How is GPS used? Understanding navigation system use and its relation to spatial ability.

Given how commonly GPS is now used in everyday navigation, it is surprising how little research has been dedicated to investigating variations in its use and how such variations may relate to navigation ability. The present study investigated general GPS dependence, how people report using GPS in various navigational scenarios, and the relationship between these measures and spatial abilities (assessed by self-report measures and the ability to learn the layout of a novel environment). GPS dependence is an individual's perceived need to use GPS in navigation, and GPS usage is the frequency with which they report using different functions of GPS. The study also assessed whether people modulate reported use of GPS as a function of their familiarity with the location in which they are navigating. In 249 participants over two preregistered studies, reported GPS dependence was negatively correlated with objective navigation performance and self-reported sense of direction, and positively correlated with spatial anxiety. Greater reported use of GPS for turn-by-turn directions was associated with a poorer sense of direction and higher spatial anxiety. People reported using GPS most frequently for time and traffic estimation, regardless of ability. Finally, people reported using GPS less, regardless of ability, when they were more familiar with an environment. Collectively these findings suggest that people moderate their use of GPS, depending on their knowledge, ability, and confidence in their own abilities, and often report using GPS to augment rather than replace spatial environmental knowledge.

High replicability of newly discovered social-behavioural findings is achievable.

Failures to replicate evidence of new discoveries have forced scientists to ask whether this unreliability is due to suboptimal implementation of methods or whether presumptively optimal methods are not, in fact, optimal. This paper reports an investigation by four coordinated laboratories of the prospective replicability of 16 novel experimental findings using rigour-enhancing practices: confirmatory tests, large sample sizes, preregistration and methodological transparency. In contrast to past systematic replication efforts that reported replication rates averaging 50%, replication attempts here produced the expected effects with significance testing (P < 0.05) in 86% of attempts, slightly exceeding the maximum expected replicability based on observed effect sizes and sample sizes. When one lab attempted to replicate an effect discovered by another lab, the effect size in the replications was 97% that in the original study. This high replication rate justifies confidence in rigour-enhancing methods to increase the replicability of new discoveries.

What I didn't grow up with is dangerous: personal experience with a new technology or societal change reduces the belief that it corrupts youth.

Introduction: Throughout history, technological and societal changes consistently receive suspicion. Their influences appear damaging, corrupting, and potential precursors to societal downfall, with today's youth often portrayed as the primary victims. This study aims to explore an underlying reason for these perceptions and to investigate why society frequently perceives technological and societal transitions as detrimental to the younger generation. Methods: We conduct two studies across a total of 1,702 participants. In a pilot study, American adults generate a list of technological/societal innovations they believe to be especially problematic for youth in various ways. The second study maps beliefs that specific technological/societal shifts are corruptive, correlating with whether American adults experience them during their upbringing. Results: People view recent technologies as particularly corrupting of today's youth. A notable within-person correlation exists between an individual's exposure to specific technologies during their youth and their belief that these technologies corrupt today's youth. Specifically, people are more inclined to view technological/societal shifts as corruptive if they don't experience them during their formative years (b = -0.09, p < 0.001, 95%CI = [-0.11, -0.09]). When reminded of their own exposure to a particular innovation during their upbringing, however, this relationship reduces. Discussion: These findings suggest unfamiliarity currently stands as a pivotal factor in societal apprehensions regarding new technological and societal evolutions. As society welcomes new innovations, an enduring cycle emerges where those unacquainted changes seem corruptive to the newer generations. Recognizing this bias, primarily driven by mere unfamiliarity, may be crucial for more balanced evaluations of the inevitable technological and societal progress.

Do Obligations Follow the Mind or Body?

Do you persist as the same person over time because you keep the same mind or because you keep the same body? Philosophers have long investigated this question of personal identity with thought experiments. Cognitive scientists have joined this tradition by assessing lay intuitions about those cases. Much of this work has focused on judgments of identity continuity. But identity also has practical significance: obligations are tagged to one's identity over time. Understanding how someone persists as the same person over time could provide insight into how and why moral and legal obligations persist. In this paper, we investigate judgments of obligations in hypothetical cases where a person's mind and body diverge (e.g., brain transplant cases). We find a striking pattern of results: In assigning obligations in these identity test cases, people are divided among three groups: "body-followers," "mind-followers," and "splitters"-people who say that the obligation is split between the mind and the body. Across studies, responses are predicted by a variety of factors, including mind/body dualism, essentialism, education, and professional training. When we give this task to professional lawyers, accountants, and bankers, we find they are more inclined to rely on bodily continuity in tracking obligations. These findings reveal not only the heterogeneity of intuitions about identity but how these intuitions relate to the legal standing of an individual's obligations.

Manipulating Belief in Free Will and Its Downstream Consequences: A Meta-Analysis.

Ever since some scientists and popular media put forward the idea that free will is an illusion, the question has risen what would happen if people stopped believing in free will. Psychological research has investigated this question by testing the consequences of experimentally weakening people's free will beliefs. The results of these investigations have been mixed, with successful experiments and unsuccessful replications. This raises two fundamental questions: Can free will beliefs be manipulated, and do such manipulations have downstream consequences? In a meta-analysis including 145 experiments (95 unpublished), we show that exposing individuals to anti-free will manipulations decreases belief in free will and increases belief in determinism. However, we could not find evidence for downstream consequences. Our findings have important theoretical implications for research on free will beliefs and contribute to the discussion of whether reducing people's belief in free will has societal consequences.

Who Denigrates Today's Youth?: The Role of Age, Implicit Theories, and Sharing the Same Negative Trait.

Adults perceive the youth of the present as being worse than from when they were young. This phenomenon has been shown to be a product of a memory bias, adults are unable to accurately recall what children were like in the past so they impose their current selves onto their memories. In two studies using American adults (N = 2,764), we seek to connect this finding to age, implicit theories of change, and extend the beliefs in the decline of the youth to new domains. Here we show as people age, they hold harsher beliefs about present children. Those who believe a trait does not change throughout the lifespan exhibit more forgiving attitudes toward the youth of today, believing they may not be in such decline on that trait. Finally, people who are low in a negative trait believe strongly that children are becoming more deficient in that particular trait (e.g., those who are not narcissistic believe the youth are becoming more narcissistic).

Situational factors shape moral judgements in the trolley dilemma in Eastern, Southern and Western countries in a culturally diverse sample.

The study of moral judgements often centres on moral dilemmas in which options consistent with deontological perspectives (that is, emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with options consistent with utilitarian judgements (that is, following the greater good based on consequences). Greene et al. (2009) showed that psychological and situational factors (for example, the intent of the agent or the presence of physical contact between the agent and the victim) can play an important role in moral dilemma judgements (for example, the trolley problem). Our knowledge is limited concerning both the universality of these effects outside the United States and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors affecting moral judgements. Thus, we empirically tested the universality of the effects of intent and personal force on moral dilemma judgements by replicating the experiments of Greene et al. in 45 countries from all inhabited continents. We found that personal force and its interaction with intention exert influence on moral judgements in the US and Western cultural clusters, replicating and expanding the original findings. Moreover, the personal force effect was present in all cultural clusters, suggesting it is culturally universal. The evidence for the cultural universality of the interaction effect was inconclusive in the Eastern and Southern cultural clusters (depending on exclusion criteria). We found no strong association between collectivism/individualism and moral dilemma judgements.

Irrelevant insights make worldviews ring true.

Our basic beliefs about reality can be impossible to prove and yet we can feel a strong intuitive conviction about them, as exemplified by insights that imbue an idea with immediate certainty. Here we presented participants with worldview beliefs such as "people's core qualities are fixed" and simultaneously elicited an aha moment. In the first experiment (N = 3000, which included a direct replication), participants rated worldview beliefs as truer when they solved anagrams and also experienced aha moments. A second experiment (N = 1564) showed that the worldview statement and the aha moment must be perceived simultaneously for this 'insight misattribution' effect to occur. These results demonstrate that artificially induced aha moments can make worldview beliefs seem truer, possibly because humans partially rely on feelings of insight to appraise an idea's veracity. Feelings of insight are therefore not epiphenomenal and should be investigated for their effects on decisions, beliefs, and delusions.

Moral contamination: Perceptions of good (but not bad) deeds depend on the ethical history of the actor.

In the majority of moral decision-making research, we are asked to consider the action of someone we know little about-an anonymous actor. This is inconsistent with our everyday judgments of the actions of others. Here we test the novel prediction of whether actions are considered as comparably virtuous or malignant when performed by a good person, an immoral person, or the standard anonymous actor. Across four sets of experiments (nine studies in total), we show that the moral status of the actor contaminates peoples' evaluations of the virtue of their actions. Even without ulterior motives, people do not judge good acts consistently across actors. We also discover a dose-response relationship where the more immoral the actor has been in the past-the less credit they are given for a good action in the present. This process does not occur for good people performing bad acts, however. Bad acts are bad regardless of who commits them. These results give new insights into the way people evaluate the behaviors of others.

Lay Theories of the Wandering Mind: Control-Related Beliefs Predict Mind Wandering Rates in- and outside the Lab.

People often fail to keep their mind from wandering. Here, we examine how the tendency to mind wander is affected by people's beliefs, or lay theories. Building on research on lay theories and self-regulation, we test whether differences in people's beliefs about the extent to which mind wandering is controllable affect thought control strategies and mind-wandering rates in daily life and the laboratory. We develop a new scale to assess control-related beliefs about mind wandering. Scores on the scale predict mind wandering (Study 1) and intrusive thoughts (Study 2) in everyday life, thought control strategies and dysfunctional responses to unwanted thoughts (Study 2), and mind wandering during reading in the laboratory (Studies 3-6). Moreover, experimentally induced lay theories affect mind-wandering rates during reading (Studies 4 and 5). Finally, the effectiveness of strategies people can use to reduce their mind wandering depends on their lay theories (Studies 2 and 6).

No relationship between researcher impact and replication effect: an analysis of five studies with 100 replications.

What explanation is there when teams of researchers are unable to successfully replicate already established 'canonical' findings? One suggestion that has been put forward, but left largely untested, is that those researchers who fail to replicate prior studies are of low 'expertise and diligence' and lack the skill necessary to successfully replicate the conditions of the original experiment. Here we examine the replication success of 100 scientists of differing 'expertise and diligence' who attempted to replicate five different studies. Using a bibliometric tool (h-index) as our indicator of researcher 'expertise and diligence', we examine whether this was predictive of replication success. Although there was substantial variability in replication success and in the h-factor of the investigators, we find no relationship between these variables. The present results provide no evidence for the hypothesis that systematic replications fail because of low 'expertise and diligence' among replicators.

Kids these days: Why the youth of today seem lacking.

In five preregistered studies, we assess people's tendency to believe "kids these days" are deficient relative to those of previous generations. Across three traits, American adults (N=3,458; M age = 33-51 years) believe today's youth are in decline; however, these perceptions are associated with people's standing on those traits. Authoritarian people especially think youth are less respectful of their elders, intelligent people especially think youth are less intelligent, well-read people especially think youth enjoy reading less. These beliefs are not predicted by irrelevant traits. Two mechanisms contribute to humanity's perennial tendency to denigrate kids: (1) a person-specific tendency to notice the limitations of others where one excels, (ii) a memory bias projecting one's current qualities onto the youth of the past. When observing current children, we compare our biased memory to the present and a decline appears. This may explain why the kids these days effect has been happening for millennia.

Rushing to Appear Virtuous: Time Pressure Increases Socially Desirable Responding.

Prosociality increases when decisions are made under time pressure. Here, we investigated whether time pressure increases socially desirable responding outside social interactions (Study 1). Finding that it did, we then examined whether this is because people align their responses with the concept of their "true" self or because of an intuitive tendency to comply with norms (Study 2). In Study 1, we randomly assigned each of 1,500 Americans to answer a measure of social-desirability bias either quickly or slowly and found that quick responding increased social desirability. In Study 2, we recruited a similar sample and tested whether fast-responding effects were moderated by the extent to which people display a good-true-self bias. A greater tendency to ascribe good behaviors to the true self predicted social desirability, but this relationship disappeared under time pressure. These results of socially desirable behavior under time pressure do not reflect people's deep-down good selves but, rather, their desire to present themselves favorably to other people.

The Psychological Science Accelerator: Advancing Psychology through a Distributed Collaborative Network.

Concerns have been growing about the veracity of psychological research. Many findings in psychological science are based on studies with insufficient statistical power and nonrepresentative samples, or may otherwise be limited to specific, ungeneralizable settings or populations. Crowdsourced research, a type of large-scale collaboration in which one or more research projects are conducted across multiple lab sites, offers a pragmatic solution to these and other current methodological challenges. The Psychological Science Accelerator (PSA) is a distributed network of laboratories designed to enable and support crowdsourced research projects. These projects can focus on novel research questions, or attempt to replicate prior research, in large, diverse samples. The PSA's mission is to accelerate the accumulation of reliable and generalizable evidence in psychological science. Here, we describe the background, structure, principles, procedures, benefits, and challenges of the PSA. In contrast to other crowdsourced research networks, the PSA is ongoing (as opposed to time-limited), efficient (in terms of re-using structures and principles for different projects), decentralized, diverse (in terms of participants and researchers), and inclusive (of proposals, contributions, and other relevant input from anyone inside or outside of the network). The PSA and other approaches to crowdsourced psychological science will advance our understanding of mental processes and behaviors by enabling rigorous research and systematically examining its generalizability.

Free to help? An experiment on free will belief and altruism.

How does belief in free will affect altruistic behavior? In an online experiment we undermine subjects' belief in free will through a priming task. Subjects subsequently conduct a series of binary dictator games in which they can distribute money between themselves and a charity that supports low-income people in developing countries. In each decision task, subjects choose between two different distributions, one of which is more generous towards the charity. In contrast to previous experiments that report a negative effect of undermining free will on honest behavior and self-reported willingness to help, we find an insignificant average treatment effect. However, we do find that our treatment reduces charitable giving among non-religious subjects, but not among religious subjects. This could be explained by our finding that religious subjects associate more strongly with social norms that prescribe helping the poor, and might therefore be less sensitive to the effect of reduced belief in free will. Taken together, these findings indicate that the effects of free will belief on prosocial behavior are more nuanced than previously suggested.

Effects of cognitive training on the structure of intelligence.

Targeted cognitive training, such as n-back or speed of processing training, in the hopes of raising intelligence is of great theoretical and practical importance. The most important theoretical contribution, however, is not about the malleability of intelligence. Instead, I argue the most important and novel theoretical contribution is understanding the causal structure of intelligence. The structure of intelligence, most often taken as a hierarchical factor structure, necessarily prohibits transfer from subfactors back up to intelligence. If this is the true structure, targeted cognitive training interventions will fail to increase intelligence not because intelligence is immutable, but simply because there is no causal connection between, say, working memory and intelligence. Seeing the structure of intelligence for what it is, a causal measurement model, allows us to focus testing on the presence and absence of causal links. If we can increase subfactors without transfer to other facets, we may be confirming the correct causal structure more than testing malleability. Such a blending into experimental psychometrics is a strong theoretical pursuit.

Believing there is no free will corrupts intuitive cooperation.

Regardless of whether free will exists, believing that it does affects one's behavior. When an individual's belief in free will is challenged, one can become more likely to act in an uncooperative manner. The mechanism behind the relationship between one's belief in free will and behavior is still debated. The current study uses an economic contribution game under varying time constraints to elucidate whether reducing belief in free will allows one to justify negative behavior or if the effects occur at a more intuitive level of processing. Here we show that although people are intuitively cooperative, challenging their belief in free will corrupts this behavior, leading to impulsive selfishness. If given time to think, however, people are able to override the initial inclination toward self-interest induced by discouraging a belief in free will.

How to Make a Young Child Smarter: Evidence From the Database of Raising Intelligence.

Can interventions meaningfully increase intelligence? If so, how? The Database of Raising Intelligence is a continuously updated compendium of randomized controlled trials that were designed to increase intelligence. In this article, the authors examine nearly every available intervention involving children from birth to kindergarten, using meta-analytic procedures when more than 3 studies tested similar methods and reviewing interventions when too few were available for meta-analysis. This yielded 4 meta-analyses on the effects of dietary supplementation to pregnant mothers and neonates, early educational interventions, interactive reading, and sending a child to preschool. All 4 meta-analyses yielded significant results: Supplementing infants with long-chain polyunsaturated fatty acids, enrolling children in early educational interventions, reading to children in an interactive manner, and sending children to preschool all raise the intelligence of young children.