Action slips in food choices: A measure of habits and goal-directed control.

We report a new, simple instrumental action-slip task, which sets goal-directed action against putative S-R associations. On each training trial, participants were presented with one of two stimuli (blue or green coloured screen). One stimulus (S1) signalled that one joystick response (R1-left or right push) would earn one of two rewards (O1-jellybeans or Pringles points). A second stimulus (S2) signalled a different instrumental relationship (S2:R2-O2). On each test trial, participants were told which outcome could be earnt (O1/O2) on that trial. They were required to withhold responding until the screen changed colour to S1 or S2. On congruent test trials, the stimulus presented (e.g., S1) was associated with the same response (R1) as the outcome available on that trial (O1). On incongruent test trials, in contrast, the outcome (e.g., O1) preceded a stimulus that was associated with a different response (e.g., S2). Hence, in order to obtain the outcome (O1) on incongruent trials, participants were required to suppress any tendency they might have to make the response associated with the stimulus (R2 in response to S2). In two experiments, participants made more errors on incongruent than congruent trials. This result suggests that, on incongruent trials, the stimulus drove responding (e.g., S2 increased R2 responding) in a manner that was inconsistent with goal-directed action (e.g., R1 responding to obtain O1)-an action slip. The results are discussed in terms of popular dual-process theories of instrumental action and a single-process alternative.

Pre-testing effects are target-specific and are not driven by a generalised state of curiosity.

Guessing an answer to an unfamiliar question prior to seeing the answer leads to better memory than studying alone (the pre-testing effect), which some theories attribute to increased curiosity. A similar effect occurs in general knowledge learning: people are more likely to recall information that they were initially curious to learn. Gruber and Ranganath [(2019). How curiosity enhances hippocampus-dependent memory: The prediction, appraisal, curiosity, and exploration (PACE) framework. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 23(12), 1014-1025] argued that unanswered questions can cause a state of curiosity during which encoding is enhanced for the missing answer, but also for incidental information presented at the time. If pre-testing similarly induces curiosity, then it too should produce better memory for incidental information. We tested this idea in three experiments that varied the order, nature and timing of the incidental material presented within a pre-testing context. All three experiments demonstrated a reliable pre-testing effect for the targets, but no benefit for the incidental material presented before the target. This pattern suggests that the pre-testing effect is highly specific and is not consistent with a generalised state of curiosity.

Theory protection: Do humans protect existing associative links?

Theories of associative learning often propose that learning is proportional to prediction error, or the difference between expected events and those that occur. Spicer et al. (2020) suggested an alternative, that humans might instead selectively attribute surprising outcomes to cues that they are not confident about, to maintain cue-outcome associations about which they are more confident. Spicer et al. reported three predictive learning experiments, the results of which were consistent with their proposal ("theory protection") rather than a prediction error account (Rescorla, 2001). The four experiments reported here further test theory protection against a prediction error account. Experiments 3 and 4 also test the proposals of Holmes et al. (2019), who suggested a function mapping learning to performance that can explain Spicer et al.'s results using a prediction-error framework. In contrast to the previous study, these experiments were based on inhibition rather than excitation. Participants were trained with a set of cues (represented by letters), each of which was followed by the presence or absence of an outcome (represented by + or -). Following this, a cue that previously caused the outcome (A+) was placed in compound with another cue (B) with an ambiguous causal status (e.g., a novel cue in Experiment 1). This compound (AB-) did not cause the outcome. Participants always learned more about B in the second training phase, despite A always having the greater prediction error. In Experiments 3 and 4, a cue with no apparent prediction error was learned about more than a cue with a large prediction error. Experiment 4 tested participants' relative confidence about the causal status of cues A and B prior to the AB- stage, producing findings that are consistent with theory protection and inconsistent with the predictions of Rescorla, and Holmes et al. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The benefits of impossible tests: Assessing the role of error-correction in the pretesting effect.

Relative to studying alone, guessing the meanings of unknown words can improve later recognition of their meanings, even if those guesses were incorrect - the pretesting effect (PTE). The error-correction hypothesis suggests that incorrect guesses produce error signals that promote memory for the meanings when they are revealed. The current research sought to test the error-correction explanation of the PTE. In three experiments, participants studied unfamiliar Finnish-English word pairs by either studying each complete pair or by guessing the English translation before its presentation. In the latter case, the participants also guessed which of two categories the word belonged to. Hence, guesses from the correct category were semantically closer to the true translation than guesses from the incorrect category. In Experiment 1, guessing increased subsequent recognition of the English translations, especially for translations that were presented on trials in which the participants' guesses were from the correct category. Experiment 2 replicated these target recognition effects while also demonstrating that they do not extend to associative recognition performance. Experiment 3 again replicated the target recognition pattern, while also examining participants' metacognitive recognition judgments. Participants correctly judged that their memory would be better after small than after large errors, but incorrectly believed that making any errors would be detrimental, relative to study-only. Overall, the data are inconsistent with the error-correction hypothesis; small, within-category errors produced better recognition than large, cross-category errors. Alternative theories, based on elaborative encoding and motivated learning, are considered.

Pretesting boosts item but not source memory.

Two experiments examined the effect of pretesting on target recognition and source memory. In an initial encoding phase, participants attempted to learn the common English definitions of rare English words. For each rare word, the participants either guessed the definition of the rare English word before it was revealed (Pretest condition) or just studied the complete word pair without first guessing the definition (Read-only condition). To manipulate source information, the targets were either presented in different colours (Experiment 1) or lists (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the participants correctly recognised more targets from Pretest trials than Read-only trials, but showed no difference in source memory. Pretesting, therefore, appears to improve target recognition memory, but not memory for contextual information. The results are discussed in relation to semantic and episodic theories of the pretesting effect.

Similarities and differences: Comment on Chan et al. (2021).

Spicer et al. (2020) reported a series of causal learning experiments in which participants appeared to learn most readily about cues when they were not certain of their causal status and proposed that their results were a consequence of participants' use of theory protection. In the present issue, Chan et al. (2021) present an alternative view, using a modification of Rescorla and Wagner's (1972) influential model of learning. Although the explanation offered by Chan et al. appears very different from that suggested by Spicer et al., there are conceptual commonalities. Here we briefly discuss the similarities and differences of the 2 approaches and agree with Chan et al.'s proposal that the best way to advance the debate will be to test situations in which the 2 theories make differing predictions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Toward High Selectivity Aniline Synthesis Catalysis at Elevated Temperatures.

In connection with an initiative to enhance heat recovery from the large-scale operation of a heterogeneously catalyzed nitrobenzene hydrogenation process to produce aniline, it is necessary to operate the process at elevated temperatures (>100 °C), a condition that can compromise aniline selectivity. Alumina-supported palladium catalysts are selected as candidate materials that can provide sustained aniline yields at elevated temperatures. Two Pd/Al2O3 catalysts are examined that possess comparable mean Pd particle sizes (∼5 nm) for different Pd loading: 5 wt % Pd/Al2O3 and 0.3 wt % Pd/Al2O3. The higher Pd loading sample represents a reference catalyst for which the Pd crystallite morphology has previously been established. The lower Pd loading technical catalyst more closely corresponds to industrial specifications. The morphology of the Pd crystallites of the 0.3 wt % Pd/Al2O3 sample is explored by means of temperature-programmed infrared spectroscopy of chemisorbed CO. Reaction testing over the range of 60-180 °C shows effectively complete nitrobenzene conversion for both catalysts but with distinction in their selectivity profiles. The low loading catalyst is favored as it maximizes aniline selectivity and avoids the formation of overhydrogenated products. A plot of aniline yield as a function of WHSV for the 0.3 wt % Pd/Al2O3 catalyst at 100 °C yields a "volcano" like curve, indicating aniline selectivity to be sensitive to residence time. These observations are brought together to provide an indication of an aniline synthesis catalyst specification suited to a unit operation equipped for enhanced heat transfer.

Pretesting boosts recognition, but not cued recall, of targets from unrelated word pairs.

Attempting to retrieve the answer to a question on an initial test can improve memory for that answer on a subsequent test, relative to an equivalent study period. Such retrieval attempts can be beneficial even when they are unsuccessful, although this benefit is usually only seen with related word pairs. Three experiments examined the effects of pretesting for both related (e.g., pond-frog) and unrelated (e.g., pillow-leaf) word pairs on cued recall and target recognition. Pretesting improved subsequent cued recall performance for related but not for unrelated word pairs, relative to simply studying the word pairs. Tests of target recognition, by contrast, revealed benefits of pretesting for memory of targets from both related and unrelated word pairs. These data challenge popular theories that suggest that the pretesting effect depends on partial activation of the target during the pretesting phase.

Human appetitive Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer: a goal-directed account.

Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (PIT) tasks assess the impact of environmental stimuli on instrumental actions. Since their initial translation from animal to human experiments, PIT tasks have provided insight into the mechanisms that underlie reward-based behaviour. This review first examines the main types of PIT tasks used in humans. We then seek to contribute to the current debate as to whether human PIT effects reflect a controlled, goal-directed process, or a more automatic, non-goal-directed mechanism. We argue that the data favour a goal-directed process. The extent to which the major theories of PIT can account for these data is then explored. We discuss a number of associative accounts of PIT as well as dual-process versions of these theories. Ultimately, however, we favour a propositional account, in which human PIT effects are suggested to be driven by both perceived outcome availability and outcome value. In the final section of the review, we present the potential objections to the propositional approach that we anticipate from advocates of associative link theories and our response to them. We also identify areas for future research.

Theory protection in associative learning: Humans maintain certain beliefs in a manner that violates prediction error.

Three experiments were conducted to investigate a possible role for certainty in human causal learning. In these experiments, human participants were initially trained with a set of cues, each of which was followed by the presence or absence of an outcome. In a subsequent training stage, 2 of these cues were trained in a causal compound, and the change in associative strength for each of the cues was compared, using a procedure based on Rescorla (2001). In each experiment, the cues differed in both their causal certainty (on the part of participants) and size of their prediction error (with respect to the outcome). The cue with the larger prediction error was always the cue with the more certain causal status. According to established prediction error models (Bush & Mosteller, 1951; Rescorla, 2001; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), a larger prediction error should result in a greater updating of associative strength. However, the opposite was observed, as participants always learned more about the cue with the smaller prediction error. A plausible explanation is that participants engaged in a form of theory protection, in which they were resistant to updating their existing beliefs about cues with a certain causal status. Instead, participants appeared to attribute outcomes to cues with a comparatively uncertain causal status, in an apparent violation of prediction error. The potential role of attentional processes (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980) in explaining these results is also discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Selective effects of errorful generation on recognition memory: the role of motivation and surprise.

The current research examined the effects of errorful generation on memory, focusing particularly on the roles of motivation and surprise. In two experiments, participants were first presented with photographs of faces and were asked to associate four facts with each photograph. On Generate trials, the participants guessed two of the facts (Guess targets) before those correct facts, and another two correct facts (Study targets), were revealed. On the remaining Read trials, all four facts were presented without a guessing stage. In Experiment 1, participants also ranked their motivation to know the answers before they were revealed, or their surprise on learning the true answers. Guess targets were subsequently better recognised than the concurrently presented, non-guessed Study targets. Guess targets were also better recognised than Read targets, and recognition of Study and Read targets did not differ. Errorful generation also increased self-reported motivation, but not surprise. Experiment 2 showed that the results of Experiment 1 can outlive a 20-minute delay, and that they generalise to a more challenging recognition test. Together, the results suggest that errorful generation improves memory specifically for the guessed fact, and this may be linked to an increase in motivation to learn that fact.

Goal-directed control in Pavlovian-instrumental transfer.

The current article concerns human outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT), where Pavlovian cues selectively invigorate instrumental responses that predict common rewarding outcomes. Several recent experiments have observed PIT effects that were insensitive to outcome devaluation manipulations, which has been taken as evidence of an automatic "associative" mechanism. Other similar studies observed PIT effects that were sensitive to devaluation, which suggests a more controlled, goal-directed process. Studies supporting the automatic approach have been criticized for using a biased baseline, whereas studies supporting the goal-directed approach have been criticized for priming multiple outcomes at test. The current experiment addressed both of these issues. Participants first learned to perform two instrumental responses to earn two outcomes each (R1-O1/O3, R2-O2/O4), before four Pavlovian stimuli (S1-S4) were trained to predict each outcome. One outcome that was paired with each instrumental response (O3 and O4) was then devalued, so that baseline response choice at test would be balanced. Instrumental responding was then assessed in the presence of each individual Pavlovian stimulus, so that only one outcome was primed per trial. PIT effects were observed for the valued outcomes (ts > 3.96, ps < .001) but not for the devalued outcomes (F < 1, Bayes Factor10 = .29). Hence, when baseline response choice was equated and only one outcome was primed per test trial, PIT was sensitive to outcome devaluation. The data therefore support goal-directed models of PIT. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Uncertainty and blocking in human causal learning.

The blocking phenomenon is one of the most enduring issues in the study of learning. Numerous explanations have been proposed, which fall into two main categories. An associative analysis states that, following A+/AX+ training, Cue A prevents an associative link from forming between X and the outcome. In contrast, an inferential explanation is that A+/AX+ training does not permit an inference that X causes the outcome. More specifically, the trials on which X is presented (AX+) are often argued to be uninformative with respect to the causal status of X because the outcome would have resulted on AX trials whether X was causal or not. If participants are uncertain about X, their ratings on test might be particularly sensitive to the overall base rate of the outcome. That is, a blocked cue, about which one is uncertain, should be rated as a more likely cause when most cues lead to the outcome than when most cues do not. This hypothesis was supported in 2 experiments. Experiment 1 used an overshadowing control and Experiment 2 used an uncorrelated control (to demonstrate a redundancy effect). Variations in the ratings of the blocked cue as a result of manipulating the outcome base rate can be explained if participants are uncertain about the status of the blocked cue. Experiment 3 showed that participants are uncertain about blocked cues by using a direct self-report measure of certainty. These data are consistent with the inferential account, but are more challenging for the associative analysis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Automaticity and cognitive control: Effects of cognitive load on cue-controlled reward choice.

The extent to which human outcome-response (O-R) priming effects are automatic or under cognitive control is currently unclear. Two experiments tested the effect of cognitive load on O-R priming to shed further light on the debate. In Experiment 1, two instrumental responses earned beer and chocolate points in an instrumental training phase. Instrumental response choice was then tested in the presence of beer, chocolate, and neutral stimuli. On test, a Reversal instruction group was told that the stimuli signalled which response would not be rewarded. The transfer test was also conducted under either minimal (No Load) or considerable (Load) cognitive load. The Non-Reversal groups showed O-R priming effects, where the reward cues increased the instrumental responses that had previously produced those outcomes, relative to the neutral stimulus. This effect was observed even under cognitive load. The Reversal No Load group demonstrated a reversed effect, where response choice was biased towards the response that was most likely to be rewarded according to the instruction. Most importantly, response choice was at chance in the Reversal Load condition. In Experiment 2, cognitive load abolished the sensitivity to outcome devaluation that was otherwise seen when multiple outcomes and responses were cued on test. Collectively, the results demonstrate that complex O-R priming effects are sensitive to cognitive load, whereas the very simple, standard O-R priming effect is more robust.

Radiation risk amongst orthopaedic surgeons - Do we know the risk?

Radiation risk amongst orthopaedic surgeons and theatre personnel is increasing with increased use of fluoroscopy imaging. Increased radiation risk has been shown to be associated with an increased risk of malignancies, ocular and thyroid disorders. Very high exposures have been reported in spinal surgery and during intra-medullary nailing. With an increase in modern and percutaneous methods, the use of intra-operative fluoroscopy has increased as well. The aim of this article was to review the available evidence of radiation risk amongst healthcare personnel. A systematic search was carried out in PubMED, CINAHL and Cochrane on intra-operative radiation in trauma and orthopaedic operating room. Inclusion criteria were clinical studies and systematic reviews reporting on radiation exposure, fluoroscopy time and references to specific safety guidelines. This article highlights the safety aspects of radiation protection and harmful effects of radiation during orthopaedic procedures. The responsibility to minimise radiation exposure in operating theatre lies with the team within the operating room.

Extinguishing cue-controlled reward choice: Effects of Pavlovian extinction on outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer.

Outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) refers to the finding that presenting Pavlovian predictors of outcomes can enhance the vigor of instrumental responding for those same outcomes. Three experiments examined the sensitivity of outcome-selective PIT to Pavlovian (stimulus-outcome) extinction. In Experiment 1, participants first learnt to perform different instrumental responses to earn different outcomes. In a separate Pavlovian training phase, certain stimuli were established as Pavlovian signals of the different outcomes. Some of these Pavlovian stimuli were then extinguished (they were presented alone, without any outcome), while others were not. A final transfer test measured the extent to which these Pavlovian cues biased instrumental response choice. Consistent with previous work, the observed PIT effects were immune to Pavlovian extinction; the non-extinguished and extinguished cues produced PIT effects that did not significantly differ in size. In Experiment 2, response choice was tested in the presence of compound stimuli that included both extinguished and non-extinguished cues. Response choice was highly sensitive to the extinction manipulation under these circumstances. Experiment 3 tested whether this sensitivity to Pavlovian extinction was a direct effect of the associative strength of the Pavlovian cues present, or an indirect effect of cue salience. The results provide unique evidence to suggest that PIT is a direct consequence of the strength of the Pavlovian associations. (PsycINFO Database Record

Evidence of a goal-directed process in human Pavlovian-instrumental transfer.

Cues that signal rewards can motivate reward-seeking behaviors, even for outcomes that are not currently desired. Three experiments examined this phenomenon, using an outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) design and an outcome devaluation procedure. In Experiment 1, participants learned to perform one response to earn crisps points and another response to earn popcorn points. One outcome was then devalued by adulterating it to make it taste unpleasant. On test, overall response choice was biased toward the outcome that had not been devalued, indicating goal-directed control. Stimuli that signaled crisps and popcorn also biased instrumental response choice toward their respective outcomes (a PIT effect). Most importantly, the strength of this bias was not influenced by the devaluation manipulation. In contrast, Experiment 2 demonstrated that when stimuli signaled equal probability of the two outcomes, cue-elicited response choice was sensitive to the devaluation manipulation. Experiment 3 confirmed this conclusion by demonstrating a selective avoidance of the cued, devalued outcome. Together, these data support a goal-directed model of PIT in which expected outcome probability and value make independent contributions to response choice. (PsycINFO Database Record

Attention and associative learning in humans: An integrative review.

This article presents a comprehensive survey of research concerning interactions between associative learning and attention in humans. Four main findings are described. First, attention is biased toward stimuli that predict their consequences reliably (learned predictiveness). This finding is consistent with the approach taken by Mackintosh (1975) in his attentional model of associative learning in nonhuman animals. Second, the strength of this attentional bias is modulated by the value of the outcome (learned value). That is, predictors of high-value outcomes receive especially high levels of attention. Third, the related but opposing idea that uncertainty may result in increased attention to stimuli (Pearce & Hall, 1980), receives less support. This suggests that hybrid models of associative learning, incorporating the mechanisms of both the Mackintosh and Pearce-Hall theories, may not be required to explain data from human participants. Rather, a simpler model, in which attention to stimuli is determined by how strongly they are associated with significant outcomes, goes a long way to account for the data on human attentional learning. The last main finding, and an exciting area for future research and theorizing, is that learned predictiveness and learned value modulate both deliberate attentional focus, and more automatic attentional capture. The automatic influence of learning on attention does not appear to fit the traditional view of attention as being either goal-directed or stimulus-driven. Rather, it suggests a new kind of "derived" attention.

Multiple context mere exposure: Examining the limits of liking.

Recent evidence suggests that increased liking of exposed stimuli-a phenomenon known as the mere exposure effect-is dependent on experiencing the stimuli in the same context at exposure and test. Three experiments extended this work by examining the effect of presenting target stimuli in single and multiple exposure contexts. Target face stimuli were repeatedly paired with nonsense words, which took the role of contexts, across exposure. On test, the mere exposure effect was found only when the target face stimuli were presented with nonsense word cues (contexts) with which they had been repeatedly paired. The mere exposure effect was eliminated when exposure to target face stimuli with the nonsense word cues (contexts) was minimal, despite the overall number of exposures to the target face being equated across single- and multiple-context exposure conditions. The results suggest that familiarity of the relationship between stimuli and their context, not simply familiarity of the stimuli themselves, leads to liking. The finding supports a broader framework, which suggests that liking is partly a function of the consistency between past and present experiences with a target stimulus.

The propositional basis of cue-controlled reward seeking.

Two experiments examined the role of propositional and automatic (ideomotor) processes in cue-elicited responding for rewarding outcomes (beer and chocolate). In a training phase, participants earned either chocolate or beer points by making one of two button-press responses. Rewards were indicated by the presentation of chocolate and beer pictures. On test, each trial began with a picture of beer or chocolate, or a blank screen, and choice of the beer versus chocolate response was assessed in the presence of these three pictures. Participants tended to choose the beer and chocolate response in the presence of the beer and chocolate pictures, respectively. In Experiment 1, instructions signalling that the pictures did not indicate which response would be rewarded significantly reduced the priming effect. In Experiment 2, instructions indicating that the pictures signified which response would not be rewarded resulted in a reversed priming effect. Finally, in both experiments, the priming effect correlated with self-reported beliefs that the cues signalled which response was more likely to be reinforced. These results suggest that cue-elicited response selection is mediated by a propositional belief regarding the efficacy of the response-outcome relationship, rather than an automatic ideomotor mechanism.