Time and memory distrust shape the dynamics of recollection and belief-in-occurrence.

The current study examined how people's metamemory judgments of recollection and belief-in-occurrence change over time. Furthermore, we examined to what extent these judgments are affected by memory distrust - the subjective appraisal of one's memory functioning - as measured by the Memory Distrust Scale (MDS) and the Squire Subjective Memory Scale (SSMQ). Participants (N = 234) studied pictorial stimuli and were tested on some of these stimuli later in the same session, but were tested on other stimuli 1, 2, 4, 8, and 17 days later. Recollection and belief ratings were correlated highly and followed similar declining patterns over time. However, belief decreased relatively more slowly than recollection, such that the discrepancy between recollection and belief increased over time. Memory distrust moderated the association between recollection and belief, with this association being weaker among people who reported greater (versus lower) memory distrust. Memory distrust also interacted with retention period to predict memory judgments. Two measures of memory distrust diverged in their predictive power. In particular, only the MDS predicted the spontaneous reporting of nonbelieved memories. Our results provide support to the theoretical perspective that belief-in-occurrence is a summative judgment informed not only by recollective phenomenology but also by metamemorial beliefs.

Effects of cueing multiple memories of eating on people's judgments about their diet.

Past research shows that recalling a single positive health-related experience, such as exercising, can encourage people's subsequent healthy behaviours. In contrast, we reasoned that attempting to recall many healthy experiences might elicit a metacognitive experience of difficulty that would lead people to perceive themselves as less healthy, and perhaps to make other health-related judgments based on this perception. In two pre-registered experiments (combined N = 729), participants recalled either "few" or "many" instances of eating either healthily or unhealthily, before rating the healthiness of their diets and completing measures of their eating preferences and choices. Contrary to our predictions, our pre-registered analyses provided minimal evidence that the number of memories people retrieved affected their judgments. However, exploratory mediation analyses suggested that two counteracting effects may have occurred, whereby retrieving more (un)healthy memories led people to identify as more (un)healthy, yet also created a sense of subjective difficulty that partially or wholly negated these effects. These findings suggest that whereas probing people's dietary memories might sometimes lead to healthier self-perceptions and dietary choices, we should also consider the possibility of backfire effects.

Preference for cheap-and-easy memory verification strategies is strongest among people with high memory distrust.

When choosing strategies for verifying one's memory, people are more influenced by the perceived cost of using a strategy than by its likelihood of yielding reliable information (i.e., cheap-strategy bias). The current preregistered study investigated whether people with high memory distrust are less likely to exhibit this bias than their low memory distrust counterparts. Participants (N = 535) imagined a scenario in which they witnessed an accident and were then led by friends to question their memories about the accident. Participants had to propose five strategies for verifying that particular memory. Following this, they rated each strategy's cost, reliability, and their likelihood of using it, as well as completing two validated measures of trait memory distrust. Contrary to our prediction, compared with participants with low memory distrust, participants with higher memory distrust exhibited a larger cheap-strategy bias. Follow-up analyses suggested that compared with memory-trusters, memory distrusters' strategy choices were more influenced by a strategy's perceived cost, and less influenced by its perceived reliability. Our results suggest that people who are more skeptical about their memories may be more cynical about the worthwhileness of verifying their memory, which could make them especially susceptible to misinformation acceptance and false memory creation.

False remembering in real life: James Ost's contributions to memory psychology.

This special issue honours James Ost's (1973-2019) contributions to our understanding of false and distorted remembering. In our editorial, we introduce some of James' distinctive research themes including the experiences of people who retract "recovered" memories, social (e.g., co-witness and interviewer influence) and personality influences on false remembering, the nature of false remembering itself (e.g., different types of false memories; false memories vs. false beliefs), public understanding of (false) memory, and a historical link to the work of Frederic Bartlett. We illustrate these themes through a number of key publications. The unifying thread behind James' work is his core interest in false/distorted remembering in real-life (typically high-stake) situations, in line with his engagement with the British False Memory Society and his role as an expert witness in court trials. The articles included in this special issue elaborate on the research themes to which James devoted his career and his curiosity.

Memories people no longer believe in can still affect them in helpful and harmful ways.

People can come to "remember" experiences they never had, and these false memories-much like memories for real experiences-can serve a variety of helpful and harmful functions. Sometimes, though, people realize one of their memories is false, and retract their belief in it. These "retracted memories" continue to have many of the same phenomenological characteristics as their believed memories. But can they also continue to serve functions? Across four experiments, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which their retracted memories serve helpful and harmful functions and compared these functions with those served by "genuine" autobiographical memories. People rated their retracted memories as serving both helpful and harmful functions, much like their genuine memories. In addition, we found only weak relationships between people's belief in their memories and the extent to which those memories served perceived functions. These results suggest memories can serve functions even in the absence of belief and highlight the potential for false memories to affect people's thinking and behavior even after people have retracted them.

Front-of-pack health imagery on both 'healthy' and 'unhealthy' foods leads people to misremember seeing health claims: Two memory experiments.

Front-of-pack health imagery can shape people's inferences about food products' health benefits, even leading people to falsely remember reading health claims they never saw. However, research has typically examined these effects in situations where participants have little contextual information to guide their inferences about a product. The present research aimed to replicate the finding that front-of-pack health imagery leads participants to falsely remember reading health claims. It also extends that finding, by exploring whether this effect is moderated by the presence of contextual information signaling the product's actual 'healthiness'. In two pre-registered experiments, participants saw images of fictitious food products accompanied by written nutrition claims. Some of the products contained a health-related image whereas others did not. The supposed 'healthiness' of each product was manipulated by altering the color of the products' multiple traffic light (MTL) label (Experiment 1), or with an explicit healthiness statement (Experiment 2). Participants then attempted to remember the written claims that had appeared on each product's packaging. Health-related images increased participants' tendency to falsely remember reading health claims. But this was true regardless of whether or not participants saw contextual cues about the products' healthiness, either indirectly (Experiment 1) or directly (Experiment 2). These findings suggest that the presence of health imagery on a food product's package can lead consumers to infer health benefits, even when other, more direct cues indicate that the product is unhealthy. This research informs debates on safeguarding consumers from potentially misleading health claims, through the regulation of imagery in food marketing.

Misremembering Brexit: partisan bias and individual predictors of false memories for fake news stories among Brexit voters.

Exposure to fake news stories can result in false memories for the events portrayed, and this effect can be enhanced if the stories conform to the reader's ideological position. We exposed 1299 UK residents to fabricated news stories about Brexit. 44% of participants reported a false memory for at least one fabricated story, with a higher rate of false memories for stories that reflected poorly on the opposing side. This effect of ideological congruency was somewhat greater among participants who were exposed to a threat to their social identity as a Leave or Remain supporter; however, this moderating effect was only statistically significant in exploratory analyses using a more conservative definition of false memory. Participants with higher cognitive ability and analytical reasoning scores were less susceptible to false memories. Individuals with better knowledge about Brexit showed better discrimination between true and false stories, while self-reported engagement with the Brexit debate was associated with an increased tendency to "remember" any story, regardless of its truth. These results implicate a combination of social and individual factors in the development of false memories from fake news, and suggest that exposure to social identity threats may enhance the polarising effects of fake news.

Front-of-pack images can boost the perceived health benefits of dietary products.

Images on dietary supplement packaging can help identify the products' supposed function. However, research shows that these images can also lead people to infer additional health benefits of consuming the products. The present research investigated the extent to which front-of-pack imagery affects people's perceptions of the health risks and benefits of fictional products. In three randomized experiments, participants saw fictitious dietary supplement packages. Some of the packages included a health-related image (e.g. a heart), whereas others did not. Participants were asked to infer the products' intended purpose and then to rate the perceived risks and benefits of consuming the product. In Experiment 1 (N = 546), the inclusion of a health-related image increased the perceived benefits of consuming the product, with minimal effect on the perceived risks. This finding was replicated in Experiment 2 (N = 164), but was contingent on whether each product's assumed health function was confirmed or disconfirmed. In Experiment 3 (N = 306), which used a pre-registered design and analysis plan, the inclusion of a health-related image increased the perceived benefits and decreased the perceived risks of consuming the product. Again, these effects were contingent on whether the assumed health functions were confirmed or disconfirmed. These findings indicate that health-related imagery could lead consumers to infer additional health properties from non-diagnostic information featured on a product's packaging, perhaps as a consequence of increased processing fluency. This research underscores the importance of regulating the use of imagery in health marketing, to protect consumers from the effects of potentially misleading claims.

Weak memory for future-oriented feedback: investigating the roles of attention and improvement focus.

Recent research showed that people recall past-oriented, evaluative feedback more fully and accurately than future-oriented, directive feedback. Here we investigated whether these memory biases arise from preferential attention toward evaluative feedback during encoding. We also attempted to counter the biases via manipulations intended to focus participants on improvement. Participants received bogus evaluative and directive feedback on their writing. Before reading the feedback, some participants set goals for improvement (experiments 1 and 2), or they wrote about their past or future use of the writing skills, and/or were incentivised to improve (experiment 3); we objectively measured participants' attention during feedback reading using eyetracking. Finally, all participants completed a recall test. We successfully replicated the preferential remembering of evaluative feedback, but found little support for an attentional explanation. Goal-setting reduced participants' tendency to reproduce feedback in an evaluative style, but not their preferential remembering of evaluative feedback. Neither orienting participants toward their past or future use of the writing skills, nor incentivising them to improve, influenced their attention toward or memory for the feedback. These findings advance the search for a mechanism to explain people's weaker memory for future-oriented feedback, demonstrating that attentional and improvement-oriented accounts cannot adequately explain the effect.

Reasons to Doubt the Reliability of Eyewitness Memory: Commentary on Wixted, Mickes, and Fisher (2018).

Wixted, Mickes, and Fisher (this issue) take issue with the common trope that eyewitness memory is inherently unreliable. They draw on a large body of mock-crime research and a small number of field studies, which indicate that high-confidence eyewitness reports are usually accurate, at least when memory is uncontaminated and suitable interviewing procedures are used. We agree with the thrust of Wixted et al.'s argument and welcome their invitation to confront the mass underselling of eyewitnesses' potential reliability. Nevertheless, we argue that there is a comparable risk of overselling eyewitnesses' reliability. Wixted et al.'s reasoning implies that near-pristine conditions or uncontaminated memories are normative, but there are at least two good reasons to doubt this. First, psychological science does not yet offer a good understanding of how often and when eyewitness interviews might deviate from best practice in ways that compromise the accuracy of witnesses' reports. Second, witnesses may frequently be exposed to preinterview influences that could corrupt reports obtained in best-practice interviews.

A memory advantage for past-oriented over future-oriented performance feedback.

People frequently receive performance feedback that describes how well they achieved in the past, and how they could improve in future. In educational contexts, future-oriented (directive) feedback is often argued to be more valuable to learners than past-oriented (evaluative) feedback; critically, prior research led us to predict that it should also be better remembered. We tested this prediction in six experiments. Subjects read written feedback containing evaluative and directive comments, which supposedly related to essays they had previously written (Experiments 1-2), or to essays another person had written (Experiments 3-6). Subjects then tried to reproduce the feedback from memory after a short delay. In all six experiments, the data strongly revealed the opposite effect to the one we predicted: despite only small differences in wording, evaluative feedback was in fact recalled consistently better than directive feedback. Furthermore, even when adult subjects did recall directive feedback, they frequently misremembered it in an evaluative style. These findings appear at odds with the position that being oriented toward the future is advantageous to memory. They also raise important questions about the possible behavioral effects and generalizability of such biases, in terms of students' academic performance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

False memories, nonbelieved memories, and the unresolved primacy of communication.

Mahr & Csibra (M&C) make a compelling case for a communicative function of episodic remembering, but a less compelling case that this is its primary function. Questions arise on whether confirming their predictions would support their account sufficiently, on the communicative function of preserving rich, nonbelieved memories, and on the epistemic benefits of developing false memories via the acceptance of misinformation.

Changing beliefs about past public events with believable and unbelievable doctored photographs.

Doctored photographs can shape what people believe and remember about prominent public events, perhaps due to their apparent credibility. In three studies, subjects completed surveys about the 2012 London Olympic torch relay (Experiment 1) or the 2011 Royal Wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton (Experiments 2-3). Some were shown a genuine photo of the event; others saw a doctored photo that depicted protesters and unrest. A third group of subjects saw a doctored photo whose inauthenticity had been made explicit, either by adding a written disclaimer (Experiment 1) or by making the digital manipulation deliberately poor (Experiments 2-3). In all three studies, doctored photos had small effects on a subset of subjects' beliefs about the events. Of central interest though, comparable effects also emerged when the photos were overtly inauthentic. These findings suggest that cognitive mechanisms other than credibility - such as familiarity misattribution and mental imagery - can rapidly influence beliefs about past events even when the low credibility of a source is overt.

Responsibility-Sharing in the Giving and Receiving of Assessment Feedback.

Many argue that effective learning requires students to take a substantial share of responsibility for their academic development, complementing the responsibilities taken by their educators. Yet this notion of responsibility-sharing receives minimal discussion in the context of assessment feedback, where responsibility for enhancing learning is often framed as lying principally with educators. Developing discussion on this issue is critical: many barriers can prevent students from engaging meaningfully with feedback, but neither educators nor students are fully empowered to remove these barriers without collaboration. In this discussion paper we argue that a culture of responsibility-sharing in the giving and receiving of feedback is essential, both for ensuring that feedback genuinely benefits students by virtue of their skilled and proactive engagement, and also for ensuring the sustainability of educators' effective feedback practices. We propose some assumptions that should underpin such a culture, and we consider the practicalities of engendering this cultural shift within modern higher education.

Misrepresentations and Flawed Logic About the Prevalence of False Memories.

Brewin and Andrews (2016) propose that just 15% of people, or even fewer, are susceptible to false childhood memories. If this figure were true, then false memories would still be a serious problem. But the figure is higher than 15%. False memories occur even after a few short and low-pressure interviews, and with each successive interview, they become richer, more compelling, and more likely to occur. It is therefore dangerously misleading to claim that the scientific data provide an "upper bound" on susceptibility to memory errors. We also raise concerns about the peer review process.

Sub-types of nonbelieved memories reveal differential outcomes of challenges to memories.

Nonbelieved memories (NBMs) highlight the independence between distinct metamemorial judgements that contribute to the experience of remembering. Initial definitions of NBMs portrayed them as involving the withdrawal of belief in occurrence despite sustained recollection. While people rate belief for their NBMs as weaker than recollection, the average difference is too small to support the idea that autobiographical belief is completely withdrawn in all cases. Furthermore, autobiographical belief and recollection ratings vary considerably across NBMs. In two studies, we reanalysed data from prior studies to examine whether NBM reports reflect a single category or multiple sub-categories using cluster analytic methods. In Study 1, we identified three sub-types of NBMs. In Study 2 we incorporated the concept of belief in accuracy, and found that two of the clusters from Study 1 split into two clusters apiece. All clusters were characterised by higher recollection than belief in occurrence ratings, and clusters were differentiated by the degree of difference between these variables. In both studies the clusters were discriminated by a number of memory characteristic ratings and by reasons reported as leading to the alteration of belief. Implications for understanding the remembering of past events and predicting the creation of NBMs are discussed.

A robust preference for cheap-and-easy strategies over reliable strategies when verifying personal memories.

People depend on various sources of information when trying to verify their autobiographical memories. Yet recent research shows that people prefer to use cheap-and-easy verification strategies, even when these strategies are not reliable. We examined the robustness of this cheap strategy bias, with scenarios designed to encourage greater emphasis on source reliability. In three experiments, subjects described real (Experiments 1 and 2) or hypothetical (Experiment 3) autobiographical events, and proposed strategies they might use to verify their memories of those events. Subjects also rated the reliability, cost, and the likelihood that they would use each strategy. In line with previous work, we found that the preference for cheap information held when people described how they would verify childhood or recent memories (Experiment 1), personally important or trivial memories (Experiment 2), and even when the consequences of relying on incorrect information could be significant (Experiment 3). Taken together, our findings fit with an account of source monitoring in which the tendency to trust one's own autobiographical memories can discourage people from systematically testing or accepting strong disconfirmatory evidence.

When is an image a health claim? A false-recollection method to detect implicit inferences about products' health benefits.

OBJECTIVE: Images on food and dietary supplement packaging might lead people to infer (appropriately or inappropriately) certain health benefits of those products. Research on this issue largely involves direct questions, which could (a) elicit inferences that would not be made unprompted, and (b) fail to capture inferences made implicitly. Using a novel memory-based method, in the present research, we explored whether packaging imagery elicits health inferences without prompting, and the extent to which these inferences are made implicitly. METHOD: In 3 experiments, participants saw fictional product packages accompanied by written claims. Some packages contained an image that implied a health-related function (e.g., a brain), and some contained no image. Participants studied these packages and claims, and subsequently their memory for seen and unseen claims were tested. RESULTS: When a health image was featured on a package, participants often subsequently recognized health claims that-despite being implied by the image-were not truly presented. In Experiment 2, these recognition errors persisted despite an explicit warning against treating the images as informative. In Experiment 3, these findings were replicated in a large consumer sample from 5 European countries, and with a cued-recall test. CONCLUSION: These findings confirm that images can act as health claims, by leading people to infer health benefits without prompting. These inferences appear often to be implicit, and could therefore be highly pervasive. The data underscore the importance of regulating imagery on product packaging; memory-based methods represent innovative ways to measure how leading (or misleading) specific images can be. (PsycINFO Database Record

Public Attitudes on the Ethics of Deceptively Planting False Memories to Motivate Healthy Behavior.

Researchers have proposed that planting false memories could have positive behavioral consequences. The idea of deceptively planting 'beneficial' false memories outside of the laboratory raises important ethical questions, but how might the general public appraise this moral dilemma? In two studies, participants from the USA and UK read about a fictional 'false-memory therapy' that led people to adopt healthy behaviors. Participants then reported their attitudes toward the acceptability of this therapy, via scale-rating (both studies) and open-text (study 2) responses. The data revealed highly divergent responses to this contentious issue, ranging from abject horror to unqualified enthusiasm. Moreover, the responses shed light on conditions that participants believed would make the therapy less or more ethical. Whether or not deceptively planting memories outside the lab could ever be justifiable, these studies add valuable evidence to scientific and societal debates on neuroethics, whose relevance to memory science is increasingly acute.

Truthiness and falsiness of trivia claims depend on judgmental contexts.

When people rapidly judge the truth of claims presented with or without related but nonprobative photos, the photos tend to inflate the subjective truth of those claims--a "truthiness" effect (Newman et al., 2012). For example, people more often judged the claim "Macadamia nuts are in the same evolutionary family as peaches" to be true when the claim appeared with a photo of a bowl of macadamia nuts than when it appeared alone. We report several replications of that effect and 3 qualitatively new findings: (a) in a within-subjects design, when people judged claims paired with a mix of related, unrelated, or no photos, related photos produced truthiness but unrelated photos had no significant effect relative to no photos; (b) in a mixed design, when people judged claims paired with related (or unrelated) and no photos, related photos produced truthiness and unrelated photos produced "falseness;" and (c) in a fully between design, when people judged claims paired with either related, unrelated, or no photos, neither truthiness nor falsiness occurred. Our results suggest that photos influence people's judgments when a discrepancy arises in the expected ease of processing, and also support a mechanism in which-against a backdrop of an expected standard-related photos help people generate pseudoevidence to support claims.