Laypeople's beliefs about the effects of common estimator variables on memory.

This research builds on James Ost's research investigating whether laypeople's beliefs align with those of experts. Recent studies that examined the relationship between high-confidence eyewitness identifications and accuracy proposed that the mechanism underlying this relationship may be based on a knowledge-conditional model. According to this model, the accuracy of a confidence judgment depends on knowledge about factors that affect memory accuracy. However, there has not been a comprehensive assessment of laypeople's knowledge about the effect on memory accuracy of many estimator variables known to influence the accuracy of eyewitnesses, specifically those relevant to research on the relationship between witness confidence and accuracy. This study consists of the development of a 30-item scale to assess laypeople's knowledge of the effect of 10 common estimator variables on memory accuracy from three points of view (POV): Self, Other, and Juror. Across MTurk and undergraduate samples, laypeople's beliefs about the effect of these estimator variables were generally consistent with research findings and did not differ as a function of POV. Additionally, for most estimator variables, participants' beliefs about memory were consistent with results in the confidence-accuracy literature; confidence and identification accuracy appear to be poorly calibrated for estimator variables that people know less about.

Elevated stress impairs the accuracy of eyewitness memory but not the confidence-accuracy relationship.

Although numerous studies have identified factors that affect eyewitness identification accuracy, recent studies report that many of these factors do not affect the accuracy of high-confidence identifications. This is critical because legal cases are more likely to be prosecuted if they involve high-confidence eyewitnesses. Using a confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) analysis, we explored whether stress affects the accuracy of high-confidence identifications. In two experiments, people viewed faces followed by an old/new recognition-memory test and provided confidence ratings. Stress was manipulated by pairing a low- or high-valence image with each studied face. Identification accuracy was higher in the low- than high-stress condition, yet the proportion correct for high-confidence positive identifications was similar in the two stress conditions. Elevated stress impairs eyewitness identification accuracy overall. However, the results of this study suggest that confidence is a better predictor of recognition-memory accuracy than is stress even though confidence alone is still an imperfect predictor. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Target-related autobiographical memories affect dietary intake intentions.

Although there is evidence that autobiographical memory (AM) recall impacts behaviour in multiple domains, the mechanisms for this effect are unclear. Two experiments examined how AM Frame and Relatedness to target behaviour affect intention to control future dietary intake. Participants completed an AM task where they recalled success or fail-framed memories of behaviour in the target domain (dietary intake), a related domain (exercise), and an unrelated domain (work). Next they completed questionnaires about attitudes, self-efficacy, and behavioural intention for controlling dietary intake. In Experiment 1, Frame and Relatedness of AMs recalled did not affect attitudes or self-efficacy ratings of controlling dietary intake. However, Related AMs resulted in higher intention ratings to control future dietary intake compared to Unrelated AMs. Experiment 2 replicated these results for attitude and self-efficacy, but showed no effect on behavioural intention. A mini-meta analysis was conducted to clarify the effect of AM recall on intention. This analysis confirmed a significant effect of AM Relatedness on intention ratings (meta-analysis Cohen's d = .25, Z = 2.54, p = .011). These results provide evidence that recalling related AM can affect dietary behaviour intentions directly, without changes attitudes or ratings of personal control regarding dietary intake.

Postdictive confidence (but not predictive confidence) predicts eyewitness memory accuracy.

If testing conditions are uncontaminated, confidence at test reliably predicts eyewitness memory accuracy. Unfortunately, information about eyewitness postdictive confidence (at the time of the identification test) is frequently unavailable or not well documented. In cases where postdictive confidence is unavailable, a useful indicator of eyewitness accuracy might be an eyewitness's predictive confidence made shortly after the event. How do the accuracy of predictive and postdictive confidence judgments compare; and do variables reported to affect memory (e.g. exposure duration, face race) affect the reliability of the confidence-accuracy relationship for predictive and postdictive judgments? In two experiments, we tested the accuracy of memory predictions (immediate and delayed judgments of learning [JOLs]) and postdictions (confidence) for same- and cross-race faces. Although delayed high JOLs were indicative of higher recognition memory accuracy than delayed low JOLs for both same- and cross-race faces, the accuracy of even high predictive JOLs was objectively low. Postdictive confidence was a far stronger indicator of memory accuracy than predictive JOLs; high postdictive confidence was indicative of high accuracy; and this was true for both same- and cross-race recognition memory.

Evidence for a confidence-accuracy relationship in memory for same- and cross-race faces.

Discrimination accuracy is usually higher for same- than for cross-race faces, a phenomenon known as the cross-race effect (CRE). According to prior research, the CRE occurs because memories for same- and cross-race faces rely on qualitatively different processes. However, according to a continuous dual-process model of recognition memory, memories that rely on qualitatively different processes do not differ in recognition accuracy when confidence is equated. Thus, although there are differences in overall same- and cross-race discrimination accuracy, confidence-specific accuracy (i.e., recognition accuracy at a particular level of confidence) may not differ. We analysed datasets from four recognition memory studies on same- and cross-race faces to test this hypothesis. Confidence ratings reliably predicted recognition accuracy when performance was above chance levels (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) but not when performance was at chance levels (Experiment 4). Furthermore, at each level of confidence, confidence-specific accuracy for same- and cross-race faces did not significantly differ when overall performance was above chance levels (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) but significantly differed when overall performance was at chance levels (Experiment 4). Thus, under certain conditions, high-confidence same-race and cross-race identifications may be equally reliable.

A meta-analysis of children's self-reports of dietary intake.

OBJECTIVE: Although research studies increasingly use children as primary reporters in dietary assessments, it is unclear how well children's self-reported intake correlates with independently validated reports of their intake; this meta-analysis assesses that correlation. DESIGN: Moderators of the correlation between self-reported and independently validated intake were predicted a priori: type of dietary intake assessment (24 h recall, food diary and food frequency questionnaires), validation measures, parental assistance and age. Online databases were searched for articles published from 1990 to 2014 that compared children's self-reports of dietary intake to validated observations of food intake in children age 4-16. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Summary effect size Pearson r between children's self-reported dietary intake and independently validated dietary intake were calculated. RESULTS: In k = 32 samples from 23 studies, a statistically significant correlation (r = .48, Z = 7.26, p < .001) was found between children's self-reported dietary intake and independently validated reports of dietary intake. Validation method (Q = 17.49, df = 2, p < .001) and parental assistance (Z = 2.03, p = .042) were significant moderators of this correlation. Self-report methodology (Q = 3.95, df = 2, p = .139) and age (Q = .02, p = .879) were not significant moderators of the distribution of effect sizes. CONCLUSION: Together, these results provide baseline information about children's recall in dietary intake assessments conducted with children as primary reporters.

The cross-race effect in face recognition memory by bicultural individuals.

Social-cognitive models of the cross-race effect (CRE) generally specify that cross-race faces are automatically categorized as an out-group, and that different encoding processes are then applied to same-race and cross-race faces, resulting in better recognition memory for same-race faces. We examined whether cultural priming moderates the cognitive categorization of cross-race faces. In Experiment 1, monoracial Latino-Americans, considered to have a bicultural self, were primed to focus on either a Latino or American cultural self and then viewed Latino and White faces. Latino-Americans primed as Latino exhibited higher recognition accuracy (A') for Latino than White faces; those primed as American exhibited higher recognition accuracy for White than Latino faces. In Experiment 2, as predicted, prime condition did not moderate the CRE in European-Americans. These results suggest that for monoracial biculturals, priming either of their cultural identities influences the encoding processes applied to same- and cross-race faces, thereby moderating the CRE.

Postencoding cognitive processes in the cross-race effect: Categorization and individuation during face recognition.

The cross-race effect (CRE) describes the finding that same-race faces are recognized more accurately than cross-race faces. According to social-cognitive theories of the CRE, processes of categorization and individuation at encoding account for differential recognition of same- and cross-race faces. Recent face memory research has suggested that similar but distinct categorization and individuation processes also occur postencoding, at recognition. Using a divided-attention paradigm, in Experiments 1A and 1B we tested and confirmed the hypothesis that distinct postencoding categorization and individuation processes occur during the recognition of same- and cross-race faces. Specifically, postencoding configural divided-attention tasks impaired recognition accuracy more for same-race than for cross-race faces; on the other hand, for White (but not Black) participants, postencoding featural divided-attention tasks impaired recognition accuracy more for cross-race than for same-race faces. A social categorization paradigm used in Experiments 2A and 2B tested the hypothesis that the postencoding in-group or out-group social orientation to faces affects categorization and individuation processes during the recognition of same-race and cross-race faces. Postencoding out-group orientation to faces resulted in categorization for White but not for Black participants. This was evidenced by White participants' impaired recognition accuracy for same-race but not for cross-race out-group faces. Postencoding in-group orientation to faces had no effect on recognition accuracy for either same-race or cross-race faces. The results of Experiments 2A and 2B suggest that this social orientation facilitates White but not Black participants' individuation and categorization processes at recognition. Models of recognition memory for same-race and cross-race faces need to account for processing differences that occur at both encoding and recognition.

Imagination perspective affects ratings of the likelihood of occurrence of autobiographical memories.

Two experiments tested and confirmed the hypothesis that when the phenomenological characteristics of imagined events are more similar to those of related autobiographical memories, the imagined event is more likely to be considered to have occurred. At Time 1 and 2-weeks later, individuals rated the likelihood of occurrence for 20 life events. In Experiment 1, 1-week after Time 1, individuals imagined 3 childhood events from a first-person or third-person perspective. There was a no-imagination control. An increase in likelihood ratings from Time 1 to Time 2 resulted when imagination was from the third-person but not first-person perspective. In Experiment 2, childhood and recent events were imagined from a third- or first-person perspective. A significant interaction resulted. For childhood events, likelihood change scores were greater for third-person than first-person perspective; for recent adult events, likelihood change scores were greater for first-person than third-person perspective, although this latter trend was not significant.

Oxytocin eliminates the own-race bias in face recognition memory.

The neuropeptide Oxytocin influences a number of social behaviors, including processing of faces. We examined whether Oxytocin facilitates the processing of out-group faces and reduce the own-race bias (ORB). The ORB is a robust phenomenon characterized by poor recognition memory of other-race faces compared to the same-race faces. In Experiment 1, participants received intranasal solutions of Oxytocin or placebo prior to viewing White and Black faces. On a subsequent recognition test, whereas in the placebo condition the same-race faces were better recognized than other-race faces, in the Oxytocin condition Black and White faces were equally well recognized, effectively eliminating the ORB. In Experiment 2, Oxytocin was administered after the study phase. The ORB resulted, but Oxytocin did not significantly reduce the effect. This study is the first to show that Oxytocin can enhance face memory of out-group members and underscore the importance of social encoding mechanisms underlying the own-race bias. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled Oxytocin and Social Behav.

The effect of nonprobative photographs on truthiness persists over time.

When making rapid judgments about the truth of a claim, related nonprobative information leads people to believe the claim-an effect called "truthiness" (Newman, Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, 2012). For instance, within a matter of seconds, subjects judge the claim "The Mona Lisa has no eyebrows," to be true more often when it appears with a photograph of the Mona Lisa viewed at a distance by a person. But does truthiness persist longer than a few seconds? To determine if truthiness "sticks," we asked people to judge if each trivia claim in a series was true. Half of the claims appeared with nonprobative photos; the rest appeared alone. In a second session 48h later, people returned and made the same judgments about the same statements, but this time, all claims appeared without photos. We found that truthiness "stuck." The magnitude of the effect of photos on subjective feelings of truth was consistent over time. These results fit with those from cognitive and educational psychology, as well as with the related idea that photos make relevant information more available and familiar-and therefore feel more true-even after a delay.

Interviewing child witnesses: the effect of forced confabulation on event memory.

Age differences in rates of forced confabulation and memory consequences thereof were assessed using a recall task similar to real forensic interview procedures. Children viewed a target video and were tested with the same 18 questions immediately afterward and 1 week later. Of the 18 questions, 12 were answerable; the 6 unanswerable questions referred to information not in the video. Participants in the voluntary confabulation condition had a "don't know" response option; those in the forced confabulation condition did not. Although 6-year-olds and 9-year-olds were equally likely to provide a response to an unanswerable question initially, 1 week later 9-year-olds were significantly more likely than 6-year-olds to repeat their initial confabulated responses. These findings suggest that pressing child witnesses to answer questions they are initially reluctant to answer is not an effective practice, and the consistency of children's responses over time is not necessarily an indication of the accuracy of their eyewitness memory.

Cross-race (but not same-race) face identification is impaired by presenting faces in a group rather than individually.

This study extends the research on cross-race identification by examining how group presentation of faces influences the cross-race effect (CRE) and confirming systematic qualitative differences between the cognitive processes involved in memory for same- and cross-race faces. White individuals viewed 16 target faces (8 White, 8 Black) presented individually or each in a 3-face group. The conditions that impaired cross-race but not same-race face recognition memory were (a) group compared to individual presentation of target faces (Experiment 1), and (b) presentation of target faces in homogeneous (foil faces matched the race of the target face) rather than heterogeneous groups (foil faces did not match the race of the target face; Experiment 2). These findings are interpreted within the context of social-cognitive processes that operate on same- and cross-race faces, specifically, the dual-process account of the CRE. Together, results of these two experiments suggest that the CRE is moderated by viewing conditions that are likely to vary in real world eyewitness memory and identification situations.

Motivated forgetting and misremembering: perspectives from betrayal trauma theory.

Individuals are sometimes exposed to information that may endanger their well-being. In such cases, forgetting or misremembering may be adaptive. Childhood abuse perpetrated by a caregiver is an example. Betrayal trauma theory (BTT) proposes that the way in which events are processed and remembered will be related to the degree to which a negative event represents a betrayal by a trusted, needed other. Full awareness of such abuse may only increase the victim's risk by motivating withdrawal or confrontation with the perpetrator, thus risking a relationship vital to the victim's survival. In such situations, minimizing awareness of the betrayal trauma may be adaptive. BTT has implications for the larger memory and trauma field, particularly with regard to forgetting and misremembering events. This chapter reviews conceptual and empirical issues central to the literature on memory for trauma and BTT as well as identifies future research directions derived from BTT.

Forced confabulation affects memory sensitivity as well as response bias.

A signal detection analysis assessed the extent to which forced confabulation results from a change in memory sensitivity (d(a)), as well as response criterion (ß). After viewing a crime video, participants answered 14 answerable and 6 unanswerable questions. Those in the voluntary guess condition had a "don't know" response option; those in the forced guess condition did not. One week later, the same questions were answered using a recognition memory test that included each participant's initial responses. As was predicted, on both answerable and unanswerable questions, participants in the forced guess condition had significantly lower response criteria than did those who voluntarily guessed. Furthermore, on both answerable and unanswerable questions, d(a) scores were also significantly lower in the forced than in the voluntary guess condition. Thus, the forced confabulation effect is a real memory effect above and beyond the effects of response bias; forcing eyewitnesses to guess or speculate can actually change their memory.

The development of memory for own- and other-race faces.

This study demonstrates that experience and development interact to influence the "cross-race effect." In a multination study (n=245), Caucasian children and adults of European ancestry living in the United States, Norway, or South Africa, as well as biracial (Caucasian-African American) children and adults living in the United States, were tested for recognition of Asian, African, and Caucasian faces. Regardless of national or biracial background, 8- to 10-year-olds, 12- to 14-year-olds, and adults recognized own-race faces more accurately than other-race faces, and did so to a similar extent, whereas 5- to 7-year-olds recognized all face types equally well. This same developmental pattern emerged for biracial children and adults. Thus, early meaningful exposure did not substantially alter the developmental trajectory. During young childhood, developmental influences on face processing operate on a system sufficiently plastic to preclude, under certain conditions, the cross-race effect.

Interviewing witnesses: the effect of forced confabulation on event memory.

After viewing a crime video, participants answered 16 answerable and 6 unanswerable questions. Those in the "voluntary guess" condition had a "don't know" response option; those in the "forced guess" condition did not. One week later the same questions were answered with a "don't know" option. In both experiments, information generated from forced confabulation was less likely remembered than information voluntarily self-generated. Further, when the same answer was given to an unanswerable question both times, the confidence expressed in the answer increased over time in both the forced and the voluntary guess conditions. Pressing eyewitnesses to answer questions, especially questions repeated thrice (Experiment 2), may not be an effective practice because it reliably increases intrusion errors but not correct recall.

What research paradigms have cognitive psychologists used to study "false memory," and what are the implications of these choices?

This research examines the methodologies employed by cognitive psychologists to study "false memory," and assesses if these methodologies are likely to facilitate scientific progress or perhaps constrain the conclusions reached. A PsycINFO search of the empirical publications in cognitive psychology was conducted through January, 2004, using the subject heading, "false memory." The search produced 198 articles. Although there is an apparent false memory research bandwagon in cognitive psychology, with increasing numbers of studies published on this topic over the past decade, few researchers (only 13.1% of the articles) have studied false memory as the term was originally intended--to specifically refer to planting memory for an entirely new event that was never experienced in an individual's lifetime. Cognitive psychologists interested in conducting research relevant to assessing the authenticity of memories for child sexual abuse should consider the generalizability of their research to the planting of entirely new events in memory.

Imagination and memory: does imagining implausible events lead to false autobiographical memories?

Previous studies have reported that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories. This finding has been used to suggest that psychotherapists who have clients imagine suspected repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse may, in fact, be inducing false memories for the imagined events. In this study, at Time 1 and then, 2 weeks later, at Time 2, 145 subjects rated each of 20 events on the Life Events Inventory as to whether each had occurred to them in childhood. One week after Time 1, the subjects were told that 2 target events were plausible and 2 were implausible. They were then asked to imagine 1 plausible and 1 implausible target event. Plausibility and imagining interacted to affect occurrence ratings; whereas imagining plausible events increased the change in occurrence ratings, imagining implausible events had no effect on occurrence ratings.