Remuneration committees, executive remuneration, and firm performance in Indonesia.

Indonesia is currently in the process of mandating the establishment of Remuneration Committees (RCs) for all listed companies. However, little is known about the effectiveness of RCs in Indonesia. This study sheds light on this issue, by examining the relationships between RCs, executive and board of director remuneration, and firm performance in Indonesia. This study uses 847 observations of firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2014-2017. Our results indicate that RCs are positively related to executives remuneration and firm performance. In particular, higher remuneration is only linked to higher performance in firms that have established a remuneration committee. This study documents the interactions between RCs, remuneration levels of senior company officers and firm performance in an emerging market setting with voluntary formation of RCs. This study has implications for regulators and company management in Indonesia (and other emerging markets), as the existence of remuneration committees is found to be associated with more effective remuneration packages and higher firm performance.

CEO busyness and firm performance: evidence from Indonesia.

This study investigates whether busy CEOs are associated with lower firm performance, and if this relationship is moderated by firm growth, CEO tenure and corporate governance practices in Indonesia. This study uses 876 firms-year observations from 268 firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the period spanning 2014 to 2017. We find that busy CEOs are associated with lower firm performance. This negative relationship is stronger in firms with high growth and when busy CEOs have shorter tenure. We also show that corporate governance practices have no impact on the negative relationship between CEO busyness and firm performance. For firms and shareholders, our findings indicate that it is not a good idea for CEOs to hold two or more outside directorships, particularly in the early years of taking up their CEO position. Our results suggest that restrictions on CEO busyness would be beneficial to shareholders.