Can selecting the most qualified candidate be unfair? Learning about socioeconomic advantages and disadvantages reduces the perceived fairness of meritocracy and increases support for socioeconomic diversity initiatives in organizations.

While the majority of Americans today endorse meritocracy as fair, we suggest that these perceptions can be shaped by whether or not people learn about the presence of socioeconomic advantages and disadvantages in others' lives. Across five studies (N = 3,318), we find that people are able to attach socioeconomic inequalities in applicants' backgrounds to their evaluation of the fairness of specific merit-based selection processes and outcomes. Learning that one applicant grew up advantaged-while the other grew up disadvantaged-leads both liberals and conservatives to believe that otherwise identical merit-based procedures and outcomes are significantly less fair. Importantly, learning about starting inequalities leads to greater support for policies that promote socioeconomic diversity in organizations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Testing the automaticity features of the affect misattribution procedure: The roles of awareness and intentionality.

The affect misattribution procedure (AMP) is a measure of implicit evaluations, designed to index the automatic retrieval of evaluative knowledge. The AMP effect consists in participants evaluating neutral target stimuli positively when preceded by positive primes and negatively when preceded by negative primes. After multiple prior tests of intentionality, Hughes et al. (Behav Res Methods 55(4):1558-1586, 2023) examined the role of awareness in the AMP and found that AMP effects were larger when participants indicated that their response was influenced by the prime than when they did not. Here we report seven experiments (six preregistered; N = 2350) in which we vary the methodological features of the AMP to better understand this awareness effect. In Experiments 1-4, we establish variability in the magnitude of the awareness effect in response to variations in the AMP procedure. By introducing further modifications to the AMP procedure, Experiments 5-7 suggest an alternative explanation of the awareness effect, namely that awareness can be the outcome, rather than the cause, of evaluative congruency between primes and responses: Awareness effects emerged even when awareness could not have contributed to AMP effects, including when participants judged influence awareness for third parties or primes were presented post hoc. Finally, increasing the evaluative strength of the primes increased participants' tendency to misattribute AMP effects to the influence of target stimuli. Together, the present findings suggest that AMP effects can create awareness effects rather than vice versa and support the AMP's construct validity as a measure of unintentional evaluations of which participants are also potentially unaware.

What Does the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status Measure? Separating Economic Circumstances and Social Status to Predict Health.

BACKGROUND: Subjective socioeconomic status is robustly associated with many measures of health and well-being. The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status (i.e., the MacArthur ladder) is the most widely used measure of this construct, but it remains unclear what exactly the MacArthur ladder measures. PURPOSE: The present research sought to explore the social and economic factors that underlie responses to the MacArthur ladder and its relationship to health. METHODS: We investigated this issue by examining the relationship between scores on the MacArthur ladder and measures of economic circumstances and noneconomic social status, as well as health and well-being measures, in healthy adults in the USA. RESULTS: In three studies (total N = 1,310) we found evidence that economic circumstances and social status are distinct constructs that have distinct associations with scores on the MacArthur ladder. We found that both factors exhibit distinct associations with measures of health and well-being and accounted for the association between the MacArthur ladder and each measure of health and well-being. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that the MacArthur ladder's robust predictive validity may result from the fact that it measures two factors-economic circumstances and social status-that are each independently associated with health outcomes. These findings provide a novel perspective on the large body of literature that uses the MacArthur ladder and suggests health researchers should do more to disentangle the social and economic aspects of subjective socioeconomic status.

Past research has found that people's subjective perception of their own socioeconomic status (SES) is associated with their health and well-being, even after controlling for traditional measures of SES such as income. But researchers still do not know why. One possibility is that subjective SES is simply a different measure of SES. Another is that it measures social status, separate from economic circumstances. We investigated this question using the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status, which measures how people see their place in society. Across three studies using 1,300 adults in the USA, we found that the MacArthur Ladder measures two distinct factors: (i) economic circumstances, as measured by their income, education, housing, etc. and (ii) social status as measured by relative judgements of power, control, social influence, and their standing in their community and society. Both of these aspects of SES uniquely predict health and well-being. Our investigation demonstrates that the MacArthur ladder is good at predicting health outcomes because it measures both economic circumstances and social status. This new insight can help health researchers better understand the effects of social and economic factors on health, and to measure them more precisely.

People's Preferences for Inequality Respond Instantly to Changes in Status: A Simulated Society Experiment of Conflict Between the Rich and the Poor.

Most people in the United States agree they want some income inequality but debate exactly how much is fair. High-status people generally prefer more inequality than low-status individuals. Here we examine how much preferences for inequality are (or are not) driven by self-interest. Past work has generally investigated this idea in two ways: The first is by stratifying preferences by income, and the second is by randomly assigning financial status within lab-constructed scenarios. In this paper, we develop a method that combines both experimental control and the social experience of inequality-a simulated society experiment. Across two experiments (N = 138, observations = 690), participants voted on the distribution of rewards-first behind a veil of ignorance, and then when they were randomly assigned a status within a game of chance. Status varied repeatedly across five rounds, allowing us to measure dynamic preferences. Under the veil of ignorance, people preferred inequality favoring the top status. When the veil of ignorance disappeared, self-interest immediately influenced inequality preferences. Those who randomly landed in top positions were satisfied with the status quo established under the veil of ignorance, whereas those who randomly landed in bottom positions wanted more equality. Yet these preferences were not stable; decisions about the optimal level of inequality changed according to changes in social status. Our results also showed that, when inequality grows in a society, preferences regarding inequality become polarized by social status. Individuals in low-status positions, particularly, tend to demand more equality.

Constructing Explicit Prejudice: Evidence From Large Sample Datasets.

How does implicit bias contribute to explicit prejudice? Prior experiments show that concept knowledge about fear versus sympathy determines whether negative affect (captured as implicit bias) predicts antisocial outcomes (Lee et al.). Concept knowledge (i.e., beliefs) about groups may similarly moderate the link between implicitly measured negative affect (implicit negative affect) and explicit prejudice. We tested this hypothesis using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2008 Time Series Study (Study 1) and Project Implicit (Study 2). In both studies, participants high in implicit negative affect reported more explicit prejudice if they possessed negative beliefs about Black Americans. Yet, participants high in implicit negative affect reported less explicit prejudice if they possessed fewer negative beliefs about Black Americans. The results are consistent with psychological constructionist and dynamic models of evaluation and offer a more ecologically valid extension of our past laboratory work.

Two thousand years after Archimedes, psychologist finds three topics that will simply not yield to the experimental method.

Cesario argues that experiments cannot illuminate real group disparities because they leave out factors that operate in ordinary life. But what Cesario calls flaws are, in fact, the point of the experimental method. Of all the topics in science, we have to wonder why racial discrimination would be uniquely unsuited for investigating with experiments. The argument to give up the most powerful scientific method to study one of the hardest problems we confront is laughable.

Implicit bias reflects systemic racism.

Implicit bias refers to automatically evoked mental associations about social groups. The idea has been influential across the social sciences as a way to explain persistent racial disparities amid changing self-report attitudes. Most research has treated implicit bias as an individual attitude. However, evidence suggests that it is neither a stable individual difference nor a strong correlate of individual behavior. Moreover, the individual-focused approach can lead researchers to neglect systemic racism as a cause of persistent disparities. We argue that implicit bias can be considered a cognitive reflection of systemic racism in the environment. In this view, implicit bias is an ongoing set of associations based on inequalities and stereotypes in the environment. As such, implicit bias changes when contexts change.

Randomized controlled field trial comparing quarter and cow level selective dry cow treatment using the California Mastitis Test.

Selective use of antibiotic dry cow treatment can be implemented at the cow or quarter level, with the latter having the potential to further reduce antibiotic use. Our objective was to compare these 2 approaches in 6 herds in the United Kingdom in which environmental mastitis predominated. Eight hundred seven cows were enrolled and categorized as having a high cell count (n = 401) or low cell count (n = 406) in the last 3 mo of lactation and clinical mastitis history. All quarters of all enrolled cows received an internal teat sealant. Within each category, cows were randomly allocated to 1 of 3 groups; in one group antibiotic treatment was allocated at cow level (i.e., all 4 quarters received antibiotic), whereas in the 2 remaining groups antibiotic treatment was allocated at quarter level, based on California Mastitis Test (CMT) findings. Two different thresholds, score 1 and 2, were used to determine likely infection status. Quarter milk samples were collected at dry off and postcalving for bacteriological culture and somatic cell count (SCC). Cows were monitored for clinical mastitis from dry off until 100 d in milk. Cow level SCC and milk yield data were collated from farm records. Within each category, the 2 quarter level treatment groups were compared with cow level treatment at dry off. Leaving quarters untreated with intramammary antibiotic in cows in the high cell count group, with a CMT <2 or <1, reduced antibiotic use by 55% and 31%, respectively, and resulted in no difference in the odds of being infected with any pathogen postcalving, but was associated with a higher SCC at the first test day. Intramammary antibiotic treatment of quarters with a CMT ≥1 in cows in the low cell count category at dry off was not associated with any reduction in the odds of being infected with a major pathogen postcalving but was associated with a decrease in the odds of being infected with a minor mastitis pathogen postcalving. The use of antibiotics in quarters of cows categorized as low cell count at dry off, increased the proportion of quarters treated with antibiotic from 0% at cow level to 31% (CMT ≥ 1) and 12% (CMT ≥ 2) at quarter level, only resulting in a reduction in SCC of around 20,000 cells/mL at the first test day, if all quarters with CMT score ≥1 were treated with antibiotic. No differences in clinical mastitis incidence and milk yield in the first 100 d in milk were detected between any of the treatment groups. These study findings support selective quarter level dry off treatment only in cows with cow level SCC >200,000 cells/mL at dry off.

A Privileged Point of View: Effects of Subjective Socioeconomic Status on Naïve Realism and Political Division.

In the United States, both economic inequality and political conflict are on the rise. We investigated whether subjective socioeconomic status (SSS) may help explain why these dual patterns emerge. We hypothesized that higher SSS may increase naïve realism-the belief that one perceives the world as it is, rather than as interpreted through one's own knowledge and beliefs-regarding political issues. Using a representative sample of the American electorate, we found that higher SSS predicted more political naïve realism toward those from a different political party (Study 1). The remaining experiments examined the causal relationship between SSS and political naïve realism (Studies 2-5). We extended these findings by investigating whether SSS influenced participants' willingness to exclude those with contrary views from a vote (Studies 4 and 5). Together, these studies demonstrate that SSS enhances political naïve realism and can lead to the exclusion of others with contrary opinions.

Math and language gender stereotypes: Age and gender differences in implicit biases and explicit beliefs.

In a cross-sectional study of youth ages 8-15, we examined implicit and explicit gender stereotypes regarding math and language abilities. We investigated how implicit and explicit stereotypes differ across age and gender groups and whether they are consistent with cultural stereotypes. Participants (N = 270) completed the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) and a survey of explicit beliefs. Across all ages, boys showed neither math nor language implicit gender biases, whereas girls implicitly favored girls in both domains. These findings are counter to cultural stereotypes, which favor boys in math. On the explicit measure, both boys' and girls' primary tendency was to favor girls in math and language ability, with the exception of elementary school boys, who rated genders equally. We conclude that objective gender differences in academic success guide differences in children's explicit reports and implicit biases.

An indirect measure of discrete emotions.

Experiences of discrete emotion play important roles in a variety of psychological domains. Yet, current measures of discrete emotion face significant limitations. Biological and behavioral measures often do not capture subjective experiences related to discrete emotions, while self-reports are susceptible to reporting biases. An indirect measure of discrete emotions would help address the limitations of existing measures; however, few such measures exist. Across 4 studies, we offer an indirect measure of discrete emotion. Our results provide evidence that our measure can distinguish between participants' experiences of same-valenced emotions (Study 1), is relatively less susceptible to deliberate attempts to suppress emotional responses (Studies 2 and 3), and is also relatively less susceptible to the influence of social norms (i.e., gender stereotypes) in self-reported discrete emotions than an explicit measure (Study 4). Overall, these findings demonstrate that our measure of discrete emotions can capture discrete emotional responses above and beyond affective valence, is indirect, and measures affective processes contributing to discrete emotional responses. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Beyond contingency awareness: the role of influence awareness in resisting conditioned attitudes.

Evaluative conditioning procedures change people's evaluations of stimuli that are paired with pleasant or unpleasant items. To test whether influence awareness allows people to resist such persuasive attempts, we conducted three experiments. In the first two experiments featuring low levels of influence awareness (N1 = 96, N2 = 93) we manipulated the degree of control people have in expressing their attitudes, by providing participants in one condition with the option to "pass" rather than respond, when they felt influenced in their evaluations of conditioned stimuli. In the third experiment (N3 = 240) we manipulated the level of influence awareness by using a warning instruction similar to the one found in prior controllability studies, while giving everyone the option to pass the evaluation when they felt influenced. All studies found that participants often failed to use the skip option to exert control over conditioned preferences. In some cases, this may be because participants failed to notice the pairings, but in most cases because participants lacked awareness that the pairings could influence them. Even when explicitly warned that the pairings could influence them, participants seemed to believe that they were not vulnerable to such effects.

Historical roots of implicit bias in slavery.

Implicit racial bias remains widespread, even among individuals who explicitly reject prejudice. One reason for the persistence of implicit bias may be that it is maintained through structural and historical inequalities that change slowly. We investigated the historical persistence of implicit bias by comparing modern implicit bias with the proportion of the population enslaved in those counties in 1860. Counties and states more dependent on slavery before the Civil War displayed higher levels of pro-White implicit bias today among White residents and less pro-White bias among Black residents. These associations remained significant after controlling for explicit bias. The association between slave populations and implicit bias was partially explained by measures of structural inequalities. Our results support an interpretation of implicit bias as the cognitive residue of past and present structural inequalities.

Stability and Change in Implicit Bias.

Can implicit bias be changed? In a recent longitudinal study, Lai and colleagues (2016, Study 2) compared nine interventions intended to reduce racial bias across 18 university campuses. Although all interventions changed participants' bias on an immediate test, none were effective after a delay. This study has been interpreted as strong evidence that implicit biases are difficult to change. We revisited Lai et al.'s study to test whether the stability observed reflected persistent individual attitudes or stable environments. Our reanalysis (N = 4,842) indicates that individual biases did not return to preexisting levels. Instead, campus means returned to preexisting campus means, whereas individual scores fluctuated mostly randomly. Campus means were predicted by markers of structural inequality. Our results are consistent with the theory that implicit bias reflects biases in the environment rather than individual dispositions. This conclusion is nearly the opposite of the original interpretation: Although social environments are stable, individual implicit biases are ephemeral.

Learning what to inhibit: The influence of repeated testing on the encoding of gender and age information.

Psychological research has devoted considerable attention to the relationship between the multiple category dimensions that can be extracted from faces. In the present studies, we investigated the role of experience and learning on the way the social perceiver deals with multiple category dimensions. Specifically, we tested whether learning which of 2 dimensions is the most relevant to the task at hand influences the encoding and retrieval of both task-relevant and irrelevant dimensions. In our studies, participants went through several cycles, each consisting of a study and a test phase. We manipulated the structure of the tests such that participants were probed on only 1 category dimension (age or gender), despite viewing faces of both category dimensions in all study phases. We hypothesized that when participants were repeatedly tested on 1 dimension, they would proactively control their attention toward that specific dimension and away from the nonrelevant dimension. Five studies demonstrated that: (a) participants learned which dimension was test-relevant such that they gradually became faster and more accurate on that dimension; (b) when the gender dimension was test-relevant, participants were faster and more accurate retrieving information concerning the target faces' gender than age, while the opposite did not happen when the age dimension was test-relevant; and (c) this dominance of the gender dimension is mainly caused by the inhibition of the age dimension. Implications about the importance of previous experience and control for research on social categorization in general and research examining the interplay between gender and age are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Constructing bias: Conceptualization breaks the link between implicit bias and fear of Black Americans.

Negative affect toward outgroup members has long been known to predict discriminatory behavior. However, psychological constructionist theories of emotion suggest that negative affect may not always reflect antipathy for outgroup members. Rather, the subjective experience depends on how negative affect is conceptualized as specific discrete emotions (e.g., fear vs. sympathy). Our current research integrates theories of implicit bias with psychological constructionist theories of emotion to understand the implications of negative affect toward outgroup members. Across 3 studies, we find evidence that conceptualization of negative affect toward Black Americans as sympathy, rather than fear, mitigates the relationship between negative affect and fear of Black Americans on self-report and perceptual measures, and reduces racial bias on a psychophysiological measure. These studies provide evidence that conceptualization of negative affect can shape reactions to outgroup members. We discuss the implications of these findings and ground them in theories of implicit bias, social cognition, and affective science. (PsycINFO Database Record