New clues for the role of cerebellum in schizophrenia and the associated cognitive impairment.

Schizophrenia (SZ) is a complex neuropsychiatric disorder associated with severe cognitive dysfunction. Although research has mainly focused on forebrain abnormalities, emerging results support the involvement of the cerebellum in SZ physiopathology, particularly in Cognitive Impairment Associated with SZ (CIAS). Besides its role in motor learning and control, the cerebellum is implicated in cognition and emotion. Recent research suggests that structural and functional changes in the cerebellum are linked to deficits in various cognitive domains including attention, working memory, and decision-making. Moreover, cerebellar dysfunction is related to altered cerebellar circuit activities and connectivity with brain regions associated with cognitive processing. This review delves into the role of the cerebellum in CIAS. We initially consider the major forebrain alterations in CIAS, addressing impairments in neurotransmitter systems, synaptic plasticity, and connectivity. We then focus on recent findings showing that several mechanisms are also altered in the cerebellum and that cerebellar communication with the forebrain is impaired. This evidence implicates the cerebellum as a key component of circuits underpinning CIAS physiopathology. Further studies addressing cerebellar involvement in SZ and CIAS are warranted and might open new perspectives toward understanding the physiopathology and effective treatment of these disorders.

The effect of context and reason on the neural correlates of intentions.

Many studies have identified networks in parietal and prefrontal cortex that are involved in intentional action. Yet, our understanding of the way these networks are involved in intentions is still very limited. In this study, we investigate two characteristics of these processes: context- and reason-dependence of the neural states associated with intentions. We ask whether these states depend on the context a person is in and the reasons they have for choosing an action. We used a combination of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and multivariate decoding to directly assess the context- and reason-dependency of the neural states underlying intentions. We show that action intentions can be decoded from fMRI data based on a classifier trained in the same context and with the same reason, in line with previous decoding studies. Furthermore, we found that intentions can be decoded across different reasons for choosing an action. However, decoding across different contexts was not successful. We found anecdotal to moderate evidence against context-invariant information in all regions of interest and for all conditions but one. These results suggest that the neural states associated with intentions are modulated by the context of the action.

Strategic complexity and cognitive skills affect brain response in interactive decision-making.

Deciding the best action in social settings requires decision-makers to consider their and others' preferences, since the outcome depends on the actions of both. Numerous empirical investigations have demonstrated variability of behavior across individuals in strategic situations. While prosocial, moral, and emotional factors have been intensively investigated to explain this diversity, neuro-cognitive determinants of strategic decision-making and their relation with intelligence remain mostly unknown. This study presents a new model of the process of strategic decision-making in repeated interactions, first providing a precise measure of the environment's complexity, and then analyzing how this complexity affects subjects' performance and neural response. The results confirm the theoretical predictions of the model. The frequency of deviations from optimal behavior is explained by a combination of higher complexity of the strategic environment and cognitive skills of the individuals. Brain response correlates with strategic complexity, but only in the subgroups with higher cognitive skills. Furthermore, neural effects were only observed in a fronto-parietal network typically involved in single-agent tasks (the Multiple Demand Network), thus suggesting that neural processes dealing with cognitively demanding individual tasks also have a central role in interactive decision-making. Our findings contribute to understanding how cognitive factors shape strategic decision-making and may provide the neural pathway of the reported association between strategic sophistication and fluid intelligence.

Surgical face masks do not impair the decoding of facial expressions of negative affect more severely in older than in younger adults.

Surgical face masks reduce the spread of airborne pathogens but also disturb the flow of information between individuals. The risk of getting seriously ill after infection with SARS-COV-2 during the present COVID-19 pandemic amplifies with age, suggesting that face masks should be worn especially during face-to-face contact with and between older people. However, the ability to accurately perceive and understand communication signals decreases with age, and it is currently unknown whether face masks impair facial communication more severely in older people. We compared the impact of surgical face masks on dynamic facial emotion recognition in younger (18-30 years) and older (65-85 years) adults (N = 96) in an online study. Participants watched short video clips of young women who facially expressed anger, fear, contempt or sadness. Faces of half of the women were covered by a digitally added surgical face mask. As expected, emotion recognition accuracy declined with age, and face masks reduced emotion recognition accuracy in both younger and older participants. Unexpectedly, the effect of face masks did not differ between age groups. Further analyses showed that masks also reduced the participants' overall confidence in their emotion judgements, but not their performance awareness (the difference between their confidence ratings for correct and incorrect responses). Again, there were no mask-by-age interactions. Finally, data obtained with a newly developed questionnaire (attitudes towards face masks, atom) suggest that younger and older people do not differ in how much they feel impaired in their understanding of other people's emotions by face masks or how useful they find face masks in confining the COVID-19 pandemic. In sum, these findings do not provide evidence that the impact of face masks on the decoding of facial signals is disproportionally larger in older people.

Robots facilitate human language production.

Despite recent developments in integrating autonomous and human-like robots into many aspects of everyday life, social interactions with robots are still a challenge. Here, we focus on a central tool for social interaction: verbal communication. We assess the extent to which humans co-represent (simulate and predict) a robot's verbal actions. During a joint picture naming task, participants took turns in naming objects together with a social robot (Pepper, Softbank Robotics). Previous findings using this task with human partners revealed internal simulations on behalf of the partner down to the level of selecting words from the mental lexicon, reflected in partner-elicited inhibitory effects on subsequent naming. Here, with the robot, the partner-elicited inhibitory effects were not observed. Instead, naming was facilitated, as revealed by faster naming of word categories co-named with the robot. This facilitation suggests that robots, unlike humans, are not simulated down to the level of lexical selection. Instead, a robot's speaking appears to be simulated at the initial level of language production where the meaning of the verbal message is generated, resulting in facilitated language production due to conceptual priming. We conclude that robots facilitate core conceptualization processes when humans transform thoughts to language during speaking.

Bringing Together Robotics, Neuroscience, and Psychology: Lessons Learned From an Interdisciplinary Project.

The diversified methodology and expertise of interdisciplinary research teams provide the opportunity to overcome the limited perspectives of individual disciplines. This is particularly true at the interface of Robotics, Neuroscience, and Psychology as the three fields have quite different perspectives and approaches to offer. Nonetheless, aligning backgrounds and interdisciplinary expectations can present challenges due to varied research cultures and practices. Overcoming these challenges stands at the beginning of each productive collaboration and thus is a mandatory step in cognitive neurorobotics. In this article, we share eight lessons that we learned from our ongoing interdisciplinary project on human-robot and robot-robot interaction in social settings. These lessons provide practical advice for scientists initiating interdisciplinary research endeavors. Our advice can help to avoid early problems and deal with differences between research fields, prepare for and anticipate challenges, align project expectations, and speed up research progress, thus promoting effective interdisciplinary research across Robotics, Neuroscience, and Psychology.

The Effect of Counterfactual Information on Outcome Value Coding in Medial Prefrontal and Cingulate Cortex: From an Absolute to a Relative Neural Code.

Adaptive coding of stimuli is well documented in perception, where it supports efficient encoding over a broad range of possible percepts. Recently, a similar neural mechanism has been reported also in value-based decision, where it allows optimal encoding of vast ranges of values in PFC: neuronal response to value depends on the choice context (relative coding), rather than being invariant across contexts (absolute coding). Additionally, value learning is sensitive to the amount of feedback information: providing complete feedback (both obtained and forgone outcomes) instead of partial feedback (only obtained outcome) improves learning. However, it is unclear whether relative coding occurs in all PFC regions and how it is affected by feedback information. We systematically investigated univariate and multivariate feedback encoding in various mPFC regions and compared three modes of neural coding: absolute, partially-adaptive and fully-adaptive.Twenty-eight human participants (both sexes) performed a learning task while undergoing fMRI scanning. On each trial, they chose between two symbols associated with a certain outcome. Then, the decision outcome was revealed. Notably, in one-half of the trials participants received partial feedback, whereas in the other half they got complete feedback. We used univariate and multivariate analysis to explore value encoding in different feedback conditions.We found that both obtained and forgone outcomes were encoded in mPFC, but with opposite sign in its ventral and dorsal subdivisions. Moreover, we showed that increasing feedback information induced a switch from absolute to relative coding. Our results suggest that complete feedback information enhances context-dependent outcome encoding.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT This study offers a systematic investigation of the effect of the amount of feedback information (partial vs complete) on univariate and multivariate outcome value encoding, within multiple regions in mPFC and cingulate cortex that are critical for value-based decisions and behavioral adaptation. Moreover, we provide the first comparison of three possible models of neural coding (i.e., absolute, partially-adaptive, and fully-adaptive coding) of value signal in these regions, by using commensurable measures of prediction accuracy. Taken together, our results help build a more comprehensive picture of how the human brain encodes and processes outcome value. In particular, our results suggest that simultaneous presentation of obtained and foregone outcomes promotes relative value representation.

Neural Representations of Hierarchical Rule Sets: The Human Control System Represents Rules Irrespective of the Hierarchical Level to Which They Belong.

Humans use rules to organize their actions to achieve specific goals. Although simple rules that link a sensory stimulus to one response may suffice in some situations, often, the application of multiple, hierarchically organized rules is required. Recent theories suggest that progressively higher level rules are encoded along an anterior-to-posterior gradient within PFC. Although some evidence supports the existence of such a functional gradient, other studies argue for a lesser degree of specialization within PFC. We used fMRI to investigate whether rules at different hierarchical levels are represented at distinct locations in the brain or encoded by a single system. Thirty-seven male and female participants represented and applied hierarchical rule sets containing one lower-level stimulus-response rule and one higher-level selection rule. We used multivariate pattern analysis to investigate directly the representation of rules at each hierarchical level in absence of information about rules from other levels or other task-related information, thus providing a clear identification of low- and high-level rule representations. We could decode low- and high-level rules from local patterns of brain activity within a wide frontoparietal network. However, no significant difference existed between regions encoding representations of rules from both levels except for precentral gyrus, which represented only low-level rule information. Our findings show that the brain represents conditional rules regardless of their level in the explored hierarchy, so the human control system did not organize task representation according to this dimension. Our paradigm represents a promising approach to identifying critical principles that shape this control system.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Several recent studies investigating the organization of the human control system propose that rules at different control levels are organized along an anterior-to-posterior gradient within PFC. In this study, we used multivariate pattern analysis to explore independently the representation of formally identical conditional rules belonging to different levels of a cognitive hierarchy and provide for the first time a clear identification of low- and high-level rule representations. We found no major spatial differences between regions encoding rules from different hierarchical levels. This suggests that the human brain does not use levels in the investigated hierarchy as a topographical organization principle to represent rules controlling our behavior. Our paradigm represents a promising approach to identifying which principles are critical.

Working memory in healthy aging and in Parkinson's disease: evidence of interference effects.

Focusing on relevant information while suppressing the irrelevant one are critical abilities for different cognitive processes. However, their functioning has been scarcely investigated in the working memory (WM) domain, in both healthy and pathological conditions. The present research aimed to study these abilities in aging and Parkinson's disease (PD), testing three groups of healthy participants (young, older and elderly) and one of PD patients, employing a new experimental paradigm. Results showed that the transient storing of irrelevant information in WM causes substantial interference effects, which were remarkable in elderly individuals on both response latency and accuracy. Interestingly, PD patients responded faster and were equally accurate compared to a matched control group. Taken together, findings confirm the existence of similar mechanisms for orienting attention inwards to WM contents or outwards to perceptual stimuli, and suggest the suitability of our task to assess WM functioning in both healthy aging and PD.

Multiple neural representations of elementary logical connectives.

A defining trait of human cognition is the capacity to form compounds out of simple thoughts. This ability relies on the logical connectives AND, OR and IF. Simple propositions, e.g., 'There is a fork' and 'There is a knife', can be combined in alternative ways using logical connectives: e.g., 'There is a fork AND there is a knife', 'There is a fork OR there is a knife', 'IF there is a fork, there is a knife'. How does the brain represent compounds based on different logical connectives, and how are compounds evaluated in relation to new facts? In the present study, participants had to maintain and evaluate conjunctive (AND), disjunctive (OR) or conditional (IF) compounds while undergoing functional MRI. Our results suggest that, during maintenance, the left posterior inferior frontal gyrus (pIFG, BA44, or Broca's area) represents the surface form of compounds. During evaluation, the left pIFG switches to processing the full logical meaning of compounds, and two additional areas are recruited: the left anterior inferior frontal gyrus (aIFG, BA47) and the left intraparietal sulcus (IPS, BA40). The aIFG shows a pattern of activation similar to pIFG, and compatible with processing the full logical meaning of compounds, whereas activations in IPS differ with alternative interpretations of conditionals: logical vs conjunctive. These results uncover the functions of a basic cortical network underlying human compositional thought, and provide a shared neural foundation for the cognitive science of language and reasoning.

Deduction without awareness.

We investigated whether two basic forms of deductive inference, Modus Ponens and Disjunctive Syllogism, occur automatically and without awareness. In Experiment 1, we used a priming paradigm with a set of conditional and disjunctive problems. For each trial, two premises were shown. The second premise was presented at a rate designed to be undetectable. After each problem, participants had to evaluate whether a newly-presented target number was odd or even. The target number matched or did not match a conclusion endorsed by the two previous premises. We found that when the target matched the conclusion of a Modus Ponens inference, the evaluation of the target number was reliably faster than baseline even when participants reported that they were not aware of the second premise. This priming effect did not occur for any other valid or invalid inference that we tested, including the Disjunctive Syllogism. In Experiment 2, we used a forced-choice paradigm in which we found that some participants were able to access some information on the second premise when their attention was explicitly directed to it. In Experiment 3, we showed that the priming effect for Modus Ponens was present also in subjects who could not access any information about P(2). In Experiment 4 we explored whether spatial relations (e.g., "a before b") or sentences with quantifiers (e.g., "all a with b") could generate a priming effect similar to the one observed for Modus Ponens. A priming effect could be found for Modus Ponens only, but not for the other relations tested. These findings show that the Modus Ponens inference, in contrast to other deductive inferences, can be carried out automatically and unconsciously. Furthermore, our findings suggest that critical deductive inference schemata can be included in the range of high-level cognitive activities that are carried out unconsciously.