Are cost advantages from a modern Indian hospital transferable to the United States?

BACKGROUND: Multiple modern Indian hospitals operate at very low cost while meeting US-equivalent quality accreditation standards. Though US hospitals face intensifying pressure to lower their cost, including proposals to extend Medicare payment rates to all admissions, the transferability of Indian hospitals' cost advantages to US peers remains unclear. METHODS: Using time-driven activity-based costing methods, we estimate the average cost of personnel and space for an elective coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery at two American hospitals and one Indian hospital (NH). All three hospitals are Joint Commission accredited and have reputations for use of modern performance management methods. Our case study applies several analytic steps to distinguish transferable from non-transferable sources of NH's cost savings. RESULTS: After removing non-transferable sources of efficiency, NH's residual cost advantage primarily rests on shifting tasks to less-credentialed and/or less-experienced personnel who are supervised by highly-skilled personnel when perceived risk of complications is low. NH's high annual CABG volume facilitates such supervised work "downshifting." The study is subject to limitations inherent in case studies, does not account for the younger age of NH's patients, or capture savings attributable to NH's negligible frequency of re-admission or post-acute care facility placement. CONCLUSIONS: Most transferable bases for a modern Indian hospital's cost advantage would require more flexible American states' hospital and health professional licensing regulations, greater family participation in inpatient care, and stronger support by hospital executives and clinicians for substantially lowering the cost of care via regionalization of complex surgeries and weekend use of costly operating rooms.

Time-driven activity-based costing of multivessel coronary artery bypass grafting across national boundaries to identify improvement opportunities: study protocol.

INTRODUCTION: Coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery is a well-established, commonly performed treatment for coronary artery disease--a disease that affects over 10% of US adults and is a major cause of morbidity and mortality. In 2005, the mean cost for a CABG procedure among Medicare beneficiaries in the USA was $32, 201 ± $23,059. The same operation reportedly costs less than $2000 to produce in India. The goals of the proposed study are to (1) identify the difference in the costs incurred to perform CABG surgery by three Joint Commission accredited hospitals with reputations for high quality and efficiency and (2) characterise the opportunity to reduce the cost of performing CABG surgery. METHODS AND ANALYSIS: We use time-driven activity-based costing (TDABC) to quantify the hospitals' costs of producing elective, multivessel CABG. TDABC estimates the costs of a given clinical service by combining information about the process of patient care delivery (specifically, the time and quantity of labour and non-labour resources utilised to perform each activity) with the unit cost of each resource used to provide the care. Resource utilisation was estimated by constructing CABG process maps for each site based on observation of care and staff interviews. Unit costs were calculated as a capacity cost rate, measured as a $/min, for each resource consumed in CABG production. Multiplying together the unit costs and resource quantities and summing across all resources used will produce the average cost of CABG production at each site. We will conclude by conducting a variance analysis of labour costs to reveal opportunities to bend the cost curve for CABG production in the USA. ETHICS AND DISSEMINATION: All our methods were exempted from review by the Stanford Institutional Review Board. Results will be published in peer-reviewed journals and presented at scientific meetings.

Aligning incentives in supply chains.

Most companies don't worry about the behavior of their supply chain partners. Instead, they expect the supply chain to work efficiently without interference, as if guided by Adam Smith's famed invisible hand. In their study of more than 50 supply networks, V.G. Narayanan and Ananth Raman found that companies often looked out for their own interests and ignored those of their network partners. Consequently, supply chains performed poorly. Those results aren't shocking when you consider that supply chains extend across several functions and many companies, each with its own priorities and goals. Yet all those functions and firms must pull in the same direction for a chain to deliver goods and services to consumers quickly and cost-effectively. According to the authors, a supply chain works well only if the risks, costs, and rewards of doing business are distributed fairly across the network. In fact, misaligned incentives are often the cause of excess inventory, stock-outs, incorrect forecasts, inadequate sales efforts, and even poor customer service. The fates of all supply chain partners are interlinked: If the firms work together to serve consumers, they will all win. However, they can do that only if incentives are aligned. Companies must acknowledge that the problem of incentive misalignment exists and then determine its root cause and align or redesign incentives. They can improve alignment by, for instance, adopting revenue-sharing contracts, using technology to track previously hidden information, or working with intermediaries to build trust among network partners. It's also important to periodically reassess incentives, because even top-performing networks find that changes in technology or business conditions alter the alignment of incentives.