Equality and efficiency shape cooperation in multiple-public-goods provision problems.

The functioning of groups and societies requires that individuals cooperate on public goods such as healthcare and state defense. More often than not, individuals face multiple public goods and must choose on which to cooperate, if at all. Such decisions can be difficult when public goods are attractive on one dimension (e.g., being "efficient" in providing comparatively high returns) and unattractive on another (e.g., creating inequality by providing some group members greater returns than others). We examined how people manage such decision conflicts in five preregistered experiments (N = 900) that confronted participants with two public goods that varied in efficiency and (in)equality of returns. People cooperated more on the comparatively efficient public good and on the equal-return (vs. unequal-return) public good (Experiment 1), yet when the unequal-returns public good was also the most efficient, individuals cooperated comparatively more on this unequal-but-efficient public good when they themselves benefitted the most from inequality (Experiments 2-4). Low beneficiaries largely ignored public goods efficiency and preferentially cooperated on the equal- rather than unequal-returns public good. Expectations (Experiments 2-4), preferences for revising the multiple-public-goods provision problems' choice architecture (Experiments 3-4), and descriptive norms held by uninvolved arbitrators (Experiment 5) echoed these cooperation patterns, but uninvolved arbitrators deemed it socially appropriate to cooperate more on the equal than the unequal public good regardless of beneficiary position. We discuss implications for theory and policy on cooperation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Political ideology and moral dilemmas in public good provision.

Individuals often face dilemmas in which non-cooperation serves their self-interest and cooperation favors society at large. Cooperation is often considered the moral choice because it creates equality and fairness among citizens. Accordingly, individuals whose political ideology attaches greater value to equality than to agency and self-reliance should not only cooperate on more rather than less efficient public goods, but also more on public goods from which individuals benefit equally rather than unequally. We examine this possibility by comparing ideologically left-leaning and right-leaning individuals' cooperation on multiple public goods that varied in efficiency and (in)equality in returns. We find that left-leaning individuals cooperate more than right-leaning ones, but only on public goods that benefit everyone equally, and not more on public goods that generate inequalities. Left-leaning individuals also trust and expect others to cooperate more on equal- versus unequal-returns public goods, while self-identified right-leaning individuals do not differentiate between these. Interestingly, ideology does not predict which public good is deemed more morally appropriate to cooperate on. Results combined specify when and why self-identified leftists can(not) be expected to cooperate more than rightists and reveal how moral decision-making depends on structural elements of the public good provision problems that citizens face.

Political games of attack and defence.

Political conflicts often revolve around changing versus defending a status quo. We propose to capture the dynamics between proponents and opponents of political change in terms of an asymmetric game of attack and defence with its equilibrium in mixed strategies. Formal analyses generate predictions about effort expended on revising and protecting the status quo, the form and function of false signalling and cheap talk, how power differences impact conflict intensity and the likelihood of status quo revision. Laboratory experiments on the neurocognitive and hormonal foundations of attack and defence reveal that out-of-equilibrium investments in attack emerge because of non-selfish preferences, limited capacity to compute costs and benefits and optimistic beliefs about the chances of winning from one's rival. We conclude with implications for the likelihood of political change and inertia, and discuss the role of ideology in political games of attack and defence. This article is part of the theme issue 'The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms'.

With or without you: The paradoxical role of identification in predicting joint and ingroup collective action in intergroup conflict.

While we have a rich understanding of the motivations of disadvantaged group members to act collectively with their group, especially the important role played by identification, we know less about the disadvantaged's motivations to engage in joint action with the advantaged. This research examines the role of identification in predicting joint and ingroup collective action in intergroup conflicts. Since joint action inherently diffuses the perception of "us versus them", we propose that identification predicts ingroup action, but not joint action. We also examine conflict intensity as a moderator, and examine how changing identification is linked to change in support for joint action. We test these hypotheses in a three-wave longitudinal study in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Results support our hypotheses, demonstrating that identification positively predicts ingroup action but not necessarily joint action, and that when conflict intensifies, changes in identification are negatively related to joint action with outgroup members.

Economic system justification predicts muted emotional responses to inequality.

Although humans display inequality aversion, many people appear to be untroubled by widespread economic disparities. We suggest that such indifference is partly attributable to a belief in the fairness of the capitalist system. Here we report six studies showing that economic ideology predicts self-reported and physiological responses to inequality. In Studies 1 and 2, participants who regard the economic system as justified, compared with those who do not, report feeling less negative emotion after watching videos depicting homelessness. In Studies 3-5, economic system justifiers exhibit low levels of negative affect, as indexed by activation of the corrugator supercilii muscle, and autonomic arousal, as indexed by skin conductance, while viewing people experiencing homelessness. In Study 6, which employs experience-sampling methodology, everyday exposure to rich and poor people elicits less negative emotion among system justifiers. These results provide the strongest evidence to date that system-justifying beliefs diminish aversion to inequality in economic contexts.

An eight-week mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) workshop increases regulatory choice flexibility.

Individuals encounter a variety of emotional challenges daily, with optimal emotion modulation requiring adaptive choice among available means of regulation. However, individuals differ in the ability to flexibly and adaptively move between engaging and disengaging emotion regulation (ER) strategies as per contextual demands, referred to as regulatory choice flexibility. Greater regulatory choice flexibility is associated with greater mental health, well-being and resilience, warranting the development of interventions to increase such flexibility. We hypothesized that a mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) program would fulfill this goal. To test our hypothesis, we recruited college students to either participate in an 8-week MBSR workshop or join a waiting list for a later workshop (i.e., control participants). After the workshop's completion, all participants were invited to the laboratory and completed several computerized tasks examining their regulatory choice flexibility when exposed to universally emotion-laden stimuli as well as stimuli specifically related to the students' social and political environment. The regulatory choice patterns of participants who underwent MBSR training were found to be more flexible than those of participants who had not yet completed the workshop, with the former more likely than the latter to favor an engaging ER strategy (i.e., reappraisal) when faced with low-intensity stimuli and a disengaging strategy (i.e., distraction) when faced with high-intensity stimuli. The findings' importance is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

A Darker Side of Hope: Harmony-Focused Hope Decreases Collective Action Intentions Among the Disadvantaged.

Hope is viewed as a positive emotion associated with the motivation to change existing conditions. As such, it is highly relevant for social change, particularly when considering disadvantaged groups. We propose that, in the context of unequal intergroup relations, hope may actually undermine motivation for change among disadvantaged group members. Specifically, we distinguish between hope targeted at harmony with the outgroup and hope targeted at social equality between groups. Drawing on insights regarding the consequences of positive intergroup interactions, we predict that hope for harmony with the outgroup can undermine the constructive tension that motivates the disadvantaged toward equality. Across four studies, involving different intergroup contexts, hope for harmony was negatively associated with disadvantaged group members' motivation for collective action. We further found that high identifiers from the disadvantaged group were immune to this effect. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for the role of hope in social change.

Exposure to the 2014 Gaza War and Support for Militancy: The Role of Emotion Dysregulation.

How do wars shape emotions and attitudes in intractable conflicts? In two studies conducted in the aftermath of the 2014 Gaza War in the Middle East, we tested a new theoretical model wherein the ability to regulate emotions is central in determining the influence of war exposure on emotions (i.e., group-based humiliation) and support for militancy, through posttraumatic stress symptoms (PSS). Results supported our model: (a) higher exposure to the war predicted group-based humiliation in both studies and in Study 2 also greater support for militancy; in both studies, (b) higher exposure predicted more PSS only among participants high in emotion dysregulation, and, for them, (c) higher exposure predicted greater group-based humiliation, through increased levels of PSS. Results from Study 2 suggest that (d) group-based humiliation will ultimately lead to greater support for militancy. The findings' contribution to the different literatures and their integration is discussed.

Relational mobility predicts social behaviors in 39 countries and is tied to historical farming and threat.

Biologists and social scientists have long tried to understand why some societies have more fluid and open interpersonal relationships and how those differences influence culture. This study measures relational mobility, a socioecological variable quantifying voluntary (high relational mobility) vs. fixed (low relational mobility) interpersonal relationships. We measure relational mobility in 39 societies and test whether it predicts social behavior. People in societies with higher relational mobility report more proactive interpersonal behaviors (e.g., self-disclosure and social support) and psychological tendencies that help them build and retain relationships (e.g., general trust, intimacy, self-esteem). Finally, we explore ecological factors that could explain relational mobility differences across societies. Relational mobility was lower in societies that practiced settled, interdependent subsistence styles, such as rice farming, and in societies that had stronger ecological and historical threats.

When ideology meets conflict-related content: Influences on emotion generation and regulation.

Do rightists and leftists experience information about suffering and harm with differing emotional intensities, depending on the identity of target depicted? Do they consequently choose differently how to regulate or cope with these emotions? Research has identified ideological differences in emotional processes, but it has yet to identify what types of content lead to ideological differences in emotional intensity or whether these content-dependent differences relate to differing preferences for engaging versus disengaging emotion-regulation strategies. We posited that right-left differences in experienced emotional intensity would be context-dependent, emerging mostly in response to depictions of harm to the outgroup, in accordance with the centrality of intergroup attitudes to ideological self-placement in conflict. Study 1 (N = 83) supported this hypothesis, with leftists (vs. rightists) experiencing outgroup harm (but not ingroup harm or conflict-irrelevant harm) with greater emotional intensity. Study 2 (N = 101), which replicated this finding, additionally examined whether behavioral differences in regulatory choice consequently emerge mostly regarding outgroup harm. We tested 2 competing hypotheses as to the nature of these differences: (a) the intensity hypothesis, positing that leftists (more than rightists) would regulate their intensified reactions to outgroup harm through disengagement-distraction (vs. engagement-reappraisal) due to a documented greater preference for disengaging coping strategies as intensity increases, and (b) the motivation hypothesis, positing that leftists (more than rightists) would prefer engagement-reappraisal (vs. disengagement-distraction), consistent with leftists' documented greater preference for intergroup empathy. Results exclusively supported the intensity hypothesis, and the significance of both studies is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

Are leftists more emotion-driven than rightists? The interactive influence of ideology and emotions on support for policies.

Although emotions and ideology are important factors guiding policy support in conflict, their interactive influence remains unclear. Based on prior findings that ideological leftists' beliefs are more susceptible to change than rightists' beliefs, we tested a somewhat counterintuitive extension that leftists would be more susceptible to influence by their emotional reactions than rightists. In three laboratory studies, inducing positive and negative emotions affected Jewish-Israeli leftists', but not rightists', support for conciliatory policies toward an adversarial (Studies 1 and 3) and a non-adversarial (Study 2) outgroup. Three additional field studies showed that positive and negative emotions were related to leftists', but not rightists', policy support in positive as well as highly negative conflict-related contexts, among both Jewish (Studies 4 and 5) and Palestinian (Study 6) citizens of Israel. Across different conflicts, emotions, conflict-related contexts, and even populations, leftists' policy support changed in accordance with emotional reactions more than rightists' policy support.

Overcoming the barrier of narrative adherence in conflicts through awareness of the psychological bias of naïve realism.

One significant socio-psychological barrier for peaceful resolution of conflicts is each party's adherence to its own collective narrative. We hypothesized that raising awareness to the psychological bias of naïve realism and its identification in oneself would provide a path to overcoming this barrier, thus increasing openness to the adversary's narrative. We conducted three experimental studies in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Studies 1 and 2, conducted among Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Israelis, respectively, revealed that participants with hawkish political ideology reported greater openness to the adversary's narrative when they were made aware of naïve realism bias. Study 3 revealed that hawkish participants at the baseline adhered to the ingroup narrative and resisted the adversary's narrative more than dovish participants. They were also more able to identify the bias in themselves upon learning about it. This identification may explain why the manipulation led to bias correction only among hawkish participants.