A Backwards-step for Gillick: Trans Children's Inability to Consent to Treatment for Gender Dysphoria-Quincy Bell & Mrs A v The Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust and Ors [2020] EWHC 3274 (Admin).

The case of Quincy Bell & Mrs A v The Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust and Ors is a judicial review into the treatment practices of the Gender Identity Development Service (GIDS) run by Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust (Tavistock). The Divisional Court considered whether children and young people with Gender Dysphoria (GD) can ever be Gillick competent to consent to treatment with Puberty Blockers (PBs), and if so whether GIDS provided sufficient information to support an informed consent. This commentary examines the six key areas of the judgment: the nature of GD and its treatment with PBs; the categorisation of PBs as experimental treatment; the high bar set to achieve Gillick competence; the convergence of information provision and competence; the role of parental consent; and finally the protective jurisdiction of the court. The conclusion of the court that transgender children aged under 16 years will find 'enormous difficulties' in reaching the Gillick threshold to be able to consent to PBs, and that even 16- to 17-year olds would benefit from a 'best interests determination' from the court, signals judicial thinking which is markedly protectionist. Considering the broad contemporary stance in healthcare of facilitating competence, valuing patient participation, and respecting rights, I argue that this judgment is out of step. It has implications not only for transgender children, but it may also be a worrying signal of a greater general retreat from Gillick and a corresponding advance in emphasis on judicially determined best interests.

Reflecting on 'Hannah's Choice': Using the Ethics of Care to Justify Child Participation in End of Life Decision-Making.

It has been ten years since the case of Hannah Jones-the 12-year-old girl who was permitted to refuse a potentially life-saving heart transplant. In the past decade, there has been some progress within law and policy in respect of children's participatory rights (UNCRC-Article 12), and a greater understanding of family-centred decision-making. However, the courts still largely maintain their traditional reluctance to find children Gillick competent to refuse medical treatment. In this article, I revisit Hannah's case through the narrative account provided by Hannah and her mother, to ascertain what lessons can be learnt. I use an Ethics of Care framework specially developed for children in mid-childhood, such as Hannah, to argue for more a creative and holistic approach to child decision-making in healthcare. I conclude that using traditional paradigms is untenable in the context of palliative care and at the end of life, and that the law should be able to accommodate greater, and even determinative, participation of children who are facing their own deaths.

Gillick reinstated: judging mid-childhood competence in healthcare law: an NHS Trust v ABC & A Local Authority [2014] EWHC 1445 (Fam).

This case commentary discusses a recent case concerning the competence of a 13-year-old girl to consent to the termination of her pregnancy. It critically analyses four specific elements of the judgment--Gillick competence, the impact of best interests, judicial deference to medical opinion, and individualism and the construction of undue influence. It concludes by commending the approach taken by the court as a reinstatement of the law as originally intended in Gillick but is nonetheless cautious as to its likely overall effect upon child decision-making.