Many potential pathways to future pandemic influenza.

Although influenza A viruses have caused pandemics for centuries, future pandemics cannot be predicted with our current understanding and resources. Concern about an H5N1 avian influenza pandemic has caused alarm since 1997, but there are many other possible routes to pandemic influenza.

Genetic sequencing of a 1944 Rocky Mountain spotted fever vaccine.

Rocky Mountain spotted fever (RMSF) is a rapidly progressive and often fatal tick-borne disease caused by Rickettsia rickettsii. Its discovery and characterization by Howard Ricketts has been hailed as a remarkable historical example of detection and control of an emerging infectious disease, and subsequently led to the establishment of the Rocky Mountain Laboratories (RML). Here, we examined an unopened bottle of a vaccine, labeled as containing RMSF inactivated by phenol-formalin of infected ticks, developed prior to 1944 at RML by DNA analysis using Illumina high throughput sequencing technology. We found that it contains DNA from the Rocky Mountain wood tick (Dermacentor andersoni), the vector of RMSF, the complete genome of Rickettsia rickettsii, the pathogen of RMSF, as well as the complete genome of Coxiella burnetii, the pathogen of Q-fever. In addition to genomic reads of Rickettsia rickettsii and Coxiella burnetii, smaller percentages of the reads are from Rickettsia rhipicephali and Arsenophonus nasoniae, suggesting that the infected ticks used to prepare the vaccine carried more than one pathogen. Together, these findings suggest that this early vaccine was likely a bivalent vaccine for RMSF and Q-fever. This study is the among the first molecular level examinations of an historically important vaccine.

Rethinking next-generation vaccines for coronaviruses, influenzaviruses, and other respiratory viruses.

Viruses that replicate in the human respiratory mucosa without infecting systemically, including influenza A, SARS-CoV-2, endemic coronaviruses, RSV, and many other "common cold" viruses, cause significant mortality and morbidity and are important public health concerns. Because these viruses generally do not elicit complete and durable protective immunity by themselves, they have not to date been effectively controlled by licensed or experimental vaccines. In this review, we examine challenges that have impeded development of effective mucosal respiratory vaccines, emphasizing that all of these viruses replicate extremely rapidly in the surface epithelium and are quickly transmitted to other hosts, within a narrow window of time before adaptive immune responses are fully marshaled. We discuss possible approaches to developing next-generation vaccines against these viruses, in consideration of several variables such as vaccine antigen configuration, dose and adjuventation, route and timing of vaccination, vaccine boosting, adjunctive therapies, and options for public health vaccination polices.

An inactivated multivalent influenza A virus vaccine is broadly protective in mice and ferrets.

Influenza A viruses (IAVs) present major public health threats from annual seasonal epidemics and pandemics and from viruses adapted to a variety of animals including poultry, pigs, and horses. Vaccines that broadly protect against all such IAVs, so-called "universal" influenza vaccines, do not currently exist but are urgently needed. Here, we demonstrated that an inactivated, multivalent whole-virus vaccine, delivered intramuscularly or intranasally, was broadly protective against challenges with multiple IAV hemagglutinin and neuraminidase subtypes in both mice and ferrets. The vaccine is composed of four ß-propiolactone-inactivated low-pathogenicity avian IAV subtypes of H1N9, H3N8, H5N1, and H7N3. Vaccinated mice and ferrets demonstrated substantial protection against a variety of IAVs, including the 1918 H1N1 strain, the highly pathogenic avian H5N8 strain, and H7N9. We also observed protection against challenge with antigenically variable and heterosubtypic avian, swine, and human viruses. Compared to control animals, vaccinated mice and ferrets demonstrated marked reductions in viral titers, lung pathology, and host inflammatory responses. This vaccine approach indicates the feasibility of eliciting broad, heterosubtypic IAV protection and identifies a promising candidate for influenza vaccine clinical development.

Archival influenza virus genomes from Europe reveal genomic variability during the 1918 pandemic.

The 1918 influenza pandemic was the deadliest respiratory pandemic of the 20th century and determined the genomic make-up of subsequent human influenza A viruses (IAV). Here, we analyze both the first 1918 IAV genomes from Europe and the first from samples prior to the autumn peak. 1918 IAV genomic diversity is consistent with a combination of local transmission and long-distance dispersal events. Comparison of genomes before and during the pandemic peak shows variation at two sites in the nucleoprotein gene associated with resistance to host antiviral response, pointing at a possible adaptation of 1918 IAV to humans. Finally, local molecular clock modeling suggests a pure pandemic descent of seasonal H1N1 IAV as an alternative to the hypothesis of origination through an intrasubtype reassortment.

Averting wildlife-borne infectious disease epidemics requires a focus on socio-ecological drivers and a redesign of the global food system.

A debate has emerged over the potential socio-ecological drivers of wildlife-origin zoonotic disease outbreaks and emerging infectious disease (EID) events. This Review explores the extent to which the incidence of wildlife-origin infectious disease outbreaks, which are likely to include devastating pandemics like HIV/AIDS and COVID-19, may be linked to excessive and increasing rates of tropical deforestation for agricultural food production and wild meat hunting and trade, which are further related to contemporary ecological crises such as global warming and mass species extinction. Here we explore a set of precautionary responses to wildlife-origin zoonosis threat, including: (a) limiting human encroachment into tropical wildlands by promoting a global transition to diets low in livestock source foods; (b) containing tropical wild meat hunting and trade by curbing urban wild meat demand, while securing access for indigenous people and local communities in remote subsistence areas; and (c) improving biosecurity and other strategies to break zoonosis transmission pathways at the wildlife-human interface and along animal source food supply chains.

Great Expectations of COVID-19 Herd Immunity.

There is a common preconception that reaching an estimated herd immunity threshold through vaccination will end the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the mathematical models underpinning this estimate make numerous assumptions that may not be met in the real world. The protection afforded by vaccines is imperfect, particularly against asymptomatic infection, which can still result in transmission and propagate pandemic viral spread. Immune responses wane and SARS-COV-2 has the capacity to mutate over time to become more infectious and resistant to vaccine elicited immunity. Human behavior and public health restrictions also vary over time and among different populations, impacting the transmissibility of infection. These ever-changing factors modify the number of secondary cases produced by an infected individual, thereby necessitating constant revision of the herd immunity threshold. Even so, vaccination remains a powerful strategy to slow down the pandemic, save lives, and alleviate the burden on limited health care resources.

A Centenary Tale of Two Pandemics: The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and COVID-19, Part II.

Both the 1918 influenza pandemic and the 2019‒2021 COVID-19 pandemic are among the most disastrous infectious disease emergences of modern times. In addition to similarities in their clinical, pathological, and epidemiological features, the two pandemics, separated by more than a century, were each met with essentially the same, or very similar, public health responses, and elicited research efforts to control them with vaccines, therapeutics, and other medical approaches. Both pandemics had lasting, if at times invisible, psychosocial effects related to loss and hardship. In considering these two deadly pandemics, we ask: what lessons have we learned over the span of a century, and how are we applying those lessons to the challenges of COVID-19?

A Centenary Tale of Two Pandemics: The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and COVID-19, Part I.

Separated by a century, the influenza pandemic of 1918 and the COVID-19 pandemic of 2019-2021 are among the most disastrous infectious disease emergences of modern times. Although caused by unrelated viruses, the two pandemics are nevertheless similar in their clinical, pathological, and epidemiological features, and in the civic, public health, and medical responses to combat them. Comparing and contrasting the two pandemics, we consider what lessons we have learned over the span of a century and how we are applying those lessons to the challenges of COVID-19.

Seasonal Influenza Prevention and Control Progress in Latin America and the Caribbean in the Context of the Global Influenza Strategy and the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Each year in Latin America and the Caribbean, seasonal influenza is associated with an estimated 36,500 respiratory deaths and 400,000 hospitalizations. Since the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, the Region has made significant advances in the prevention and control of seasonal influenza, including improved surveillance systems, burden estimates, and vaccination of at-risk groups. The Global Influenza Strategy 2019-2030 provides a framework to strengthen these advances. Against the backdrop of this new framework, the University of Colorado convened in October 2020 its Immunization Advisory Group of Experts to review and discuss current surveillance, prevention, and control strategies for seasonal influenza in Latin America and the Caribbean, also in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. This review identified five areas for action and made recommendations specific to each area. The Region should continue its efforts to strengthen surveillance and impact evaluations. Existing data on disease burden, seasonality patterns, and vaccination effectiveness should be used to inform decision-making at the country level as well as advocacy efforts for programmatic resources. Regional and country strategic plans should be prepared and include specific targets for 2030. Existing investments in influenza prevention and control, including for immunization programs, should be optimized. Finally, regional partnerships, such as the regional networks for syndromic surveillance and vaccine effectiveness evaluation (SARInet and REVELAC-i), should continue to play a critical role in continuous learning and standardization by sharing experiences and best practices among countries.

Unique pattern of COVID-19 infection in the State of Hawai'i.

This is a brief report on an unusual observation regarding COVID-19 cases. The State of Hawaii is one of the most remote of the Pacific islands and the population is approximately 1.4 million. The racial and ethnic diversity is very high. For example, white Caucasians comprise ∼25%, Asians including Japanese, Chinese, and other Asians account for ∼30%, Hawaiians for 20%, and Pacific Islanders mostly from Micronesia and Samoa comprise ∼4%. We discovered that the COVID-19 rate in the latter group was up to 10 times that in all of the other groups combined and they accounted for almost 30% of cases. Moreover, we are unaware of COVID-19 transmission from Pacific Islanders to islanders with other ethnicities. Thus, there is an epidemic within the epidemic in Hawai'i.

Emerging Pandemic Diseases: How We Got to COVID-19.

Infectious diseases prevalent in humans and animals are caused by pathogens that once emerged from other animal hosts. In addition to these established infections, new infectious diseases periodically emerge. In extreme cases they may cause pandemics such as COVID-19; in other cases, dead-end infections or smaller epidemics result. Established diseases may also re-emerge, for example by extending geographically or by becoming more transmissible or more pathogenic. Disease emergence reflects dynamic balances and imbalances, within complex globally distributed ecosystems comprising humans, animals, pathogens, and the environment. Understanding these variables is a necessary step in controlling future devastating disease emergences.

The Origin of COVID-19 and Why It Matters.

The COVID-19 pandemic is among the deadliest infectious diseases to have emerged in recent history. As with all past pandemics, the specific mechanism of its emergence in humans remains unknown. Nevertheless, a large body of virologic, epidemiologic, veterinary, and ecologic data establishes that the new virus, SARS-CoV-2, evolved directly or indirectly from a ß-coronavirus in the sarbecovirus (SARS-like virus) group that naturally infect bats and pangolins in Asia and Southeast Asia. Scientists have warned for decades that such sarbecoviruses are poised to emerge again and again, identified risk factors, and argued for enhanced pandemic prevention and control efforts. Unfortunately, few such preventive actions were taken resulting in the latest coronavirus emergence detected in late 2019 which quickly spread pandemically. The risk of similar coronavirus outbreaks in the future remains high. In addition to controlling the COVID-19 pandemic, we must undertake vigorous scientific, public health, and societal actions, including significantly increased funding for basic and applied research addressing disease emergence, to prevent this tragic history from repeating itself.