelligence to make motivationally relevant inferences earlier than previously thought.

Metacognition of agency: proximal action and distal outcome.

The cues contributing to people's metacognitions of agency were investigated in two experiments in which people played a computer game that involved trying to "touch", via a mouse moving a cursor, downward scrolling X's (Experiment 1), or trying to "explode" the downward scrolling X's (Experiment 2). Both experiments varied (a) proximal action-related information by either introducing or not introducing Turbulence into the mouse controls and (b) distal outcome-related information such that touched X's "exploded" either 100 or 75 % of the time. Both variables affected people's judgments of agency (JOAs), but the effect was different. First, the decrement in feelings of agency was greater with the proximal variable than with distal variable. Second, while the proximal variable always had a large direct effect on JOAs, even taking judgments of performance (JOPs) into account, JOPs completely accounted for the effect of the distal variable in Experiment 1, where the instructions were just to touch the X's. And even in Experiment 2, in which the instructions were to explode the X's, the direct effect of the distal variable on JOAs was small. These data indicate that these two cues exhibit different psychological profiles. The proximal action-related information is a diagnostic cue to agency indicating the match between one's own intentions and actions. Internal monitoring of intentions is necessary and so the self is implicated. However, distal outcome can be largely monitored using information external to the agent, and so-while it is used by people to make agency judgments-it is a non-diagnostic cue.

Dissociating neural correlates of action monitoring and metacognition of agency.

Judgments of agency refer to people's self-reflective assessments concerning their own control: their assessments of the extent to which they themselves are responsible for an action. These self-reflective metacognitive judgments can be distinguished from action monitoring, which involves the detection of the divergence (or lack of divergence) between observed states and expected states. Presumably, people form judgments of agency by metacognitively reflecting on the output of their action monitoring and then consciously inferring the extent to which they caused the action in question. Although a number of previous imaging studies have been directed at action monitoring, none have assessed judgments of agency as a potentially separate process. The present fMRI study used an agency paradigm that not only allowed us to examine the brain activity associated with action monitoring but that also enabled us to investigate those regions associated with metacognition of agency. Regarding action monitoring, we found that being "out of control" during the task (i.e., detection of a discrepancy between observed and expected states) was associated with increased brain activity in the right TPJ, whereas being "in control" was associated with increased activity in the pre-SMA, rostral cingulate zone, and dorsal striatum (regions linked to self-initiated action). In contrast, when participants made self-reflective metacognitive judgments about the extent of their own control (i.e., judgments of agency) compared with when they made judgments that were not about control (i.e., judgments of performance), increased activity was observed in the anterior PFC, a region associated with self-reflective processing. These results indicate that action monitoring is dissociable from people's conscious self-attributions of control.

Does easily learned mean easily remembered?: it depends on your beliefs about intelligence.

Because numerous studies have shown that feelings of encoding fluency are positively correlated with judgments of learning, a single dominant heuristic, easily learned = easily remembered (ELER), has been posited to explain how people interpret encoding fluency when assessing their own memory. However, the inferences people draw from feelings of encoding fluency may vary with their beliefs about why information is easy or effortful to encode. We conducted two experiments in which participants studied word lists and then predicted their future recall of those items. Results revealed that subjects who viewed intelligence as fixed, and who tended to interpret effortful encoding as indicating that they had reached the limits of their ability, used the ELER heuristic to make judgments of learning. However, subjects who viewed intelligence as malleable, and who tended to interpret effortful encoding as indicating greater engagement in learning, did not use the ELER heuristic and at times predicted greater memory for items that they found more effortful to learn.

Naive theories of intelligence and the role of processing fluency in perceived comprehension.

Previous research overwhelmingly suggests that feelings of ease people experience while processing information lead them to infer that their comprehension is high, whereas feelings of difficulty lead them to infer that their comprehension is low. However, the inferences people draw from their experiences of processing fluency should also vary in accordance with their naive theories about why new information might be easy or difficult to process. Five experiments that involved reading novel texts showed that participants who view intelligence as a fixed attribute, and who tend to interpret experiences of processing difficulty as an indication that they are reaching the limits of their ability, reported lower levels of comprehension as fluency decreased. In contrast, participants who view intelligence as a malleable attribute that develops through effort, and who do not tend to interpret experiences of processing difficulty as pertaining to some innate ability, did not report lower levels of comprehension as fluency decreased. In fact, when these participants were particularly likely to view effort as leading to increased mastery, decreases in fluency led them to report higher levels of comprehension.

Motivated comprehension regulation: vigilant versus eager metacognitive control.

The more accurately people assess their comprehension, the more likely they are to engage in study behaviors that precisely target gaps in their learning. However, comprehension regulation involves more than knowing when to implement a new study strategy; it also involves deciding which strategy will most effectively resolve one's confusion. In two experiments, we explored how people's motivational orientations influence which study strategies they select to regulate their comprehension. In Experiment 1, people who were motivated to vigilantly protect against potential mistakes (i.e., prevention-focused individuals) were more likely to adopt a rereading strategy than people who were motivated to eagerly pursue new learning opportunities (i.e., promotion-focused individuals). In Experiment 2, this difference in strategy use emerged specifically in response to confusing sentences that had been inserted into the text. Furthermore, by using rereading strategies to resolve their confusion, prevention-focused individuals performed better than promotion-focused individuals on a comprehension test and a transfer task.