Semantic partitioning facilitates memory for object location through category-partition cueing.

In our lived environments, objects are often semantically organised (e.g., cookware and cutlery are placed close together in the kitchen). Across four experiments, we examined how semantic partitions (that group same-category objects in space) influenced memory for object locations. Participants learned the locations of items in a semantically partitioned display (where each partition contained objects from a single category) as well as a purely visually partitioned display (where each partition contained a scrambled assortment of objects from different categories). Semantic partitions significantly improved location memory accuracy compared to the scrambled display. However, when the correct partition was cued (highlighted) to participants during recall, performance on the semantically partitioned display was similar to the scrambled display. These results suggest that semantic partitions largely benefit memory for location by enhancing the ability to use the given category as a cue for a visually partitioned area (e.g., toys - top left). Our results demonstrate that semantically structured spaces help location memory across partitions, but not items within a partition, providing new insights into the interaction between meaning and memory.

Productions Need Not Match Study Items to Confer a Production Advantage, But It Helps.

The production effect is the finding that, relative to silent reading, producing information at study (e.g., reading aloud) leads to a benefit in memory. In most studies of this effect, individuals are presented with a set of unique items, and they produce a subset of these items (e.g., they are presented with the to-be-remembered target item TABLE and produce table) such that the production is both unique and representative of the target. Across two preregistered experiments, we examined the influence of a production that is unique but that does not match the target (e.g., producing fence to the target TABLE, producing car to the target TREE, and so on). This kind of production also yielded a significant effect-the mismatching production effect-although it was smaller than the standard production effect (i.e., when productions are both unique and representative of their targets) and was detectable only when targets with standard productions were included in the same study phase (i.e., when the type of production was manipulated within participant). We suggest that target-production matching is an important precursor to the production effect and that the kind of production that brings about a benefit depends on the other productions that are present.

Semantic partitioning facilitates memory for object location through category-partition cueing.

In our lived environments, objects are often semantically organised (e.g., cookware and cutlery are placed close together in the kitchen). Across four experiments, we examined how semantic partitions (that group same-category objects in space) influenced memory for object locations. Participants learned the locations of items in a semantically partitioned display (where each partition contained objects from a single category) as well as a purely visually partitioned display (where each partition contained a scrambled assortment of objects from different categories). Semantic partitions significantly improved location memory accuracy compared to the scrambled display. However, when the correct partition was cued (highlighted) to participants during recall, performance on the semantically partitioned display was similar to the scrambled display. These results suggest that semantic partitions largely benefit memory for location by enhancing the ability to use the given category as a cue for a visually partitioned area (e.g., toys - top left). Our results demonstrate that semantically structured spaces help location memory across partitions, but not items within a partition, providing new insights into the interaction between meaning and memory.

Dissociations between data-driven and goal-driven effort reports: Performance, metacognition, and affect.

Measuring effort has long been a challenge and this seems particularly true in the case of subjective effort. Koriat et al. compared two types of effort frames, what they call data-driven effort, the amount of effort perceived to be required by a task, and goal-driven effort, the amount of effort one chooses to invest in a task. This study investigates whether self-reports of data- and goal-driven effort are differentially associated with test performance, metacognition, and affect in a complex learning task. Results demonstrate that data- and goal-driven effort have qualitatively different relations with many of these variables. For example, partial correlations revealed data-driven effort was negatively associated with prospective and retrospective performance estimates, but the opposite pattern emerged for goal-driven effort. These results demonstrate that how subjective measures of effort are framed (and interpreted by the respondent) can drastically influence how they relate to other variables of interest.

The prod eff: Partially producing items moderates the production effect.

Current accounts of the production effect suggest that production leads to the encoding of additional production-associated features and/or better feature encoding. Thus, if it is the act of production that leads to the storage and/or enhanced encoding of these features, then less of this act should reduce the resulting production effect. In two experiments, we provide a direct test of this idea by manipulating how much of a given item is produced within a single mode of production (typing). Results demonstrate that such partial production can yield a significant production effect that is smaller than the effect that emerges from producing the entire item. These results suggest that how much of an item is produced can moderate the size of the production effect and are considered in the context of recent modelling efforts.

Semantic relatedness can impair memory for item locations.

While memory for semantically related items is improved over unrelated items in many cases, relatedness can also lead to memory costs. Here we examined how the semantic relatedness of words within a display influenced memory for their locations. Participants learned the locations of words inside grid displays; the words in a given display were either from a single category or were from different assorted categories. When a display containing words from a single category was compared to a scrambled display containing words from multiple categories, location memory performance was rendered worse, while word recall performance was significantly improved. Our results suggest that semantically structured spaces can both help and harm memory within the context of a location memory task. We hypothesize that relatedness can improve memory performance by increasing the likelihood that matching candidates will be retrieved, yet might worsen performance that requires distinguishing between similar target representations.

Speeding lectures to make time for retrieval practice: Can we improve the efficiency of interpolated testing?

Testing is increasingly recognized as an important tool in learning. One form of testing often used in lectures, particularly recorded lectures, is interpolated testing wherein tests are interspersed throughout the lecture. Like testing in general, interpolated testing appears to benefit performance on content tests among other outcome variables (e.g., mind wandering). While beneficial, adding testing also increases instructional time. In the present investigation, we examine one strategy to mitigate the costs of this increase in instructional time in the context of recorded lectures. Specifically, we examine the interaction between increasing the playback speed of a recorded lecture and adding interpolated tests. Results demonstrate that the conjoint effects of these two interventions are largely additive. That is, the benefit of testing was as robust in a normal speed lecture and a lecture that was sped up 1.5×. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Response generation, not response execution, influences feelings of rightness in reasoning.

It has been argued that the experience of ease (i.e., the ability to quickly generate an initial response) during processing influences one's likelihood of engaging reflectively when reasoning. This is a key facet of Metacognitive Reasoning Theory (MRT) and numerous studies have found support for this claim by showing that answers that come to mind quickly, are associated with higher feelings of rightness (FORs), and less reflective processing. However, the possibility remains that the critical determinant of FORs may be the speed of executing a response and not generating a response, given the nature of the evidence for this claim. Across two experiments, we manipulated the duration of the response execution to identify whether participants' FOR judgements are at least partially based on factors occurring after the initial mental generation of an answer. We found no evidence that FORs nor reflection are influenced by a manipulation of response execution. Broadly, the present investigation provides evidence that the relation between speed of response and FORs is likely due to the speed with which an answer is generated internally, and not the response execution phase. These findings are consistent with Metacognitive Reasoning Theory and provide further support for the suggestion that answer fluency is the critical variable in determining FORs. All data, scripts, and materials can be found at https://osf.io/f48az/.

Study effort and the memory cost of external store availability.

Previous work demonstrates that individuals often recall less information if, at study, there is expectation that an external memory store will be available at test. One explanation for this effect is that when individuals can expect access to an external memory store, they forgo intentional, controlled efforts at encoding. The present work offers a novel test of this account by examining study effort, indexed by study time and self-reported strategy use, as a function of instructed external store availability. In two preregistered experiments, participants studied lists of to-be-remembered items for a free recall test and were either instructed that they could use their study list to support them at test or that they could not. Critically, participants controlled their own study time, and no participant had their study list at test, regardless of instruction. Consistent with the effort at encoding account, external store availability influenced both study time and strategy use, and there was evidence that these effects mediated the influence of external store availability on recall performance. Interestingly, much of the memory cost remained when controlling for study effort, thus, suggesting that the cost is potentially multiply determined.

On the influence of evaluation context on judgments of effort.

Cognitive effort is a central construct in our lives, yet our understanding of the processes underlying our judgments of effort are limited. Recent work has suggested that our judgments of effort are sensitive to the context in which they are made (i.e., the judgment context). Using a cognitive task and stimulus set that has produced a reliable dissociation between judgments of effort and cognitive demand (as measured by performance and other indirect measures of demand), we examined whether evaluation context might be able to eliminate this dissociation (i.e., bring judgments of effort more in line with measures of cognitive demand). To address this question, we conducted four experiments manipulating a number of aspects of the judgment context including, principally, a manipulation of joint versus separate evaluation; whether the judgment was prospective, or retrospective; and whether prospective judgments were made with or without having experienced the cognitive task. Additionally, we collected objective demand measures and examined participants' self-reported reasons for their judgments of effort across the joint and separate evaluation contexts. Results demonstrated that evaluation context has a marked effect on judgments of effort; however, no judgment context appeared to yield a pattern more similar to what is found using measures of cognitive demand. Moreover, the reasons individuals cited for their judgments varied across evaluation contexts. Implications of the present work for our understanding of judgments of effort are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The effect of external store reliance on actual and predicted value-directed remembering.

We often rely on external devices to store to-be-remembered information in our everyday lives (e.g., writing grocery lists, setting reminders), yet there is limited research about how certain information (i.e., valuable information) may be differentially encoded when we rely on our internal memory versus an external store. Across three preregistered experiments, we examined the effect of relying on an external store on the recall of high-value and low-value information. In Experiments 1a and 1b, we presented participants with words associated with point values and examined mean recall performance during two critical trials in which the external store was not available: (1) a trial in which participants were told that they would have access to an external memory store at test (told-external-store) and (2) a trial in which participants were told that they would not have access to their external store at test (told-no-external-store). In Experiment 2, we explored participants' metacognitive predictions of performance on the recall test. Critically, across all of the experiments, we found that the value effect (i.e., better recall for valuable information) was significantly reduced when individuals were told that they could rely on an external store. The same pattern was present in participant's metacognitive judgements. Together, these results suggest that when relying on external stores, individuals forgo (to some extent, at least) selective encoding by value and that individuals might be aware of this change in strategy.

Revisiting the influence of offloading memory on free recall.

Relying on external memory aids is a common memory strategy that has long allowed us to "remember" vast amounts of information more reliably than with our internal memory alone. However, recent work has provided evidence consistent with the idea that offloading memory demands encourages a reduced engagement in intentional or top-down memory strategies/efforts, leading to lower memory performance in general. Evidence for this view comes from results demonstrating a reduced primacy effect but intact recency and isolation effects when individuals could offload memory demands (but had to unexpectedly rely on their internal memory at test). In the present investigation, we attempt a replication of these critical results, given some inconsistencies in the findings between studies. In addition, we extend the examination of offloading's impact on memory via examining individual differences in reliance on the external store (when available) and different strategies for the use of that store. Results of the replication are generally consistent with previous research. An individual differences analysis yielded results consistent with the notion that increased reliance on an external store can compromise internal/biological memory in the absence of that store. Finally, a verbal model of offloading memory demands within a framework of effort and study time allocation is presented. Together, the results both reinforce extant research and extend it in new directions.

To organise or not to organise? Understanding search strategy preferences using Lego building blocks.

Humans routinely organise or reconfigure the environment as part of their everyday activities, such as placing a set of keys in a designated location to reduce the need to remember its location. This type of spatial organisation is widely thought to reduce both the physical and cognitive demands of a task to allow individuals to perform tasks more easily. Although spatial organisation can be a useful strategy when searching for items in the environment, individuals do not always choose to utilise these organisational strategies when carrying out everyday tasks. Across three experiments, we examined individuals' preference for spatial organisation in the context of a real-world search task, and the degree to which individuals engaged in time- and effort-based cost-benefit analysis to inform whether to choose between an organisation-based or non-organisation-based search strategy. We found that individuals' strategy preferences could be explained by the perceived task time associated with each strategy, but not perceived task effort. However, even statistically controlling for relative perceived task time or reported effort, participants showed a strong systematic preference against organisation prior to engaging in the task, and, post-task, a strong preference towards organisation. Implications for understanding individuals' use of spatial organisation are discussed.

On our susceptibility to external memory store manipulation: examining the influence of perceived reliability and expected access to an external store.

Offloading memory to external stores (e.g., a saved file) allows us to evade the limitations of our internal memory. One cost of this strategy is that the external memory store used may be accessible to others and, thus, may be manipulated. Here we examine how reducing the perceived reliability of an external memory store and manipulating one's expectation for future access to such a store can influence participants' susceptibility to its manipulation (i.e., endorsing manipulated information as authentic). Across three pre-registered experiments, participants were able to store to-be-remembered information in an external store. On a critical trial, we surreptitiously manipulated the information in that store. Results demonstrated that an explicit notification of a previous manipulation of that store and the warning that the store will be inaccessible in the future can decrease susceptibility to manipulation of that store. Results are discussed in the context of the metacognitive monitoring and control of memory reports in situations that involve the distribution of memory demands across both internal and external spaces.

The gist of it: offloading memory does not reduce the benefit of list categorisation.

When we can offload to-be-remembered information to an external store, our ability to recall that information from internal memory can be diminished. However, previous research has suggested that associative memory processes may remain intact in the face of offloading behaviour. In the present investigation, we examine how the opportunity to offload memory demands affects the learning of categorised word lists. Across six experiments, participants studied and wrote down word lists that were either strongly associated with a semantic theme (categorised) or word lists that consisted of the same set of words but shuffled across the categorised lists (shuffled). When participants expected to have access to their written lists during the recall test (i.e., a condition that would encourage offloading) but were not given access to it, we found the typical recall advantage for categorised lists. This effect was found to be the same size or larger compared to a condition where participants did not expect to have access to their written lists during the recall test (i.e., a condition that would not allow offloading). We propose that gist memory supported by semantic associations is not substantially reduced in offloading.

Attention spreads between students in a learning environment.

We propose a novel phenomenon, attention contagion, defined as the spread of attentive (or inattentive) states among members of a group. We examined attention contagion in a learning environment in which pairs of undergraduate students watched a lecture video. Each pair consisted of a participant and a confederate trained to exhibit attentive behaviors (e.g., leaning forward) or inattentive behaviors (e.g., slouching). In Experiment 1, confederates sat in front of participants and could be seen. Relative to participants who watched the lecture with an inattentive confederate, participants with an attentive confederate: (a) self-reported higher levels of attentiveness, (b) behaved more attentively (e.g., took more notes), and (c) had better memory for lecture content. In Experiment 2, confederates sat behind participants. Despite confederates not being visible, participants were still aware of whether confederates were acting attentively or inattentively, and participants were still susceptible to attention contagion. Our findings suggest that distraction is one factor that contributes to the spread of inattentiveness (Experiment 1), but this phenomenon apparently can still occur in the absence of distraction (Experiment 2). We propose an account of how (in)attentiveness spreads across students and discuss practical implications regarding how learning is affected in the classroom. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Judgements of effort as a function of post-trial versus post-task elicitation.

Cognitive effort is a central construct in our lives, yet our understanding of the processes underlying our perception of effort is limited. Performance is typically used as one way to assess effort in cognitive tasks (e.g., tasks that take longer are generally thought to be more effortful); however, Dunn and Risko reported a recent case where such "objective" measures of effort were dissociated from judgements of effort (i.e., subjective effort). This dissociation occurred when participants either made their judgements of effort after the task (i.e., reading stimuli composed of rotated words) or without ever performing the task. This leaves open the possibility that if participants made their judgements of effort more proximal to the actual experience of performing the task (e.g., right after a given trial) that these judgements might better correspond to putatively "objective" measures of effort. To address this question, we conducted two experiments replicating Dunn and Risko with additional probes for post-trial judgements of effort (i.e., a judgement of effort made right after each trial). Results provided some support for the notion that judgements of effort more closely follow reading times when made post-trial as opposed to post-task. Implications of the present work for our understanding of judgements of effort are discussed.

'You can't bullshit a bullshitter' (or can you?): Bullshitting frequency predicts receptivity to various types of misleading information.

Research into both receptivity to falling for bullshit and the propensity to produce it have recently emerged as active, independent areas of inquiry into the spread of misleading information. However, it remains unclear whether those who frequently produce bullshit are inoculated from its influence. For example, both bullshit receptivity and bullshitting frequency are negatively related to cognitive ability and aspects of analytic thinking style, suggesting that those who frequently engage in bullshitting may be more likely to fall for bullshit. However, separate research suggests that individuals who frequently engage in deception are better at detecting it, thus leading to the possibility that frequent bullshitters may be less likely to fall for bullshit. Here, we present three studies (N = 826) attempting to distinguish between these competing hypotheses, finding that frequency of persuasive bullshitting (i.e., bullshitting intended to impress or persuade others) positively predicts susceptibility to various types of misleading information and that this association is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style.

The Bullshitting Frequency Scale: Development and psychometric properties.

Recent psychological research has identified important individual differences associated with receptivity to bullshit, which has greatly enhanced our understanding of the processes behind susceptibility to pseudo-profound or otherwise misleading information. However, the bulk of this research attention has focused on cognitive and dispositional factors related to bullshit (the product), while largely overlooking the influences behind bullshitting (the act). Here, we present results from four studies focusing on the construction and validation of a new, reliable scale measuring the frequency with which individuals engage in two types of bullshitting (persuasive and evasive) in everyday situations. Overall, bullshitting frequency was negatively associated with sincerity, honesty, cognitive ability, open-minded cognition, and self-regard. Additionally, the Bullshitting Frequency Scale was found to reliably measure constructs that are (1) distinct from lying and (2) significantly related to performance on overclaiming and social decision tasks. These results represent an important step forward by demonstrating the utility of the Bullshitting Frequency Scale as well as highlighting certain individual differences that may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in everyday bullshitting.

The role of cognitive load in modulating social looking: a mobile eye tracking study.

The effect of cognitive load on social attention was examined across three experiments in a live pedestrian passing scenario (Experiments 1 and 2) and with the same scenario presented as a video (Experiment 3). In all three experiments, the load was manipulated using an auditory 2-back task. While the participant was wearing a mobile eye-tracker, the participant's fixation behavior toward a confederate was recorded and analyzed based on temporal proximity from the confederate (near or far) and the specific regions of the confederate being observed (i.e., head or body). In Experiment 1 we demonstrated an effect of cognitive load such that there was a lower proportion of fixations and time spent fixating toward the confederate in the load condition. A similar pattern of results was found in Experiment 2 when a within-subject design was used. In Experiment 3, which employed a less authentic social situation (i.e., video), a similar effect of cognitive load was observed. Collectively, these results suggest attentional resources play a central role in social attentional behaviors in both authentic (real-world) and less authentic (video recorded) situations.