Psychiatry as a vocation: Moral injury, COVID-19, and the phenomenology of clinical practice.

In this article, we focus on a particular kind of emotional impact of the pandemic, namely the phenomenology of the experience of moral injury in healthcare professionals. Drawing on Weber's reflections in his lecture Politics as a Vocation and data from the Experiences of Social Distancing during the COVID-19 Pandemic Survey, we analyse responses from healthcare professionals which show the experiences of burnout, sense of frustration and impotence, and how these affect clinicians' emotional state. We argue that this may relate to the ethical conflicts they experience when they are forced to make clinical decisions where there are no optimal outcomes, and how in turn that impacts on their own emotional state. We then further examine the notion of 'burnout' and the phenomenology of 'moral injury'. Our argument is that these experiences of moral injury across a range of clinicians during the pandemic may be more prevalent and long-standing in psychiatry and mental health than in other areas of healthcare, where ethically difficult decisions and resource constraints are common outside times of crisis. Hence, in these clinical arenas, moral injury and the phenomenology of emotional changes may be independent of the pandemic. The insights gained during the pandemic may provide wider insights into the challenges of developing services and training the workforce to provide appropriate mental health care.

Understanding the Mechanisms of Cognitive Remediation on Recovery in People With Early Psychosis: A Mediation and Moderation Analysis.

BACKGROUND: To provide precision cognitive remediation therapy (CR) for schizophrenia, we need to understand whether the mechanism for improved functioning is via cognition improvements. This mechanism has not been rigorously tested for potential moderator effects. STUDY DESIGN: We used data (n = 377) from a randomized controlled trial using CIRCuiTS, a therapist-supported CR, with participants from first-episode psychosis services. We applied structured equation modeling to test whether: (1) CR hours explain the goal attainment functional outcome (GAS) at posttreatment, (2) global cognitive improvement mediates GAS, and if (3) total symptoms moderate the CR hours to cognitive improvement pathway, and/or negative symptoms moderate the cognition to functioning pathway, testing moderator effects via the mediator or directly on CR hours to functioning path. STUDY RESULTS: CR produced significant functioning benefit for each therapy hour (Coeff = 0.203, 95% CI 0.101-0.304, P < .001). The mediated path from CR hours to cognition and cognition to functioning was small and nonsignificant (Coeff = 0.014, 95% CI = -0.010, 0.037, P = .256). Total symptoms did not moderate the path to cognition (P = .211) or the direct path to outcome (P = .896). However, negative symptoms significantly moderated the effect of cognitive improvements on functioning (P = .015) with high negative symptoms reducing the functional gains of improved cognition. CONCLUSIONS: Although cognitive improvements were correlated with functioning benefit, they did not fully explain the positive effect of increased therapy hours on functioning, suggesting additional CR factors also contribute to therapy benefit. Negative symptoms interfere with the translation of cognitive improvements into functional gains so need consideration.

Satisfaction with cognitive remediation therapy: its effects on implementation and outcomes using the cognitive remediation satisfaction scale.

Cognitive Remediation (CR) improves cognition and functioning but is implemented in a variety of ways (independent, group and one-to-one). There is no information on whether service users find these implementation methods acceptable or if their satisfaction influences CR outcomes. We used mixed participatory methods, including focus groups, to co-develop a CR satisfaction scale. This was refined using three psychometric criteria (Cronbach's alpha, item discrimination, test-retest agreement) to select items. Factor analysis explored potential substructures. The refined measure was used in structural equation joint modelling to evaluate whether satisfaction with CR is affected by implementation method and treatment engagement or influences recovery outcome, using data from a randomised controlled trial. Four themes (therapy hours, therapist, treatment effects, computer use) generated a 31-item Cognitive Remediation Satisfaction scale (CRS) that reduced to 18 Likert items, 2 binary and 2 open-ended questions following psychometric assessment. CRS had good internal consistency (Alpha = 0.814), test-retest reliability (r= 0.763), and concurrent validity using the Working Alliance Inventory (r = 0.56). A 2-factor solution divided items into therapy engagement and therapy effects. Satisfaction was not related to implementation method but was significantly associated with CR engagement. Therapy hours were significantly associated with recovery, but there was no direct effect of satisfaction on outcome. Although satisfaction is important to therapy engagement, it has no direct effect on outcome. CR therapy hours directly affect outcome irrespective of which implementation model is used, so measuring satisfaction early might help to identify those who are likely to disengage. The study has mixed methods design.

Cognitive Remediation Works But How Should We Provide It? An Adaptive Randomized Controlled Trial of Delivery Methods Using a Patient Nominated Recovery Outcome in First-Episode Participants.

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS: Cognitive remediation (CR) benefits cognition and functioning in psychosis but we do not know the optimal level of therapist contact, so we evaluated the potential benefits of different CR modes. STUDY DESIGN: A multi-arm, multi-center, single-blinded, adaptive trial of therapist-supported CR. Participants from 11 NHS early intervention psychosis services were independently randomized to Independent, Group, One-to-One, or Treatment-as-usual (TAU). The primary outcome was functional recovery (Goal Attainment Scale [GAS]) at 15-weeks post randomization. Independent and TAU arms were closed after an interim analysis, and three informative contrasts tested (Group vs One-to-One, Independent vs TAU, Group + One-to-One vs TAU). Health economic analyses considered the cost per Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY). All analyses used intention-to-treat principles. STUDY RESULTS: We analyzed 377 participants (65 Independent, 134 Group, 112 One-to-One, 66 TAU). GAS did not differ for Group vs One-to-One: Cohen's d: 0.07, -0.25 to 0.40 95% CI, P = .655; Independent vs TAU: Cohen's d: 0.07, -0.41 to 0.55 95% CI, P = .777. GAS and the cognitive score improved for Group + One-to-One vs TAU favoring CR (GAS: Cohen's d: 0.57, 0.19-0.96 95% CI, P = .003; Cognitive score: Cohens d: 0.28, 0.07-0.48 95% CI, P = .008). The QALY costs were £4306 for Group vs TAU and £3170 for One-to-One vs TAU. Adverse events did not differ between treatment methods and no serious adverse events were related to treatment. CONCLUSIONS: Both active therapist methods provided cost-effective treatment benefiting functional recovery in early psychosis and should be adopted within services. Some individuals benefited more than others so needs further investigation. TRIAL REGISTRATION: ISRCTN14678860 https://doi.org/10.1186/ISRCTN14678860Now closed.

Do delusions have and give meaning?

Delusions are often portrayed as paradigmatic instances of incomprehensibility and meaninglessness. Here we investigate the relationship between delusions and meaning from a philosophical perspective, integrating arguments and evidence from cognitive psychology and phenomenological psychopathology. We review some of the empirical and philosophical literature relevant to two claims about delusions and meaning: (1) delusions are meaningful, despite being described as irrational and implausible beliefs; (2) some delusions can also enhance the sense that one's life is meaningful, supporting agency and creativity in some circumstances. Delusions are not incomprehensible representations of reality. Rather, they can help make sense of one's unusual experiences and in some circumstances even support one's endeavours, albeit temporarily and imperfectly. Acknowledging that delusions have meaning and can also give meaning to people's lives has implications for our understanding of psychotic symptoms and for addressing the stigma associated with psychiatric conditions.

Subjective experience and meaning of delusions in psychosis: a systematic review and qualitative evidence synthesis.

BACKGROUND: Delusions are a common transdiagnostic feature of psychotic disorders, and their treatment remains suboptimal. Despite the pressing need to better understand the nature, meaning, and course of these symptoms, research into the lived experience of delusional phenomena in psychosis is scarce. Thus, we aimed to explore the lived experience and subjective apprehension of delusions in help-seeking individuals with psychosis, regardless of diagnosis and thematic content of the delusion. METHODS: In our systematic review and qualitative evidence synthesis, we searched MEDLINE, Embase, PsycINFO, CINAHL, and Web of Science for qualitative studies published in English from database inception, with the last search on Sept 9, 2021. Grey literature search and hand-searching of relevant journals were also done. Studies were eligible if they provided an analysis of lived experience of delusions or predelusional phenomena presented from the perspective of individuals (age 14-65 years) who had developed a clinical high-risk stage of psychosis, or a diagnosable affective or non-affective psychotic disorder (as clinically defined, self-reported, or assessed within the primary study). Studies with only a subset of relevant participants were eligible only if data for the population of interest were reported separately. Studies that did not discriminate between the experience of delusion and other positive symptoms (eg, hallucinations) were included only if data for delusions were reported separately or could be extracted. First-person accounts (and author interpretations) discussing changes in the sense of self, lived world, and meaning in relation to delusions were extracted and synthesised using a novel thematic synthesis approach informed by a critical realist stance and a phenomenological theoretical framework. Analytic themes were developed into a new overarching framework for understanding the emergence of delusional phenomena. The study was registered with PROSPERO, CRD42020222104. FINDINGS: Of the 3265 records screened, 2115 were identified after duplicate removal. Of these, 1982 were excluded after title and abstract screening and 106 after full-text eligibility assessment. Of the 27 studies entering quality assessment, 24 eligible studies were included in the qualitative evidence synthesis, representing the perspectives of 373 help-seeking individuals with lived experience of delusions in the context of psychosis. Gender was reported as male (n=210), female (n=110), transgender (n=1), or not reported (n=52). Only 13 studies reported ethnicity, with White being predominant. The age of most participants ranged from 15 to 65 years. We found no eligible studies investigating subclinical or predelusional experiences in at-risk mental state populations through qualitative methods. Most studies were undertaken in western, educated, industrialised, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and most included participants had received or self-reported a diagnosis within the schizophrenia spectrum. Studies differed in relation to whether they focused on one kind or theme of delusion or delusional phenomena more generally as a unified category. Three superordinate themes relating to experiential changes and meanings in delusion were identified: (1) a radical rearrangement of the lived world dominated by intense emotions; (2) doubting, losing, and finding oneself again within delusional realities; and (3) searching for meaning, belonging, and coherence beyond mere dysfunction. Based on the review findings and thematic synthesis, we propose the Emergence Model of Delusion to advance understanding of delusional phenomena in psychosis. INTERPRETATION: Delusions are best understood as strongly individualised and inherently complex phenomena emerging from a dynamic interplay between interdependent subpersonal, personal, interpersonal, and sociocultural processes. Integrative approaches to research on delusion, which consider their potential adaptiveness and favour explanatory pluralism, might be advantageous. Effective clinical care for individuals with psychosis might need adapting to match more closely, and take account of, the subjective experience and meaning of delusions as they are lived through, which might also help redress power imbalances and enduring epistemic injustices in mental health. FUNDING: Priestley Scholars, Wellcome Trust.

Finding order within the disorder: a case study exploring the meaningfulness of delusions.

Can delusions, in the context of psychosis, enhance a person's sense of meaningfulness? The case described here suggests that, in some circumstances, they can. This prompts further questions into the complexities of delusion as a lived phenomenon, with important implications for the clinical encounter. While assumptions of meaninglessness are often associated with concepts of 'disorder', 'harm' and 'dysfunction', we suggest that meaning can nonetheless be found within what is commonly taken to be incomprehensible or even meaningless. A phenomenological and value-based approach appears indispensable for clinicians facing the seemingly paradoxical coexistence of harmfulness and meaningfulness.