Is Suffering a Useless Concept?

"Suffering" is a central concept within bioethics and often a crucial consideration in medical decision making. As used in practice, however, the concept risks being uninformative, ambiguous, or even misleading. In this paper, we consider a series of cases in which "suffering" is invoked and analyze them in light of prominent theories of suffering. We then outline ethical hazards that arise as a result of imprecise usage of the concept and offer practical recommendations for avoiding them. Appeals to suffering are often getting at something ethically important. But this is where the work of ethics begins, not where it ends.

Does It Matter Whether a Psychiatric Intervention Is "Palliative"?

Palliative interventions are intended to alleviate suffering and improve quality, not quantity, of life and are not intended to cure illness. In psychiatry, uncertainty about which interventions count as palliative stems from the fact that psychiatry generally prioritizes symptom management irrespective of diagnosis or specific pathophysiology of illness. This commentary on a case considers how distinctions between palliative and other psychiatric interventions might not be all that helpful in resolving clinical and ethical questions about which interventions are-and when they are-appropriate.

From Bridge to Destination? Ethical Considerations Related to Withdrawal of ECMO Support over the Objections of Capacitated Patients.

Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) is typically viewed as a time-limited intervention-a bridge to recovery or transplant-not a destination therapy. However, some patients with decision-making capacity request continued ECMO support despite a poor prognosis for recovery and lack of viability as a transplant candidate. In response, critical care teams have asked for guidance regarding the ethical permissibility of unilateral withdrawal over the objections of a capacitated patient. In this article, we evaluate several ethical arguments that have been made in favor of withdrawal, including distributive justice, quality of life, patients' rights, professional integrity, and the Equivalence Thesis. We find that existing justifications for unilateral withdrawal of ECMO support in capacitated patients are problematic, which leads us to conclude that either: (1) additional ethical arguments are necessary to defend this approach or (2) the claim that it is not appropriate to use ECMO as a destination therapy should be questioned.

Consistently Inconsistent: Does Inconsistency Really Indicate Incapacity?

While it is not explicitly included in capacity assessment tools, "consistency" has come to feature as a central concern when assessing patients' capacity. In order to determine whether inconsistency indicates incapacity, clinicians must determine the source of the inconsistency with respect to the process or content of a patient's decision-making. In this paper, we outline common types of inconsistency and analyze them against widely accepted elements of capacity. We explore the question of whether inconsistency necessarily entails a deficiency in a patient's capacity. While inconsistency may count as prima facie evidence of incapacity-enough evidence to justify a closer look-when making such determinations, it is important for clinicians to slow down, inquire about the reasons underlying the inconsistency and clearly show which of the elements of capacity the patient fails to satisfy.

Bioethics and the Moral Authority of Experience.

While experience often affords important knowledge and insight that is difficult to garner through observation or testimony alone, it also has the potential to generate conflicts of interest and unrepresentative perspectives. We call this tension the paradox of experience. In this paper, we first outline appeals to experience made in debates about access to unproven medical products and disability bioethics, as examples of how experience claims arise in bioethics and some of the challenges raised by these claims. We then motivate the idea that experience can be an asset by appealing to themes in feminist and moral epistemology, distinguishing between epistemic and justice-based appeals. Next, we explain the concern that experience may be a liability by appealing to empirical work on cognitive biases and theoretical work about the problem of partial representation. We conclude with preliminary recommendations for addressing the paradox and offer several questions for future discussion.

Is a Video Worth a Thousand Words?

Bodily imagery elicits strong affective responses and is highly salient, potentially altering viewers' decision making. When clinicians engage surrogates in video calls showing the patient's body, several competing ethical issues must be considered. On the one hand, surrogates may require visual information to make informed decisions, and video technology closes crucial information gaps. On the other, video technology puts an increased amount of control in the hands of clinicians over how the patient's condition is perceived. This article explores some situations that can result in manipulation due to the affective impact of bodily images and the potential for selectivity and framing. Focusing on goals of care, the paper outlines the foremost ethical considerations for clinicians and provides recommendations for clinicians on how to reduce possible manipulation when making these video calls.

Pediatric Authenticity: Hiding in Plain Sight.

The range of decisions considered permissible in pediatrics is typically understood to involve a balance between patient interests and parental or surrogate authority. In this article, we argue that there is a distinct set of considerations relevant to pediatric decision-making that is often neglected or unacknowledged in pediatrics-namely, considerations related to patient authenticity. The standard of pediatric authenticity asks not what is best for the patient or what the patient would choose but, rather, what is most consistent with who the patient is. We begin the article with an overview of the best interest standard and suggest that authenticity can elucidate considerations that fall between a child's strictly medical interests and broader familial or relational interests. Next, we discuss authenticity in greater detail, noting the limits of applying certain philosophical conceptions of authenticity in pediatrics. We then sketch our own account of pediatric authenticity and distinguish it from the related concepts of subjective interests and assent. We conclude with a discussion of three cases illustrating the normative significance of authenticity in a range of situations arising in pediatric medicine.

Building Effective Mentoring Relationships During Clinical Ethics Fellowships: Pedagogy, Programs, and People.

How should clinical ethicists be trained? Scholars have stated that clinical ethics fellowships create well-trained, competent ethicists. While this appears intuitive, few features of fellowship programs have been publicly discussed, let alone debated. In this paper, we examine how fellowships can foster effective mentoring relationships. These relationships provide the foundation for the fellow's transition from novice to competent professional. In this essay, we begin by discussing our pedagogical commitments. Next, we describe the structures our program has created to assist our fellows in becoming competent ethicists. We then outline the kinds of knowledge, skills, and professional attributes mentors should possess. Following this, we focus on the knowledge, skills, and professional attributes that fellows develop as they co-create effective mentoring relationships. We will not prescribe a single approach to fellowship training; instead, our perspective will, we hope, become a catalyst for further conversation on training and mentoring clinical ethics fellows.

Two Minds, One Patient: Clearing up Confusion About "Ambivalence".

Patients who experience difficulty making medical decisions are often referred to as "ambivalent." However, the current lack of attention to the nuances between a cluster of phenomena that resemble ambivalence means that we are not always recognizing what is really going on with a patient. Importantly, different kinds of "ambivalence" may call for different approaches. In this paper, we present a taxonomy of ambivalence-related phenomena, provide normative analysis of some of the effects of-and common responses to-such mental states, and sketch some practical strategies for addressing ambivalence. In applying lessons from the philosophical literature and decision theory, our aim is to provide ethicists and clinicians with the tools to better understand and effectively intervene in cases of ambivalence.

Erasing Workers' Identities: Comment on Blanck, Hyseni, and Altunkol Wise's National Study of the Legal Profession.

"Bring your whole self to work" remains a common mantra of supporters of workplace diversity, equity, and inclusion ("DEI").1 For example, disability rights advocates have long contended that hiding or downplaying one's disability from one's colleagues at work "create[s] an invisible layer of additional work for the individual" in being accepted at the job and negatively affects productivity.2 LGBTQ+ rights advocates have raised similar points, noting that hiding or downplaying one's sexual orientation or gender identity from one's colleagues hinders internal advancement of LGBTQ+ workers.3 As recently as 2019, however, a Deloitte study found that sixty-one percent of workers hid or downplayed one or more of their identities from their colleagues at work.4.

Caring for Unvaccinated Patients in the ICU: Beyond Frustration, Toward Beneficial Relationships.

Critical care professionals in the United States are experiencing distress and frustration during the recent delta-wave of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. This wave feels different because most, although not all, patients suffering with the sequelae from coronavirus disease 2019 who enter ICUs are unvaccinated. Since vaccines in the United States are safe, effective, and widely available for people 12 and older, severe cases of coronavirus disease 2019 are now considered preventable. However, even when a disease is preventable, critical care professionals still have remaining role-based, ethical obligations to their patients. Developing additional mechanisms for reflection and resilience, in spite of accumulated frustrations from otherwise preventable mortality, may help the professional and those they care for. In this essay, we propose a number of questions that recognize the existential frustrations critical care professionals experience, while also uncovering the ethical obligations that remain. Rather than becoming comfortable with silence or frustration, these reflections intend to bridge the gap between feeling frustrated and building relationships that benefit both the patient and the critical care professional during this pandemic.