Attentional set and explicit expectations of perceptual load determine flanker interference.

Task-irrelevant stimuli often capture our attention despite our best efforts to ignore them. It has been noted that tasks involving perceptually complex displays can lead to reduced interference from distractors. The mechanism behind this effect is debated, with some accounts emphasizing the "perceptual load" of the stimuli themselves and others emphasizing the role of proactive control. Here, in three experiments, we investigated the roles of perceptual load, proactive control, and reward motivation in determining distractor interference. Participants performed a visual search task of high, low, or intermediate load, with flanking task-irrelevant distractors. Each trial was preceded by a cue indicating the level of perceptual load (Experiments 1-3) as well as the potential reward that could be earned (Experiments 2 and 3). In all three experiments, the attentional set induced by the preceding trial and cued proactive expectation of perceptual load interacted to determine flanker interference, which was significant for all trial types except trials cued as high load which were also preceded by high load. These effects were not modulated by reward motivation, although in the final experiment reward did significantly improve performance overall. Thus, successful distractor exclusion does not depend upon motivation or load per se but does require an expectation of high load. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Testing the dopamine overdose hypothesis in action control: A study in people with Parkinson's disease.

Prior work on patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) has shown that the administration of dopaminergic medication in the early to intermediate stages of PD benefits (motor) functions associated with the dopamine-depleted dorsal striatal circuitry but may 'overdose' and interfere with (cognitive) functions associated with the relatively intact ventral striatal circuitry. The present study aimed to elucidate this so-called dopamine overdose hypothesis for the action control domain. Using a within-subject design in a sample of 13 people with PD, we evaluated the effect of dopaminergic medication on two cognitive processes underlying goal-directed behaviour, namely action selection and initiation through event binding and conflict adaptation. We also investigated whether individual differences in the magnitude of medication effects were associated across these processes. Results showed no indications that dopaminergic medication affects action selection and initiation or conflict adaptation in PD patients. Additionally, we observed no correlations between both cognitive processes nor between individual differences in medication effects. Our findings do not support the notion that dopaminergic medication modulates action control processes, suggesting that the dopamine overdose hypothesis may only apply to a specific set of cognitive processes and should potentially be refined.

Correct responses alleviate the negative evaluation of conflict.

Recent studies have demonstrated that cognitive conflict, as experienced during incongruent Stroop trials, is automatically evaluated as negative in line with theories emphasising the aversive nature of conflict. However, while this is well replicated when people only see the conflict stimuli, results are mixed when participants also respond to stimuli before evaluating them. Potentially, the positive surprise people feel when overcoming the conflict allows them to evaluate the experience as more positive. In this study, we investigated whether task experience can account for contradictory findings in the literature. Across three experiments, we observed that responding to incongruent stimuli was evaluated as negative on the first trials, but this effect disappeared after 32 trials. This contrasted with the results of a fourth experiment showing that the negative evaluation of incongruent trials did not disappear, when participants could not respond to the conflict. A re-analysis of three older experiments corroborated these results by showing that a positive evaluation of conflict only occurred after participants had some experience with the task. These results show that responding to conflict clearly changes its affective evaluation fitting with the idea that creating outcome expectancies (lower expectancies for being correct on incongruent trials) makes the experience of conflict less negative.

Reward does not modulate corticospinal excitability in anticipation of a Stroop trial.

Action preparation is associated with a transient decrease of corticospinal excitability just before target onset. We have previously shown that the prospect of reward modulates preparatory corticospinal excitability in a Simon task. While the conflict in the Simon task strongly implicates the motor system, it is unknown whether reward prospect modulates preparatory corticospinal excitability in tasks that implicate the motor system less directly. To that effect, we examined reward-modulated preparatory corticospinal excitability in the Stroop task. We administered a rewarded cue-target delay paradigm using Stroop stimuli that afforded a left or right index finger response. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation was administered over the left primary motor cortex and electromyography was obtained from the right first dorsal interosseous muscle. In line with previous findings, there was a preparatory decrease in corticospinal excitability during the delay period. In contrast to our previous study using the Simon task, preparatory corticospinal excitability was not modulated by reward. Our results indicate that reward-modulated changes in the motor system depend on specific task-demands, possibly related to varying degrees of motor conflict.

Shared Neural Representations of Cognitive Conflict and Negative Affect in the Medial Frontal Cortex.

Influential theories of Medial Frontal Cortex (MFC) function suggest that the MFC registers cognitive conflict as an aversive signal, but no study directly tested this idea. Instead, recent studies suggested that nonoverlapping regions in the MFC process conflict and affect. In this preregistered human fMRI study (male and female), we used MVPAs to identify which regions respond similarly to conflict and aversive signals. The results reveal that, of all conflict- and value-related regions, only the ventral pre-supplementary motor area (or dorsal anterior cingulate cortex) showed a shared neural pattern response to different conflict and affect tasks. These findings challenge recent conclusions that conflict and affect are processed independently, and provide support for integrative views of MFC function.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Multiple theories propose that the MFC, and the dorsal ACC in particular, integrates information related to suboptimal outcomes from different psychological domains (e.g., cognitive control and negative affect) with the aim of adaptively steering behavior. In contrast to recent studies in the field, we provide evidence for the idea that cognitive control and negative affect are integrated in the MFC by showing that a classification algorithm trained on discerning cognitive control (conflict vs no conflict) can predict affect (negative vs positive) in the voxel pattern response of the dorsal ACC/pre-SMA.

Cognitive and Affective Theory of Mind in Healthy Aging.

BACKGROUND: Previous studies on the effect of healthy aging on Theory of Mind (ToM) have produced mixed results. A possible explanation may be that different ToM components and types of inference have not systematically been considered. This study examined the effect of aging on ToM by assessing both first and second order cognitive and affective components within a single task. METHODS: We compared performance of young (M = 18.3y) and older adults (M = 61.0y) on the Yoni task. This task allows for a within-subject assessment of both first and second order cognitive and affective ToM. RESULTS: We observed that older adults had longer reaction times than young adults across cognitive and affective first order items. For second order items, this age difference was larger for affective than cognitive items. Results showed no indications that these findings could be explained by age differences in speed/accuracy trade-offs. CONCLUSION: Our findings suggest that decision processes underlying ToM are slower in older adults on both first and second order inferences, but that age differences in these processes between cognitive and affective ToM are selective to second order inferences. We propose that the observed age differences may be associated with cortical and mental changes that occur with aging.

Measuring Adaptive Control in Conflict Tasks.

The past two decades have witnessed an explosion of interest in the cognitive and neural mechanisms of adaptive control processes that operate in selective attention tasks. This has spawned not only a large empirical literature and several theories but also the recurring identification of potential confounds and corresponding adjustments in task design to create confound-minimized metrics of adaptive control. The resulting complexity of this literature can be difficult to navigate for new researchers entering the field, leading to suboptimal study designs. To remediate this problem, we present here a consensus view among opposing theorists that specifies how researchers can measure four hallmark indices of adaptive control (the congruency sequence effect, and list-wide, context-specific, and item-specific proportion congruency effects) while minimizing easy-to-overlook confounds.

Reward anticipation changes corticospinal excitability during task preparation depending on response requirements and time pressure.

The preparation of an action is accompanied by transient corticospinal (CS) excitability changes. Motivation can modulate these changes. Specifically, when a cue indicates that a reward can be obtained, CS excitability initially increases, followed by a pronounced decrease. This dynamic could reflect processes related to reward expectancy, processes related to action preparation, or a combination of both. Here we set up two experiments to dissociate these accounts. A rewarded choice reaction time task was used in which individuals were cued at the beginning of each trial whether or not a response would be required at target onset and whether or not a reward could be obtained. We used single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (spTMS) over the left primary motor cortex (M1) early (shortly after cue onset) or late (shortly before target onset) preceding target onset to examine CS excitability during motivated action preparation. Electromyography (EMG) was obtained from the right first dorsal interosseous (FDI) muscle. In the first experiment, we used a lenient response deadline, whereas a strict response time-out procedure was employed in the second experiment. Reward modulated CS excitability differentially only in the second experiment: CS excitability was highest during reward anticipation for the early stimulation epoch and was reduced for the late stimulation epoch when individuals were required to prepare a response, while CS excitability remained unchanged during non-reward anticipation. Our findings suggest that the reward effect on CS excitability is dependent on the actual implementation of effort to attain reward (i.e., the preparation of an actual action), as well as on temporal requirements (i.e., time pressure) invoked by the task.

Differential effects of sustained and transient effort triggered by reward - A combined EEG and pupillometry study.

In instrumental task contexts, incentive manipulations such as posting reward on successful performance usually trigger increased effort, which is signified by effort markers like increased pupil size. Yet, it is not fully clear under which circumstances incentives really promote performance, and which role effort plays therein. In the present study, we compared two schemes of associating reward with a Flanker task, while simultaneously acquiring electroencephalography (EEG) and pupillometry data in order to explore the contribution of effort-related processes. In Experiment 1, reward was administered in a block-based fashion, with series of targets in pure reward and no-reward blocks. The results imply increased sustained effort in the reward blocks, as reflected in particular in sustained increased pupil size. Yet, this was not accompanied by a behavioral benefit, suggesting a failure of translating increased effort into a behavioral pay-off. In Experiment 2, we introduced trial-based cues in order to also promote transient preparatory effort application, which indeed led to a behavioral benefit. Again, we observed a sustained pupil-size increase, but also transient ones. Consistent with this, the EEG data of Experiment 2 indicated increased transient preparatory effort preceding target onset, as well as reward modulations of target processing that arose earlier than in Experiment 1. Jointly, our results indicate that incentive-triggered effort can operate on different time-scales, and that, at least for the current task, its transient (and largely preparatory) form is critical for achieving a behavioral benefit, which may relate to the temporal dynamics of the catecholaminergic systems.

The affective twitches of task switches: Task switch cues are evaluated as negative.

Task switching refers to the demanding cognitive control process that allows us to flexibly switch between different task contexts. It is a seminal observation that task switching comes with a performance cost (i.e., switch cost), but recent theories suggest that task switching could also carry an affective cost. In two experiments, we investigated the affective evaluation of task switching by having participants perform a task-switching paradigm followed by an affective priming procedure. Crucially, the transition cues of the task-switching paradigm, indicating task alternations or task repetitions, were used as primes in the affective priming procedure to assess their affective connotation. We found that task alternation primes were evaluated as more negative than task repetition primes. These findings show that task switching is affectively tagged, and suggest a potential role for emotion regulation processes in cognitive control.

Reappraising cognitive control: normal reactive adjustments following conflict processing are abolished by proactive emotion regulation.

The congruency sequence effect (CSE) reflected by the influence of the congruency of the previous trial on the current one translates improved cognitive control (CC). Yet, it remains debated whether reactive or proactive control processes mostly contribute to this effect. To address this question, we administered a Stroop task controlling for effects of feature repetition and contingency learning to a large group of participants, where we manipulated the frequency of incongruent trials in a block-wise fashion to induce either proactive (high-conflict frequency) or reactive (low-conflict frequency) control. Moreover, as the presentation of trial-by-trial evaluative feedback could influence control processes operating at a local level, we compared effect of evaluative vs. neutral feedback on the CSE, for each control mode separately. We tested the prediction that CSE should be influenced by conflict frequency and feedback type concurrently. Results showed that when evaluative feedback was used, the CSE was increased if conflict frequency was low, confirming that the CSE stemmed from reactive control mainly. If conflict frequency was high, a different sequence effect was observed. The use of neutral feedback abolished the modulation of the CSE by conflict frequency. Moreover, correlation results showed that reappraisal, corresponding to a proactive emotion regulation strategy, was negatively related to the CSE in this condition, suggesting that proactive control can alleviate the reactive dominance of the CSE. Altogether, these results suggest that CC is flexible, and its expression depends on the subtle balance between proactive and reactive control processes.

The effect of dopaminergic medication on conflict adaptation in Parkinson's disease.

Parkinson's disease (PD) is a neurological disorder associated primarily with motor symptoms such as tremor, slowness of movement, and difficulties with gait and balance. Most patients take dopaminergic medication to improve their motor functions. Previous studies reported indications that such medication can impair higher cognitive functions (cf. dopamine overdose hypothesis). In the present study, we examined the effect of medication status on conflict adaptation. PD patients performed a Stroop task in which we manipulated the proportion of congruent and incongruent items, thereby allowing us to explore conflict adaptation. The use of mouse movements allowed us to examine the action dynamics of conflict adaptation in PD, and their sensitivity to dopaminergic medication. Each patient performed the same task twice: once without making changes to their regular medication regime, and once after overnight withdrawal from their medication. Results showed that medication improved mouse movements and alleviated motor symptoms. Moreover, patients' mouse movements were modulated as a function of the proportion congruency manipulation, revealing conflict adaptation in PD, which was unaffected by medication status. The present study extends earlier work on conflict adaptation in PD where reduced transient (trial-by-trial) conflict adaptation was observed ON compared to OFF medication (Duthoo et al., 2013, Neuropsychology, 27, 556). Our findings suggest that more sustained cognitive control processes may not be sensitive to dopamine overdose effects.

Early and late indications of item-specific control in a Stroop mouse tracking study.

Previous studies indicated that cognitive conflict continues to bias actions even after a movement has been initiated. The present paper examined whether cognitive control also biases actions after movement initiation. To this end, we had participants perform a Stroop task in which we manipulated the item-specific proportion of (in)congruent trials (80% congruent vs. 20% congruent). Importantly, participants responded via mouse movements, allowing us to evaluate various movement parameters: initiation times, movement times, and movement accuracy. Results showed that mouse movements were faster and more accurate during congruent trials compared to incongruent trials. Moreover, we observed that this congruency effect was larger for 80% congruent compared to 20% congruent items, which reflects item-specific cognitive control. Notably, when responses were initiated very fast - rendering virtually no time for stimulus processing before movement onset - this item-specific control was observed only in movement times. However, for relatively slow initiated responses, item specific control was observed both in initiation and in movement times. These findings demonstrate that item-specific cognitive control biases actions before and after movement initiation.

Reduced distractor interference during vagus nerve stimulation.

Suppressing irrelevant information in decision making is an essential everyday skill. We studied whether this ability could be improved in epileptic patients during vagus nerve stimulation (VNS). VNS is known to increase norepinephrine (NE) in the brain. NE is thought to improve several aspects of cognitive control, including the suppression of irrelevant information. Nineteen epileptic VNS patients executed the Eriksen flanker task twice, both during on and off stimulation. Distractor interference was indexed by the congruency effect, a standard empirical marker of cognitive control. We found a reduced congruency effect during stimulation, which indicates an improved ability to suppress distractor interference. This effect was only found in patients that are clinically determined VNS-responders (n = 10). As VNS increases NE in VNS-responders, our finding suggests a beneficial role of NE in cognitive control. At the same time, it suggests that VNS does not only reduce seizure frequency in epileptic patients, but also improves cognitive control.

The role of temporal predictability for early attentional adjustments after conflict.

A frequently-studied phenomenon in cognitive-control research is conflict adaptation, or the finding that congruency effects are smaller after incongruent trials. Prominent cognitive control accounts suggest that this adaptation effect can be explained by transient conflict-induced modulations of selective attention, reducing congruency effects on the next trial. In the present study, we investigated these possible attentional modulations in four experiments using the Stroop and Flanker tasks, dissociating possible enhancements of task-relevant information from suppression of task-irrelevant information by varying when this information was presented. In two experiments, the irrelevant stimulus information was randomly presented shortly before, at the same time, or briefly after the presentation of the relevant dimension. In the other two, irrelevant information was always presented first, making this aspect fully predictable. Despite the central role that attentional adjustments play in theoretical accounts of conflict adaption, we only found evidence for such processes in one of the four experiments. Specifically, we found a modulation of the attention-related posterior N1 event-related potential component that was consistent with paying less attention to the irrelevant information after incongruent trials. This was accompanied by increased inter-trial mid-frontal theta power and a theta-power conflict adaptation effect. We interpret these results as evidence for an adaptive mechanism based on relative attentional inhibition. Importantly, this mechanism only clearly seems to be implemented in a very specific context of high temporal predictability, and only in the Flanker task.

The Role of Anterior Cingulate Cortex in the Affective Evaluation of Conflict.

An influential theory of ACC function argues that this brain region plays a crucial role in the affective evaluation of performance monitoring and control demands. Specifically, control-demanding processes such as response conflict are thought to be registered as aversive signals by ACC, which in turn triggers processing adjustments to support avoidance learning. In support of conflict being treated as an aversive event, recent behavioral studies demonstrated that incongruent (i.e., conflict inducing), relative to congruent, stimuli can speed up subsequent negative, relative to positive, affective picture processing. Here, we used fMRI to investigate directly whether ACC activity in response to negative versus positive pictures is modulated by preceding control demands, consisting of conflict and task-switching conditions. The results show that negative, relative to positive, pictures elicited higher ACC activation after congruent, relative to incongruent, trials, suggesting that ACC's response to negative (positive) pictures was indeed affectively primed by incongruent (congruent) trials. Interestingly, this pattern of results was observed on task repetitions but disappeared on task alternations. This study supports the proposal that conflict induces negative affect and is the first to show that this affective signal is reflected in ACC activation.

Sequence learning in Parkinson's disease: Focusing on action dynamics and the role of dopaminergic medication.

Previous studies on movement sequence learning in Parkinson's disease (PD) have produced mixed results. A possible explanation for the inconsistent findings is that some studies have taken dopaminergic medication into account while others have not. Additionally, in previous studies the response modalities did not allow for an investigation of the action dynamics of sequential movements as they unfold over time. In the current study we investigated sequence learning in PD by specifically considering the role of medication status in a sequence learning task where mouse movements were performed. The focus on mouse movements allowed us to examine the action dynamics of sequential movement in terms of initiation time, movement time, movement accuracy, and velocity. PD patients performed the sequence learning task once on their regular medication, and once after overnight withdrawal from their medication. Results showed that sequence learning as reflected in initiation times was impaired when PD patients performed the task ON medication compared to OFF medication. In contrast, sequence learning as reflected in the accuracy of movement trajectories was enhanced when performing the task ON compared to OFF medication. Our findings suggest that while medication enhances execution processes of movement sequence learning, it may at the same time impair planning processes that precede actual execution. Overall, the current study extends earlier findings on movement sequence learning in PD by differentiating between various components of performance, and further refines previous dopamine overdose effects in sequence learning.

Reward anticipation modulates primary motor cortex excitability during task preparation.

Task preparation has been associated with a transient suppression of corticospinal excitability (CSE) before target onset, but it is an open question to what extent CSE suppression during task preparation is susceptible to motivational factors. Here, we examined whether CSE suppression is modulated by reward anticipation, and, if so, how this modulation develops over time. We administered a cue-target delay paradigm in which 1000ms before target onset a cue was presented indicating whether or not reward could be obtained for fast and accurate responses in a Simon task. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation was applied over left primary motor cortex (M1) during the delay period (400, 600, or 800ms after cue onset) or 200ms after target onset, and electromyography was obtained from the right first dorsal interosseous muscle. Behaviorally, the anticipation of reward improved performance (i.e. faster reaction times). Most importantly, during reward anticipation we observed a linear decrease of motor evoked potential amplitudes that was absent when no reward was anticipated. This suggests that reward anticipation modulates CSE during task preparation.

Grounding cognitive control in associative learning.

Cognitive control covers a broad range of cognitive functions, but its research and theories typically remain tied to a single domain. Here we outline and review an associative learning perspective on cognitive control in which control emerges from associative networks containing perceptual, motor, and goal representations. Our review identifies 3 trending research themes that are shared between the domains of conflict adaptation, task switching, response inhibition, and attentional control: Cognitive control is context-specific, can operate in the absence of awareness, and is modulated by reward. As these research themes can be envisaged as key characteristics of learning, we propose that their joint emergence across domains is not coincidental but rather reflects a (latent) growth of interest in learning-based control. Associative learning has the potential for providing broad-scaled integration to cognitive control theory, and offers a promising avenue for understanding cognitive control as a self-regulating system without postulating an ill-defined set of homunculi. We discuss novel predictions, theoretical implications, and immediate challenges that accompany an associative learning perspective on cognitive control. (PsycINFO Database Record